By now it has become accepted wisdom that Ukraine is losing the war against Russia.
Western governments are slowly accepting that their Ukrainian proxy forces have no chance to turn the situation around. None of their own populations or military are prepared to get themselves engaged in combat. Meanwhile the war support for Ukraine is eating into their budgets.
The situation necessitates to push for an end of the war – at least a temporarily one.
The Zelenski government is officially against any talk of ceasefire or piece without it being a full Ukrainian victory. But behind close doors such talks are preceding.
That is at least what the editors of the Financial Times are telling the public:
Ukraine’s shifting war aims (archived)
In Washington and some western capitals, meanwhile — and in the corridors of Kyiv — the mood is shifting: from a determination that the war can end only with Russia’s army driven from Ukraine, to the reluctant recognition that a negotiated settlement that leaves the bulk of the country intact may be the best hope. Yet Kyiv is not being given the support it needs even to achieve that scaled-back goal.
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[G]rappling simultaneously with an escalating Middle East war, even some western capitals that previously insisted on the need to defeat Russia’s Vladimir Putin militarily are recalibrating their goals. Some Kyiv officials, too, fret in private that they lack the personnel, firepower and western support to recover all territory seized by Russia. There is talk behind closed doors of a deal in which Moscow retains de facto control over the roughly one-fifth of Ukraine it has occupied — though Russia’s sovereignty is not recognised — while the rest of the country is allowed to join Nato or given equivalent security guarantees. Under that umbrella, it could rebuild and integrate with the EU, akin to West Germany in the cold war.
The plan is to concede some land to Russia while giving a NATO protection cover to a rump Ukraine.
There are at least four groups involved here who will not agree to such a solution.
All NATO countries have to agree to take up new members. If the western parts of Ukraine are allowed to join NATO who is going to keep Ukraine under control? What would happen if it provokes another war with Russia? Will all current NATO countries find that agreeing to Ukraine's NATO membership will increase their own security?
Some countries, like the Russo-phobe Baltic ones, would probably support that step. But I do no believe that any of the more sane NATO members will be willing to risk a war with Russia over an issue, Ukraine, that is only of marginal interest to them.
An Ukrainian membership in the EU will see similar hurdles. Two-third of the EU budget are agricultural subsidies designed to allow for a common market without destroying the farming communities in this or that country. The largest share of those subsidies currently goes to Poland. Ukrainian land is extremely fertile. It can produce crops at much lower costs than its EU neighbors. The EU does not have and will not have the budget to compensate for that. Any entering of Ukraine into the EU would thereby lead to losses for farmers in any if not all current EU member states.
The price advantage of Ukrainian agricultural products is the reason why Polish farmers have just restarted their blocking of border crossings with Ukraine (machine translation):
Polish farmers blocked traffic at several checkpoints last winter and spring. They demanded that the Polish government suspend the transit of Ukrainian agricultural products, the import of which was previously prohibited.
The farmers of Poland have an unusually big influence on the country's policies. Poland will thereby likely be the country most opposed to a EU membership of Ukraine. Others will agree with it.
Ukraine itself would of course also have to agree to a ceasefire or peace agreement that would lead to a loss of some 25% of its land. While the average Ukrainian may well favor a land for peace deal a distinct minority on the radical right is adamant against it. As a previous FT piece noted (archived):
“If you get into any negotiation, it could be a trigger for social instability,” says a Ukrainian official. “Zelenskyy knows this very well.”
“There will always be a radical segment of Ukrainian society that will call any negotiation capitulation. The far right in Ukraine is growing. The right wing is a danger to democracy,” says Merezhko, who is an MP for Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party.
The radical segment in Ukraine's society, aka the Nazis, are heavily armed and experienced in combat. They do have sympathy in the higher ranks of the Ukrainian army. The former Chief of Staff General Zaluzny is known for good relations with it as is General Budanov, the current head of the military intelligence service.
A civil government of Ukraine which wants to engage in serious peace negotiations will first have to neutralize those radical forces. Without that it will have little chance to survive their onslaught.
The fourth party that would have to agree to such a ceasefire, and NATO membership for a rump Ukraine, is of course Russia.
Russia was, is, and will be against any membership in NATO of any part of Ukraine:
In January 2008, William Burns, the U. S. Ambassador to Russia at the time, sent a classified cable to Washington in which he summarized Russia’s concerns about NATO expansion. The subject line, “Nyet means Nyet,” or “No means No,” conveyed in a single word Burns’ belief that NATO expansion into Ukraine was “brightest of all redlines” for Russia.
Russia largely launched its special military operation in 2022 to prevent a NATO membership for Ukraine. It was and is sure that any encroachment of NATO in Ukraine will be used to weaken Russia. It is now winning the war in Ukraine. To now agree on some form of NATO membership for a rump of Ukraine would contradict the war's purpose.
The ceasefire or peace plan the FT editorial foresees depends on the agreement of all NATO and EU member states as well as the approval by the Ukrainian and Russian government. Neither of the four groups is likely to sign off on it.
The FT editors know this well:
This scenario relies, however, on ambitious assumptions. One is that the US and its allies must be prepared to offer Nato membership or the necessary guarantees, when they have so far been reluctant to grant Kyiv a binding path into the alliance.
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A second assumption is that Russia’s president can be induced to negotiate and accept such a scenario. But preventing Ukraine from joining Nato was one of his ostensible war aims.
But instead of rejecting the plan because it is obviously infeasible the editors demand to apply more violence to achieve its acceptance:
Whether the goal is outright victory or bringing Russia to the table, western allies need to strengthen Ukraine’s hand. The Kremlin can only be pushed into talks on a deal that might be satisfactory for Kyiv, and the west, if it feels the costs of fighting on are too high. And any resolution to the war that enables all or part of Ukraine to survive and prosper will need guarantees of its security.
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We cannot yet know how the war will end. But it is within the west’s power — and interest — to help Ukraine regain the upper hand over its foe.
The editorial is a demonstration of the childish naivety that is predominant in western government thinking: Ukraine is losing. Propose a peace agreement that has no chance of getting implemented. Demand to intensify and prolong the war to -may be- make the infeasible peace plan less infeasible.
But Ukraine and the west have lost the war. Negotiating a ceasefire of peace deal with oneself, as the FT editors do, does no make it plausible. All ways to a deal that is "satisfactory for Kyiv, and the west" have long been foreclosed – by the west. There will simply be no deal like that – ever.
Denying that reality will only lead to higher losses for Ukraine and for the west.