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Ukraine Launches Its Counterattack
The long announced Ukrainian counter offensive has started. New Ukrainian units, never seen before, have come to the front.
The attack was launched by Ukraine for political reasons under pressure from its 'western' sponsors. Militarily it is unlikely to become successful but it will eat away at whatever is left of Ukraine's military capabilities.
Attacks happened all around the front. In the north towards Belgograd, to the east and, with the most forces, towards the south. There was so far little to no success in any of the attacks.
The daily report by the Russian Ministry of Defense list as Ukrainian losses over the last 24 hours 910 soldiers, 16 tanks, 33 armored combat vehicles/infantry fighting vehicle and some 30 trucks.
So far only the most forward positions of Russian troops have been attacked. There are two to three well organized defense lines behind those. The Russians can fall back whenever needed and let the artillery and air force destroy their oncoming enemies.
As I wrote previously about any attacks in the direction of Tokmak and Melitopol:
From the point of strategic value the chosen target is the right one. However, it is also the one where the Russian military has prepared its strongest defense lines.
Source: @Inkvisiit, Scribblemaps – bigger
In military books this is know as 'echeloned defense' with three lines of well prepared positions ten kilometer apart from each other. Each line consists of tank obstacles, mine belts, prepared anti-tank positions to monitor and counter potential breach attempts and well prepared artillery support from behind the next defense line.
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To crack such a nut without air support and without significant artillery advantage is nearly impossible.
There may still come larger attacks in other directions. But how many could there be?
As a former Swedish officer notes:
June 4th UkrAF scaled up offensive operations on the Southern Front, but the losses are too high for long time success. Earlier operations were mainly reconnaissance in force with platoon and company sized combat groups. Yesterday the Ukrainian forces seemed to be battalion sized combat groups. According to Russian MoD 8 UkrAF battalions was involved in offensive operations SE of Mala Tokmachka (1), at the Vremivka salient (2) and East of Vuhledar towards Velikonovoselovka (3). The fighting was intense, but on most places Ukrainian forces was turned back, mainly by intense Russian artillery and air attacks. On some places UkrAF succeeded in capturing a couple of hundred meters.
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[If the Russian numbers are true], the prospects for a Ukrainian counteroffensive looks very dim. This is even if we don't take into account the ongoing intense Russian air and artillery offensive against UkrAF troop concentrations, ammunition and fuel depots.
With losses of over 1000 KIA and WIA that means that a Ukrainian brigade of 4000 man loose at least 25 percent of its manpower. That's on the brink of making a brigade unusable. Two days fighting with such losses would destroy a brigade's battle capability. 24 days with such losses would in effect destroy the entire fist of 12 brigades UkrAF has gathered for the counteroffensive. With losses of around 12 brigades, 25 000 KIA/WIA, 250 tanks and 1000 IFVs/APCs all the strategic reserves UkrAF has built during the last 6 months would be gone. In exchange the Ukrainian side could have advanced maybe 10 km on some places or more generally 2-3 km along maybe half the southern front.
Once again, IF the Russian claims are true, RuAF must feel relieved and UkrAF very worried by the results of the fighting on the Southern front June 4th.
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I strongly suspect that the Russian military will let the Ukrainian attacks run their course to then launch its own larger scale attacks against weakened Ukrainian defenses.
Roger | Jun 5 2023 17:21 utc | 102–
Your comment is close to today’s Crooke essay, “‘Give War a Chance’ – A ‘War That Even Pacifists Can Get Behind’”. The introductory tease:
More than a year into Russia’s Special Operation, the initial burst of European excitement at western push-back on Russia has dissipated. The mood instead has turned to “existential dread, a nagging suspicion that [western] civilisation may destroy itself”, Professor Helen Thompson writes [in New Statesman; link at original].
For an instant, a euphoria had coalesced around the putative projection of the EU as a world power; as a key actor, about to compete on a world scale. Initially, events seemed to play to Europe’s conviction of its market powers: Europe was going to bring down a major power – Russia – by financial coup d’état alone. The EU felt ‘six feet tall’.
It seemed at the time a galvanising moment: “The war re-forged a long-dormant Manichaean framing of existential conflict between Russia and the West, assuming ontological, apocalyptic dimensions. In the spiritual fires of the war, the myth of the ‘West’ was rebaptised”, Arta Moeini suggests [at Unherd; link at original].
After the initial disappointment at the lack of a ‘quick kill’, the hope persisted – that if only the sanctions were given more time, and made more all-embracing, then Russia surely would ultimately collapse. That hope has turned to dust. And the reality of what Europe has done to itself has begun to dawn – hence Professor Thomson’s dire warning:
“Those who assume that the political world can be reconstructed by the efforts of human Will, have never before had to bet so heavily on technology over [fossil] energy – as the driver of our material advancement”.
For the Euro-Atlanticists however, what Ukraine seemed to offer – finally – was validation for their yearning to centralise power in the EU, sufficiently, to merit a place at the ‘top table’ with the U.S., as partners in playing the Great Game.
