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Ukraine SitRep: Western Media Dismiss Ukraine’s Kursk Offensive
Two weeks ago, when the Ukrainian army started its incursion into Russia's Kursk region, I had expected the Russia army to dispel the Ukrainians within a few days. That did not happen as it took time to bring enough troops towards that new frontline.
I also underestimated the size of the force the Ukrainians had made available for the operation. It is now estimated to be in the range of 10,000 to 30,000.
For now the Ukrainian army attack has mostly be stopped though it is still trying to expand what it holds in the very rural area.
Be that as it may – the operation, even when sustained longer, makes little sense.
It gives a temporary moral high to the Ukrainian army and may allow Zelenski and the British sponsors of this operation to prolong the war.
The plan in Kiev is not to negotiate but to prolong the war and to convince the west to further finance it. This would have the advantage of moving billions of additional dollar from western sources into the various pockets in Kiev with Zelenski and Yermak cashing in the largest share of it.
But all this comes at the cost of the Ukrainian defense in Donbas.
The Kursk incursion took so many troops from the defense of the Donbas that the front lines there can no longer be held up. It has also diverted scarce artillery ammunition which the Donbas defenders now lack. The Ukrainian defense in Donbas is currently crumbling with the Russian side taking several villages per day.
There was some hope expressed that Russia would divert troops from its Donbas attack towards Kursk. But the Kursk operation is on Russian ground where the Russian army is allowed to use conscript unit to defend the country. Conscripts are not allowed to take part in the operation within Ukraine. This gives the Russian army a large reserve that it can use against the incursion. It should be sufficient to end it.
Even at the beginning of the operation some supporters of Ukraine had feared that the incursion would break the Donbas defense:
Tatarigami_UA @Tatarigami_UA – 14:23 UTC · Aug 6, 2024
The situation in the Pokrovsk direction is critical, with defenses in several areas collapsed and yet to stabilize, largely due to a shortage of personnel. Diverting nearly a brigade to launch an assault on Kursk Oblast, which lacks strategic sense, borders on mental disability.
Various western oriented media have now taken a similar view:
After being initially heralded as a brilliant military stroke, the Kursk operation could end up becoming a trap for the Ukrainian Army, these analysts said.
Ultimately, the expansion of the war to new areas will, over time, favor the side with bigger resources, the analysts said. With triple the population and a larger industrial base, that side remains Russia.
One Ukrainian artillery brigade commander in eastern Ukraine told the Financial Times that part of the reason for the Russian advance was Kyiv moving its scarce resources north.
His troops were back to rationing shells for their canons — the first time since US aid to Ukraine was held up by Congress — because ammunition had been reallocated for the incursion into Russia’s Kursk region.
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While Kyiv does not comment on casualties, the incursion has already come at a material cost: Ukraine lost at least 51 pieces of valuable military equipment, including German Marder vehicles, US-made Stryker vehicles and Himars rockets, compared to 27 such losses on the Russian side, according to the open-source intelligence researcher Naalsio.
"There is a risk of overextending, and there is a risk that precious personnel and resources may be lost and that Putin may use this as a pretext for further escalation," said Michael A. Witt, professor of international business and strategy at King's Business School, London.
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Emil Kastehelmi, a military expert from the Finland-based open-source intelligence analysis firm Black Bird Group, said that the incursion risks attrition of Ukraine's precious reserves when it still has issues with manpower.
Hopes that Ukraine’s incursion into Russia would relieve pressure on the eastern front are not being realized as Moscow’s forces approach Pokrovsk.
Ukrainian servicemen in the Pokrovsk region say the Kursk incursion has not altered Russian attack — if anything, the pressure has increased in recent days.
There are many more, including alternative sources, tooting the same horn.
I agree that the incursion into Kursk, while tactically successful, makes little strategic sense as it will lead to large losses of men and ground in the Donbas. It is also too costly for the units involved in it.
But that holds only as long as Ukraine does not have another high card to play.
Could it be that it has more reserves or tricks that it could apply elsewhere?
I doubt this as I do not see where additional reserves could have been formed or come from.
In the Pokrovsk area the Russians are not just making fast progress toward that city, but have also turned south into the rear of the Ukrainian defences there. They can drive all the way down to Kurakhove, taking the last major defence line along the heights and forcing the Ukrainians to surrender all territory east of there or risk being surrounded. With these areas of the remaining strong defensive lines in the south taken, and Pokrovsk taken, the Russians will face a much less fortified, urban, industrialized and hilly terrain. In addition, the taking of Niu York/Toretsk and an advance toward Konstyantinivka will force the Ukrainians to exit all positions east of the line between Toretsk and Konstyantinivka and south of Chasiv Yar – yet more of the Ukrainian defensive line removed. An utter disaster for Ukraine taking place before the rains come in October.
