The defeat of the west is in part happening because its loss of the ability to sensibly analyze and manage things. A consequence is the relative loss of power.
Here it is the U.S. Navy demonstrating the issue:
Navy Cuts Constellation-Class Frigate Program Short as Shipbuilding Delays Mount – gCaptain
The U.S. Navy announced Tuesday it is terminating four ships from its troubled Constellation-class frigate program before construction begins, marking a significant strategic shift as the service grapples with mounting delays and seeks faster alternatives for fleet expansion.
Secretary of the Navy John Phelan revealed the decision on social media, stating that while the first two frigates—Constellation (FFG-62) and Congress (FFG-63)—will proceed to completion at Fincantieri Marinette Marine’s Wisconsin shipyard, the Navy has reached a “comprehensive framework” with the Italian-owned contractor to cancel the next four planned vessels in the class.
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The announcement comes as the program faces severe schedule challenges. The lead ship, originally slated for delivery in April 2026, is now expected three years later in April 2029—a 36-month delay that has raised concerns about the Navy’s ability to execute its modernization plans.
Over the last 20+ years the Navy ship building management has not delivered even one class of ships on time and within the projected price frame. Moreover none ever reached the desired and promised capabilities.
Once there were to be 32 Zumwalt-class destroyers each with 16,000 tons of displacement. Only three were build and only two are active. The ships were supposed to carry new technologies which turned out to be too complicate and too expensive:
The ship is designed around its two Advanced Gun Systems (AGS), turrets with 920-round magazines, and unique Long Range Land Attack Projectile (LRLAP) ammunition. LRLAP procurement was canceled, rendering the guns unusable, so the Navy re-purposed the ships for surface warfare. In 2023, the Navy removed the AGS from the ships and replaced them with hypersonic missiles.
The Navy does not have hypersonic missiles. Until it develops some the extremely expensive destroyers will mostly be useless.
There were also the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) at 3,000 ton displacement which were supposed to be fast and carry changeable weapon modules. The Little Crappy Ships delivered turned out to be unreliable speed boats which could not survive a day in a war. Most modules they were supposed to carry were never build. Seven of the 35 commissioned since 2008 have already been retired. Some with less than five years in service.
To replace the failing LCS program the Navy desired larger multipurpose frigates. To prevent a repeat of the ill fated LCS program an order from above was given to use an existing design. The idea was to buy a ship design from allies that was proven to work and to build it in the U.S. with only minimal modifications.
But the Navy bureaucracy intervened and in 2020 it ended up with this ‘compromise’:
The Navy awarded a partial contract to Fincantieri for the design and construction of the new frigate. The $795M contract is for the basic hull. Extensive Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) will be paid for separately and includes Baseline 10 Aegis Combat System, Mk 41 VLS, Enterprise Air Surveillance Radar, command and control electronics, decoy systems, Mk110 57mm gun, RAM point defense launcher, Naval Strike Missile launcher, SEWIP Blk II … basically everything that isn’t the hull.
The lead ship will cost $1.281 billion, with $795 million of that covering the shipbuilder’s detail design and construction costs and the rest covering the GFE, including the combat systems, radar, launchers, command and control systems, decoys and more.
The Italian/French FREMM frigates are well balanced ships with about 6,000 ton displacement. They are configured to allow for anti-submarine, surface warfare and air defenses. Twenty-two are currently in service.
But the Navy did not like to use weapon systems that were made elsewhere even when they worked well. So it ripped everything out of the hull design and tried to stuff its own type of equipment into it.
Ship design does not work like this. The U.S. radar is heavier which makes the ship top heavy and instable. Thus the hull needs to be widened which decreases the potential speed of the vessel which then requires changes in the machinery and so on and so on. The whole point of buying a working design to prevent a costly design creep was missed.
Moreover the Navy ordered the ships to be build before its desired design changes were even defined. Parts of the ships had to be rebuild when the final designs arrived. The Government Accountability Office wrote a highly critical report on this:
Over at least 2 decades, the Navy’s Constellation class Guided Missile Frigate program plans to acquire and deliver up to 20 frigates—multi-mission, small surface combatant warships—at a combined cost of over $22 billion. To reduce technical risk, the Navy and its shipbuilder modified an existing design to incorporate Navy specifications and weapon systems. However, the Navy’s decision to begin construction before the design was complete is inconsistent with leading ship design practices and jeopardized this approach. Further, design instability has caused weight growth.
The ship class now has a displacement of 7,300 tons which makes it slower than the original design. It also has less endurance. It is more expensive than planned and at least three years behind schedule.
The shipyard that is building these ships did not mind to implement the Navy changes to its own design:
As of November 2024, officials reported that the shipbuilder had submitted five requests for “equitable adjustment”, raising the potential for unbudgeted cost growth. Requests for equitable adjustment provide a remedy payable only when unforeseen or unintended circumstances – such as government modification of a contract – cause an increase in costs. The US Navy deemed the total costs of the five requests “not suitable for public release”. According to officials, these requests relate to government change orders and significant design changes from the frigate’s parent ship design.
The ship yard also did not mind to chancel the program:
The agreement provides continuity of work for the two Constellation-class frigates currently under construction and discontinues the contract for the four other frigates already under contract. Crucially, Fincantieri stated that the Navy will indemnify the company on existing economic commitments and industrial impacts through measures provided as a result of the contractual decision made for the Navy’s convenience.
Looking forward, Fincantieri says it expects to receive new orders to deliver classes of vessels in segments that serve the immediate interests of the nation, including amphibious, icebreaking, and other special missions vessels. The company also stated it will support the U.S. Navy as it redefines strategic choices in the Small Surface Combatants segment, both manned and unmanned.
It’s, of course, a racket.
But behind is also ill discipline. An unwillingness to accept what already has proven to be a good solution. An unreasonable desire for new technology even when it is impractical and overly costly.
The overall result is a Navy that is constantly losing its relative power:
According to a Pentagon estimate, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is expected to have about 400 hulls in the water by the end of this year. Some 50 of those ships are frigates, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
The US fleet is around 240 ships and submarines [but no frigates].
It’s a troubling statistic, experts say, with history showing in any confrontation the larger fleet usually wins.
The Pentagon think tank RAND has recognized the decline. It recently published a report that urged the U.S. to accommodate China instead of trying to fight it:
In October of 2025, the RAND Corporation published a report titled “Stabilizing the U.S.–China Rivalry“. Within weeks, the study disappeared from RAND’s website. No explanation. No revision notice. No reupload.
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The timeline itself suggests a struggle. The study appeared on RAND’s website in mid-October 2025 and was not removed until nearly two weeks later. This is far too slow for a routine correction and far too fast for a scheduled revision. Such a delay is characteristic of an internal contest: the report was vetted, approved, published, and allowed to circulate — until opposition within the policy structure hardened sufficiently to demand its removal. The RAND report was not suppressed because it was mistaken, but because its implications became intolerable after they were recognized.
A well known quote from Sun Tsu urges to know oneself and the enemy to not fear the results of hundred battles. The U.S., it seems, rejects to know either.