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U.S. Is Withholding Aid To Push Ukraine Towards Negotiations With Russia
Yesterday, at 9:46 local time, Strana published (machine translation):
Volodymyr Zelensky to address US senators via video link today – The Washington Post
Today, President Volodymyr Zelensky will address US senators via video link with a request to approve financial assistance to Ukraine. …
Twelve hours later, at 21:43 local time, this piece came out:
"Something's happened." Zelensky canceled his speech to US senators at the last moment
President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky canceled his speech to lawmakers scheduled for today at the last moment. This was announced by the head of the Democratic majority in the US Senate, Chuck Schumer.
"By the way, Zelensky was not able to join our briefing at 15:00 (22:00 Kiev time) – something happened at the last minute," Schumer said.
Well, yes, something had happened:
Ukraine Aid Falters in Senate as Republicans Insist on Border Restrictions
President Biden’s urgent push to replenish Ukraine’s war chest and send aid to Israel is on the brink of collapse in the Senate, where Republicans are prepared on Wednesday to block the funding unless Democrats agree to add strict measures to clamp down on migration at the U.S. border with Mexico.
A classified briefing with administration officials called to shore up support devolved into a partisan screaming match on Tuesday afternoon, with Republicans angrily accusing Democrats of trying to steamroller over their demands for a border crackdown.
It would have been easy for the Democrats to commit a few billions for border security. But Biden wants to end the war in Ukraine. Starving it of money is the easiest way to push it towards negotiations.
All this was planned by the Pentagon think tank RAND which, early this year, published a study about how to end the war in Ukraine:
Avoiding a Long War – U.S. Policy and the Trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
(A 2019 study by RAND, Extending Russia – Competing from Advantageous Ground, had recommended to openly arm Ukraine to keep Russia busy. It has been the basis of U.S. Ukraine policy ever since.)
But in early 2023 RAND had turned a corner and argued that a prolonged war in Ukraine will be too costly for the U.S. to sustain:
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The biggest Ukraine problem the White House currently has is President Vladimir Zelenski who has rejected any and all negotiations with Russia.
The RAND study had foreseen such a situation and had found ways to push Ukraine towards talks with Russia:
[T]he United States could decide to condition future military aid on a Ukrainian commitment to negotiations. Setting conditions on aid to Ukraine would address a primary source of Kyiv's optimism that may be prolonging the war: a belief that Western aid will continue indefinitely or grow in quality and quantity. At the same time, the United States could also promise more aid for the postwar period to address Ukraine's fears about the durability of peace. Washington has done so in other cases, …
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Linking aid to Ukrainian willingness to negotiate has been anathema in Western policy discussions and for good reason: Ukraine is defending itself against unprovoked Russian aggression. However, the U.S. calculus may change as the costs and risks of the war mount. And the use of this U.S. lever can be calibrated. For example, the United States could level off aid, not dramatically reduce it, if Ukraine does not negotiate. And, again, a decision to level off wartime support pending negotiations can be made in tandem with promises about postwar sustained increases in assistance over the long term.
That was a nice plan. But how well the aid lever can be calibrated depends of course on Congress, not on the president's say so.
There are also downsides to withholding or giving aid promises:
Clarifying the future of U.S. aid to Ukraine could create perverse incentives depending on how the policy is implemented. Committing to increased wartime assistance to Ukraine to reduce Russian optimism could embolden the Ukrainians to obstruct negotiations, blame failure on Moscow, and gain more Western support. Announcing a decrease or leveling off in assistance to Ukraine to reduce Kyiv's optimism about the war could lead Russia to see the move as a signal of waning U.S. support for Ukraine. If it took this view, Russia might keep fighting in the hope that the United States would give up on Ukraine entirely. Although recognizing that Ukraine is fighting a defensive war for survival and Russia an aggressive war of aggrandizement, the United States would nonetheless have to carefully and dispassionately monitor events and target its efforts to create the intended effect on whichever side's optimism is determined to be the key impediment to starting talks.
This would probably have been a good way to go if Biden had control over dispensing or withholding funds to Kiev. But the Republicans as well as the Democrats, likely in consent with the White House, have so far blocked all further aid.
