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Russia Seeks ‘Asymmetrical’ Response For Strike On Its Nuclear Assets
There is some confusion over Russia's response to the June 1/2 attacks on railway infrastructure and its strategic nuclear forces.
To recap:
On Saturday/Sunday Ukrainian diversion groups used explosives to destroy two Russian railroad bridges in the Kursk and Bryansk region. These bridges were located some 50 kilometer north of the Sumy region frontline. The hits will impact, if only for a short time, the railway bound supply of Russian forces north of Sumy.
One of the bridge explosions destroyed a civil passenger train. Some 10 people were killed and some 100 were wounded. This was likely intended and thereby a terror attack.
On Sunday morning a large scale operation by the Ukrainian secret service managed to attack multiple strategic airfields throughout Russia. Ukrainian sources claimed attacks on five airfields and the destruction of more than 40 strategic bombers.
Current damage assessment confirms attacks on two airfields and the destruction or damaging of up to 10 bombers.
It is very important to distinguish these attacks. While both coincided with negotiations between Ukraine in Russia in Istanbul, and were clearly timed to influence those, the purpose was larger.
The railroad attacks were planned to hinder rearward logistics of Russia's operation in Ukraine's Sumy region. That a civilian train was hit by these was likely seen by the Ukrainian forces as an additional feature but not as a main purpose. Still, it is the mass harm of civilians that make this otherwise permissible attack on a quasi-military target a terrorist act. The Russian side has emphasized this.
The attack on the strategic bombers of Russia's nuclear triad (land based nuclear missiles, submarine based nuclear missiles, air carriers for launching nuclear bombs and missiles) hit at a much higher level. It was a military attack on a strategic military target. Russia's publicly announced doctrine allows for the use of nuclear forces to retaliate for such an attack on its nuclear assets. This independent of the immediate source of the attack.
The attack on the railway bridges were an operation that is typical for British services. It has been reported and is well known that British services have advised and helped the Ukrainians to launch sea drones against Russia in the Black Sea, to cross the Dnieper river in Krinki and in other operations of higher propaganda value.
The Russian Foreign Minister has accused the U.K of direct involvement in the terrorist attack.
Several western experts of U.S. special services believe, as the Russian's do, that the operation against its nuclear forces have a different actor behind them – most likely the CIA. It is unlikely that Ukraine would have been able to identify and target those airfields without the intelligence acquired by U.S. sources. There is also no military benefit for Ukraine to attack Russian air bases far from its territory.
It has been reported that since 2014 the CIA had build some 20 stations in Ukraine from where it operates against Russia. Several high ranking Ukrainian intelligence actors, including the head of its military intelligence service General Budanov, have been trained by the CIA and are actively cooperating with it.
The CIA has a special unit dedicated to long term plans to harm Russia. As the Washington Post once described it:
The warren of cubicles was secured behind a metal door. The name on the hallway placard had changed often over the years, most recently designating the space as part of the Mission Center for Europe and Eurasia. But internally, the office was known by its unofficial title: “Russia House.”
The unit had for decades been the center of gravity at the CIA, an agency within the agency, locked in battle with the KGB for the duration of the Cold War. The department’s prestige had waned after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, and it was forced at one point to surrender space to counterterrorism officers.
But Russia House later reclaimed that real estate and began rebuilding, vaulting back to relevance as Moscow reasserted itself. Here, among a maze of desks, dozens of reports officers fielded encrypted cables from abroad, and “targeters” meticulously scoured data on Russian officials, agencies, businesses and communications networks the CIA might exploit for intelligence.
'Russia House' was deeply involved in creating the hoax about Russian interference in U.S. elections. Former nuclear weapon inspector Scott Ritter as well as others have asserted that political control over 'Russia House' is less stringent than desirable.
Another data point for the CIA's involvement was a piece by David Ignatius, its spokesperson at the Washington Post which openly threatened further attacks on Russia's strategic nuclear assets:
Ukraine’s dirty war is just getting started (archived) – David Ignatius / Washington Post
Ukraine has considered a naval version of the sneak-attack tactic it used so effectively on Sunday. The sources said the [Ukrainian intelligence service] SBU weighed sending sea drones hidden in cargo containers to attack ships of Russia and its allies in the North Pacific. But, so far, they apparently have yet to launch these operations.
'Russia House' continues to be busy. Still, even 'Russia House' needs a legal bases to act which usually comes in the form of presidential findings.
The conclusion from this is that the CIA, with the knowledge of the White House, has planned and directed the Ukrainian attack on Russia's strategic air fields.
The different qualities of the two attacks on June 1/2 require different responses. One response, throughout the last days, has come by strong Russian missile and drone attacks against military and military-industrial targets throughout Ukraine.
