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Moldova’s Pro-EU Party Wins Vote Due To Manipulation And EU Interference
Sunday election in Moldova was probably the most manipulated one I have ever seen. And no, that is not because of the alleged Russian interference the BBC is sputtering about:
Moldova’s pro-EU party wins vote mired in claims of Russian interference
The pro-European party of Moldovan President Maia Sandu has claimed victory and a new majority in parliament in Sunday’s elections seen as critical for her country’s future path to the EU.
Sandu had warned of “massive Russian interference” after voting, saying the future of Moldova, flanked by Ukraine and Romania, was at stake.
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With 99.9% of the 1.6 million votes counted, PAS had 50.17% of the vote – far ahead of the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc on 24.18%, Moldova’s central electoral commission said.
Moldova is, similar to Ukraine, a former Soviet state in which a large part of the population speaks Russian and follows the Orthodox Church. The pro-Russian sentiment is thereby naturally strong.
biggerPresident Maia Sandu’s declared policy is to submit Moldova to the EU. Pre-election polls showed her PAS party losing by a wide margin. It was only through intervention from Brussels and outright manipulation of the expat-vote that her party was able to win.
As the Washington Post reported (archived) last Friday:
The departure of USAID had an immediate effect on Moldova’s fledgling democracy. Garcaliuc’s YouTube channel, called “The Small Country,” which produces content in Russian to reach audiences that don’t engage with Moldovan media, lost a large share of its funding almost overnight. So did other investigative websites and pro-democracy groups.
USAID had also funded many agricultural and infrastructural projects, including roads and schools.
The E.U. moved to fill the void left by the U.S.’s retreat by issuing media grants to Moldova and helping it track and combat disinformation. It sent delegations, including to pro-Russian areas, to counter rumors that it would force the Moldovans to change their culture in exchange for membership.
How come that such obvious interference is never called out?
Sandu herself used every possible trick to eliminate votes for the opposition.
Brian McDonald @27khv – 9:39 utc · Sep 29, 2025
So, Maia Sandu’s pro-EU PAS scraped 50.16% in Moldova’s election… a bare majority won only after banning at least six opposition parties, trimming Moscow-leaning Transnistria’s polling stations from 41 to 12 under the alibi of bridge repairs, and offering just two in Russia for up to half a million Moldovans, while 73 were opened in Italy for barely a hundred thousand.
A victory on paper, yes… but if the same things happened in Georgia or Serbia, Brussels would denounce such a vote as illegitimate.
For the West it seems to fine to manipulate elections as long as ‘our’ side wins.
How the EU and Sandu stole the election in Moldova.
“In recent European history, it is difficult to find a more striking example of electoral manipulation than the 2025 parliamentary elections in Moldova. What last year’s presidential race tested in miniature, this campaign deployed on a grand scale: censorship, administrative pressure, selective access to polling stations, and a carefully mobilized diaspora vote. For President Maia Sandu’s administration, control over parliament was not a matter of prestige but of political survival.
The campaign atmosphere was defined long before voting day. Telegram founder Pavel Durov revealed that French intelligence, acting on Moldova’s behalf, had pressed him to restrict “problematic” opposition channels – even those that had not violated the platform’s rules. Their only offense was providing an alternative viewpoint. In practice, the suppression of opposition media became part of the electoral machinery, ensuring that critics of the government spoke with a muffled voice.
Election night only reinforced doubts. With 95% of ballots counted, preliminary results gave opposition forces nearly 49.5% of the vote, while Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) trailed by about five points. By morning, however, the tables had turned: PAS had surged past 50%. Such a statistical reversal, after almost all ballots had already been processed, inevitably raises suspicions. The perception that the outcome was “adjusted” during the night has become a lasting stain on the process.
Outside Moldova’s borders, the picture was equally telling. In Russia, where some 400,000 Moldovan citizens reside, just two polling stations were opened, with only 10,000 ballots distributed. Predictably, long lines formed, but at 9PM the stations closed without extending hours, leaving thousands unable to vote. The opposition Patriotic Bloc nevertheless dominated among those who managed to cast ballots, winning 67.4%
In Transnistria, home to over 300,000 Moldovan citizens, only 12 polling stations were opened. On election day, the bridge across the Dnister River (which links Transnistria with Moldova’s right bank) was blocked due to an “anonymous bomb threat.” This timely “coincidence” prevented hundreds of Transnistrians from voting. Ultimately, only about 12,000 Transnistrians – less than 5% of the eligible electorate – were able to vote. Yet even under these restrictions, the Patriotic Bloc secured 51%.
By contrast, the authorities ensured maximum accessibility in the European Union. Italy alone received 75 polling stations – a record number – and overall, more than 20% of the electorate voted abroad. Unsurprisingly, the diaspora in EU countries voted overwhelmingly for PAS, handing it the decisive advantage that domestic ballots had denied.
International monitoring was similarly selective. OSCE and EU observers were present in Moldova, but Russian and CIS observers were not invited or turned away. Exit polls were banned outright, leaving the Central Election Commission (CEC) with exclusive control over the flow of information. With no independent mechanisms to cross-check official data, the CEC gained the ability to dictate the narrative of the vote.
The campaign’s repressive character was most vividly illustrated just before election day. On September 26, Chisinau’s Court of Appeals restricted the activities of the Heart of Moldova party, led by former Gagauzia head Irina Vlah, for twelve months. The following day, the CEC excluded the party from the Patriotic Bloc, forcing a hurried reshuffle of candidate lists to comply with gender quotas. Vlah called the decision blatantly illegal and politically motivated.
This was no isolated case. Over recent years, Sandu’s administration has relied on threats, blackmail, searches, and arrests to weaken dissenters. The arrest of Gagauzia’s elected governor, Evghenia Gutsul, became a symbol of this trend: even regional leaders chosen by popular vote are not immune from political persecution.
The official tally put voter turnout at 52.18%. PAS won 50.2% of the vote, the Patriotic Bloc 24.2%, the pro-European Alternative 8%, Our Party 6.2%, and Democracy at Home 5.6%, while several minor parties failed to gain more than 1%. On paper, PAS secured a majority.
But a closer look reveals a striking imbalance. Counting only ballots cast inside Moldova, PAS received just 44.13% of the vote. The opposition parties together accounted for nearly 50%. In other words, within Moldova itself, Sandu’s party was in the minority.
It was the diaspora vote that changed everything. Among Moldovans abroad, 78.5% supported PAS, enough to flip a domestic defeat into a formal victory. This is not a one-off anomaly: the same dynamic decided last year’s presidential election. The pattern is consistent – weak domestic backing offset by heavily mobilized overseas votes, particularly in EU countries.
Taken together, these facts paint a picture of a managed democracy: censorship of opposition voices, selective access to polling stations, politically motivated repression, and the decisive use of diaspora votes. Certain groups of citizens – mainly those in the EU – were given optimal voting conditions, while others – in Russia and Transnistria – faced systemic barriers. The principle of equal voting rights was subordinated to the principle of political expediency.
The paradox of Moldova’s elections is therefore clear. Inside the country, a majority voted for change. Abroad, a different electorate delivered Sandu her “victory.” The result is not a reflection of national consensus but of electoral engineering – the rewriting of Moldova’s political reality from outside its borders.
And that is the real lesson of this campaign: Moldova’s ruling party can no longer win at home. Its victories are manufactured elsewhere. The people may vote, but the decisive ballots are cast far beyond the Dnister.”
Posted by: Republicofscotland | Sep 29 2025 18:46 utc | 54
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