Criminal Prohibitions on the Publication of Classified Defense Information

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Summary

The recent online publication of classified defense documents and diplomatic cables by the organization WikiLeaks and subsequent reporting by the *New York Times* and other news media have focused attention on whether such publication violates U.S. criminal law. The Attorney General has reportedly stated that the Justice Department and Department of Defense are investigating the circumstances to determine whether any prosecutions will be undertaken in connection with the disclosure.

This report identifies some criminal statutes that may apply, but notes that these have been used almost exclusively to prosecute individuals with access to classified information (and a corresponding obligation to protect it) who make it available to foreign agents, or to foreign agents who obtain classified information unlawfully while present in the United States. Leaks of classified information to the press have only rarely been punished as crimes, and we are aware of no case in which a publisher of information obtained through unauthorized disclosure by a government employee has been prosecuted for publishing it. There may be First Amendment implications that would make such a prosecution difficult, not to mention political ramifications based on concerns about government censorship. To the extent that the investigation implicates any foreign nationals whose conduct occurred entirely overseas, any resulting prosecution may carry foreign policy implications related to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and whether suspected persons may be extradited to the United States under applicable treaty provisions.

This report will discuss the statutory prohibitions that may be implicated, including the Espionage Act; the extraterritorial application of such statutes; and the First Amendment implications related to such prosecutions against domestic or foreign media organizations and associated individuals. The report will also provide a summary of pending legislation relevant to the issue, including S. 4004.
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The recent online publication of classified defense documents and diplomatic cables by the organization WikiLeaks and subsequent reporting by the New York Times, the Guardian (UK), and Der Spiegel (Germany) have focused attention on whether such publication violates U.S. criminal law. The Attorney General has reportedly stated that the Justice Department and Department of Defense are investigating the circumstances to determine whether any prosecutions will be undertaken in connection with the disclosure, but has not released sufficient factual findings to permit a full legal analysis. Accordingly, the following discussion will provide a general overview of the relevant law as it may apply to pertinent allegations reported in the media, assuming them to be true. The discussion should not be interpreted to confirm the truth of any allegations or establish that a particular statute has been violated.

Background

WikiLeaks.org describes itself as a “public service designed to protect whistle-blowers, journalists and activists who have sensitive materials to communicate to the public.” Arguing that “[p]rincipled leaking has changed the course of history for the better,” it states that its purpose is to promote transparency in government and fight corporate fraud by publishing information governments or corporations would prefer to keep secret, obtained from sources in person, by means of postal drops, and by using “cutting-edge cryptographic technologies” to receive material electronically. The organization promises contributors that their anonymity will be protected.

According to press reports, WikiLeaks obtained more than 91,000 secret U.S. military reports related to the war in Afghanistan and posted the majority of them, unredacted, on its website in late July, 2010, after first alerting the New York Times and two foreign newspapers, the Guardian (London) and Der Spiegel (Germany), about the pending disclosure. Military officials have reportedly said they suspect an Army private, Bradley Manning, of having leaked the documents to WikiLeaks. Private Manning, a U.S. citizen, was already in military custody under suspicion of having provided WikiLeaks with video footage of an airstrike that resulted in the deaths of civilians. U.S. officials have condemned the leaks, predicting that the information disclosed could lead to the loss of lives of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and Afghan citizens who have been injured or killed.

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3 Id.
4 The New York Times published a series of articles under the headline “The War Logs,” which is available online at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/world/war-logs.html. The Times describes the leaked material as an archive covering six years of incident reports and intelligence documents—“usually spare summaries but sometimes detailed narratives”—that “illustrate[s] in mosaic detail why” the military effort in Afghanistan has not weakened the Taliban. C. J. Chivers et al., The Afghan Struggle: A Secret Archive, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010, at 1. The German periodical Der Spiegel published a series of articles under the topic “Afghanistan Protocol,” which is available (in English) online at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,708314,00.html. The Guardian (UK) published a series entitled “Afghanistan: The War Logs,” which is available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/the-war-logs.
6 Id.
provided them assistance. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates informed Members of Congress that a preliminary review of the disclosed information by the Defense Department found that no sensitive information related to intelligence sources or methods was made public, but reiterated that the release of Afghan informants’ names could have “potentially dramatic and grievously harmful consequences.” WikiLeaks subsequently released some 400,000 documents related to the war in Iraq, this time with names of informants apparently redacted.

In late November, 2010, WikiLeaks began publishing what the New York Times calls a “mammoth cache of a quarter-million confidential American diplomatic cables,” dated for the most part within the last three years. WikiLeaks.org posted 220 cables on November 28, 2010, as a first installment, some of which documents were redacted to protect diplomatic sources. The most recent documents in the collection are reportedly dated February 2010.

The United States government was aware of the impending disclosure, although not apparently directly informed by the web-based anti-secrecy organization (or given access to the documents to be released), although WikiLeaks Editor in Chief Julian Assange offered in a letter sent to the U.S. ambassador to the U.K., Louis Susman, to consider any U.S. requests to protect specific information that the government believes could, if published, put any individuals at significant risk of harm. The State Department Legal Adviser responded in a letter to Mr. Assange’s attorney that the publication of classified materials violates U.S. law, that the United States will not negotiate with WikiLeaks with respect to the publication of illegally obtained classified documents, and that WikiLeaks should cease these activities and return all documents, as well as delete any classified U.S. government material in its possession from its databases. Mr. Assange responded by accusing the United States of adopting a confrontational stance and indicating an intent to continue publishing the materials, subject to the checks WikiLeaks and its media partners planned to implement to reduce any risk to individuals.

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12 Scott Shane and Andrew W. Lehren, Cables Obtained by WikiLeaks Shine Light Into Secret Diplomatic Channels, NY TIMES.
After learning the classified cables were to be published, the Defense Department notified the U.S. Senate and House Armed Services Committees in general terms about what to expect.\textsuperscript{16} Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs Elizabeth King explained that “State Department cables by their nature contain everyday analysis and candid assessments that any government engages in as part of effective foreign relations,” and predicted that the publication of the classified cables, which she described as intended to “wreak havoc and destabilize global security,” could potentially jeopardize lives.\textsuperscript{17} State Department spokesman Philip J. Crowley told \textit{Bloomberg} that the State Department is “assessing the possible impact on our on-going diplomatic activity and notifying both Congress and other governments what may occur.”\textsuperscript{18} The White House issued a statement condemning the activities of WikiLeaks\textsuperscript{19} and ordered all agencies to conduct reviews of their information security policies and programs.\textsuperscript{20}

The publication of the leaked documents by WikiLeaks and the subsequent reporting of information contained therein raise questions with respect to the possibility of bringing criminal charges for the dissemination of materials by media organizations following an unauthorized disclosure, in particular when done by non-U.S. nationals overseas. This report will discuss the statutory prohibitions that may be implicated; the extraterritorial application of such statutes; and the First Amendment implications related to such prosecutions against domestic or foreign media organizations and associated individuals.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Id}.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Id}.


