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U.S. Questions For European Governments – Another Wake-up Call
U.S. Vice President JD Vance has held up a mirror to Europe's 'elite' which did not like to acknowledge what could be seen in it: Minions, a lot of minions.
"But our common values?" cried Christoph Heusgen, the chairman of the Munich Security Conference.
What values Mr. Heusgen? Those displayed daily, with your applause, by the European colonists in Palestine?
"Like a headless chicken," is what the German broadsheet Frankfurter Allgemeine called the reaction of Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The descriptions fits to (nearly) all European leader.
Today U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio will meet Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Saudi Arabia. They will talk like grownups, EU be damned, and find ways to achieve peace in Ukraine and elsewhere.
The Europeans are aghast that they are not invited to take part in the talks.
But why would one invite parties to peace talks when they want nothing more than to sabotage those? The EU's foreign representative Kaja Kallas, a former mayor of Baltic villages, dreams of breaking up Russia into smaller states. How could Russia ever seriously negotiate with such people?
Today the Europeans will huddle in Paris to find some, any, way to get out of the mess. It won't work unless they acknowledge that the war in Ukraine has been lost.
The U.S. has recognized that there aren't enough troops, money or will to achieve a better negotiation position for what's left of Ukraine. The European 'elite' still fails to get that.
Any prolongation of the war will lead to more losses of land to Russia. Will it take the fall of Odessa for the Europeans to be finally ready for talks?
There are still dreams of 'security guarantees' which would be given to Ukraine after it files for peace or surrenders.
No such guarantees would make any sense. When peace is achieved there will be only one manner that can prevent a new outbreak of war: good behavior towards Russians and Russia by what will be left of Ukraine.
Failing that no European battalions strewn over Ukraine could prevent or even hinder another special military operation.
The U.S. negotiation team handed the Europeans a list of questions that will hopefully help them to come to grips with that:
The United States has sent European governments a set of questions about what they would need from the U.S. in order to provide Ukraine with security guarantees.
A U.S. State Department spokesperson said that Washington "has been clear that we expect European partners to take the lead in establishing a durable security framework and look forward to their proposals."
Here are the questions with answers by me in Italic:
1) What do you view as a Europe-backed security guarantee or assurance that would serve as a sufficient deterrent to Russia while also ensuring this conflict ends with an enduring peace settlement?
There is no Europe-backed guarantee possible that would be a 'sufficient deterrent'.
2) Which European and/or third countries do you believe could or would participate in such an arrangement?
Each could provide a few dozen soldiers (plus rotations). None has the size of forces and/or stamina to really commit to the mission.
Are there any countries you believe would be indispensable?
The U.S. – if it would give nuclear guarantees to prevent the eventual annihilation of any 'security guarantee' force.
Would your country be willing to deploy its troops to Ukraine as part of a peace settlement?
No!
3) If third country military forces were to be deployed to Ukraine as part of a peace arrangement, what would you consider to be the necessary size of such a European-led force?
500,000 men, i.e. about the same size as the Russian forces in that theater.
How and where would these forces be deployed and for how long?
No idea. Any stationary deployment would be open to a Russian surprise attack. A forever roving force is thinkable but not practicable.
4) What actions do U.S., allies and partners need to be prepared to take if Russia attacks these forces?
Nuke Russia and risk being nuked back.
5) What, if any, U.S. support requirements would your government consider necessary for its participation in these security arrangements?
Nukes and the will to use them. Plus satellite based intelligence to have at least some warning.
Specifically, which short-term and long-term resources do you think will be required from the U.S.?
See above.
6) What additional capabilities, equipment and maintenance sustainment options is your government prepared to provide to Ukraine to improve its negotiating hand and increase pressure on Russia?
Never ending bickering.
I am sure the questions above, as cited by Reuters, are not meant to really be answered.
They are supposed to induce some realist thinking.
Applying such one will come to the conclusion that nothing but a long term peace agreement, which does not necessitate 'guarantees', makes any sense.
Interesting read, and a reminder there is still a war(SMO) going on
Marat Khairullin Substack
Surprisingly, none of the seasoned experts paid attention to the second major news of last week. After a brief regrouping, Russian troops launched another phase of a large-scale offensive. Once again, the repeatedly patched defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Velikaya Novosyolka was breached, the encirclement near Andreevka is being liquidated, and the highly dangerous bridgehead near Kupyansk in the Dvurechnaya area continues to expand.
A crucial point: two weeks ago, the capture of Toretsk was officially announced, and this week, the “mopping up” of Chasov Yar is being completed. These two AFU fortresses formed the unified southeastern defensive line of Konstantinovka. The distance between them is approximately 20 kilometers in a straight line—this entire territory is a potential cauldron.
divgen.ru
Currently, our forces are systematically obliterating everything that remains of the AFU defenses in Chasov Yar. It is evident that preparations are underway on the Toretsk-Chasov Yar line for the next phase: a massive offensive on Konstantinovka. This will begin after expanding control over the highway between Pokrovsk and Konstantinovka near Vozdvizhenka. The movement is primarily towards the villages of Tarasovka and further to Aleksandropol (next to Tarasovka, I couldnt make it fit on the map above), with a potential threat to the village of Zarya—forming a second cauldron along the Zarya-Novobakhmutovka-New York-Shcherbinovka line and cutting off the critical H-20 highway. The depth of this operation exceeds 15 kilometers.
