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Something Amiss
There is a war happening in Europe that is, interestingly, no longer mentioned on the first two screens of the front pages of the Washington Post and the New York Times.
bigger—
bigger
The failure of the Ukrainian counter-offensive and its lack of any viable way to win the conflict seems to be sinking in.
Who wants to write or read about the huge strategic mistake the Biden administration committed when it blackmailed Ukraine as well as its other vassals, especially when the beltway gang is strongly in favor of another Biden presidency. The alternative, another round of artificially Trump-ed up chaos, seems unbearable to them.
This despite further evidence that Biden's policies and influence were always for sale, especially to foreign bidders.
That is, by the way, another scandal that is not allowed to be on the front pages the Washington 'elite' is filling for the commons' consumption.
Posted by: Acco Hengst | Jul 22 2023 1:49 utc | 218
It’s why the YouTube commentators constant fixation on the, who is in possession of which trench, as a substitute for genuine operational developments is not only self-defeating but reinforces their amateur status. The losses accrued in the failed offensive, although substantial, are not the real problem facing Ukraine and the West, it’s the prodigious amount of supplies needed to launch an offensive and sustain it. Remember, by Ukrainian calculations the the first defensive line should have been reached and breached by D+1-2 with exploitation and capturing of the first objectives by D+3-4. However unrealistic that plan was it will have been supported by NATO’s ace in the hole, their superb logistics system, based on plus minus calculations of possibly up to 20%. Fast forward to today and we are at D+47 with no significant breach of the defence screen, let alone first defensive lines in the South and constant taking/retaking of frontal defensive positions in the East. Artillery have burned through their stockpiled reserves a month ago, yet are still having to support all the micro-offensives that are taking place, whilst constantly having their supply depots targeted. The Russian strategy of prioritising supply interdiction over CAS was a lesson learned from WW2, where the German fixation on ground support showed their strategically blinkered approach. The Russians also studied the Allied 2TAF’s performance and contrasted their own approach unfavourably, concluding that their independent air operations had not maximised either their tactical potential or crucially their interdictory capabilities. The result of this doctrinal focus on defeating an enemy before the first clash, was that NATO stockpiles, carefully built up over the months and globally resourced, were being destroyed before the offensive had even begun, and at a rate that could not be replenished fast enough. The targeting of AD supplies and systems also had a cumulative effect on this logistical attrition, as it meant supply dumps were more vulnerable against attacks delivered by increasingly more effective airborne weapons.
Without enough stocks, artillery could now not fully support the offensive in the planned concentrations and, given it was already shouldering the entire burden of providing that fire support, due to the lack of any viable CAS, the impact was immediate and the carnage was on people’s screens within hours. The impact of minefields on armoured offensives is a known quantity in the West, given that the Soviet defensive scheme at Kursk is covered in minute detail in NATO war college curriculums, so the official explanation, that their efficacy forced a transition to infantry centric operations, with armour now playing a supportive role, is laughably transparent. Ukraine had to curtail armoured operations because it could not logistically support them directly, or indirectly with fire support and those armoured breakthrough units themselves did not now have enough logistical support to attempt anything more than a token surge effort, before attrition forced them into a secondary role. Last year, doing back of the envelope calculations I figured that just to supply the promised Leopards for the proposed offensive timetable would take hundreds of tonnes of ammo and POL. Ukraine no longer has the capability to deploy armoured forces in the quantity needed, for the time required, to effect any significant breakthrough and exploitation of Russian defensive lines. She’s now keeping the bulk of her Western armour, with its limited supplies, behind their second/third lines of defence for a typically Eastern front role, that of the fire brigade, trying to prevent or slow any Russian armoured breakthroughs, if and when they come.
As for Russian logistics, they are decades behind the West, still reliant on railheads and lacking the mechanised systems NATO take for granted, leveraged from the commercial SOP’s that are crucial for a global JIT delivery system. The support of Russian operations in Syria was behind that of the Americans in Vietnam and more reminiscent of the Korean War, and the shambolic images of Russian troops stranded, for want of supplies, in the early stages of the SMO underlines Russias largely static logistical development. However, through a question of luck, circumstance and rapid field adaptions, Russia has largely shielded her Achilles heel, again, another fatal miscalculation from the West, to add to a growing list, that technology could redress the imbalance Ukraine would face, by exploiting Russia’s traditional vulnerabilities.
Forget possession of trench lines and small hamlets and shell-shattered tree lines, this is a battle of bullets, beans and bandages and Russia is not losing the logistical war, although having inherently inferior organic systems and platforms, by leveraging her superiority in the areas where she dominates. Something historically she has found historically hard to achieve.
Posted by: Milites | Jul 22 2023 10:54 utc | 292
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