Ukraine, for better or worse, underlined Europe’s profound military dependence on Washington – and on NATO.
More particularly, the Ukraine conflict seemed to open the prospect for consolidating the strange metamorphosis of NATO from military alliance to an enlightened, Progressive, peace alliance! As Timothy Garton Ash effused in the Guardian in 2002, “NATO has become a European peace movement” where one could watch “John Lennon meet George Bush”.
As you suggest, EU has only deepened its enslavement to the Outlaw US Empire. Further on, Crooke continues:
Here is the key: “the EU is much weaker than it believes it to be”. The outset of the conflict was defined by a cast of mind entranced by the notion of Europe as a ‘mover and shaker’ in world affairs, and mesmerised by Europe’s post-war prosperity.
EU leaders convinced themselves that this prosperity had bequeathed it the clout and the economic depth to contemplate war – and to weather its reversals – with panglossian sanguinity. It has produced rather, the converse: It has put its project in jeopardy.
Currently, there’re three European nations that are in rather good economic condition–Hungary, Serbia, and oddly Austria. Turkey, not European but NATO, has weathered economic war and earthquakes, and is in an excellent position to gain much from Eurasian development. There’s no mechanism within NATO’s bylaws to expel a member; however, for Turkey to join SCO as Erdogan wants, he will need to remove Turkey from NATO. It’s uncertain if those running NATO are aware of that happening and rather soon–before 2030. And that will have a big impact on Black Sea and Balkan Regional politics. With the German economic engine dying, where will the nations of Bulgaria and Romania turn to succor their economies that sorely require development? IMO, Geoeconomics will be the determining factor along with the genuine independence and democracy offered by the Eastern and Multipolar Institutions–SCO, EAEU, BRICS, etc.
The story isn’t over yet, but we can already see the Epilogue’s shape.
Posted by: karlof1 | Jun 5 2023 21:05 utc | 155
INTERNAL DISPUTES INCREASING IN UKRAINE
Lucas Leiroz, journalist, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies
Apparently, some internal disputes are taking place in Kiev. Amidst the scenario of rising tensions and a disastrous military campaign, no official seems to be completely sure of the permanence of his position in the regime. There are rumors about replacement of President Vladimir Zelensky himself, with the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Valeri Zaluzhnyi being the main name to become the new head of state.
Ukraine’s bad situation on the battlefield generates collective dissatisfaction with the government team, demanding changes and rearrangements. In this sense, Zaluzhnyi has often been seen as an official possibly more skilled than the current president in dealing with the conflict. However, there is also a race for Zaluzhnyi’s current position, that of head of the armed forces.
One of the options to replace Zaluzhnyi would be the current Commander-in-Chief of Ground Forces Alexander Syrsky, who is becoming an increasingly popular personality among the authorities. Syrsky is a very controversial person. He was primarily responsible for Bakhmut’s “meat grinder”. It was Syrsky who convinced the Ukrainian authorities of the supposed feasibility of holding positions in the city despite the Russian advance, which resulted in the (unnecessary) deaths of thousands of Kiev’s soldiers.
The problem is that Syrsky’s performance somehow pleased the regime’s leaders, for whom, as well known, the lives of Ukrainians do not seem to matter much. The fight in Bakhmut was enough to elevate Syrsky’s status and popularity, launching him not only into the race to become head of the armed forces, but into higher positions as well.
In fact, things are not going well for Zelensky. The president is already beginning to be criticized inside and outside Ukraine. His recent long international tour, supposedly in search of diplomatic support, was felt as a kind of “flee”. As expected, the fact that the leader was not in Ukraine in the most difficult days of the conflict – those last days of the Battle of Bakhmut – generated discomfort and repudiation.
Obviously, for a country at war, the worst-case scenario is for the national leader to be seen as a coward or deserter. So, considering that Zelensky was unable to raise big international support with his trip, nor was he in Kiev to welcome and reward his soldiers after the battle, the chances of him remaining in power for long seem questionable.
In this regard, it has long been speculated that Zaluzhnyi would replace Zelensky. The military commander is seen as a stronger and more capable leader, both for dealing with the challenging moments of the conflict and for eventually seeking negotiations, if there is no other alternative. However, Zaluzhnyi does not appear to be alone in the dispute.
As mentioned, Alexander Syrsky has gained prestige among Ukrainian authorities, so it is indeed possible that he is in the presidential race – despite his responsibility for what happened in Bakhmut. But he is certainly not Zaluzhnyi and Zelensky’s only rival either.
The head of Ukrainian intelligence, Kirill Budanov, is also a name that some insiders suggest as a future president. Obviously, his position grants him a very privileged status among the country’s authorities, which is why he enjoys great prestige, appearing alongside Zaluzhnyi and Syrsky in the race. In a country at war, the armed forces and intelligence sectors are certainly the most likely to take command if the civilian leader is removed, so it is possible that Budanov has a chance in this challenge.