> We anticipate the release of what are claimed to be several hundred thousand classified State department cables on Sunday night that detail private diplomatic discussions with foreign governments. By its very nature, field reporting to Washington is candid and often incomplete information. It is not an expression of policy, nor does it always shape final policy decisions. Nevertheless, these cables could compromise private discussions with foreign governments and opposition leaders, and when the substance of private conversations is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world, it can deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world. To be clear—such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world who come to the United States for assistance in promoting democracy and open government. These documents also may include named individuals who in many cases live and work under oppressive regimes and who are trying to create more open and free societies. President Obama supports responsible, accountable, and open government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and classified documents, Wikileaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information.

Statutory Protection of Classified Information

While there is no one statute that criminalizes the unauthorized disclosure of any classified information, a patchwork of statutes exists to protect information depending upon its nature, the identity of the discloser and of those to whom it was disclosed, and the means by which it was obtained. It seems likely that most of the information disclosed by WikiLeaks that was obtained from Department of Defense databases falls under the general rubric of information related to the national defense. The diplomatic cables obtained from State Department channels may also contain information relating to the national defense and thus be covered under the Espionage Act, but otherwise its disclosure by persons who are not government employees does not appear to be directly proscribed. It is possible that some of the government information disclosed in any of the three releases does not fall under the express protection of any statute, despite its classified status.

The Espionage Act

National defense information in general is protected by the Espionage Act, 21 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–798, while other types of relevant information are covered elsewhere. Some provisions apply only to government employees or others who have authorized access to sensitive government information, 22 but the following provisions apply to all persons. 18 U.S.C. § 793 prohibits the gathering, transmitting, or receipt of defense information with the intent or reason to believe the information will be used against the United States or to the benefit of a foreign nation. Violators are subject to a fine or up to 10 years imprisonment, or both, 23 as are those who conspire to violate the statute. 24 Persons who possess defense information that they have reason to know

21 Act of October 6, 1917, ch. 106, § 10(i), 40 Stat. 422.
22 E.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 952 (prohibiting disclosure of diplomatic codes and correspondence), 1924 (unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents or material); 50 U.S.C. § 783 (unauthorized disclosure of classified information to an agent of a foreign government, unauthorized receipt by foreign government official) This report does not address such prohibitions, nor prohibitions that apply to military personnel under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
23 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)-(c) provides:
   (a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, [etc.], or any prohibited place so designated by the President by proclamation in time of war or in case of national emergency in which anything for the use of the Army, Navy, or Air Force is being prepared or constructed or stored, information as to which prohibited place the President has determined would be prejudicial to the national defense; or
   (b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe, copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts to copy, take, make, or obtain any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense; or
   (c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any [protected thing] connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe ... that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this chapter [18 U.S.C. §§ 792 et seq.].
24 18 U.S.C. § 793(g) provides:
   If two or more persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this section, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such conspiracy.
could be used to harm the national security, whether the access is authorized or unauthorized, and who disclose that information to any person not entitled to receive it, or who fail to surrender the information to an officer of the United States, are subject to the same penalty. Although it is not necessary that the information be classified by a government agency, the courts seem to give deference to the executive determination of what constitutes “defense information.” Information that is made available by the government to the public is not covered under the prohibition, however, because public availability of such information negates the bad-faith intent requirement. On the other hand, classified documents remain within the ambit of the statute even if information contained therein is made public by an unauthorized leak.

18 U.S.C. § 794 (aiding foreign governments or communicating information to an enemy in time of war) covers “classic spying” cases, providing for imprisonment for any term of years or life, or under certain circumstances, the death penalty. The provision penalizes anyone who transmits defense information to a foreign government (or foreign political or military party) with the intent or reason to believe it will be used against the United States. It also prohibits attempts to elicit...
information related to the public defense “which might be useful to the enemy.” The death penalty is available only upon a finding that the offense resulted in the death of a covert agent or directly concerns nuclear weapons or other particularly sensitive types of information. The death penalty is also available under § 794 for violators who gather, transmit or publish information related to military plans or operations and the like during time of war, with the intent that the information reach the enemy. These penalties are available to punish any person who participates in a conspiracy to violate the statute. Offenders are also subject to forfeiture of any ill-gotten gains and property used to facilitate the offense.

The unauthorized creation, publication, sale or transfer of photographs or sketches of vital defense installations or equipment as designated by the President is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. §§ 795 and 797. Violators are subject to fine or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

The knowing and willful disclosure of certain classified information is punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 798 by fine and/or imprisonment for not more than 10 years. To incur a penalty, the

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31 § 794(b) provides:
(b) Whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, or communicates, or attempts to elicit any information with respect to
the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the Armed Forces, ships,
aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed
plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures
undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any
other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be
punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.

32 During time of war, any individual who communicates intelligence or any other information to the enemy may be
prosecuted by the military for aiding the enemy under Article 104 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),
and if convicted, punished by “death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct.”


34 § 795. Photographing and sketching defense installations
(a) Whenever, in the interests of national defense, the President defines certain vital military and
naval installations or equipment as requiring protection against the general dissemination of
information relative thereto, it shall be unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing,
map, or graphical representation of such vital military and naval installations or equipment without
first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the military or naval post, camp, or station,
or naval vessels, military and naval aircraft, and any separate military or naval command
concerned, or higher authority, and promptly submitting the product obtained to such commanding
officer or higher authority for censorship or such other action as he may deem necessary.

35 § 798. Disclosure of classified information
(a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes
available to an unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety
or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the
United States any classified information—
disclosure must be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United States or work to the benefit of any foreign government and to the detriment of the United States. The provision applies only to information related to cryptographic systems or communications intelligence that is specially designated by a U.S. government agency for “limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.”

