The U.S./NATO doctrine, as it had been taught to the Ukrainian units that were prepared for the counter-offensive, has failed.
As a comment allegedly made on a forum of veterans of the West Point Academy describes it:
Classic attacks under our combat regulations involve the preliminary suppression and destruction of enemy defensive positions by artillery and aircraft, as well as the simultaneous destruction of its combat controls to the depth of the defense zone and the prevention of the approaches of its reserves. Since Ukrainians have almost no aviation and they are significantly inferior to the Russians in the amount of artillery, classic attacks lead to nothing but a massive loss of expensive military equipment on the way to Russian positions, disorganization and demoralization of attackers with subsequent retreat. Almost three weeks of such attacks could not break through the Russian support band, in addition, as I was told by the G-3 from USAR EUR-AF in Stuttgart, they lost up to a quarter of our Bradleys, and they are now forced to urgently send two companies of Bradleys and a large quantity of other equipment to replenish and restore the combat readiness of two brigades of the Ukrainian strike unit.
When I was in officer school, pre-1991, NATO was less dependent on air-superiority than it is today. We also had some good air defense systems. Our artillery was not superior to the Soviet one but was well layered – from short, medium to long ranged systems – and would have created very significant damages. We also had good pioneer equipment that allowed for the crossing rivers and ditches as well as serious mine fields.
All this changed after the 1991 Gulf war in which U.S. air superiority and tank fist destroyed the Iraqi defense forces. That war was misconstrued as a big win when it in fact was simply the effect of a by far superior professional force over a unmotivated conscript army with old and often defunct weapons.
As an effect of the first Gulf war and later operations in Serbia, Afghanistan and again in Iraq the believe in NATO air-land doctrine was reinforced. Air superiority was the holy grail while the strong land force capabilities atrophied. An emphasis on guerilla suppression and on vehicles that could withstand simple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan further unbalanced the force.
It explains why the Ukrainian troops were miss-trained and miss-equipped for a counter-offensive even when the opposing force was a much harder to crack one than some goat herders from Helmand, Afghanistan.
The Ukrainian combined-arms-warfare units, without air-support and little artillery, were defeated. Western mining equipment failed to clear real 20 kilogram anti-tank mines from the heavy Ukrainian grounds. Armored Ukrainian troops were destroyed in mine fields (video) well before they could reach their targets.
Seeing that the tank heavy concept was failing the Ukrainians switched to a much older and more bloody technic:
In these conditions, our guys, together with Ukrainian commanders, developed tactics of “mosquito” promotion: continuous attacks of Russian positions by small tactical groups of Ukrainian infantry. The Russians, who are much more sensitive to losses in manpower, try to prevent close (“contact”) battles and retreat when Ukrainians reach their trenches, allowing artillery to destroy the enemy. This usually succeeds: Ukrainians die or retreat. But this tactic has a positive effect. Several such attacks almost completely destroy the Russian position, most often with their own fire, after which the Russians are forced to retreat to a new line, where this tactic is repeated. That’s how in two weeks the Russians were pushed back three miles from Makarov’s strategically important position. And this tactic is constantly improving. Our side believe that, at the continuing pace of such progress, in two weeks Ukrainians will be able to overcome the Russian support band and start storming their main line of defense, while maintaining the offensive potential of their strongest brigades. Perhaps that’s what General Milley meant yesterday about the ten weeks of the Ukrainian offensive.
This tactical technique has another important effect. Russians are forced to spend more artillery shells to repel such “mosquito” attacks, the stocks of which they replenish more slowly than they spend. And in two weeks of such battles, they may well approach the depletion of their stocks. Of course, this leads to great losses of Ukrainians but, as I said at the beginning, they are not sensitive to the death of their soldiers. In addition, advances however small are a better justification for their death than unsuccessful attacks. And here, we must admit that the Russians today are much closer to the armies of Western countries than the Ukrainians are in this respect: the Russians take care of their soldiers …
The "mosquito" technic replaces losses in armored vehicles will more heavy losses of infantry. The 128th Mountain Assault Brigade, which had led the fight on the western part of the Zaporozhia front, has just been pull back from the front line because it had lost too many of its soldiers.
After the Russian lost a few trenches to storming Ukrainian troops that did not care for their own losses they modified their own tactic. Its troops still leave the forward trenches when under pressure but they now booby-trap those before taking off. These videos show how Ukrainian troops jump into an empty Russian trench only to be blown up by several small explosions. The Russian's need no artillery to do that. The trenches are kept intact but for a number Ukrainian corpses that can easily be moved aside.
A few days ago the Austrian Colonel Markus Reisner said in an interview (in German) that Ukraine had deployed all but four of its twelve reserve brigades that were supposed to be the armored counter-offensive fist that would defeat Russian defenses. Since than the 116th, 117th, and 118th Mechanized Brigades, part of last reserve, have been deployed near the Zaparozhia front. They will replace the 128th and other units that were mostly destroyed while gaining only a few kilometer in the sparsely inhabited countryside. Half of Milley's ten weeks of counter-offensive operations have passed with no relevant gains for the Ukrainian side. The next five weeks will likely destroy the rest of the battle ready Ukrainian forces.
Another change has been made in long range fire capabilities on the Ukrainian side. Yesterday it launched several S-200 missiles against the Kerch bridge and other Russian targets. The Russian side says that all these attacks were defeated by its air-defense forces.
The S-200 is an air-defense missile first deployed in the mid 1960s. Unlike the Nike-Hercules and S-300 it does not have inherent land attack capabilities. Its original targeting system is unable to steer it towards certain points on the map:
The missile uses radio illumination mid-course correction to fly towards the target with a terminal semi-active radar homing phase.
The Ukrainians, likely with some foreign help, must have developed and tested a completely new targeting system to give the S-200 some land attack capability. Its maximum range of about 300 kilometer is sufficient to attack strategic targets on the Russian side. But even standard Russian air-defenses have no problem with it.
That this was even tried, shows again the hybris of western military thinking. Like 80 years ago there is still a believe that Russia is, economically and militarily, incapable of defending itself. Please read Conor Gallagher's latest piece on this:
NATO's doctrine is still depending on air-superiority. It lacks infantry and good tanks. It constantly underestimates Russian capabilities.
How would the real fight look if it had to overcome the superior Russian air-defenses while depending itself on system like the very expensive Patriot with a poor record of hitting anything but its own forces?