As we can see, disputes are on the rise. Zelensky increasingly seems threatened by those who should be his close allies. Some media outlets are describing the situation as a war of “all against all“. Zaluzhnyi remains the favorite to replace Zelensky. Syrsky, though respected among officials, is a notoriously cruel and unreliable personality, as was evident in Bakhmut’s meat grinder. On the other hand, Budanov often damages the West’s own image with his controversial statements in the press, as on the recent occasion when he admitted Ukrainian participation in the murder of Russian civilians. In this sense, Zaluzhnyi still sounds like a more “sober” and realistic leader. But this could change at any time, depending on the interests of Western sponsors when choosing a replacement.
However, in parallel to the presidential dispute, there is still the race for the command of the armed forces. Syrsky also aspires to this position, even more so if the prediction of Zaluzhnyi’s rise to the presidency is confirmed. In the same vein, if Budanov eventually becomes president, there will be a race to head Ukraine’s intelligence. The scenario is really one of widespread and uncontrolled dispute. And Zelensky does not seem to have enough power to control the crisis or to prevent his eventual removal from power.
Indeed, while the mainstream media tries to make it appear that Moscow is divided in internal disputes, in the real world it is Kiev that seems increasingly immersed in a war of “all against all”. Russian troops often use psychological warfare techniques to show disunity, when they are actually working cohesively in their strategies. On the other hand, Ukraine and the West try to demonstrate unity and cohesion, when in fact they have serious problems of internal administration.
https://southfront.org/internal-disputes-increasing-in-ukraine/
Posted by: HERMIUS | Jun 5 2023 22:04 utc | 173
@Posted by: NemesisCalling | Jun 5 2023 18:59 utc | 120
Re: Kursk
Kursk was won by two factors:
1) Vast numerical superiority of Soviet military which allowed success in the face of a terrific attrition rate that spoke to the fight in the Germans even though reeling
And
2) Germany had to redeploy much of its eastern front forces to stymie the allied invasion of Sicily. This order was given by Hitler.
Correct me if I am wrong..
From Wikipedia:
Germany 780,900 men, 2,928 tanks, 9,966 guns and mortars, about 2,000 aircraft
USSR 1,910,361 men (1,426,000 actual soldiers), 5,128 tanks, 25,013 guns and mortars, about 3,000 aircraft
The German army was constituted primarily by German soldiers with extensive training and combat experience (Poland, Western front, Barbarossa etc.); the German army on the Eastern Front remained an incredibly disciplined and skilled army right through 1945. The Soviet army had lost vast numbers of their well-trained soldiers in the 1941-1942 pockets, and still large numbers even after that. So, the vast number of their soldiers were much less trained and much less experienced. The Soviet vast pool of military age men and women, plus it vast ability to produce weapons overcame these shortcomings. Germany, and its allies, simply did not have the manpower and industrial capacity to equal the Soviets.
The German focus on over engineered weapons (e.g. the Tiger and Panther tanks) as against the Russian focus on simpler but still very effective weapons made the difference between the Germans and Soviets even worse. This very much mirrors the current Western predicament as its costly over complexified weapons cannot be produced at scale, and unlike with the Wermacht MIC the focus is on profits rather than military functionality.
The availability of another one or two Panzer Corps may have indeed resulted in a breakthrough at Prokhorovka, but the Russians had massive forces standing in reserve – such as the Steppe Front with the equivalent of more than 6 German Corps which could have been used to plug any breakthrough. With the northern pincer not achieving any real breakthrough the Russians could have focused their reserves on the southern flank. The losses of men and material would have been even worse, and also if the German army was sucked more into the Kursk salient they would have been even more open to a Russian flanking maneuver with their other massive troop concentrations (and the thrust along the southern coast). The calling off of the Kursk attack by Hitler may have actually saved them from that fate, which would have actually shortened the war.
There is a possibility that Manstein would have created a “greater Pokrovsk” to decimate large numbers of Soviet troops, but the war had already been lost in the inability to destroy the Soviet industry and take Moscow in 1941, and at Stalingrad a year later. Without a quick victory, Germany was always going to lose against a Soviet Union that had been given the ability to fight with the mass industrialization of the 1930s, unless it achieved a relatively quick and overwhelming victory. It was just a matter of time.
If the Germans had been able to badly maul the Soviet army and delay its next great offensives, the allies landing at Normandy may have found a much stronger opposing force to bargain with. Instead, the Soviet campaigns of late 1943 and early 1944 drove all the way to Romania, Lviv and removed the encirclement of Leningrad by April 1944 whilst producing massive German losses. The Soviet Summer campaign (Bagration) launched in June 1944 on the Central front then removed any hope at all that troops could be moved from the Eastern front to fight the allies in Normandy – 2.3 million Soviet troops against 800,000 Germans. Given the numerical difference, the Germans did an incredible job of a fighting retreat. They were still the best army in the world, there just wasn’t enough of them left.
Posted by: Roger | Jun 5 2023 23:17 utc | 190
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