Other Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) punishes the willful retention, communication, or transmission, etc., of classified information retrieved by means of knowing any computer without (or in excess of) authorization, with reason to believe that such information “could be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” Receipt of information procured in violation of the statute is not addressed, but depending on the specific facts surrounding the unauthorized access, criminal culpability might be asserted against persons who did not themselves access a government computer as conspirators, aiders and abettors, or accessories after the fact. The provision imposes a fine or imprisonment for not more than 10 years, or both, in the case of a first offense or attempted violation. Repeat offenses or attempts can incur a prison sentence of up to 20 years.

18 U.S.C. § 641 punishes the theft or conversion of government property or records for one’s own use or the use of another. While this section does not explicitly prohibit disclosure of classified information, it has been used to prosecute “leakers.” Violators may be fined, imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both, unless the value of the property does not exceed the sum of $100, in which case the maximum prison term is one year. The statute also covers knowing receipt or retention of stolen or converted property with the intent to convert it to the recipient’s own use. It does not appear to have been used to prosecute any recipients of classified information even where the original discloser was charged under the statute.

(continued)

(1) concerning the nature, preparation, or use of any code, cipher, or cryptographic system of the United States or any foreign government; or

(2) concerning the design, construction, use, maintenance, or repair of any device, apparatus, or appliance used or prepared or planned for use by the United States or any foreign government for cryptographic or communication intelligence purposes; or

(3) concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government; or

(4) obtained by the processes of communication intelligence from the communications of any foreign government, knowing the same to have been obtained by such processes—

Shall be fined … or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

37 For more information about conspiracy law, see CRS Report R41223, Federal Conspiracy Law: A Brief Overview, by Charles Doyle.
38 See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988)(photographs and reports were tangible property of the government); United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1991)(“information is a species of property and a thing of value” such that “conversion and conveyance of governmental information can violate § 641,” citing United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680-82 (6th Cir. 1985)); United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1979). The statute was used to prosecute a DEA official for leaking unclassified but restricted documents pertinent to an agency investigation. See Dan Eggen, If the Secret’s Spilled, Calling Leaker to Account Isn’t Easy, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2003, at A5 (reporting prosecution of Jonathan Randel under conversion statute for leaking government documents to journalist).
50 U.S.C. § 421 provides for the protection of information concerning the identity of covert intelligence agents. It generally covers persons authorized to know the identity of such agents, but can also apply to a person who learns of the identity of a covert agent through a “pattern of activities intended to identify and expose covert agents” and discloses the identity to any individual not authorized access to classified information, with reason to believe that such activities would impair U.S. foreign intelligence efforts. This crime is subject to a fine or imprisonment for a term of not more than three years. To be convicted, a violator must have knowledge that the information identifies a covert agent whose identity the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal. To date, there have been no reported cases interpreting the statute, but it did result in one conviction pursuant to a guilty plea.

There appears to be no statute that generally proscribes the acquisition or publication of diplomatic cables, although government employees who disclose such information without proper authority may be subject to prosecution. 18 U.S.C. § 952 punishes employees of the United States who, without authorization, willfully publish or furnish to another any official diplomatic code or material prepared in such a code, by imposing a fine, a prison sentence (up to 10 years), or both. The same punishment applies for materials “obtained while in the process of transmission between any foreign government and its diplomatic mission in the United States,” but not, apparently, materials obtained during transmission from U.S. diplomatic missions abroad to the State Department or vice versa (unless the material was or purports to have been prepared using an official diplomatic code – it is unclear whether messages that are encrypted for transmission are covered).

Analysis

In light of the foregoing, it seems that there is ample statutory authority for prosecuting individuals who elicit or disseminate most of the documents at issue, as long as the intent element can be satisfied and potential damage to national security can be demonstrated. There is some authority, however, for interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 793, which prohibits the communication,

39 The Intelligence Identities and Protection Act of 1982, codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 421-26. For more information, see CRS Report RS21636, Intelligence Identities Protection Act, by Elizabeth B. Bazan. The term “covert agent” is defined to include a non-U.S. citizen “whose past or present intelligence relationship to the United States is classified information and who is a present or former agent of, or a present or former informant or source of operational assistance to, an intelligence agency.” 50 U.S.C. § 426(4)(c). “Intelligence agency” is defined to include a “foreign intelligence component of the Department of Defense”; informant means “any individual who furnishes information to an intelligence agency in the course of a confidential relationship.” 50 U.S.C. § 426(5-6). The definitions suggest that the act is intended to protect the identities of persons who provide intelligence information directly to a military counterintelligence unit, but perhaps they can be read to cover those who provide information to military personnel carrying out other functions who provide situation reports intended to reach an intelligence component. In any event, the extraterritorial application of the statute is limited to U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. 50 U.S.C. § 424.

40 See Richard B. Schmitt, Rare Statute Figures in Rove Case, LA TIMES, July 15, 2005, at A15 (reporting 1985 conviction of Sharon Scranage, a clerk for the CIA in Ghana, for disclosing identities of covert agents).


42 It appears the intent element is satisfied by proof that the material was obtained or disclosed “with intent or reason to believe that the information is to be used [or could be used] to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794. This has been interpreted to require the prosecution to demonstrate a “bad purpose.” See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1071 (“An act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something that the law forbids. That is to say, with a bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.”). If any of the disclosed material involves communications intelligence as described in 18 U.S.C. § 798, the conduct must be undertaken knowingly and willfully to meet the intent threshold.
transmission, or delivery of protected information to anyone not entitled to possess it, to exclude the “publication” of material by the media.\textsuperscript{43} Publication is not expressly proscribed in 18 U.S.C. § 794(a), either, although it is possible that publishing covered information in the media could be construed as an “indirect” transmission of such information to a foreign party, as long as the intent that the information reach said party can be demonstrated.\textsuperscript{44} The death penalty is available under that subsection if the offense results in the identification and subsequent death of “an individual acting as an agent of the United States,”\textsuperscript{45} or the disclosure of information relating to certain other broadly defined defense matters. The word “publishes” does appear in 18 U.S.C. § 794(b), which applies to wartime disclosures of information related to the “public defense” that “might be useful to the enemy” and is in fact intended to be communicated to the enemy. The types of information covered seem to be limited to military plans and information about fortifications and the like, which may exclude data related to purely historical matters.