The Washington Post erred when it headlined:
Ukrainian cities pounded by Russia in retaliation for Sunday drone strike (archived) – Washington Post
The assault appears to be retaliation for Ukraine’s extensive attack on Russia’s bomber fleet on Sunday, targeting air bases across Russia and damaging many nuclear-capable aircraft.
The Russian attacks, by each some 500 missiles and drones over several nights, have obviously been in the plans for some time. They are not very special. Russian sources have explicitly said that these attacks were in response to Ukraine' terrorist attack:
Russian military retaliated against Kiev’s ‘terrorism’ – MOD – RT
The barrage, which included air-, sea-, and land-based missiles as well as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), was a response to recent “terrorist acts” carried out by Kiev, Russia’s Defense Ministry said on Friday.
Ukraine blew up railway bridges in Russia last week, derailing civilian and freight trains and killing at least seven and injuring over 120.
What we have so far seen as Russia's response to the attacks was only related to the terror attack which harmed civilians.
The retaliation for the attack on Russia's strategic nuclear assets has yet to come.
The U.S. knows this:
US Believes Russia Response To Ukraine Attack Not Over Yet: Officials – Reuters
The United States believes that Russian President Vladimir Putin's threatened retaliation against Ukraine over its drone attack last weekend has not happened yet in earnest and is likely to be a significant, multi-pronged strike, US officials told Reuters.
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The first official said Moscow's attack would be "asymmetrical," meaning that its approach and targeting would not mirror Ukraine's strike last weekend against Russian warplanes.
Russia launched an intense missile and drone barrage at the Ukrainian capital Kyiv on Friday and Russia's Defense Ministry said the strike on military and military-related targets was in response to what it called Ukrainian "terrorist acts" against Russia. But the US officials believe the complete Russian response is yet to come.
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Putin told President Donald Trump in a telephone conversation on Wednesday that Moscow would have to respond to attack, Trump said in a social media post.
Trump later told reporters that "it's probably not going to be pretty."
Trump claims that the U.S. had not known of the attack on Russia's strategic bombers. It is possible that Trump did not know about it. He may not have been informed to enable him to give a plausible denial. He may also simply lie about it. There is no doubt though in my mind that the U.S. was involved in it.
There is speculation that Russia will respond by attacking government buildings, especially those of the special services, in Kiev.
I doubt that this is a sufficient response for the attack on strategic nuclear assets. The Ukrainians would take a beating by such a strike but the U.S., which is undoubtedly behind the attack, would be left unharmed.
There would be nothing to deter the U.S., or others, to further chip away at Russia's nuclear retaliation capability by, for example, attacking – as Ignatius already announces – the bases of Russia's nuclear submarine fleets.
No. Any response for the attack on Russia's nuclear forces must include a very strong warning to the U.S. to not further walk down that path.
I do not know if the U.S. military still has some B-52 bombers on Diego Garcia. Destroying those would be adequate. Other potential targets are U.S. submarines and their bases. An attack on U.S. personnel that was involved in planing the attack would also be appropriate.
But all such operation could potentially lead to escalation. Especially while a hawkish Senate and blob is pushing against Trump's attempt to reestablish good relation with Russia.
Russia will need something different:
Let’s be honest: repeating slogans like “our response will be success on the battlefield” won’t cut it here. Ukraine’s leadership isn’t acting out of military logic, but emotional desperation. Their calculation is political. So Russia’s response must be political, too – emotionally resonant, unmistakably firm, and, above all, creative.
This doesn’t mean rash escalation, but we can’t rely on the old playbook. Hitting the same military targets again and again achieves little. Striking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure? Done. Launching another missile as a ‘demonstration’? Predictable. Escalating to mass casualties? Unnecessary and, frankly, counterproductive.
So what’s left?
Innovation.
Russia must now think asymmetrically. That might mean a covert action so unexpected that it catches Ukraine completely off guard. Or it could involve striking symbolic targets that shift the psychological balance. The key is to remind Kiev – and its patrons – that nothing they do goes unanswered, and that the cost of provocation will always outweigh the benefit.
You are invited to brainstorm in the comments what kind of operation might those criteria.
One asymmetrical response I can think of would be an attack on British, not U.S. owned, strategic assets. Any hit on Britain would be well deserved anyway. A strike against British nuclear assets would be strong enough to be understood by the U.S. as a severe warning while it would be unlikely to lead to escalation. The Brits are unable to escalate on their own and the U.S. will be unwilling to go there.
The planning for any asymmetrical operation will take a while. It therefore do not expect the Russian response for the attack on its nuclear assets to occur with the next days.
Later this week there will be another meeting of Russia's security council. The revenge for the strike on Russia's strategic assets will certainly be part of its agenda.
