Two remarkable pieces appeared during the last days. They are related to each other as both authors are seasoned right-wing strategist who were deeply involved with the George W. Bush administration and its war on Iraq.
The first piece is by Turki Al-Faisal:
He is a grandson of Saudi Arabia’s founder King Abdulaziz and son of King Faisal. He is chairman of the King Faisal Foundation’s Center for Research and Islamic Studies.
From 1979 to 2001, Prince Turki was director general of Al Mukhabarat Al ‘Ammah, Saudi Arabia’s intelligence agency, resigning from the position on 1 September 2001, ten days before the September 11 attacks in which 15 Saudi nationals hijacked commercial American airliners.
Prince Turki subsequently served as ambassador to the Court of St. James’s and the United States.
In an op-ed published on Saturday in the semi-official Arab News Faisal reveals the major conspiracy behind the U.S. war on Iran.
While the Saudis are miffed by Iran, they do acknowledge that it is not the real culprit who has caused the mess the whole Gulf region is now in:
When Iran and others tried to drag the Kingdom into the furnace of destruction, our leadership chose to endure the pains caused by a neighbor in order to protect the lives and property of its citizens. Had the Kingdom wanted, and it is capable of doing so, to respond in kind to Iran by destroying Iranian facilities and interests, the outcome could have been the destruction of Saudi oil facilities and desalination plants along the Arabian Gulf coast, and even deep inside the Kingdom.
Had the Israeli plan to ignite war between us and Iran succeeded, the region would have been plunged into ruin and destruction. Thousands of our sons and daughters would have been lost in a battle in which we had no stake. Israel would have succeeded in imposing its will on the region and remained the only actor in our surroundings.
Through the wisdom and foresight of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the Kingdom avoided the horrors of war and its devastating repercussions. Indeed, together with Pakistan, it is now extinguishing the fire of fighting, helping prevent escalation, and giving advocates of peace hope that they can feel reassured about the lives of their loved ones and the safety of their interests.
The op-ed debunks all the rumors spread by Zionist propagandists who had claimed that the Saudis were urging for a widening of the war.
Since Chinese moderation three years ago has led to political agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia there has been no big confrontation between those countries. Despite the war Saudi Arabia is welcoming Iranian pilgrims to the Hajj. While Iran has hit U.S. installations in Saudi Arabia it has refrained from attacking major Saudi oil interest. In consequence Saudi Aramco, the state owned oil company, is making record profits.
The Saudi position is one of many signs that the U.S. has lost its hegemonic role in the Gulf.
A second op-ed, by arch-neoconservative Robert Kagan in the pro-war Atlantic, confirms that take. Kagan, who had pushed the Bush/Cheney administration towards its war on Iran is conceding that the U.S. has lost its war on Iran:
Checkmate in Iran – Washington can’t reverse or control the consequences of losing this war. (archived) – Atlantic
It’s hard to think of a time when the United States suffered a total defeat in a conflict, a setback so decisive that the strategic loss could be neither repaired nor ignored.
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Defeat in the present confrontation with Iran will be of an entirely different character. It can neither be repaired nor ignored. There will be no return to the status quo ante, no ultimate American triumph that will undo or overcome the harm done. The Strait of Hormuz will not be “open,” as it once was. With control of the strait, Iran emerges as the key player in the region and one of the key players in the world. The roles of China and Russia, as Iran’s allies, are strengthened; the role of the United States, substantially diminished. Far from demonstrating American prowess, as supporters of the war have repeatedly claimed, the conflict has revealed an America that is unreliable and incapable of finishing what it started. That is going to set off a chain reaction around the world as friends and foes adjust to America’s failure.
Kagan acknowledges that the U.S. has no way out of its dilemma:
Even if Trump were to carry out his threat to destroy Iran’s “civilization” through more bombing, Iran would still be able to launch many missiles and drones before its regime went down—assuming it did go down. Just a few successful strikes could cripple the region’s oil and gas infrastructure for years if not decades, throwing the world, and the United States, into a prolonged economic crisis. Even if Trump wanted to bomb Iran as part of an exit strategy—looking tough as a way of masking his retreat—he can’t do that without risking this catastrophe.
If this isn’t checkmate, it’s close.
Kagan is considering the alternative, a total war on Iran, but rejects it as a worse path which is likely to lead to even bigger failure:
Unless the U.S. is prepared to engage in a full-scale ground and naval war to remove the current Iranian regime, and then to occupy Iran until a new government can take hold; unless it is prepared to risk the loss of warships convoying tankers through a contested strait; unless it is prepared to accept the devastating long-term damage to the region’s productive capacities likely to result from Iranian retaliation—walking away now could seem like the least bad option. As a political matter, Trump may well feel he has a better chance of riding out defeat than of surviving a much larger, longer, and more expensive war that could still end in failure.
Defeat for the United States, therefore, is not only possible but likely. Here is what defeat looks like.
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The new status quo in the strait will also occasion a substantial shift in relative power and influence both regionally and globally. In the region, the United States will have proved itself a paper tiger, forcing the Gulf and other Arab states to accommodate Iran. As the Iran scholars Reuel Gerecht and Ray Takeyh wrote recently, “The Gulf Arab economies were built under the umbrella of American hegemony. Take that away—and the freedom of navigation that goes with it—and the Gulf states will ineluctably go begging to Tehran.”They will not be the only ones. All nations that depend on energy from the Gulf will have to work out their own arrangements with Iran. What choice will they have?
Kagan believes that the loss of the war on Iran will have much wider implications for the U.S. position around the globe:
The global adjustment to a post-American world is accelerating. America’s once-dominant position in the Gulf is just the first of many casualties.
Later this week U.S. President Donald Trump is supposed to visit China. An administration preview of the visit, published in the Financial Times (archived), pretends that the U.S. can still use its war to apply pressure around the globe:
“I would expect the president to apply pressure,” a US official told reporters in a briefing.
He said Trump would resume previous discussions with Xi about China’s support for Iran and Russia, including providing them with dual-use components and potential arms exports.
“I expect that conversation to continue. I think you’ve seen some actions, meaning sanctions, coming out from the US side just in the last few days that I’m sure will be part of that conversation,” the official added.
The state department on Friday imposed sanctions on three Chinese satellite companies for providing imagery and other services to Iran that helped it conduct military strikes against US forces in the Middle East. The Treasury also sanctioned Yushita Shanghai International Trade for helping Iran import man-portable air-defensive systems [Manpads] from China.
Trump still hasn’t recognized that, after he has lost the war, the sanctions game is also over. It is certainly not in Chinese, or anyone other’s interest to help the U.S. to regain the hegemonic position it has now lost in the Gulf.
