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War On Iran: – Who To Blame?
Q: Why is the U.S. waging war on Iran?
Answer by the U.S. State Department:
As the United States has explained in multiple letters to the U.N. Security Council, including most recently on March 10, the United States is engaged in this conflict at the request of and in the collective self-defense of its Israeli ally, …
Q: Why is the Strait of Hormuz still closed?
Answer by the President of the U.S. of A.:
“They came to us and they said, ‘We will agree to open the strait.’ And all my people were happy, except me. I said, ‘Wait a minute, if we open the strait, that means they’re gonna make $500 million a day.’ I don’t want them to make $500 million a day until they settle this thing. So I’m the one who kept it closed.“
Honestly, what do I know? Analyze the situation for a sec then go for the Maximum Likelihood Estimate. Since I was trained as a statistical researcher at the Ph. D. level that is as honest as I get. Read this, read that, use some of other mixed breed academic background, then make my best guess.
Iran is fighting for its survival against two no good nasties. Even the people who prefer a more liberal state are standing up for their survival. Getting bombed on an regular basis has been observed to unify the population. Why would Iran be any different? Is not as if the US and Israel gave them much choice.
Posted by: Acco Hengst | Apr 24 2026 23:12 utc | 161
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Thank you. Very good point about survival as a nation, so they should hang together. I’m just a cynical person and can imagine infighting and treachery in such a situation. Things like Raisi dying in the helicopter, Khamenei, Sr. being taken out, Haniyeh’s location, but especially how people can be bought e.g., the fall of Syria. But yes, it does seem they are really trying to tighten it up. I asked AI for a rundown of the top brass and ‘regular’ government. @Peter, @ Arby.
Here’s a current overview (as of April 2026) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) top brass and key affiliated civilian administrators.
Note that Iran’s leadership has been significantly disrupted by recent conflicts, with multiple high-profile assassinations (e.g., former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, previous IRGC commanders Hossein Salami and Mohammad Pakpour). This has led to rapid promotions, a decentralized structure for resilience, and increased IRGC influence over political and security decisions.
IRGC Top Brass (Military Leadership)The IRGC operates as Iran’s parallel ideological military force, controlling ground, aerospace, naval, and extraterritorial operations (Quds Force), as well as the Basij militia. It answers directly to the Supreme Leader (currently Mojtaba Khamenei, who is reportedly injured and sidelined in day-to-day decisions).
- Ahmad Vahidi (Brigadier General / often referred to as Major General in reports) — Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC (appointed March 2026). Former Quds Force commander (1988–1998), Defense Minister, and Interior Minister. He is a central figure in wartime decision-making and reportedly exerts strong influence over broader regime policies.
- Esmail Qaani (Brigadier General) — Commander of the IRGC Quds Force (extraterritorial operations and proxy network support). He succeeded Qassem Soleimani and remains active in regional “resistance” efforts.
- Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh (Brigadier General) — Deputy Commander of the Quds Force.
- Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi (Major General) — Commander of the Khatam-al Anbiya Central Headquarters (coordinates IRGC, regular army/Artesh, and police operations).
- Mohammad Karami (Brigadier General) — Commander of the IRGC Ground Forces (succeeded Mohammad Pakpour in this role earlier).
- Amir Ali Hajizadeh (Brigadier General) — Commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force (oversees missile and drone programs; noted for longevity despite losses in the branch).
- Alireza Tangsiri (Commodore) — Commander of the IRGC Navy.
- Gholamreza Soleimani (Brigadier General) — Commander of the Basij Resistance Force (internal mobilization and suppression).
- Yahya Rahim Safavi (Major General) — Senior military advisor to the Supreme Leader; longtime IRGC strategist and former IRGC commander-in-chief.
Other influential veterans include Mohsen Rezaei (former longtime IRGC commander, now military advisor to Mojtaba Khamenei) and figures in intelligence or decentralized regional commands. The structure has become more collective/decentralized to survive targeted strikes.
Top Civilian Administrators with Strong IRGC TiesMany senior civilian roles are held by IRGC veterans or hardliners, blurring the line between military and political power. The IRGC has reportedly tightened control over key institutions amid the conflict, sidelining some moderates.
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- Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr (IRGC veteran) — Secretary-General of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC; appointed March 2026 after Ali Larijani’s death). Coordinates national security, foreign policy, and nuclear issues. Former IRGC deputy commander-in-chief and joint staff head.
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- Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf — Speaker of Parliament. Former IRGC Air Force commander and Tehran mayor; a pragmatic hardliner involved in some diplomatic channels but aligned with IRGC priorities.
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- Eskandar Momeni — Minister of Interior (oversees police and internal security; IRGC-affiliated background).
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- Ahmad Vahidi (also listed above) — Previously served in civilian roles like Defense and Interior Minister, illustrating the IRGC-to-civilian pipeline.
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- Abbas Araghchi — Foreign Minister. Not a core IRGC figure but operates under significant IRGC/SNSC constraints in wartime diplomacy (e.g., backchannels via Pakistan).
The SNSC itself includes ex-officio members like the President (Masoud Pezeshkian), Chief Justice, Armed Forces Chief of Staff (position impacted by losses), and IRGC/Army commanders, but real influence has shifted heavily toward IRGC-aligned figures. Context and Notes
- Power Shift: Post-2025/2026 strikes and leadership losses, the IRGC (especially under Vahidi) has consolidated de facto control over military strategy, internal security, and even some diplomatic decisions, with a “military council” reportedly influencing appointments.
- Deceased/Former Key Figures: Hossein Salami (former IRGC commander, killed 2025), Mohammad Pakpour (brief IRGC commander, killed Feb 2026), Qassem Soleimani (Quds Force, killed 2020), and others like Ali Larijani.
- Leadership is fluid due to ongoing events; many second-tier commanders have risen.
This list draws from public reporting and may not be exhaustive, as Iran’s system is opaque. For the most real-time updates, cross-reference official Iranian sources (e.g., Tasnim, Fars) or analytical outlets.
If this goes through at all the formatting will be a mess, I am sure.
Posted by: frito | Apr 25 2026 1:11 utc | 184
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