The Economist continues its series of interviews related to war in Ukraine. This week it has a talk with Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukraine's military intelligence branch:
An interview with the head of Ukraine’s defence intelligence
Budanov comes off as a bit of a loudmouth with claims that diverge from reality:
Ukraine may already have drawn on limited numbers of its reserve troops, but Russia is now, in seeming desperation, known to be committing under-strength reserves that it had not planned to deploy until late October. “Contrary to what the Russian Federation declares, it has absolutely no strategic reserve,” the general says. Russia’s 25th Combined Arms Army, now being prematurely deployed in the eastern front around Lyman and Kupyansk, has only 80% of the manpower and 55% of the equipment it was supposed to have, he says.
That seems to contradict the chief analyst of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency who the Economist interviewed just two weeks ago:
Ukrainian generals have told the Guardian newspaper that 80% of Russia’s effort went into building its first and second [defense] lines. But Mr Maul cautions that the bulk of Russia’s reinforcements remain at the third.
Budanov also has some strange believes about the state of Russia's economy:
Amid reports that Russia is poised to step up its ongoing mobilisation drive, General Budanov says that headcount is the only obvious advantage that Russia still retains over Ukraine. “Human resources in Russia are, relatively speaking, unlimited. The quality is low, but the quantity is sufficient.” As far as other components of the war effort are concerned, Russian resources are being exhausted, and a reckoning is coming. Russia’s economy will hold out only until 2025, he says. The flow of weapons will dry up in 2026, “perhaps earlier”, he asserts—though the evidence to support his claims is patchy.
Back in May the Economist reported that the cost of the war is a minor issue to Russia:
Yet all this damage has come at a relatively mild cost to Russia. As we have reported, its economy is holding up much better than almost anyone expected. And the direct fiscal cost of the war—what it is spending on men and machines—is surprisingly low.
Russia’s budget is murky—especially its military one. So our estimate of what Russia is spending on invading Ukraine is imprecise. However, in consultation with various experts, and using our own analysis, we have come up with a figure. In essence this involved taking the Russian government’s pre-invasion forecast of what it would spend on defence and security, and comparing that with what it is actually spending. That would put the cost of its invasion at 5trn roubles ($67bn) a year, or 3% of GDP.
That is, by historical standards, a puny amount.
Russia's economy is in fact booming:
Moscow's economy has grown by more than a fifth over the past five years despite facing serious challenges during that time, according to Deputy Mayor for Economic Policy Vladimir Efimov.
Despite facing economic headwinds such as the Covid-19 pandemic and Western sanctions, the Russian capital experienced substantial growth, which was driven in particular in industry, finance and telecommunications, he said on Wednesday at the Urban Forum.
Just today President Putin also gave an optimistic forecast for Russia's economy:
The Russian economy has recovered, and the country has successfully withstood sanctions pressure, President Vladimir Putin said on Monday.
“In general, we can say that the restoration of the Russian economy has been completed. We withstood absolutely unprecedented external pressure, the sanctions onslaught of some ruling elites in the so-called Western bloc, some ruling elites in certain countries, which we call unfriendly," Putin stated at a meeting on the planning of the federal budget for 2024.
Moreover, Russia's GDP growth may amount to 2.5-2.8% by the end of the year, the president stressed.
The Economist is very polite when it calls the support for Budanov claims as "patchy". There simply is no support for his assertions and the data we have points to the opposite of what he claims.
Lunatic claims from Ukraine have become routine:
Ukraine has liberated Donetsk Oblast's village of Andriivka, located south of Bakhmut, the General Staff of Ukraine's Armed Forces reported on Sept. 15.
…
Later the same day, the 3rd Assault Brigade confirmed that the settlement had been retaken, adding that Ukrainian forces dealt a crushing blow to the Russian 72nd Separate Motor Rifle Brigade in the course of battle.According to the 3rd Brigade's report, the Russian formation lost its chief of intelligence, three commanders, almost all of its infantry, including officers, and a significant amount of equipment.
Here is an aerial picture of Andrivka before the war.
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It consists of two roads with some 40 houses and had a prewar population of some 80 people. How a significant part of a whole brigade with some 3,500 men and their ~700 trucks and armored vehicles supposedly got lost in such a small place is unexplained. At most there were probably one or two Russian companies with 100 men each defending that town. It took the Ukrainian military several weeks and many dead men to conquer the settlement. Andrivka is now gone. All its houses are in ruins. Just east of Andrivka runs an elevated railway line that will be difficult to cross. Why the Ukrainian army even tried to take that place is beyond me.
The Economist interview with Budanov does not touch on Ukrainian losses and human reserves. But yesterday's daily summary by the Ukrainian news site Strana emphasizes the importance of that point [edited machine translation]:
A prolonged war of attrition – and this is the stage the conflict is entering – poses a very painful question for Ukraine about reserves to make up for losses.
The scale of these losses was recently revealed by the head of the Poltava regional mobilization center Vitaliy Berezhnoy. Speaking at the city council, he said that out of every 100 people mobilized in the fall of last year, 10-20 remained, the rest are dead, wounded and disabled.
These are losses at the level of 80-90%.
"In fact, these are true figures for our division as well… Some have even less (left in the ranks- Ed .), "commented sniper Konstantin Proshinsky, who is fighting near Bakhmut, with the call sign "Grandfather".
Also noteworthy is another figure voiced by Berezhny – the failure to implement the General Staff plan for mobilization. According to Berezhny, in Poltava, the plan was completed by only 13% and this is the worst indicator in the region (which is natural – in a large city it is easier to hide from mobilization than in a village or in a small town).
Usually a military unit which has lost more than 30% of its men and material is considered to be incapacitated. Such units should be pulled from the line of contact to be rebuild with new staff. The mix of old and new troops will then help in further operations.
A division that lost 80-90% is merely a small battalion made up from the hodgepodge of remaining soldiers. It certainly will not be able to launch any coordinated operation. It will also be impossible to rebuild it as it will lack the experienced management level of sergeants and officers. These people do not grow on trees. They require years of training.
Why Ukraine insist on attacking Russian forces instead of taking a defensive posture at some geographically protected line is impossible to understand. It is not rational.
People in the West who support this should be sued for the unnecessary losses that position is causing.