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Ukraine Open Thread 2024-229
News & views related to the war in Ukraine …
According to the Russian Defence Ministry report on the progress of the special military operation (14 September – 20 September 2024) the Ukrainian military lost a total of 24 tanks and 125 other Armored Fighting Vehicles during that week.
Of these only 6 tanks and 18 AFV were lost along the 1,000+ kilometer frontline within Ukraine. A total of 18 tanks and 117 AFV were lost due to the Ukrainian incursion of the Russian Kursk oblast.
This emphasizes the fact that the Ukrainian forces has used most of its material resources into the morale lifting public-relation campaign in Kursk without achieving much else, if anything, of value. There is little chance that any of the losses incurred during that short campaign will ever get a replacement.
The incursion will thus become a historic lecture of how not to employ ones scarce resources for short term political reasons.
The former Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Sergei Avakyants quoted by J. Helmer (for the context read the whole article https://johnhelmer.net/sending-a-boy-to-do-a-mans-job-vladimir-medinsky-to-negotiate-istanbul-ii/#more-90348):
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In Russia, it is dangerous for the current government to lose wars, especially when for a long time this government held parades and convinced the people of the invincibility of their native army. Defeat will cause disappointment and loss of faith, but not in the army, rather in the political leadership.
… the pressure on Russia from its historical opponents will only increase, and the escalation process will enter an irreversible phase. The enormous resources currently invested in the indirect hot war of the collective West against our country will be redirected to finance all destructive and anti-state forces (regional separatism, ‘the fight against the rotten corrupt regime’, ‘the promotion of universal freedoms and values’, etc.). Various states ‘historically offended’ by our country will begin to make territorial claims against Russia from all sides.
The sanctions will not be lifted, but they may take even harsher and more painful forms for our economy. Part of the elite — weakened but still strong compradors, the remaining part of the ‘fifth column’ in the country – will painlessly adapt to the conditions of the collapse of the state. The country’s leadership, elite groups directly integrated into state structures, will be destroyed (politically, economically, and some even physically). No one will be forgiven, and no one will be forgotten.
It is very important for the West to once again demonstrate to the entire world what awaits the ‘rebels’ who have encroached on its model of world order. There is no hope for support from allies due to the absence of any (except Belarus). It will be necessary to answer a very difficult question that is already forming in the public consciousness: ‘For what were so many sacrifices made if the goals of the SVO were not achieved, and is not peace concluded at the expense of fundamental concessions to enemies a defeat for Russia?’ The people, having once again lost their ‘Faith’ and ‘Tsar’, will remain silent, watching the collapse of their ‘Fatherland’. All this will not happen overnight, but by historical standards very quickly – in five to seven years.
To avoid all this, Russia must choose the second option. It can be briefly described in two words – ‘Fight and Victory’. This option is unattractive and uncomfortable. It requires the leadership to assume the heaviest burden of responsibility, implement unpopular decisions, change the usual, established way of life for millions of people, introduce a different system of values and life priorities for the ruling elite. ‘Option No. 2’will require (for some time) exerting all efforts, attracting new personnel selected on the basis of professionalism, patriotism and the prevalence of the interests of society and the state over personal ones. It will be necessary to carry out a significant reorganization and restructuring of various government structures and a significant part of the entire state mechanism.
The victory must be unconditional – neither enemies, nor partners, nor our own people should have even the slightest doubt that this is Russia’s Victory. The goals declared by the President must be achieved without fail: access to the 2014 administrative borders of the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions; denazification – a change of the ruling regime in Ukraine, a change in the Constitution of Ukraine and current legislation (permission for the UOC [Ukrainian Orthodox Church], official bilingualism, a ban on Nazi-Bandera ideology, etc.); demilitarization – constitutionally activated neutral status of Ukraine, prohibition of deployment on its territory of foreign military bases and military contingents (including advisers and instructors), heavy weapons, types of weapons capable of threatening the territory of Russia; after the invasion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces into the Kursk region, Ukrainian statehood in its current form should not exist or, in extreme cases, can be preserved, but weakened as much as possible.
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Helmer concludes:
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For the time being, no Russian mainstream media nor alternative press has reported Medinsky’s reemergence as Putin’s personal negotiator of end-of-war terms. The military bloggers Boris Rozhin (Colonal Cassad) and Mikhail Zvinchuk (Rybar) refused to respond to questions about Medinsky’s role. Dmitry Rogozin, currently the senator representing Zaporozhye and a future presidential succession candidate, has not commented publicly on Medinsky as Putin’s spokesman for negotiations.
The Communist Party, which fiercely attacked Medinsky’s performance in Istanbul-I, has warned against the prospects for Istanbul-II but party leaders and the party spokesman refuse to answer questions on Medinsky’s current role.
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Posted by: burak | Sep 27 2024 11:43 utc | 239
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