The Trial of Netanyahu
Part I, version 1.0
A rehearsal in writing:
Prosecutor: Israel had captured Hamas’ plan for an Oct 7th level event.
Hamas’ detailed plan included a section on how it would trick Israel into becoming complacent.
That is, making Israel believe Hamas had no interest in a large scale attack,
but rather was focused primarily on administering Gaza.
Why was the IDF unprepared and demonstrating lack of diligence on Oct 7th, 2023?
Witness: The consensus of the IDF intelligence services and the political administration
was that Hamas had appeared uninterested in a large scale attack.
Prosecutor: The IDF intelligence services and the political administration had become complacent?
Witness: Yes
Prosecutor: Hamas had misled Israel into complacency?
Witness: So it would seem.
Prosecutor: And the IDF intelligence services had shared Hamas’ plan
with the political administration. Why did they dismiss Hamas’ plan?
Witness: The Hamas Plan was dismissed because we assessed that they could not perform such
a large scale operation.
Prosecutor: In other words, they had become complacent and so they dismissed Hamas’ written
plan that told them Hamas would attempt to make them complacent. Is that correct?
Witness: The Hamas Plan was dismissed because we assessed that they could not perform such
a large scale operation.
Prosecutor: Creating complacency was beyond their capabilities?
Witness: No, I was referring to their attack capabilities.
Prosecutor: Answer the question. Was creating complacency beyond their capabilities?
Witness: Of course not, but the Hamas plan was dismissed in it’s entirety.
Prosecutor: Because of complacency on the part of the IDF intelligence services and the political administration?
Witness: They believed Hamas’ attack capabilities were insufficient for carrying out
such a large scale attack.
Prosecutor:…and they had been tricked into complacency.
Witness: This is going in circles. Let me rephrase this. The IDF intelligence services and the political administration knew Hamas’ was attempting to trick Israel into complacency,
but they dismissed that intelligence information as they deemed Hamas’ Plan, taken in it’s
entirety, was beyond their capabilities.
Prosecutor: (Hands Witness a print out) Read to the court what the Times of Israel
published on March 5, 2021, in the paragraphs I have marked.
Witness: “Meanwhile, according to Kan News, Israel’s security establishment assesses Hamas is currently taking advantage of the relative calm to train for future conflict with Israel and procure more advanced weapons.”
Prosecutor: Continue further…
Witness: “A senior Israeli military commander said in February that, according to IDF estimates, Hamas has replenished its arsenal since a 2014 war with Israel and now has a vast stock of rockets, guided missiles, and drones.
It also has acquired dozens of unmanned aerial vehicles and has an army of some 30,000 fighters, including 400 naval commandos who have received sophisticated training and equipment to carry out seaborne operations, the commander added. He spoke on condition of anonymity under military guidelines.”
Prosecutor: Do you take exception to these 2021 IDF estimates?
Witness: No
Prosecutor: You have just testified that the IDF intelligence services and the political administration believed Hamas’ attack capabilities were insufficient for carrying out
a large scale attack such as we saw on October 7th, 2023. Is “30,000 fighters, and a vast stock of rockets, guided missiles, and drones” insufficient for a large scale attack?
Witness: No
Prosecutor: Would Hamas’ attack resources be more in October 2023 than in 2021?
Witness: More…(flustered) but everyone believed that Hamas was more interested in administering Gaza.
Prosecutor: You just reversed yourself. It was a Hamas trick to make everyone complacent, and everyone knew it was a trick. Everyone knew it was a trick.
How can Hamas trick the political administration if they knew that Hamas was trying to trick them? Who was trying to trick whom?
Who was trying to trick whom?
Was the Netanyahu administration trying to convince Hamas that the IDF was indeed complacent? Was that the real trick?
Did they want Hamas to go forward with their plans to increase their attack resources;
did they want Hamas to train and train and train, AND I might add, right under the noses of the IDF,
so that Hamas would break through the Gaza Wall?