Journalist: My question is direct: why, despite the numerous provocations of the West, whether economic sanctions, hostile speeches or indirect military acts, does Russia not respond more head-on, more firmly, when you have all the means to impose respect and even force the West to reconsider its position? Is it a strategy, a restraint or something else.
Putin: Thank you for this question, it is legitimate and it resonates with many people in Russia and beyond. What you are asking here is actually the question of choosing between immediate strength and long-term strategy, between the reaction instinct and self-control. You see, Russia is not a young country, it is not a power born from a coup or an accident of history, it is the heir of a thousand years of civilization, trials, victories and rebirths. We have seen empires arise and collapse, we have survived invasions, revolutions, world wars, blockades, encirclement attempts, and we are still here. This is not the result of an aggressive posture, it is the result of our ability to observe, analyze, wait and act at the right moment. Yes, we have the necessary means, whether military, economic, energy or technological, to respond head-on to any attempt to provoke or pressure. Yes, we have modernized our armed forces, yes we have strengthened our economic sovereignty and yes we have forged solid alliances with nations that respect international law and the principles of multipolarity, but precisely because we have its means, we do not need to brandish them at any time as a threat. In history, the greatest mistakes have been made by those who have confused power and impulsiveness. To respond to each provocation with an immediate reaction is to enter into a spiral of conflicts that benefits no one, except perhaps those who live from disorder. And Russia, I firmly say, will not allow itself to be dragged into this spiral. We have other ambitions, other responsibilities, we love the world, this may come as a surprise from the mouth of a president whom some Western media describe as cold, strategic or even authoritarian. But I repeat, we love the world, we love peace, we respect peoples, their traditions, their right to choose their path, We do not believe in the uniformity imposed by a single power or a single cultural model. The international order must not be that of the strongest, but that of the fairest. Look at what is happening under the pretext of democracy, some states seek to impose their interests, to overthrow governments, to instrumentalize regional conflicts, have triggered trade or monetary wars, and when a country like Russia simply says no, we will not follow this logic, so they sanction it, they isolate it, they demonize it. But we will not give in, because our strength is in our calm, in our historical memory and in our vision of the future.
Posted by: Naive | Jun 9 2025 22:21 utc | 221
I’m not sure the response for the terrorist attack has been delivered either. The long-range strikes were no doubt already in the pipeline, as targets perpetually accumulate, and adding a “response” tag to them is more a matter of expediency, to placate those hungry for retaliation with something that was always going to take place regardless. There’s murmurings about Russia potentially upgrading the SMO to a CTO, with emphasis on the latter allowing for targeted assassination of individuals behind the planning and execution of terrorist acts, and their extended support networks.
While officially carrying out and taking credit for a number of high-profile assassinations, with the corresponding evidence base for the personal culpability of these individuals of course, would to my mind be a “reasonable” counter-terrorism response, I’m on the fence about the validity of this rumor. It gives me a hearty chuckle to think of the surprise people exhibit at the idea that Russia, during all this time, never seriously considered targeted assassinations as a possible tool, and I’m sure that goes double for the likely targets of such a reorientation, who no doubt have always taken precaution against possible retaliation. I rather suspect that, with every long-range strike against targets designated as having a tactical or strategic military significance, individuals likely to be within the zone of influence of these strikes have always been taken into consideration. I don’t myself believe that there can be a functional strategy of deterrence against terrorism or acts of sabotage, so whatever the response is, its main utility must be practical, straight up weakening the potential of similar acts in the future, while the emotional influence aspect is of secondary importance, itself best accomplished by a practical, material focus.
When it comes to a response that seeks to re-establish nuclear deterrence, things get a lot more complicated. For one, since we are not in a conflict where either side is arbitrarily using nuclear weapons, it’s an open question whether the nuclear deterrence is being significantly undermined, or if the narrative we’re presented with is meant to make us think that it is. A sabotage/infiltration mission against airbases that constitute part of a state’s nuclear-capable assets, performed by a proxy-force backed by other nuclear powers, while concerning in its implications, is also difficult to untangle in terms of precisely what it means. I’ve yet to come across the view that the Ukrainian operation created an existential threat for Russia, which is the fundamental condition for warranting a nuclear response, even if there’s doctrinal leeway in how one can interpret “existential” for purposes of operational flexibility. But, as far as I know, the world didn’t end.
In truth, the best response in pursuit of such an objective, to my mind would be one that is directly symmetrical — a sabotage operation performed by a different proxy force or internal saboteurs against adversarial nuclear assets, that can be plausibly linked to the Russians, but where any direct links can be denied just as plausibly. If the goal is to have all sides involved restate the position which everyone formally holds regardless, that nuclear war is off the table, meaning that strategic assets themselves are similarly untouchable, then even a failed attempt at doing something similar, or a hint of intent in this direction, may already be sufficient. If the planned response leans in this direction, then it’s unlikely that we as members of the general public will know anything about it, and whatever agreements or incriminations are made would probably be made behind closed doors.
