At least a part of the U.S. foreign policy borg has come to the conclusion that the U.S. has lost its primary role in the Middle East. There seems to be little appetite to regain the position.
The purpose of this post is to collect these voices.
Marc Lynch writes in Foreign Affairs:
The End of the American Middle East – Iran and the Last Gasp of a Failed Order (archived) – Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2026
The American Middle East is finished. The regional order that has prevailed since 1991 has been one of the many casualties of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. The American and Israeli failure to dislodge the regime in Tehran has proved the bankruptcy of decades of sanctions and violence. The inability of the United States to protect its Gulf allies from Iranian attacks or to keep the Strait of Hormuz open has fatally undermined the core security bargain that justified its network of military bases in the region. And Israel’s increasingly threatening posture and abandonment of any pretense of interest in reaching an accommodation with the Palestinians have ended Washington’s decades-long mission of bringing its Arab allies and Israel together into an enduring security partnership.
Nevertheless, at the end March Lynch, being a liberal interventionist, argues to further ‘spread democracy’ in the name of ‘human rights’ in the Middle East. It is what the instinct of the ‘liberals’ in the Democratic party prescribes. It is the reason why the Democrats, should they regain power, would likely support a prolongation of the war against Iran.
In the Atlantic the neo-conservative Robert Kagan ponders the consequences of the U.S. defeat:
Iran Unleashed – The dominant power in the Middle East from now on will not be the U.S. or Israel but Iran. (archived) – Atlantic, Aug 23, 2026
For years, Iran confronted a balance of power in the Middle East that tilted against it. The region was dominated by a hostile American superpower, a nuclear-armed and militarily superior Israel, and significant local actors—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates—that were strategically and economically aligned with the United States.
Today finds Iran in entirely new circumstances. It has gone head-to-head with the superpower and Israel, withstood a pounding from their most advanced weapons, and more than survived. As a result, Iran has, with American help, completely reconfigured the power structure of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. The dominant power in the region going forward will be Iran, not the U.S. or Israel. Neighboring countries are already making their adjustments to this new reality. More distant powers will too. For years, the world has been dealing with an Iran constrained. It will now discover what Iran unleashed looks like.
Kagan says that Iran does not need an MoU, or any other agreement with the U.S. It does not even need nuclear weapons. Sanctions against Iran wont help:
Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz is a more useful instrument of power than a nuclear weapon would be. A nuclear weapon might deter an attack, but control of the strait gives Iran leverage every day, over dozens of countries. With it, Iran can reward friends, punish enemies, extract revenue, force the loosening of sanctions, and make governments think twice before opposing Iranian policies. It can do all of this without firing a shot, and while preserving the ability to threaten violence when necessary.
The sanctions strategy that for decades served to isolate Iran rested on international cooperation. Nations that depend on access to the strait—Japan and South Korea, for example—will have to choose between access to a reliable energy supply and participation in American-backed sanctions. Will they choose solidarity with Washington—this Washington—over their economic interests? In the new order that Iran is creating, a global sanctions regime is likely to be unsustainable.
In an op-ed in the New York Times Rosemary Kelanic of Defense Priorities makes an economic argument to end the blockade against Iran and to let it collect tolls from ships passing the Strait:
Let Iran Control the Strait of Hormuz – NY Times, Aug 24 2026
Financially, transit fees are a better deal for the United States and the world than a prolonged semiclosure of the strait. … If the Hormuz standoff causes oil prices to spike, the economic damage could be severe, especially for the United States, whose economy is far more oil-intensive than those of other great powers like Russia and China.
…
As embarrassing as Hormuz taxes would be for the United States and for Mr. Trump personally, monetizing safe passage would encourage Iran to allow through as many ships as possible so it can collect more tolls. And if Iran grows dependent on revenue from administering the strait, closing it in the future for political reasons becomes more difficult.
General McCaffrey (ret.), a hawk who had ordered the Highway Of Death slaughter during the 1991 war on Iraq, is lamenting the need of a U.S. retreat:
Barry R McCaffrey @mccaffreyr3 – 23:54 UTC · Aug 22, 2026
In my judgement, the US Armed Forces have probably permanently lost access to 15 Persian Gulf bases. Iran now poised to control access the Gulf States. US will have to negotiate new access in western Saudi Arabia, Israel, southern Europe.
The Financial Times is asking accordingly:
Are America’s vast Gulf bases worth rebuilding? (archived) – FT, Aug 24 2026
“There is not a lot of utility in rebuilding some of these sites,” said Nate Swanson, a former director for Iran at the US National Security Council, who noted the need to fund a rebuild of otherwise unwanted installations could accelerate existing trends. “I would be very surprised if there is not a westwards move.”
Giving up on the bases means more than a military move. It implicates a loss of control:
“This is a situation where the military and diplomatic imperatives cut in opposing directions,” Brands of Johns Hopkins said. “You have to combat the perception that you are cutting and running.”
…
“The Carter Doctrine does appear to have collapsed,” said Gregory Brew, a historian and analyst at the Eurasia Group, adding that there was a sense that Washington had come full circle. “The Islamic Revolution compelled the Carter Doctrine, and it was war with Iran that caused it to collapse,” he added.
The Carter Doctrine, which threatened the use of U.S. force to control the Persian Gulf, was a response to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The danger it was supposed to fight is, of course, no longer exiting.
The ‘China threat’ is too vague to justify the extremely high costs of its revival.
It is therefore likely that the U.S., probably after some additional skirmishes, is forced to retreat.