There current path then seems to be a different one towards negotiations with Russia – regime change in Kiev.
President Zelenski is unwilling to take up peace talks. If he can be pushed out of office during the next few months his likely replacement, General Zaluzny, will probably be more inclined to seek an end of the war.
Thus the current tactic is to pressure Zelenski into leaving by withholding all future funds. If another Ukrainian leader comes in, aid might again flow to prevent a total takeover of the country by Russia.
Still – the aid calibration would be a problem. So may be giving up and leave, as Biden did in Afghanistan, might be the preferred option.
In today’s London TIMES, the ever idiotic Roger Boyes, Whitehall and Westminster’s propagandist.
At least it confirms how ‘The West’ is still viewing the conflict: ‘IT IS NATO’S DUTY TO THWART HIM’. Here is the piece in full:
Putin’s war plan for 2024 is a giant gamble
Switching Russia’s economy to all-out conflict in Ukraine requires urgent response from West
Roger Boyes THE TIMES 5 DECEMBER 2023
There is a silly question bouncing around the geopolitical talking shops: is Vladimir Putin winning? It’s about as illuminating as asking who’s winning after a couple of overs of a cricket match. It matters hugely, of course, how long Putin’s war against Ukraine will last.
Analysis of 75 years of data compiled by Uppsala University showed recently that “when interstate wars last longer than a year, they extend to over a decade on average”.
That dismal finding could well apply to the current war in the east, and who could say now whether Putin will come out alive from an elongated version of this conflict, let alone victorious?
Only one thing is certain: the Russian leader is sufficiently rattled to be hatching a significant rebrand of the war next spring. The supposed special military operation, the limited war, is set to be transformed into a general Russian mobilisation, an all-hands-on-deck attempt to expose cracks in Ukrainian resistance.
That’s not the action of a leader who believes victory to be already in the bag. And it involves a high degree of domestic risk. Crucially, the move is being timed to follow the Russian presidential elections in March, which Putin’s propaganda machine will turn into a vote of unblinking national confidence in their war leader.
The original assumption that Russians would remain apathetic about the invasion of Ukraine no longer holds. There are higher levels of engagement and anxiety, broad fears about a future that unites the West against Russia.
So, Putin has been breaking the news piecemeal to Russians that their society is heading for wholesale militarisation. First came a record increase in next year’s defence budget, which is set to swallow a third of the national budget. The last time Moscow spent so much on defence was in 1990, a year before the Soviet Union collapsed. It is being justified with the rhetoric of the Second World War, when the slogan justifying national sacrifice was: “Everything for the front, everything for victory.”
To pay for an enhanced military, child healthcare will be halved, and social spending and science funding put on the back burner. In return: more men, more ammunition, more firepower. Salaries have already been pushed up for volunteer soldiers, close to four times the monthly average in the provinces. They also get a month’s salary bonus on signing up and, if they are killed after five months’ service, their families can expect to become well-padded rouble millionaires. It could be an economically astute decision to get killed in action.
Putin’s victory, if it comes, will be on the basis of mass, the ability to replenish forces lost in attritional warfare.
It is perhaps his clinching advantage over the Ukrainians and one that comes only with general mobilisation; throwing convicts on to the battlefield is a cynical cost-benefit calculation that does no more than slow the pace of war.
But the Putin push is about more than manpower on the battlefield.
It’s about turning the economy into a war economy, nationalising the military supply chain, bringing state planning back into the defence sector. There hasn’t been such an upheaval in the military establishment since 1941 when, surprised by the German attack, Stalin uprooted the arms industry from vulnerable western Russia beyond the Urals into Siberia.
Here is how it could all begin to go wrong.
The draft is already creating severe labour shortages in the civilian economy. Now the military-industrial complex is suffering the same problem. Arms factories used to poach civilian workers because you could get exemption from the call-up. That is becoming more difficult: the expanding defence industry, which employs about two million engineers and other workers, is now short of 400,000.
