The 'west' pushed Ukraine into a hopeless counter-offensive based on false assessments and wild expectations.
Russian troops were claimed to be weak, untrained and unprepared for an Ukrainian attack. On the other side it was claimed that the freshly mobilized Ukrainian men which received 'western' weapons and training would have the necessary quantity and quality to overcome Russian defenses.
Ukrainian troops, as well as the public, were told to believe that bullshit.
Lord Bebo @MyLordBebo – 0:55 UTC · Jun 23, 2023
NATO training explained by an Ukrainian POW
-> Psychologists trained them to not be afraid and that Russia is exhausted and weak …
Embedded video From Maimunka News
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Any rational and neutral military assessment showed a far more realistic picture. One in which Russia would always defeat the planned counter-offensive.
At the end of 2022 the Ukrainian army had been exhausted and had been already been destroyed twice. The Russians had first destroyed large parts of the original equipment of the Ukrainian army and then the Soviet era equipment that was brought to Ukraine from former Warsaw Pact nations.
More importantly they had killed or wounded many of the experienced non-commissioned staff (Sergeants etc) and lower rank officers of the Ukrainian military that command and are the core of each company. The newly mobilized Ukrainian forces did not have the knowledge or training necessary to replace them.
'Western' equipment is more complex than Soviet era stuff. It also requires more specialized maintenance. The Ukraine received a zoo. The many types of equipment and the many incompatible kinds of ammunition they use are a logistic nightmare.
'Western' training for the mobilized Ukrainian forces did not bring up more capable soldiers than Soviet training would have done. Those who watched NATO stumble in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya should have recognized that.
Russian on the other side mobilized 300,000 soldiers who mostly had been contract soldiers before they had returned to private life. They received extensive refresher training. They now mostly get paid more than in their civilian life which certainly helped to increase their motivation.
Russia also changed the structure of its military. The main Russian fighting force in 2022 was made up of Brigade Tactical Groups (BIG). Each of them was part of a garrison brigade which next to the one contract soldier BTG had additional battalions that were mostly training conscripts. Under Russian laws the conscript battalions could not be used on foreign ground.
The fighting BTG's had few real infantry soldiers. Next to their 9 infantry platoons they had 8 artillery and 5 auxiliary platoons. Of a total of some 800 plus soldiers in a BTG only 200 were actually infantry that could man the trenches. The whole structure was too big and too difficult to command.
After the mobilization had brought up enough men the Russian military changed from BTGs to a mobile brigade structure. Under a higher commander the brigade holds two or three battalions that each consist of three or four companies of mobile infantry or tanks. Most of the artillery and auxiliary troops of the former BTGs are now concentrated under the brigade structure and can be used more flexible wherever they are needed. The tooth to tail ratio in the frontline battalions is now much higher than in a BTG and the whole structure is easier to command.
Above the newly structured brigades are now division commands which have additional assets like air defenses, attack helicopters and electronic warfare units. They direct the brigades within a wider front and with a bigger picture in mind.
While a lack of contract infantry necessitated the BTG structure of 2022 the additionally mobilized forces allowed in 2023 to return to the more efficient classic structures of battalions under brigades under divisions. All this was visible through the reports from the Russian military which had stopped to mention BTGs and changed to brigade numbers. For an unbiased military mind it was easy to see that this new Russian force would be a more balanced and better one.
Satellite pictures had shown for months that the Russian troops were building extensive defense structures like trench lines and anti-tank barriers. They are by the way still adding to them.
In the spring of 2023 the Ukrainian army was much weaker than when the war started. The Russian military had grown and was stronger. It also had well prepared positions. 'Western' politicians, the propagandized public and military commands failed to recognize those facts.
NATO had simulated the Ukrainian counter-offensive:
Logic dictates that any responsible use of the KORA simulation system would have predicted the failure of the 47th Brigade’s attack. According to The Washington Post, the officers of the 47th Brigade “planned their assaults and then let the [KORA] program show them the results – how their Russian enemies might respond, where they could make a breakthrough and where they would suffer losses.” The KORA simulation allowed the Ukrainian officers to coordinate their actions “to test how they’d work together on the battlefield.”
Given that the Ukrainian force structure was insufficient to accomplish the mission-critical task of suppression, there was no chance for the Ukrainian forces to accomplish the actual assault requirements of a breaching operation – the destruction of enemy forces on the opposite side of the obstacle barrier being breached. The Ukrainians, however, came away from their KORA experience confident that they had crafted a winning plan capable of overcoming the Russian defenses in and around Orekhov.
When one examines the structure of a KORA-based simulation, it becomes clear that the system is completely dependent upon the various inputs which define the simulation as a whole.
They probably thought the Ukrainians could actually win. But when one uses wrong estimates for the fighting powers of each side as input of a simulation the output will always be garbage.
The real world results are now in. The Ukrainian counter-offensive has failed.
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The weekend edition of the German business daily headlines: "This isn't a counter-offensive. It is a bloody crash test."
It is now time to acknowledge that the 'western' military assessments and its expectations were completely wrong:
In its early phases, Ukraine’s counteroffensive is having less success and Russian forces are showing more competence than western assessments expected, two western officials and a senior US military official tell CNN.
The counteroffensive is “not meeting expectations on any front,” one of the officials said.
According to the Western assessments, Russian lines of defense have been proving well-fortified, making it difficult for Ukrainian forces to breach them. In addition, Russian forces have had success bogging down Ukrainian armor with missile attacks and mines and have been deploying air power more effectively.
Ukrainian forces are proving “vulnerable” to minefields and Russian forces “competent” in their defense, one of the Western officials said.
Even the neoconservative Institute for the Study of War was forced to eat some tiny bits of craw and to acknowledge the competence of the Russian forces:
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) responded to the Ukrainian attack with an uncharacteristic degree of coherency and praised Southern Military District elements for repelling the attack and regaining lost positions.
Anyone who thinks that coherency is uncharacteristic for the Russians should go back and read up on Operation Bagration which showed what a well prepared Russian military can actually do.
ISW also writes:
Russian forces appear to have executed their formal tactical defensive doctrine in response to the Ukrainian attacks …
Well, what did the ISW 'experts' expect? That the Russians would use their manuals as toilet paper and run away when the turkey shooting begins?
In their utter stupidity the neoconservatives probably really believed that.
The assessments made did not acknowledge the dubious quality of freshly stood up Ukrainian forces. They did not acknowledge the changes and growth in the military structures on the Russian side. They failed to recognize the quality of the Russian fortifications and military capabilities and the deep roots of their doctrine.
The results are the consequence of ignoring reality, of seeing what one wants to see.
The politics of this war demanded that the 'western' side wins. NATO military was biased towards that. Instead of telling the politicians what a realistic outcome would be it delivered hopeful assessments that defied reality.
In consequence the Ukrainian military suffered many unnecessary casualties and lost the initiative.
Let's hope that at least some folks will learn from this.