Moreover, the statutes described in the previous section have been used almost exclusively to prosecute individuals with access to classified information (and a corresponding obligation to protect it) who make it available to foreign agents, or to foreign agents who obtain classified information unlawfully while present in the United States. Leaks of classified information to the press have only rarely been punished as crimes, and we are aware of no case in which a publisher of information obtained through unauthorized disclosure by a government employee has been prosecuted for publishing it. There may be First Amendment implications that would make such a prosecution difficult, not to mention political ramifications based on concerns about government censorship. To the extent that the investigation implicates any foreign nationals whose conduct occurred entirely overseas, any resulting prosecution may carry foreign policy implications related to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction and whether suspected persons may be extradited to the United States under applicable treaty provisions.

Jurisdictional Reach of Relevant Statutes

The Espionage Act gives no express indication that it is intended to apply extraterritorially, but courts have not been reluctant to apply it to overseas conduct of Americans, in particular because Congress in 1961 eliminated a provision restricting the act to apply only “within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States and on the high seas, as well as within the United States.”\textsuperscript{46} This does not answer the question whether the act is intended to apply to foreigners

\textsuperscript{43} See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 721-22 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (rejecting government argument that term “communicate” should be read to include “publish,” based on conspicuous absence of the term “publish” in that section of the Espionage Act and legislative history demonstrating Congress had rejected an effort to reach publication).


outside the United States. Because espionage is recognized as a form of treason, which generally applies only to persons who owe allegiance to the United States, it might be supposed that Congress did not regard it as a crime that could be committed by aliens with no connection to the United States. However, the only court that appears to have addressed the question concluded otherwise. A district court judge held in 1985 that a citizen of East Germany could be prosecuted under §§ 793(b), 794(a) and 794(c) for having (1) unlawfully sought and obtained information regarding the U.S. national defense, (2) delivered that information to his own government, and (3) conspired to do so with the intent that the information be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of the German Democratic Republic, all of which offenses were committed within East Germany or in Mexico. The court rejected the defendant’s contention that construing the act to cover him would permit the prosecution of noncitizens “who might merely have reviewed defense documents supplied to them by their respective governments.” The court considered the scenario unlikely, stating:

Under the statutorily defined crimes of espionage in §§ 793 and 794, noncitizens would be subject to prosecution only if they actively sought out and obtained or delivered defense information to a foreign government or conspired to do so.

Under this construction, it is possible that noncitizens involved in publishing materials disclosed to them by another would be subject to prosecution only if it can be demonstrated that they took an active role in obtaining the information. The case was not appealed. The defendant, Dr. Alfred Zehe, pleaded guilty in February, 1985 and was sentenced to eight years in prison, but was traded as part of a “spy swap” with East Germany in June of that year.

Application of the Espionage Act to persons who do not hold a position of trust with the government, outside of the classic espionage scenario (in which an agent of a foreign government delivers damaging information to such hostile government), has been controversial. The only known case of that type involved two pro-Israel lobbyists in Washington, Steven J. Rosen and Keith Weissman, associated with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), who were indicted in 2005 for conspiracy to disclose national security secrets to unauthorized individuals, including Israeli officials, other AIPAC personnel, and a reporter for the Washington Post. Their part in the conspiracy amounted to receiving information from government employees with knowledge that the employees were not authorized to disclose it.

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47 See 70 AM. JUR. 2d Sedition, Subversive Activities and Treason § 15 (2005). Courts have not been persuaded that the Treason Clause of the Constitution requires the safeguards associated with treason apply also to similar crimes such as espionage or levying war against the United States. See id., United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952)(espionage); United States v. Rodriguez, 803 F.2d 318 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1986) (levying war).

48 Zehe at 198 (“Espionage against the United States, because it is a crime that by definition threatens this country’s security, can therefore be punished by Congress even if committed by a noncitizen outside the United States.”).

49 Id. at 199.

50 Id.


prosecution was criticized for effectively “criminalizing the exchange of information,” based in part on the government’s theory that the defendants were guilty of solicitation of classified information because they inquired into matters they knew their government informant was not permitted to discuss, something that many journalists consider to be an ordinary part of their job. Charges were eventually dropped, reportedly due to a judge’s ruling regarding the government’s burden of proving the requisite intent and concerns that classified information would have to be disclosed at trial.

**Extradition Issues**

Assuming that the Espionage Act does apply to foreign nationals for their conduct overseas, there may be several legal obstacles to the extradition of such a suspect to the United States to face charges under the statute, including the possibility that the crime constitutes a political offense for which extradition is unavailable. Extradition to or from the United States is almost exclusively a creature of treaty. The United States has extradition treaties with more than 100 countries, although there are many countries with which it does not. In addition to providing an explicit list of crimes for which extradition may be granted, most modern extradition treaties also identify various classes of offenses and situations for which extradition may or must be denied.

The “political offense” exception has been a common feature of extradition treaties for almost a century and a half, and the exception appears to be contained in every modern U.S. extradition treaty. A political offense may be characterized as a *pure political offense*, or one that is directed

54 Time to Call It Quits, WASH. POST, March 11, 2009 (editorial urging Attorney General to drop charges).


Is Congress prohibited from punishing those who attempt to acquire what they believe to be national-security documents, but which are actually fakes? To ask is to answer.

*Williams* at 304.

56 See Markon, supra footnote 52 (quoting Dana J. Boente, the acting U.S. attorney in Alexandria, VA, where the trial was scheduled to take place). The judge found the scienter requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 793 to require that the defendants must have reason to believe the communication of the information at issue “could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.” 445 F. Supp. 2d at 639. Moreover, the judge limited the definition of “information related to the national defense” to information that is “potentially damaging to the United States or ... useful to an enemy of the United States.” Id. (citing United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1084 (4th Cir. 1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring)) .

57 This section is contributed by Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney.

58 A current list of countries with which the United States has an extradition treaty is found in CRS Report 98-958, *Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties*, by Michael John Garcia and Charles Doyle, at Appendix A.