The largest tank factory in the country, Uralvagonzavod, is again having to recruit convicts from penal colonies in the Sverdlovsk region.
Those who run these plants are becoming powerful figures, on a par with other securocrats such as the heads of the intelligence services. The old-school oligarchs, who shudder at the nationalisation process, are being marginalised.
It’s all about the war effort now, and only a very few are getting a hearing in the Kremlin.
If there is to be an internal shift against Putin it will come out of dogfighting between sections of the business elites, the security services and the new heavyweights in the arms industry.
And the trigger could come in the form of a sensational defeat on the battlefield that can’t just be pinned on a sleepy or burned-out general.
There has to be a catastrophic collapse in confidence in Putin as a military leader. A loss of faith in him not only on the part of elites but also on the streets and perhaps even in China.
Putin is gambling too much on a Trump presidency or at least on a more isolationist US administration.
Betting, too, on war fatigue in Europe.
A spring and summer assertion of military might, he seems to calculate, will lead to western pressure on Kiev to sign up to a patchwork peace. He thinks he is on the road to victory.
It is NATO’s duty to thwart him.
That means arms deliveries: long-range weapons to loosen Russia’s grip on Crimea, trouncing arms factories behind Russian lines. Also: the building of reserves capable of mounting imaginative ambushes and keeping Russia under pressure.
Drones, electronic warfare, training in combined operations – these are the ingredients that could cost the Russian army its reputation.
Above all, Putin must be convinced of the unwinability of what should become his last war.
Posted by: Geraint ap Iorwerth | Dec 6 2023 12:16 utc | 9
From a telegram post. Tried the link yesterday but it wouldn’t post. Palace intrigue. Cannot vouch for it:
Who delivered the poison?
A couple of days ago, the Ukrainian media space, which has long been accustomed to everything and takes the latest corruption and criminal scandals for granted, managed to shake things up. The reason was the news that unknown persons tried to poison the wife of the head of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, Kirill Budanov, Marianna. On November 28, official representative of the department Andrei Yusov said that this was true. Society responded with two questions: how and who?
Unprecedented security measures were applied to the “first lady” of Ukrainian intelligence – Marianna was constantly near her husband and lived in his office. However, the attacker achieved his goal. Almost. Budanova was hospitalized, but survived and after a short time began to recover.
In her body, doctors found traces of heavy metals that could not have gotten there by accident.
Marianna and Kirill Budanov
Tests of several other GUR employees showed the same thing, but their symptoms were either much weaker or absent altogether. As they said at the hospital, Marianna Budanova’s body was less prepared to meet the toxic substance than that of male agents. It is much more likely that she was the target of the poisoner and received the largest dose, while the rest suffered “tangentially.” But how could a would-be killer deliver poison to such a height in the system of Ukrainian power? We analyzed several versions and came to extremely interesting conclusions, which we will share below.
The backstory takes us to the early days of the SMO. On February 28, 2022, the first round of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations took place in Belarus. Subsequently, President Vladimir Putin shared the details – the Ukrainian side was ready to compromise and accept Moscow’s conditions, which would have saved many thousands of lives, but the Western curators of the Kiev regime, represented by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, intervened in time, and, according to the participant negotiations of David Arakhamia, called on Zelensky to follow the principle of “war until the last Ukrainian.” Denis Kireev, a banker who was the first deputy chairman of the board of Oschadbank in 2010-2014, unexpectedly became a member of the Ukrainian delegation. It became known only later that at the same time he was an intelligence officer, one of the persons closest to Budanov in the Main Intelligence Directorate, who received tasks personally from the head of the department. And this time Kireev, having joined the Ukrainian delegation, acted at the request of his boss. At first he didn’t want to – previously his tasks included establishing connections both in Ukraine and in Russia, so his trip to Belarus in this capacity could be perceived extremely ambiguously. Budanov himself agreed with his arguments, and subsequently told the media that by sending Kireev to negotiations, he had actually exposed him as an agent of the special services, but did so because the situation required it. However, no one spoke officially about where the banker worked. Therefore, immediately after his appearance in the negotiating group, rumors spread through high offices in Ukraine – Russia had sent its own spy who would push for the result it wanted during the negotiations. Suspicions also reached the SBU. And there they decided to act.