Andreevka Cauldron dated February 16th, 2025
When considering the situation alongside the breakthrough near Velikaya Novosyolka and the accelerated liquidation of the Andreevka cauldron, a picture emerges of a future grand operation by the Russian army.
Here, it is essential to understand some details. After the fall of Toretsk, the AFU pulled their best units to Pokrovsk. A similar situation is unfolding after the battle for Chasov Yar—the relatively intact Nazi forces are being redeployed there. Why?
Don’t laugh—the Ukrainian command is valiantly destroying those who weren’t finished off in Toretsk and Chasov Yar in suicidal counterattacks on Kotlino. Of course, they claim success—having captured some warehouses on the outskirts. But their victory celebrations lasted exactly two days. As soon as the frost set in, our forces calmly sent the “suicide squads” to Bandera and restored our positions.
Pokrovsk dated February 11th, 2025
These positions, by the way, are not even decisive today. Notice the detail—while the AFU “valiantly” perished in attacks on Kotlino (labeled Kotlyno on the map above) from the north, the Russian army was methodically crushing the Ukrop defenses on the opposite side of our salient near Udachnoe (Southwest of “Kotlyno”), expanding it.
This episode clearly demonstrates that the AFU is utterly incapable of influencing the implementation of our command’s plans, even on small, isolated sections of the front. From the perspective of the AFU’s strategic plans, the redeployment of the remnants of their best troops to Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk indicates that they genuinely believe the main Russian strike will occur here, as a major battle for Pokrovsk looms.
Let me emphasize again—this is the thinking of the single-celled Ukrainian generals, led by the bloodthirsty Syrsky, whose brain has long been replaced by a piece of raw meat. Otherwise, he wouldn’t have killed so many people in senseless operations.
However, the actions of the Russian troops clearly indicate that there will be several main strikes. The first is the battle for Krasnoarmeysk/Pokrovsk. The second is a simultaneous assault on Konstantinovka. The only question is the sequence.
But the most unpleasant thing for the Nazis is that Russia does not intend to stop here. A strike on the flank of the Ukrop’s conditional defensive line along the Kurakhovo-Pokrovsk line is already clearly visible. Our forces are advancing along the entire front from Andreevka to the village of Novy Komar—an offensive zone over thirty kilometers wide. On the southern flank, we need to cover just over 10 kilometers to reach the H-15 highway (the highway just under Novosyolka on the map below, which is labeled as “Novoselka”). Simultaneously, there is movement towards Gulyaipole along the highway connecting it with Novosyolka.
Velikaya Novosyolka direction dated February 16th, 2025
Here, it is worth noting again that the frost has set in, the ground has frozen, and the pace of our advance has accelerated. This is happening on literally all fronts. What does this mean? In the spring, as soon as dry weather sets in, the Ukrainians will have no chance at all. The question is not whether the Ukrainians will stop this flanking strike towards the H-15 highway or not. The question is when our forces will reach the settlements of Bogatyr and Komar on this highway—and from three sides simultaneously.
Reaching this line will mean that the entire front from Kurakhovo to Pokrovsk will turn into the same kind of cauldron as the one between Chasov Yar and Toretsk. Moreover, it is already evident that our forces are preemptively cutting this line into sections near Sribnoe and Novoelizavetovka. Speaking more broadly, our forces are advancing non-stop along all roads leading to the Dnepropetrovsk region in the Pokrovsk-Kurakhovo sector.
South of Pokrovsk, the front is simply collapsing, and the Ukies, who have concentrated their main forces in Krasnoarmeysk, do not know what to do about it. And here, there is no doubt—as soon as our troops approach Gulyaipole from the northeast, the entire Zaporozhye front will come alive. Let me remind you again—the encirclement of Konstantinovka and Pokrovsk, as well as the collapse of the front from Pokrovsk to Velikaya Novosyolka, are happening simultaneously. And the process is gaining momentum.
Now, let’s think—the frost will eventually end, and the spring mud will also come to an end. And then what? That’s right—the large spring-summer offensive will begin.
It’s interesting to consider what state the bridgehead near Dvurechnaya will be in by then, and what will happen in Kursk Oblast, or more likely, Sumy Oblast! Few doubt that our forces will stop at the border with Ukraine after what the AFU did in Sudzha.
In other words, the dynamics of the fighting show that the winter period on the front was used by our troops for regrouping and preparing for the next phase of the Special Military Operation (SMO).
All of this indicates that it is not in our interest to negotiate or halt hostilities at this time. And, judging purely by the situation on the front, we have no intention of doing so.
But then why did we enter into dialogue with the Americans? That’s right—to buy time and allow our military to finish off the Nazi hydra. Most likely, this is the number one task. And, incidentally, to negotiate something else as well. The initiative is on our side on both tracks—diplomatic and military.
The Americans will likely have to put something very substantial on the table to shift our position. Everything else is just empty talk. They can stomp their shoes in Munich all they want, but the situation on the ground shows that it hasn’t fooled us in the slightest. The main argument is the situation on the front. As for talking—why not? That’s Lavrov’s job.
Posted by: ctiger | Feb 18 2025 18:34 utc | 441
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