That said, I believe the Russians are already milking the Ukrainian op for all that it’s worth politically. Western backed sabotage operations against nuclear assets shouldn’t sit well with anyone, including states otherwise backing Ukraine. I’m far from convinced that the operation was even intended to undermine nuclear deterrence, thinking instead that this angle may have been completely overlooked in the hunt for a symbolic strike against long-range bombers in general, and the political fallout that can be generated from this with a bit of precise diplomatic work may come as a surprise to those involved in planning and carrying out the operation. So, regardless of any other response, clandestine or formal, the Ukrainian operation has created a target rich political environment for Russia in strengthening its coalition against Ukraine and its Western backers and weakening the influence of its adversaries. Zelensky running his mouth about performing similar stunts with cargo ships to disrupt maritime traffic and target naval assets is not making any new friends, and the maniacal reputation being cultivated will undoubtedly rub off on his current “friends.” For the political side of the Russian response, the situation itself provides all the necessary innovation, requiring only an appeal to sanity, which if rejected will produce even greater dividends.
So, perhaps the most boring and predictable, tried and tested, but ultimately useful and rational response is some form of drone-tech embargo on Ukraine and its immediate appendages, or vice-versa, enforced both politically and militarily, and with international support. This would be asymmetrical, in that the incident would be used to pursue a different objective, undermining Ukrainian war-fighting capability in the high-tech sector. Such a response would not actually address the underlying causes for the incident itself, but piggy-back on the logic behind it. Western-backed Ukrainian terror-cells who have infiltrated Russia or other states, whatever their objectives actually are, would be best addressed through a formal terrorist designation, ideally with a security council mandate for their extermination, and an official sanctions regime against their backers, whether private individuals or state entities. True, it’s not the visceral oreshnik-strike against British naval bases or car-bombing Victoria Nuland, but a different kind of wishful thinking that I’m engaged in — of a system that works as intended, in preventing world events from spiraling out of control into complete chaos. To my mind, having the world increasingly turn against them, including isolation within international institutions, as a direct response to their own stunts, is more painful blowback to the has-been hegemon and the various globalist elites that serve it, than strikes on tangible assets, which they are perhaps too far removed from reality to know or care about anyway.
Posted by: Skiffer | Jun 9 2025 23:23 utc | 251
Adding to my last post@253, as I was parsing it for errors, I was reminded of the discussion we had in the last Ukraine thread. In the context of the question “Why people might not resist being herded to their deaths” Skarnkai@95 responded thusly,
Most people especially in modernity are very much sheep. Psychopaths/Serial Killers will candidly admit that their greatest advantage is that their targets never even think that they might be killed until it is too late.
The majority believe it will happen to someone else because of protagonist/main character syndrome, and there is insufficient communal spirit for people to rise up and fight for other people.
The reason I bring it up here, is in the context of targeted retaliation against individual Western elites, or even Ukrainian representatives. If we assume that such a strategy would cause them, as a group, to reconsider their decisions, and distance themselves from similar decisions in the future, aren’t we then also assuming that they as a group maintain a kind of community spirit uncharacteristic of individuals in the societies that they formally represent and govern? I sometimes come across the view, that if Zelensky is taken out in some spectacular fashion, whoever his replacement is will surely think twice about doing “X,Y & Z” but, if we assume that Zelensky and post-Zelensky are both protagonists, invincible in their own minds, then the opposite reaction is equally likely. If Zelensky is taken out, that’s fine, because he wasn’t me, the protagonist. And if I’m almost killed, spooked or threatened in some way, it doesn’t so much remind me of my own mortality, but incentivizes me to escalate. Who do my opponents think they are? Don’t they know that I’m the protagonist, invincible and able to do no wrong?
Going further, we can apply the same logic to entire states and populations. Would a strike against British assets cause the general public to rein in their deluded elites, or would it produce a similarly deluded reaction, with calls for escalation? Is Britain as a whole a protagonist on the international arena, in the view of its population? I’m sure the United States is. I’m sure, if this hypothesis represents a real phenomenon, that in cases where there’s dissonance between ruling or representative elites and the general public, the protagonist complex may be more pronounced among the general public than the elites, as well as vice versa naturally.
This is not a question I’ve dug too deeply into, especially in the context of response dynamics in a conflict scenario. But it’s an interesting facet to take into account, especially when considering what constitutes an effective response.
Posted by: Skiffer | Jun 9 2025 23:58 utc | 270
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