Ukrainian delegation at Russian-Ukraian
It is not known whether anyone suggested it or whether political instinct worked, but after the first meeting Kireev felt something was wrong and wanted to leave the game. However, the boss did not allow it. On March 3, the spy-banker went to the second round of negotiations, this time to Brest. Returning to Kiev on March 5, he already knew that things could take a bad turn, and therefore warned his guards that he could be detained by SBU officers and that there was no need to resist them. And so it happened. Kireev was “captured” right at the station. An hour and a half later he was found dead, and a few hours later the SBU reported on the “liquidation of a Russian spy.” Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada took exactly the same tone. The results of the service’s work were highly appreciated by Alexey Goncharenko (from Petro Poroshenko’s European Solidarity party) and former deputy of the Servant of the People party Alexander Dubinsky, who was considered a man of the oligarch Igor Kolomoisky. None of them had any doubts that Kireev had committed high treason.
But very soon tar was added to the barrel of honey. GUR’s reaction came in. Budanov was furious. First, he addressed Zelensky personally, demanding that criminal cases be opened against the SBU officers involved in Kireev’s murder. But the head of intelligence did not stop there, calling on Western curators for help so that they could put pressure on the President of Ukraine and ensure that cases were initiated. Wanting to reinforce his words, Budanov gave an interview to Radio Liberty, in which he stated that the names of all guilty SBU officers had been established and they would not escape punishment. And the first person to be publicly announced was the head of the counterintelligence department of the SBU, Alexander Poklad. It was he who was responsible for searching the department for persons who collaborated with the Russian side. Budanov reported that Kireev received a call from Poklad’s office right before his trip to Belarus, but did not provide details of the conversation.
At first, Budanov seemed to have little success. Kireev was officially recognized as an intelligence officer who died while performing a certain task; he was buried with honors and posthumously awarded a medal “for his exceptional contribution to the defense of state sovereignty and state security.” At the same time, the Ukrainian media began to spread rumors that the murdered man had almost decided the outcome of the entire conflict, allegedly warning Kiev about the impending landing of the Russian Armed Forces at the Gostomel airfield. At the same time, there were no visible legal consequences for either Poklad or anyone else. No one began to give public comments to the SBU. The State Bureau of Investigation decided to follow the same path. This seems to be the end of the incident. However, in July 2022, the SBU was suddenly shaken by a loud resignation. No less than the head of the department, Igor Bakanov, was fired – with the wording “for improper performance of official duties.” According to Zelensky, he made this decision in the wake of a large number of cases in which Bakanov’s subordinates engaged in espionage for Russia or interfered with the work of other law enforcement agencies. However, almost all the participants in Kireev’s murder remained in their places, so it was too early for the GUR to celebrate the victory. The conflict between the two departments continued to smolder, reaching the level of internal intrigue.
In October 2023, another such intrigue, the authorship of which, of course, belonged to Budanov personally, led to the dismissal of the deputy chairman of the SBU, Anatoly Sandursky, who oversaw the service’s cooperation with partners in the military-technical sphere. The order signed by Zelensky did not indicate the reason for the dismissal, but the immediate reason, obviously, was Budanov’s appeal to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU). However, it was more of an excuse than the reason. The participation of an official in a corruption scandal could not in any way lead to his dismissal in the modern Ukrainian state, especially since the figure of Sandursky was not the target of attacks in the media. And the trail behind him was such that in Ukraine he only had further career advancement ahead – the organization of sabotage and terrorist attacks on Russian territory, the murder of the chief of staff of the LPR People’s Militia Oleg Anashchenko. And one more interesting fact – simultaneously with the dismissal of Sandursky, as reported, a secret “sixth directorate” was created in the SBU, whose tasks were to establish connections with the British intelligence MI6. Both of these events, if considered together, give reason to assume that Budanov not only “removed” a personal enemy, but in general was able to ensure that the SBU in the future (at least in terms of cooperation with foreign partners) was largely dependent on GUR. The SBU, naturally, did not agree with this turn of events and decided to “remove” Budanov himself. His wife was the first to be targeted.