At the same time the rapid devolution of the Ukrainian forces into an infantry relying on lightly armoured and wheeled vehicles (MRAPS – mine resistant ambush protected, also known as light tactical vehicles) such as the Iveco LAV (Norway), the Oshkosh M ATV (US), MaxxPro MRAP (US), Bushmaster AUV (Australia), Roshel Senator (Canada), together with the hardly armoured US Humvee and SUV “technicals” with a heavy machine gun on the back, and lots of civilian cars for mobility is very evident in the rapidly diminishing losses of AFV/IFV/APC vehicles reported by the Russians. In the more open, flat, less industrialized and fortified areas that the Russians will be moving into such a mix of vehicles and men on foot will make easy targets for fixed wing ground attack aircraft, helicopters, drones, guided artillery, and Russian tanks and armoured fighting vehicles (e.g. BMP-3s). The winter months will even remove what natural cover such troops will have, and provide a nightmare for the wheeled MRAPS and Humvees while the Russians still have predominantly tracked vehicles designed to operate in a Russian/Ukrainian winter (and much better during the “season of mud” that will start in mid-October).
The destruction of Ukrainian anti-aircraft, anti-battery radar and EW systems will just compound this. As will the rapid diminution of Ukrainian artillery at a rate of about 30 a day (900 a month). As will the very significant reduction in the levels of financial and military support being provided to Ukraine.
Ukrainian losses for August 21st, as reported by the Russian defence ministry:
– Sever Group (Kharkov): 100 troops, 3 motor vehicles, 3 artillery pieces.
– Zapad Group (Luhansk area): 470 troops, 1 tank, 4 motor vehicles, 2 artillery pieces.
– Yug Group (Donetsk north): 700 troops, 3 motor vehicles, 8 artillery pieces, 2 EW systems.
– Tsetr Group (Donetsk south): 630 troops, 1 HMV, 12 motor vehicles, 8 artillery pieces.
– Vostok Group (southern front): 130 troops, 1 IFV, 5 motor vehicles, 3 artillery pieces.
– Dnepr Group: 30 troops, 5 motor vehicles, 2 artillery pieces.
In total: 2,060 troops (about 2,500 with undercounting: 75,000 a month). About average.
1 tank, 1 IFV, 1 HMV, 29 motor vehicles. The previous day there were no AFV/IFV/APC losses, underlining the transformation of the Ukrainians to an infantry using light armoured vehicles, Humvees, “technicals” (pickup trucks with mounted weapons), and civilian vehicles for mobility.
26 artillery pieces, a bit lower than normal, at a rate of around 800 per month. 2 EW systems. These are still catastrophic daily loss levels.
In addition, the Russians have become adept at shooting down and jamming Ukrainian (i.e. Western manufactured) guided bombs, missiles, rockets and the mostly locally-made drones.
Posted by: Roger | Aug 21 2024 17:09 utc | 45
The questions now facing us are the same questions that faced us in 2022. 1. How will the Russians deal with the problem of remnant Ukraine. 2. Will the Russians impose reverse sanctions on Europe.
The second question may become superfluous. The Europeans are doing the work for the Russians and are still imposing sanctions on themselves. But they’re still partially dependent on Russia for fuel and raw materials so there’s room there for reverse sanctions should the Russians decide to impose them.
The first question is unresolved as yet. As many opinions as there are people to give them. But a recent discussion elsewhere led to a consideration of a (possibly unlikely!) solution to the problem of remnant Ukraine. It’s one that’s been hovering in the air for a couple of years now – that the Ukrainians might solve the problem themselves!
………………………….
With reference to the Putin statement – “Russia President Vladimir Putin, Address to Security Council, August 12, 2024: Now it is clear why the Kiev regime refused our proposals to return to a peaceful settlement plan, as well as proposals from interested and neutral mediators.” I believe that statement has a wider application than is immediately apparent.
The Russians are faced with a problem few on our side of the fence recognise. The problem of remnant Ukraine.
For eastern Ukraine the future is clear. The four oblasts will become Russian and as much or as little of the remaining Kharkov-Odessa arc as the Russians see fit. Maybe more. We don’t know yet. That leaves the Russians with a problem. Remnant Ukraine.
Remnant Ukraine the Russians will not wish to absorb or even to occupy. We must remember that in early 2022 the expectation in the West had been that the Russians would defeat the Ukrainians in short order but then would find themselves faced with a long and wearing guerilla war. Ukraine would then become “Russia’s Afghanistan” in the phrase that all were using at the time, and the weapons we had provided would be suitable for that as they were not suitable for the combined arms warfare the Ukrainians found themselves in the event facing. As Borrell pointed out, so too the training.
That’s because we had trained them before 2022 in urban warfare and small unit fighting. Had the Russians “taken Kiev in three days” as we expected, that would not have been the end of it. They would then have found themselves facing an insurrection. Supported by the West and with a large number of suitably armed fighters determined to keep the fight going that would have been an insurrection very difficult to cope with. That was the same problem we faced in Iraq. Defeating the Iraqis was child’s play. Occupying and pacifying them afterwards, not.
The Russians sidestepped that problem in a way we had not expected. Instead of finding themselves chasing all over the country rooting out fighters, they established themselves behind secure lines and allowed the fighters, and as much equipment with them as the West cared to supply, to come to them to be destroyed. We’re now seeing the end of that process of destruction of fighters and equipment.