59 See, e.g., Australian Extradition Treaty, art. VII(1), entered into force May 8, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 957 (“Extradition shall not be granted … when the offense in respect of which extradition is requested is of a political character, or the person whose extradition is requested proves that the extradition request has been made for the purpose of trying or punishing him for an offense of a political character.”); Norwegian Extradition Treaty, entered into force Mar. 7, 1980, 31 U.S.T. 5619 (similar); United Kingdom Extradition Treaty, art. 4, entered into force Apr. 26, 2007, S. TREATY DOC. 108-23 (“Extradition shall not be granted if the offense for which extradition is requested is a political offense.”); Swedish Extradition Treaty, art. 5, entered into force Dec. 3, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1845 (“Extradition shall not be granted...[if] the (continued...)
singly at a sovereign entity and does not have the features an ordinary crime (e.g., there is no violation of the private rights of individuals),\(^6\) or as a *relative political offense*, meaning an “otherwise common crime[] committed in connection with a political act … or common crimes … committed for political motives or in a political context.”\(^6\)

The political offense exception may pose a significant obstacle to the extradition of a foreign national to the United States to face charges under the Espionage Act. Espionage, along with treason and sedition, has been recognized as a quintessential example of a purely political offense,\(^6\) although this recognition may arguably apply only to the “classic case” of espionage on behalf of a foreign government by one who owes allegiance to the aggrieved government.\(^6\) Even if the political offense exception applies to the unauthorized disclosure of national defense information, however, the United States could still seek the extradition of a suspect to face other criminal charges (though it would likely be unable to try the fugitive for an offense other than the one for which he was extradited),\(^6\) although extradition might be refused if the charged conduct is deemed to have been committed in furtherance of an act of espionage (or other political offense).\(^6\)

Extradition is also generally limited to crimes identified in the relevant treaty. Early extradition treaties concluded by the United States typically listed specific crimes constituting extraditable offenses. More recent agreements often adopt a dual criminality approach, in which extradition is available when each party recognizes a particular form of misconduct as a punishable offense (subject to other limitations found elsewhere in the applicable extradition treaty).\(^6\) No U.S.

\(^{(...continued...)}\)

offense is regarded by the requested State as a political offense or as an offense connected with a political offense.”).


\(^{61}\) *Quinn*, 783 F.2d at 791 (internal citations omitted).

\(^{62}\) See, e.g., *Quinn*, 783 F.2d at 791 (citing treason, sedition, and espionage as examples of purely political offenses); *Bassiouni*, supra footnote 60, at 604.

\(^{63}\) It might be argued that certain offenses punishable under the Espionage Act do not fall under the traditional conception of “espionage,” and should therefore not be deemed to be pure political offenses per se. See generally PIETRO VERRI, DICTIONARY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 47 (1992) (espionage is “commonly applied to the efforts made in territory under enemy control by a party to the conflict to collect all information on the enemy that may be useful to the conduct of the war in general and to that of hostilities in particular….The word espionage is also applied to the collection by States, in peacetime as well as in time of war, of political and military information regarding each other.”); Lt. Col. Geoffrey B. Demarest, *Espionage in International Law*, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POLY 321, 324 (1996) (“Throughout history, the terms ‘espionage’ and ‘spying’ have carried varying amounts of pejorative baggage. Therefore, any attempt at a precise definition is difficult.”). Nonetheless, such an offense might still be deemed to be sufficiently related to political action or informed by political motivations so as to fall under the political offense exception.

\(^{64}\) Under the doctrine of specialty, sometimes called speciality, “a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of an extradition treaty, can only be tried for one of the offences described in that treaty, and for the offence with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings.” United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 (1992) (*quoting* United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886)). This limitation is expressly included in many treaties.

\(^{65}\) 18 U.S.C. § 641

\(^{66}\) E.g., Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 4(1), entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. 109-14 (applying in place of any provision in an earlier extradition agreement between the United States and an EU (continued...)
extradition treaty currently in force lists espionage as an extraditable offense.\(^{67}\) Assuming for the sake of argument that certain espionage offenses are not \textit{per se} political offenses for which extradition may not be granted, it would appear that the United States could only seek the extradition of a foreign national for an espionage offense if the applicable treaty authorized extradition in cases of dual criminality, and the requested state recognized espionage (or perhaps unauthorized receipt or disclosure of protected government information) as a criminal offense under its domestic laws.

Whether extradition is available for an offense occurring outside the United States may depend in part upon whether the applicable treaty covers extraterritorial offenses. As a general rule, crimes are defined by the laws of the place where they are committed.\(^{68}\) Nations have always been understood to have authority to outlaw and punish conduct occurring outside the confines of their own territory under some circumstances, but the United States now claims more sweeping extraterritorial application for some of its criminal laws than is recognized either in its more historic treaties or by many of today’s governments.\(^{69}\) This may complicate any extradition efforts because many U.S. extradition treaties apply only to crimes “committed within the [territorial] jurisdiction” of the country seeking extradition.\(^{70}\) Some contemporary treaties call for extradition regardless of where the offense was committed, while perhaps an equal number permit or require denial of an extradition request that falls within an area where the countries hold conflicting views on extraterritorial jurisdiction.\(^{71}\)

The extradition of a foreign national to the United States to face criminal charges may be impeded by nationality provisions contained in extradition treaties with many countries, which recognize the right of a requested party to refuse to extradite its own nationals. U.S. extradition agreements generally are either silent with respect to nationality, in which case all persons are subject to extradition without regard to their nationality, or they contain a nationality clause that specifies that parties are not bound to deliver up their own nationals, in some cases leaving room for executive discretion.\(^{72}\) Some newer treaties declare that “extradition shall not be refused based on the nationality of the person sought,” while others limit the nationality exemption to

\(^{67}\) It should be noted, however, that extradition treaties may cover certain offenses that can constitute elements of the crime of espionage (e.g., knowingly receiving or fraudulently obtaining property). \textit{See}, \textit{e.g.}, Extradition Treaty with Belize, appendix listing extraditable offenses, entered into force March 27, 2001, \textit{S. TREATY DOC.} 106-38 (replacing provision of earlier extradition agreement listing specific offenses where extradition was available with a provision requiring dual criminality).


\(^{71}\) For examples of specific treaties, see CRS Report 98-958, \textit{Extradition To and From the United States: Overview of the Law and Recent Treaties}.

\(^{72}\) \textit{BASSIOUNI}, \textit{supra} footnote 60, at 739.
nonviolent crimes or bar nationality from serving as the basis to deny extradition when the fugitive is sought in connection with a listed offense.

