How will a president-elect Donald Trump handle the war in Ukraine?

I doubt that he will be able to close down the war in 24 hours, as he had promised. I rather think that he will escalate it. As I stated two weeks ago:

I expect the new president to double down on the anti-Russian project in Ukraine …

A new Wall Street Journal piece on Trump's promise does not give me any reason to believe otherwise.

Trump Promised to End the War in Ukraine. Now He Must Decide How. (archived
Foreign-policy advisers close to the president-elect put forth different versions of a plan to effectively freeze the front line

Like in Trump’s first term, different factions are set to compete to influence the Republican’s foreign policy. More traditionally minded allies such as Mike Pompeo, the former secretary of state now in contention to lead the Pentagon, are likely to push for a settlement that doesn’t appear to give a major win to Moscow. Other advisers, particularly Richard Grenell, a top candidate to lead the State Department or serve as national-security adviser, could give priority to Trump’s desire to end the war as soon as possible, even if it means forcing Kyiv into significant concessions.

But what are ways to do that?

One idea proposed inside Trump’s transition office, detailed by three people close to the president-elect and not previously reported, would involve Kyiv promising not to join NATO for at least 20 years. In exchange, the U.S. would continue to pump Ukraine full of weapons to deter a future Russian attack.

Under that plan, the front line would essentially lock in place and both sides would agree to an 800-mile demilitarized zone. Who would police that territory remains unclear, but one adviser said the peacekeeping force wouldn’t involve American troops, nor come from a U.S.-funded international body, such as the United Nations.

“We can do training and other support but the barrel of the gun is going to be European,” a member of Trump’s team said. “We are not sending American men and women to uphold peace in Ukraine. And we are not paying for it. Get the Poles, Germans, British and French to do it.”

The idea is laughable for several reasons. It does not take Russia's position into account. To continue to arm Ukraine while keeping a ceasefire is an obvious delaying tactic – nothing that will solve the conflict. Russia will only agree to something that concludes the war for good. The assumption that Russia would condone European NATO forces on the ground in Ukraine is also delusional.

Other ideas are just a variant of the above:

Earlier this year, Keith Kellogg and Fred Fleitz, who both served in Trump’s first White House, presented Trump with a blueprint that includes withholding weapons from Ukraine until Kyiv agrees to peace talks with Russia. Ukraine could still try to regain lost territory, but would have to do so through diplomatic negotiations.

The only real way to stop the war is for the U.S. to drop all support for Ukraine. The Europeans would bicker about that but, if only for budget reasons, would likely follow through. It would then be up to Ukraine, having lost all support, to make nice with Moscow.

Trump will likely select (neo-conservative) hawks to run his defense and foreign policies. They will take all possible measures, even against Trump's declared will, to keep the war going. For them it is down to the last Ukrainian, then down to the last European – if only to show that the U.S. will never give up.

To cover for this Trump and his acolytes may well offer an immediate ceasefire. But that will not work.

As Dimitry Trenin, the former director of Carnegie Moscow Center, writes in Kommersant (machine translation):

If we are talking about the cessation of hostilities along the existing line of contact, then this approach is unlikely to be taken seriously in Moscow. Such a "stop to the war" will be nothing more than a pause, after which the conflict will flare up with renewed vigor and, probably, with greater intensity. The nature of the future Ukrainian regime, the military and military-economic potential, as well as the military-political status of Ukraine are of paramount importance for Russia. In addition, it is necessary to take into account the new territorial realities.

All those items would require serious concessions by the U.S. which the future Trump administration will be unwilling to give:

It is hard to expect the Trump administration to agree to a substantive dialogue on these issues, much less to take into account Russia's core interests. If he shows readiness, the dialogue will start, but even in this case, an agreement is far from guaranteed.

There is also the major issue of trust:

A separate topic is what can be considered satisfactory guarantees in conditions when both parties do not trust each other at all. Two "Minsk" agreements (2014 and 2015 agreements) were violated, the third attempt — the "Istanbul" initialed in 2022 — was thwarted, so the fourth one is unlikely to happen. The only guarantee that Russia can rely on is a guarantee for itself.

The only guarantee to Russia is a permanent (conventional) superiority over Ukrainian forces. Any new arms for Ukraine would undermine that. But acknowledging Russia's superiority is exactly the loss the U.S. does not want to concede.

The author of Events in Ukraine comes to a similar conclusion:

Personally, this is what I predict happening if Trump gets into office (if the ‘if’ is even necessary at this point). Trump proposes Putin a ‘compromise deal’ in Ukraine. Putin refuses, given that he’s winning on the battlefield – see my military newsletters. Trump is enraged by this loss of face, and encouraged by his Ukraine hawk advisors like Pompeo (who called for a "$500 billion lend-lease for Ukraine” this July), what does he do next? De-escalate? Hard to believe.

Indeed – hard to believe.

The war will go on. Russia will have to, as Gordon Hahn predicts, cross the Dnieper, retake Odessa and threaten Kiev. Zelenski is unlikely to politically survive such a situation. Other forces would come to the fore:

The pivot of decision-making will then shift to Kiev and the question of whether Zelenskiy or any Ukrainian leader is able to start peace talks at all, no less ones that presuppose loss of territory as part of any settlement with Moscow, without prompting a domestic political crisis. The resulting coup poker game could involve a Kiev-based coup led by intelligence and security forces, the HRU and/or SBU, or emerge from the periphery at the front with ultranationalists and neofascists such as the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps (DUK), Azov, and others, well-armed as part of Ukraine‘s armed forces, turning their guns around and marching on Kiev in order to seize power.
…
A U.S.-backed coup might pre-empt, precede or facilitate such a turn of events. Washington and Brussels might gamble that easing or allowing the radicals‘ rise to power is he only way to rally what remains of the Ukrainian nation so the effort to hand Moscow a 'strategic defeat‘ can be realized and further NATO expansion can be secured.

But a fascist coup, supported by the U.S. or not, will not be able to change the situation on the ground. Russia would still have the upper hand and win the war.

Only a direct intervention by NATO, could be able to change that trajectory. That however would likely expand the war into a global contest that not even Trump's hawks will want to pursue.