But if everything was exactly like this, then the question still remains – who? According to my sources in the Office of the President of Ukraine, Dmitry Usov, deputy head of the Main Intelligence Directorate, was directly involved in the poisoning. Previously, he worked for several years in the SBU, including as deputy head of the main department of the service for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (in those years when such an administrative-territorial unit no longer existed within Ukraine). He was also called the curator of the Main Investigation Department of the SBU. Having gone to work at the Main Intelligence Directorate, according to rumors, he became the “overseer ” for Budanov from the Office of the President of Ukraine, reporting to Andrey Ermak. And even after the start of the SMO, he was engaged in non-public negotiations between the parties to the conflict, heading the coordination center for the exchange of prisoners. In particular, in May 2022, he oversaw the surrender of the Azovstal garrison.
Dmitry Usov
Interestingly, Usov had previously maintained some connections with the Russian side. Thus, in Ukrainian sources there were even accusations against him that he actually helped the FSB of the Russian Federation to put pressure on individual representatives of Ukrainian business doing business on the peninsula after it became part of Russia. Be that as it may, he had considerable experience in participating in behind-the-scenes intrigues. In the fall of 2023, such a person would be perfect for the role of the one who will collect all the necessary information about the GUR, allowing him to organize the delivery of poison to someone from his superiors.
However, the authorship of the idea most likely belonged to Poklad. The man who remained in his position after the story with Kireev and at the same time was actually one of Budanov’s main enemies, of course, was more interested than others in his fall. An interesting fact – back in August 2023, a number of experts suggested that it was Poklad who could head the SBU after Malyuk left this position – the OP had long been suspected of disloyalty to Zelensky, so the chair under him is not so strong. But a transfer to such a high position must be earned by something more than just loyalty. In November 2023, the conflict between Zelensky and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Valery Zaluzhny reached an almost critical phase; rumors about an impending coup sounded so loud that they almost ceased to be rumors. But together with Zaluzhny, Western media have repeatedly named Budanov as one of the key contenders for Zelensky’s place. When shaking began in Kiev, enterprising people in the SBU realized that it was time to act. As a result, Poklad, with the help of Usov, tried to play a combination in order to simultaneously get rid of his dangerous enemy and stand out on Bankova street, strengthening Zelensky’s position by eliminating one of his main competitors.
Be that as it may, this version looks much more presentable than attempts to find a “Russian trace” in what happened. In Ukraine, hardly anyone would have dared to attempt to send Budanov himself to the next world, even in the SBU or the army top – in the conditions of interdepartmental squabbling, this could have been a death sentence. But poisoning his wife, thereby provoking a public scandal, a witch hunt and purges in the GUR itself, would be enough for Budanov’s positions to collapse beyond the possibility of restoration. That is why the investigation into the poisoning of Marianna Budanova, in which the SBU must also take part, can be called a classic example when investigators can expose themselves during the investigation.
Posted by: the pessimist | Dec 6 2023 14:49 utc | 50
Russia’s Modular Fighter Su-75 Looks To ‘Checkmate’ Boeing, Lockheed; UAC Patents Landmark Innovation!
Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) has patented what appears to be a modular variant of the Su-75 Checkmate single-engine light stealth fighter with an interchangeable cockpit.
According to TASS, the patent documents describe the concept aircraft design as a “single-engine tactical aircraft with low radar signature.”
The patented concept logically splits the aircraft into a fuselage base part and a fuselage head part. The fuselage base part serves as the “basic transport platform.” The fuselage head part is specific to the role for which the fighter is configured. Using different replaceable head parts, the aircraft can be configured as a single seat, dual seat, or pilotless stealth fighter.
The head parts can have different aerodynamic designs that retain the stealth characteristics of the fighter.
The patent documents state that the patented universal platform will allow “to radically change the functionality of the entire aviation complex while maintaining the same transport capabilities built into the basic platform.”