The ability of the United States to obtain the extradition of a foreign national for a criminal offense may also be impacted by the existence of competing extradition requests made by other States. The criteria used by a requested State to determine the precedence given to competing extradition requests may be established either by its domestic laws or via its extradition treaties with the requesting countries. If the requested State opts to give priority to the extradition request of another country, it might still be possible for the United States to obtain the extradition of the fugitive at a later date. Whether a fugitive extradited to one State can thereafter be extradited to a third country may depend upon the applicable treaties between the relevant States. Some extradition agreements authorize the requesting State to re-extradite a person to a third country in certain circumstances. Generally, re-extradition is only permitted when the State from whom extradition was initially obtained consents to the re-extradition of the fugitive, or the fugitive voluntarily remains in the State where he was initially extradited for a specified period after having been released from custody.

**Constitutional Issues**

The publication of information pertaining to the national defense or foreign policy may serve the public interest by providing citizens with information necessary to shed light on the workings of government, but it seems widely accepted that the public release of at least some of such information poses a significant enough threat to the security of the nation that the public interest is better served by keeping it secret. The Constitution protects the public right to access government information and to express opinions regarding the functioning of the government, among other things, but it also charges the government with “providing for the common defense.” Policymakers are faced with the task of balancing these interests.

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press....” Despite this absolute language, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he Government may ... regulate the content of constitutionally protected

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73 Extradition Agreement with the European Union, art. 10, entered into force Feb. 1, 2010, S. TREATY DOC. 109-14 (describing factors to be considered by requested State when considering competing extradition requests from the United States or other EU Member States); Bolivian Extradition Treaty, art. X, entered into force Nov. 21, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. 104-22.

74 See, e.g., Swedish Extradition Treaty, art. IX, entered into force Dec. 3, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1845 (“A person extradited by virtue of this Convention may not be tried or punished by the requesting State for any offense committed prior to his extradition, other than that which gave rise to the request, nor may he be re-extradited by the requesting State to a third country which claims him, unless the surrendering State so agrees or unless the person extradited, having been set at liberty within the requesting State, remains voluntarily in the requesting State for more than 45 days from the date on which he was released. Upon such release, he shall be informed of the consequences to which his stay in the territory of the requesting State might subject him.”); Turkish Extradition Treaty, art. 17, entered into force Jan. 1, 1987, 32 UST 2111 (similar). See also Council of Europe, Convention on Extradition, art. 15, done Dec. 13, 1957 (providing similar requirements for re-extradition among member States of the Council of Europe), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Htm/024.htm.

75 For an analysis of exceptions to the First Amendment, see CRS Report 95-815, Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment, by Kathleen Ann Ruane.
speech in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”

Where speech is restricted based on its content, the Supreme Court generally applies “strict scrutiny,” which means that it will uphold a content-based restriction only if it is necessary “to promote a compelling interest,” and is “the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” Protection of the national security from external threat is without doubt a compelling government interest. It has long been accepted that the government has a compelling need to suppress certain types of speech, particularly during time of war or heightened risk of hostilities. Speech likely to incite immediate violence, for example, may be suppressed. Speech that would give military advantage to a foreign enemy is also susceptible to government regulation.

Where First Amendment rights are implicated, it is the government’s burden to show that its interest is sufficiently compelling to justify enforcement. Whether the government has a compelling need to punish disclosures of classified information turns on whether the disclosure has the potential of causing damage to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States. Actual damage need not be proved, but potential damage must be more than merely speculative and incidental. On the other hand, the Court has stated that “state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.” And it has described the constitutional purpose behind the guarantee of press freedom as the protection of “the free discussion of governmental affairs.”

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77 Id.
78 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981) (“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”)(citing Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509; accord Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 546 (1956)).
81 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“No one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops.”).
85 Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). Because of the First Amendment purpose to protect the public’s ability to discuss governmental affairs along with court decisions denying that it provides any special rights to journalists, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), it is not likely a plausible argument to posit that it does not apply to the foreign press. See United States v. 18 Packages of Magazines 238 F. Supp. 846, 847-848 (D.C. Cal. 1964) (“Even if it be conceded, arguendo, that the ‘foreign press’ is not a direct beneficiary of the Amendment, the concession gains nought for the Government in this case. The First Amendment does protect the public of this country. … The First Amendment surely was designed to protect the rights of readers and distributors of publications no less than those of writers or printers. Indeed, the essence of the First Amendment right to freedom of the press is not so much the right to print as it is the right to read. The rights of readers are not to be curtailed because of the geographical origin of printed materials.”). Likewise, the fact that WikiLeaks is not a typical newsgathering and publishing organization would likely (continued...
Although information properly classified in accordance with statute or executive order carries by definition, if disclosed to a person not authorized to receive it, the potential of causing at least identifiable harm to the national security of the United States,\(^86\) it does not necessarily follow that government classification by itself will be dispositive of the issue in the context of a criminal trial. However, courts have adopted as an element of the espionage statutes a requirement that the information at issue must be “closely held.”\(^87\) Government classification will likely serve as strong evidence to support that contention, even if the information seems relatively innocuous or does not contain much that is not already publicly known.\(^88\) Typically, courts have been unwilling to review decisions of the executive related to national security, or have made a strong presumption that the material at issue is potentially damaging.\(^89\) Still, judges have recognized that the government must make some showing that the release of specific national defense information has the potential of harming U.S. interests, lest the Espionage Act become a means to punish whistle-blowers who reveal information that poses more of a danger of embarrassing public officials than of endangering national security.\(^90\)

The Supreme Court seems satisfied that national security is a vital interest sufficient to justify some intrusion into activities that would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment—at least with respect to federal employees. Although the Court has not held that government classification of material is sufficient to show that its release is damaging to the national security,\(^91\) it has


Sec. 1.3 defines three levels of classification:

1. “Top Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

2. “Secret” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

3. “Confidential” shall be applied to information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security that the original classification authority is able to identify or describe.

\(^{87}\) United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.1945) (information must be “closely held” to be considered “related to the national defense” within the meaning of the espionage statutes).

\(^{88}\) See, e.g., United States v. Abu-Jihaad 600 F.Supp.2d 362, 385 -386 (D. Conn. 2009) (although completely inaccurate information might not be covered, information related to the scheduled movements of naval vessels was sufficient to bring materials within the ambit of national defense information).

\(^{89}\) See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291 (1981) (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.”).