Did the IDF plan to ambush Hamas as it came through the Gaza Wall? This seems to me
the most useful of strategies.
Or did the political administration make a calculation that the more Israeli casualties
on October 7th, the greater the justification for a counter-attack upon Gaza?
Defense: I object. Does the prosecutor have a question, this is a speech.
Judge: The prosecution is advised to wait until their summation. Ask a specific question of the Witness.
Prosecutor: The border observers at the Gaza Wall were unarmed on October 7th.
Is this correct?
Witness: Yes
Prosecutor: Why were they unarmed?
Witness: No one seems to know.
Prosecutor: The border observers were warning their own families that an invasion was imminent,
for weeks and months they were reporting to the IDF intelligence services that unusual training was taking place right up against the Gaza Wall. What did the IDF intelligence services do with this information?
Witness: PM Netanyahu has said that he was told by his son that the border observations were not being entered into a database as they should have been. And therefore unavailable to the intelligence services.
Prosecutor: And this seems credible to you?
Witness: There has been further investigation into this matter, but at this time I am only aware of what the Prime Minister has said about it.
Prosecutor: The border observers, who were stationed right up near the Gaza Wall, were unarmed and the intelligence they gathered was not used or lost.
On October 7th, the highest echelon of the IDF staff were called into an emergency meeting in the very early morning hours of October 7th because of significant “Red Flag” information in Gaza. Were the border observers warned the morning of October 7th or put on alert?
Witness: Not that I am aware of.
Prosecutor: Did the political administration make a calculation that the more Israeli casualties on October 7th, the greater the justification for a counter-attack upon Gaza?
Witness: That is a horrid accusation and cannot be true. No!
Prosecutor: The border observers were stationed right up near the Gaza Wall and were unarmed for reasons unknown and they did not get sufficient – or any – warning the morning of Oct 7th?
Witness: …yes…I believe that is correct.
Prosecutor: Did Netanyahu do anything in the days leading up to October 7th to intentionally
provoke the Palestinians? And thus mandate that the IDF put their forces on heightened alert?
Witness: Palestinians are always acting provoked.
Prosecutor: The Palestinians knew that Netanyahu’s Abraham Accords promise not to annex any more of the West Bank before 2024 was about to lapse. Netanyahu in a UN speech before the world showed Palestine wiped from the map. This UN speech was held nine days before Israeli settlers invaded and defiled the al Aqsa Mosque. They did this on October 1st. They did this on October 2nd. They did this on October 3rd, and 4th and 5th.
Was there good cause for the IDF to be on heightened alert on October 7th?
Witness: Certainly
Prosecutor: On October 3rd or 4th, while Palestinians were inflamed about the defilement of al Aqsa Mosque, the infamous Rave Party was relocated to a location 5 km (3 miles) from the Gaza Wall. The officer in charge of approving such events had said, “No, it is too great of a security risk”. But IDF Division HQ, in an unusual move, inserted themselves into the decision making process and told the officer in charge to change his decision to a “Yes”.
Defense: Object, does the Prosecution have a question here?
Prosecutor: Your honor, I am asking the Witness whether he agrees with the known facts.
Judge: No speeches, ask a question.
Prosecutor: Did Hamas state in their detailed Plan that they would choose the Sabbath or a Jewish holiday for an attack?
Witness: Yes.
Prosecutor: Hamas’ reasoning was that large numbers of IDF would be on leave on either of those days, is this not correct?
Witness: It is correct.
Prosecutor: October 7th was BOTH of these, the Sabbath and a Jewish holiday. Were special arrangements made by the IDF to reinforce the Gaza sector during this time?
Witness: No, however, 100 commandos were moved to the West Bank as a precaution.
Prosecutor: Where did these commandos come from?
Witness: The Gaza sector.
Prosecutor: What is your estimate of how much of the IDF Gaza sector was on leave on October 7th?
Witness: 50%

Posted by: Otto Penn | May 21 2025 15:46 utc | 102