Replaceable head parts are attached using units in the transition zone on the base part of the fuselage; there are also connectors and fittings for electrical, hydraulic, and other systems that interact with the mating connectors and fittings of the replaceable part.
Explaining the rationale for the concept, the patent authors state, “Currently, military aircraft perform many tasks. For this purpose, a wide fleet of aircraft of various sizes is used, which requires large material and human costs; when all tasks are performed with one aircraft, the efficiency of its use decreases. To reduce or eliminate costs, it is necessary to ensure in one aircraft the possibility of modification to solve various problems in the conditions of the technical base of operating organizations.”
The Concept Explained
Aerodynamically speaking, the part of the fuselage behind the cockpit supports the flight capabilities of an aircraft. Broadly speaking, the engine(s) in the fuselage provide propulsion, the fuel tanks keep the engines running, the wings and control surfaces provide flight and maneuver capability, the undercarriage provides take-off and landing capability, sensors on the fuselage provide situational awareness and a self-protection suite keeps the aircraft safe from adversary missiles.
In other words, the fuselage base provides the capability required for all mission configurations – multi-role fighter (single seat), drone mothership (dual seat), trainer (dual seat), EW (dual/single seat), and penetrating sensor (pilotless).
The weapons and sensors required change with mission configuration. On stealth fighters, weapons specific to a mission are carried internally in weapon bays. The concept is already modular. Sensors – radar, electro-optical – are carried in the front fuselage.
It is possible to carry power generation, communication, and data-crunching hardware in support of missions such as drone mothership operations in weapon bays.
If the modular fighter is being used purely for reconnaissance, the fuselage head doesn’t need a cockpit. The space saved can be used for fitting additional sensors. Also, the fuselage head could be smaller, reducing weight and increasing endurance.
The concept of a modular fighter is logical – it will reduce costs all around – procurement cost, operating costs, pilot and support personnel training costs. The concept will help reduce inventory by facilitating the use of the same hardware to respond to a much wider spectrum of threats and adversaries.
Is A Modular Fighter Feasible?
The big question is – Is the concept technically feasible? And if so, why has it not been implemented so far?
Yes, the concept is technically feasible because of technical advances. Flight control software (FCS) can easily accommodate changes in aerodynamic configurations.
Modern fighter aircraft are aerodynamically unstable. They can only be flown by FCS, not by pilots. The FCS flies the aircraft, the pilot merely guides it.
If FCS can accommodate the external carriage of the 7.2 m long Kinzhal missile weighing 4.3 t on a MiG-31K, it can certainly handle a differently shaped or sized fuselage head.
In the Checkmate concept, each cockpit, or more precisely, the fuselage head design, would come with its own FCS. So the change in capabilities would be nearly seamless.
Why Don’t We Have Modular Fighters Already
Modular fighter design became feasible with the advent of fly-by-wire control systems, wherein pilot inputs were relayed to flight control surfaces on the fuselage not by control rods or hydraulic fluid piping but by electrical wires.
However, the imperative for a modular fighter has arisen only recently to cope with growing diversity in the means of wielding air power. No more are fighter aircraft used to just deliver bombs and missiles.
They are being used for reconnaissance, SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences), EW (Electronic Warfare), and, more recently, to control stealthy drones that can penetrate highly contested airspace, either to provide targeting information to a mother ship or attack targets based on the targeting information provided by a mothership.
The communication, networking, and data processing hardware required for SEAD, EW, Reconnaissance, and mothership operations differ greatly from the support hardware requirement for conventional multirole operations. A modular fighter design would allow the operator to hone the same aircraft for completely different missions, depending on the operational requirement.
Conclusion
The modular fighter concept patented by the UAC is a landmark development in military aviation. The technology to implement the concept is already in place.
During the recent Dubai Airshow 2023, UAC announced that it is poised to start production for the Checkmate fighter.
It is, therefore, unlikely that the initial variant of the Checkmate would be modular in design. But as I have stated above, the technology to implement it is in place. The UAC could well spring a surprise and wrest the initiative that it earlier lost to the West with its hesitant adoption of fighter stealth.
Posted by: Su-75 | Dec 6 2023 15:03 utc | 57
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