That still leaves the problem of remnant Ukraine.
If left unoccupied remnant Ukraine will be, to use Sleboda’s term, a “zone of destabilisation and insecurity”. Budanov or his like will be running assassination or sabotage missions into Russia indefinitely. Missile attacks, using missiles supplied by the West but the use of which the Western powers can deny responsibility for, will remain a common occurrence. The Russians will find themselves no more secure than they were before 2022.
If occupied, remnant Ukraine would need heavy and manpower intensive policing.
It would not be the drain on Russian resources that it would have been in 2022. Most of the ultra-nationalists will have fled. Much of the equipment that would have been at their disposal has been destroyed in the killing fields of the Donbass. And the population has been sharply reduced since 2022, mostly by emigration but also by the fighting. Guesses on that – they can only be guesses – range from 17 million to 25 million. By the time the fighting has stopped, and the emigration, it’ll probably be in the lower part of that range. Nevertheless occupying and policing remnant Ukraine will be an unwelcome drain on Russian resources.
There is an additional factor that is seldom considered: the Brics countries, or the SCO countries, the developing bloc of non-Western countries. The strengthening of diplomatic and sometimes military links between these countries gathered pace during the various contacts between them at the end of the Afghan war and has continued since.
The more powerful members of this bloc are most reluctant to see alterations in existing boundaries. Setting a precedent for that in Ukraine would leave them themselves vulnerable. What of Kashmir, what of XinJian, if boundaries can be altered like that? And particularly in Africa, the sympathy for Russia in this war derives from the belief that Russia is defending itself from a predatory West. That sympathy would markedly reduce if it looked as if Russia was pursuing the war for territorial gain. From their point of view the taking of eastern Ukraine can be justified by the argument that in reality it was the only way of protecting the inhabitants of the region. The taking of western Ukraine, where the population mix is different and the majority of the inhabitants clearly do not wish to be under Russian rule, would be for many of the Brics countries not only a step too far. It would in their eyes turn the Russians from defenders against Western aggression to no more than land grabbers!
That is the Russian dilemma. Leave remnant Ukraine unoccupied and it becomes a country that will remain a running sore to them. Occupy it, and it becomes an expensive liability and one that will weaken their credibility within the new bloc they attach so much importance to. That last is important for reasons of trade too. The infrastructure required to accommodate the new patterns of trade is expensive and that demands long term commitment. Who will trust themselves to enter into such commitments, if they fear the Russians might depart from the principles of non-interference in the affairs of others on which the new bloc will be founded?
A long reply so I had better speed up. The Russians are aware, as we in the West are not, that the current government in Kiev is no normal government. It is dominated by the ultra -nationalists we put in power in 2014. Zelensky’s war policies are in direct opposition to the peace policy he was elected on by a large majority. Repression is the norm and corruption is if anything worse than it was before. It is a government only in place because it is locked in place by Western support and by the powerful internal security apparatus.
Increasingly, within the population and even within the Kiev government, the Ukrainians are aware that they are a proxy being used by the West as a means of attacking Russia, and a proxy that is being used for that purpose to its own grievous harm. Also, and this matters, a proxy aware that it was promised unlimited western support “as long as it takes” but is now finding that the West is reneging on that promise and in any case has no effective military support it can give in this theatre.
The Russians are hoping that the people will themselves be able to get clear of this government. They do not want the type of solution that failed for us in Iraq. They want the solution they looked for in Syria, where the reconciliation teams did more than the soldiers ever could to defeat the jihadis. In fact at the start they were sending analogous teams out into Ukraine in the hope of achieving the same result. Since February 2022 they have been searching for that solution from within Ukraine unceasingly. We may see the misrepresented Qatar talks as but merely one component of that search. There will be many other such components in the background.
Our response? We may see the recent Kursk offensive, and it has become clear now that that was a western inspired offensive, as a means of holding the Ukrainians to a war it is not in their interests to fight and that an increasing number of them do not wish to fight. When, therefore, we look at the future for remnant Ukraine as a bleak choice between occupation or continuing as a Western proxy we should be aware that there is a third possibility. One I believe the Russians are hoping for. That is, that the people of remnant Ukraine will free themselves from an unwanted and ineffectual government and themselves arrive at the solution to the problem of remnant Ukraine.
A remote possibility, as it seems at the moment, but a possibility that should not be ignored as we wonder how this war will end. When Putin said “Now it is clear why the Kiev regime refused our proposals to return to a peaceful settlement plan, as well as proposals from interested and neutral mediators”, he had been hoping for a resolution to the conflict coming from inside Ukraine. We’ve just blocked that possible resolution with that otherwise inexplicably foolish Kursk offensive. I hope we don’t keep on attempting to block it. Time, one might feel, for us to let the Ukrainians off the hook.
https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/ukraine-rolls-the-dice-on-kursk-incursion
Posted by: English Outsider | Aug 21 2024 17:44 utc | 66
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