\(^{90}\) See, e.g., United States v. Morison, , 844 F.2d 1057, 1086 (4th Cir. 1988) (Phillips, J., concurring) (“… I assume we reaffirm today, that notwithstanding information may have been classified, the government must still be required to prove that it was in fact ‘potentially damaging … or useful,’ i.e., that the fact of classification is merely probative, not conclusive, on that issue, though it must be conclusive on the question of authority to possess or receive the information. This must be so to avoid converting the Espionage Act into the simple Government Secrets Act which Congress has refused to enact.”) (emphasis in original).

\(^{91}\) See, e.g., Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding government did not have to show (continued...)
seemed to accept without much discussion the government’s assertion that the material in
question is damaging. It is unlikely that a defendant’s bare assertion that information poses no
danger to U.S. national security will be persuasive without some convincing evidence to that
effect, or proof that the information is not closely guarded by the government.\(^92\)

A challenge to the Espionage Act has reached the Supreme Court for decision in only one
instance. In *Gorin v. United States*,\(^93\) the Court upheld portions of the act now codified as 18
U.S.C. §§ 793 and 794 against assertions of vagueness, but only because jury instructions
properly established the elements of the crimes, including the scienter requirement (proof of
“guilty knowledge”) and a definition of “national defense” that includes potential damage in case
of unauthorized release of protected information and materials. *Gorin* was a “classic case” of
espionage, and did not involve a challenge based on the First Amendment right to free speech.
The Court agreed with the government that the term “national defense” was not vague; it was
satisfied that the term describes “a generic concept of broad connotations, referring to the military
and naval establishments and the related activities of national preparedness.”\(^94\) Whether
information was “related to the national defense” was a question for the jury to decide,\(^95\) based on
its determination that the information “may relate or pertain to the usefulness, efficiency or
availability of any of the above places, instrumentalities or things for the defense of the United
States of America. The connection must not be a strained one nor an arbitrary one. The
relationship must be reasonable and direct.”\(^96\) As long as the jury was properly instructed that
only information likely to cause damage meets the definition of information “related to the
national defense” for the purpose of the statute, the term was not unconstitutionally vague.

*United States v. Morison*\(^97\) is significant in that it represents the first case in which a person was
convicted for selling classified documents to the media.\(^98\) Samuel Loring Morison, charged with
providing classified satellite photographs to the British defense periodical *Jane’s Defence Weekly*,
argued that the espionage statutes did not apply to his conduct because he could not have had the
requisite intent to commit espionage. The Fourth Circuit rejected his appeal, finding the intent to
sell photographs that he clearly knew to be classified sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement
under 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) ( disclosure by lawful possessor of defense information to one not
entitled to receive it). The definition of “relating to the national defense” was not overbroad
because the jury had been instructed that the government had the burden of showing that the

\(^{92}\) See *United States v. Dedeyan*, 594 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1978).

\(^{93}\) 312 U.S. 19 (1941).

\(^{94}\) *Id.* at 28.

\(^{95}\) *Id.* at 32. The information defendant was charged with passing to the Soviet government had to do with U.S.
intelligence on the activities of Japanese citizens in the United States.

\(^{96}\) *Id.* at 31.


\(^{98}\) Efforts to prosecute Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo in connection with the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers
were unsuccessful after the judge dismissed them for prosecutorial misconduct. More recently, a Defense Department
employee pleaded guilty to charges under the Espionage Act for disclosing classified material to lobbyists and to
journalists. *United States v. Franklin*, Cr. No. 05-225 (E.D. Va., 2005). For a description of these and other relevant
cases, see Lee, *supra* footnote 53.
information was so related. His assertedly laudable motive in permitting publication of the photographs did not negate the element of intent.

The fact that the Morison prosecution involved a leak to the media with no obvious intent to transmit sensitive information to hostile intelligence services did not persuade the jury or the judges involved that he lacked culpability, but the Justice Department did come under some criticism on the basis that such prosecutions are so rare as to amount to a selective prosecution in his case, and that it raised concerns about the chilling effect such prosecutions could have on would-be whistle-blowers who could provide information embarrassing to the government but vital to public discourse. On leaving office, President Clinton pardoned Morison.

As far as the possible prosecution of the publisher of information leaked by a government employee is concerned, the most relevant case is likely to be the Pentagon Papers case. To be sure, the case involved an injunction against publication rather than a prosecution for having published information, but the rationale for protecting such disclosure may nevertheless inform any decision involving a conviction. In a per curiam opinion accompanied by nine concurring or dissenting opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant the government’s request for an injunction to prevent the New York Times and the Washington Post from printing a classified study of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The Court explained:

prior restraints are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.... A prior restraint, ... by definition, has an immediate and irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication “chills” speech, prior restraint “freezes” it at least for the time. The damage can be particularly great when the prior restraint falls upon the communication of news and commentary on current events.

A majority of the justices suggested in separate dicta that the newspapers—along with the former government employee who leaked the documents to the press—could be prosecuted under the Espionage Act. Still, in later cases the Court stressed that any prosecution of a publisher for

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99 But see Scarbeck v. United States, 317 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (holding that government did not need to prove proper classification of documents to prove a violation).

100 844 F.2d at 1073-74. Morison had stated that he sought the publication of the photos because they would demonstrate to the public the gravity of the threat posed by the Soviet Union, which he hoped would result in an increased defense budget. See P. Weiss, The Quiet Coup: U.S. v. Morison - A Victory for Secret Government, HARPER’S, September 1989.


104 Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (striking down a court order restraining the publication or broadcast of accounts of confessions or admissions made by the defendant at a criminal trial).

105 403 U.S. at 734-40 (White, J. with Stewart, J. concurring); id. at 745-47 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 752-59 (Harlan, J., joined by Burger, C.J. and Blackmun, J., dissenting). See David Topol, Note, United States v. Morison: A Threat to the First Amendment Right to Publish Security Information, 43 S.C. L. REV. 581, 586 (noting that three concurring justices suggested that the government could convict the newspapers under the Espionage Act even though it could not enjoin them from printing the documents, while the three dissenting (continued...
what has already been printed would have to overcome only slightly less insurmountable hurdles.\textsuperscript{106} Moreover, if national security interests were not sufficient to outweigh the First Amendment principles implicated in the prior restraint of pure speech related to the public interest, as in the \textit{Pentagon Papers} case,\textsuperscript{107} it is difficult to discern an obvious rationale for finding that punishing that same speech after it has already been disseminated nevertheless tilts the balance in favor of the government’s interest in protecting sensitive information.

