There are three new pieces in the Economist with the Ukrainian General Zaluzny.
The first is an interview:
Ukraine’s commander-in-chief on the breakthrough he needs to beat Russia – Economist – Nov 1, 2023
The second is an op-ed written by Zaluzny himself:
The commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces on what he needs to beat Russia – Economist – Nov 1, 2023
Technology is the key as the war becomes “positional”, says Valery Zaluzhny
The op-ed is the short form of a longer essay by Zaluzny which is also available at the Economist site:
MODERN POSITIONAL WARFARE AND HOW TO WIN IN IT – Economist – Nov 1, 2023
Zaluzny's central thesis is that the war is currently at a stalemate. It has become positional, with no large maneuvers being possible. He compares it to the war in Europe in 1917. There, he says, a change only happened through the introduction of new technologies (i.e. tanks).
Zaluzny recognizes that the long term winner in a positional war will be Russia:
[D]ue to many subjective and objective reasons, the war at the present stage is gradually moving to a positional form, a way out of which in the historical retrospect has always been difficult for both the Armed Forces and the state as a whole. At the same time, the prolongation of a war, as a rule, in most cases, is beneficial to one of the parties to the conflict. In our particular case, it is the russian federation, as it gives it the opportunity to reconstitute and build up its military power. Therefore, the issues of understanding the causes of such a situation, finding possible ways out of it and changing the nature and course of this war in favour of Ukraine are of particular relevance in modern conditions.
Zaluzny thinks that the way to end the positional warfare stalemate are new technologies. His solution is to ask for, and to heavily invest in, certain fields that might give Ukraine an advantage.
He wants masses of drones, more small electronic warfare systems, better counter-artillery abilities, better and more mine breaching technologies and last but not least more build-up of reserves.
I for one think that Zaluzny is mistaken. The war is not at a stalemate. Russia has clearly the advantage as it is free to maneuver along the whole frontline and to attack wherever it likes. It does not do so in full force because the current situation allows it to conveniently fulfill the order its commander in chief had given to it – to destroy the military capabilities of Ukraine.
None of the technologies Zaluzny has listed are really new. They are capabilities Russia already has, and which the Ukraine clearly lacks – at least in numbers. During the two decades of the war of terror the West has neglected to deeply invest in these fields while Russia had continued to further develop them. It is an advantage that will be hard to catch up with.
One more point on the last change Zaluzny wants to implement – the build-up of reserves.
It is Ukraine's strategy of 'attack everywhere' and of 'never giving ground for lives', that has prevented it from doing that. This may well be because of Zelenski's insistence of holding Bakhmut and currently of holding Avdiivka at whatever the price. Both have cost the Ukraine a huge amount of material and men. Zelenski insisted on attacking and on holding out because he needed to show success to get more money and weapons.
That strategy has failed and it has killed the Ukrainian army:
Since the start of the invasion, Ukraine has refused to release official counts of dead and wounded. But according to U.S. and European estimates, the toll has long surpassed 100,000 on each side of the war. It has eroded the ranks of Ukraine’s armed forces so badly that draft offices have been forced to call up ever older personnel, raising the average age of a soldier in Ukraine to around 43 years. “They’re grown men now, and they aren’t that healthy to begin with,” says the close aide to Zelensky. “This is Ukraine. Not Scandinavia.”
It was Zaluzny's task, as the top military leader, to convince the civilian leadership of the right way to fight the war.
One year ago, after the Russian forces left Kherson city, the Ukrainian army should have gone to solely defensive positions along geographic features that give an advantage. Russia would have had to attack and to endure higher losses. But we still do not see even one decently build Ukrainian defense line. Instead reserves still get thrown into failing attacks and to hold on to obviously lost cauldron positions.
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During the last days tanks from the 47th brigade (Leo 2) and 10th mountain brigade (T-64BM/BV) have been seen, and were destroyed, near Avdiivka. Both brigades had only recently been mauled during their hopeless attacks at the southern front. It does not make sense to throw what is left of them into another battle without reconstituting them. The whole experience and knowledge these brigades had gained will be lost with them.
Zaluzny shows no sign of acknowledging those mistakes. If Zelenzki did not follow his military advice he should have resigned. If he has agreed with Zelenzki's strategy his judgment has simply failed. It is now far too late to correct for either.