The publication of truthful information that is lawfully acquired enjoys considerable First Amendment protection.\textsuperscript{108} The Court has not resolved the question “whether, in cases where information has been acquired \textit{unlawfully} by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.”\textsuperscript{109} (The \textit{Pentagon Papers} Court did not consider whether the newspapers’ receipt of the classified document was in itself unlawful, although it appeared to accept that the documents had been unlawfully taken from the government by their source).

The Court has established that “routine newsgathering” is presumptively lawful acquisition, the fruits of which may be published without fear of government retribution.\textsuperscript{110} However, what constitutes “routine newsgathering” has not been further elucidated. In the 2001 case \textit{Bartnicki v. Vopper}, the Court cited the \textit{Pentagon Papers} case to hold that media organizations cannot be punished (albeit in the context of civil damages) for divulging information on the basis that it had been obtained unlawfully by a third party.\textsuperscript{111} The holding suggests that recipients of unlawfully disclosed information cannot be considered to have obtained such material unlawfully based solely on their knowledge (or “reason to know”) that the discloser acted unlawfully. Under such circumstances, disclosure of the information by the innocent recipient would be covered by the First Amendment, although a wrongful disclosure by a person in violation of an obligation of trust would receive no First Amendment protection, regardless of whether the information was obtained lawfully.\textsuperscript{112}

\textit{Bartnicki} had to do with the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications in violation of federal and state wiretap laws, which prohibited disclosure of such information by anyone who knew or had reason to know that it was the product of an unlawful interception, but did not prohibit the \textit{receipt} of such information. The Espionage Act, by contrast, does expressly prohibit

(...continued)

justices thought the injunction should issue).

\textsuperscript{106} Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1979) (“Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for publishing lawfully obtained, truthful in-formation is not dispositive because even the latter action requires the highest form of state interest to sustain its validity.”) The case involved the prosecution of a newspaper for publishing the name of a juvenile defendant without court permission, in violation of state law.


\textsuperscript{108} See, e.g., \textit{Florida Star v. B.J.F.} 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989). The Court also questioned whether the receipt of information can ever constitutionally be proscribed. \textit{Id.} at 536.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Daily Mail}, 443 U.S at 103. Here, routine newsgathering consisted of perusing publicly available court records.

\textsuperscript{110} 532 U.S. 514 (2001).

\textsuperscript{111} See \textit{Boehner v. McDermott}, 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Congressman, bound by Ethics Committee rules not to disclose certain information, had no First Amendment right to disclose to press contents of tape recording illegally made by third party).
the receipt of any national defense material with knowledge or reason to believe that it “is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation” and that it was disclosed contrary to the provisions of the Espionage Act.  

This distinction could possibly affect whether a court would view the information as having been lawfully acquired; although the Bartnicki opinion seems to establish that knowledge that the information was unlawfully disclosed by the initial leaker cannot by itself make receipt or subsequent publication unlawful, it does not directly address whether knowledge of the nature of the information received would bring about a different result.

Proposed Legislation

To date, one bill has been introduced to address disclosures of classified information of the type at issue in the WikiLeaks publications. The Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination Act (SHIELD Act), S. 4004, introduced by Senator Ensign on December 2, 2010, would amend 18 U.S.C. § 798 to add coverage for disclosures of classified information related to human intelligence activities (the provision currently covers only certain information related to communications intelligence). The bill would add “transnational threat” to the entities whose benefit from unlawful disclosures would make such disclosure illegal. The statute as written prohibits disclosure of classified information for the benefit of any foreign government (or to the detriment of the United States, which would remain unchanged if the bill is enacted). A “transnational threat” for purposes of the bill means any “any transnational activity (including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national security of the United States” or any person or group who engages in any of these activities. This change is likely intended to ensure that disclosures of any covered information that a violator “publishes, or uses in any manner … for the benefit” of Al Qaeda or any other terrorist group, international drug cartels, arms dealers who traffic in weapons of mass destruction, and other international criminals will be subject to prosecution, regardless of whether the group purports to govern any territory. As is currently the case, it is unclear whether this conduct must be undertaken “knowingly and willfully” to incur a punishment, or whether those qualifiers apply only to furnishing covered information to an unauthorized individual.

The bill would add two types of information to be covered by the prohibition: “information concerning the human intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign government”; and “information concerning the identity of a classified source or informant of an element of the intelligence community of the United States.” “Human intelligence” is defined under the bill as “all procedures, sources, and methods employed in the collection of intelligence through human sources.” “Classified information” would continue to be defined as “information which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.” In other words, the information need not be classified information within the meaning of the executive order, so long as it has been specifically designated as subject to some form of restricted dissemination due to national security concerns. Because the concept of national security includes foreign affairs as well as national defense, the information covered may be broader than that already protected under the preceding sections of the Espionage Act. However, the limitation on the identity of informants and sources to those giving information to an element

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113 18 U.S.C. § 793(c).
of the intelligence community may be interpreted to exclude informants and sources who provide information to entities not listed in 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4), such as infantry units or consular offices.

Conclusion

The Espionage Act on its face applies to the receipt and unauthorized dissemination of national defense information, which has been interpreted broadly to cover closely held government materials related to U.S. military operations, facilities, and personnel. It has been interpreted to cover the activities of foreign nationals overseas, at least when they take an active part in seeking out information. Although cases involving disclosures of classified information to the press have been rare, it seems clear that courts have regarded such disclosures by government employees to be conduct that enjoys no First Amendment protection, regardless of the motives of the divulger or the value the release of such information might impart to public discourse.\(^\text{114}\) The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the question remains open whether the publication of unlawfully obtained information by the media can be punished consistent with the First Amendment. Thus, although unlawful acquisition of information might be subject to criminal prosecution with few First Amendment implications, the publication of that information remains protected. Whether the publication of national security information can be punished likely turns on the value of the information to the public weighed against the likelihood of identifiable harm to the national security, arguably a more difficult case for prosecutors to make.

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\(^\text{114}\) The courts have permitted government agencies to enjoin their employees and former employees from publishing information they learned on the job, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972), and permitted harsh sanctions against employees who publish even unclassified information in violation of an obligation to obtain pre-publication clearance, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).