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The MoA Week In Review – (Not Ukraine) OT 2023-71
Last week's post on Moon of Alabama:
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Other issues:
Well, who previously praised those guys?
'Disinformation':
Shipping:
Aukus:
Use as open (not Ukraine related) thread …
I apologize to b for posting such a long article, but it’s an important one. The article is not so much about tanks for the Ukraine, as it is about the possibility of Pakistan being drawn into an Azerbaijan–Iran war instigated by the West behind the scenes:
Pakistan may send tanks to the Ukraine (EurAsia Daily, Pyotr Makedontsev, March 24, 2023 — in Russian)
Pakistan, which is a serious force militarily, is a country in urgent need of economic assistance. At the same time, traditionally allied with both the United States and China, Pakistan has recently given preference to relations with the Euro-Atlantic community. A striking example of the Western bias in the politics of Islamabad is Pakistan’s participation, together with Poland, in the supply of weapons to the Ukraine (read “Pakistan and Poland will establish joint arms supplies to the Ukraine”).
However, the story of the supply of Pakistani weapons to the Ukraine, which began back in 2022 (read “Why is Pakistan arming the Ukraine?”), has developed further in 2023, as Pakistan is now supplying ammunition to the Ukraine (read “The Ukraine eliminates ammunition hunger with the help of Pakistan”). And on March 21, the Indian publication Firstpost reported on Pakistan’s plans to send 44 T-80UD tanks to the Ukraine in exchange for financial assistance from the West. These tanks are a modernized version of the Soviet T-80 tank. More than 320 T-80UD tanks were previously purchased by Pakistan from the Ukraine, and the Ukrainian side fully provided the tanks with everything, including ammunition and spare parts. In total, Pakistan has 2,467 tanks in service.
Considering that the Pakistani army, which is a state within a state, strictly adheres to allied relations with the U.S. and the UK, Pakistan’s actions are predictable. In addition, at the diplomatic level, Islamabad is also active on the Ukrainian track. For instance, on February 22, before the vote in the UN General Assembly, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy called Pakistani President Arif Alvi. Zelenskiy asked Pakistan to support the anti-Russian resolution. They also discussed economic and political ties between the two countries, including food and energy security.
The Pakistani side is also showing interest in the Ukraine. On February 10, new Pakistani Ambassador Nadir Khan discussed with representatives of the Pakistani business community the development of economic ties with the Ukraine (read “More than arms: How Pakistan helps the Ukraine”). On March 2, Nadir Khan, like his predecessor, a former military officer, in the rank of Major General, was received by President Alvi in Islamabad. Interestingly, the short report on this event states that Alvi focused on trade relations and spoke in favor of a peaceful solution to the Ukrainian conflict.
On the same day, the Ambassador met with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar, whom he guaranteed the development of economic ties between Pakistan and the Ukraine. In addition, Nadir Khan noted the opportunities for business and investment in connection with the reconstruction of the Ukraine.
However, while officially Islamabad takes a pseudo-neutral position on the Ukrainian crisis, the Pakistani army is not at all neutral, and this circumstance can seriously harm the South Asian country in other areas. On March 10, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry welcomed the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran mediated by China. The press release noted:
“Pakistan warmly welcomes the normalization of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran with the assistance of the People’s Republic of China. Pakistan firmly believes that this important diplomatic breakthrough will contribute to peace and stability in the region and beyond. We commend China’s forward-thinking leadership in coordinating this historic agreement, which reflects the strength of constructive engagement and meaningful dialogue. We pay tribute to the visionary leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran for this very positive development. With a track record of consistently supporting and coordinating efforts to bridge the gap between the two brotherly countries, Pakistan will continue to play a constructive role in the Middle East and the region. We hope that this positive step will become a model for regional cooperation and harmony.”
This landmark event is especially important for Pakistan. Saudi Arabia is one of Pakistan’s most important allies. And Iran is a neighbor with which productive and profitable cooperation has been established in some areas, and in some areas there is competition turning into enmity. China, which has achieved Saudi–Iranian normalization, is altogether indispensable for Pakistan from an economic point of view. Regarding the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, China takes a neutral position on it, blaming it on the West, which ignored its own promises and the corresponding Russian demands about the non-expansion of the NATO bloc to the East.
Therefore, it’s a bad situation when China, at the diplomatic level, does everything to end the Russian–Ukrainian conflict, and the Pakistani army, for material reasons and encouraged by the U.S. and the UK, sends weapons to the Ukraine.
Things are even worse for official Islamabad in the Transcaucasian direction. Pakistan, which does not recognize the existence of Armenia at all, is in close alliance with Azerbaijan and Turkey, which want to break an extraterritorial Zangezur corridor through Syunik and turn Armenia into “Western Azerbaijan”. Pakistan will not stand aside from Ankara and Baku in these matters. For example, on March 2, Pakistani Economy Minister Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, who attended the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement Contact Group in Response to COVID-19 in Baku, stated:
“When Armenia attacked Azerbaijan, I personally raised the issue in the Parliament of Pakistan, where I read a resolution condemning the attack. Fortunately, I had the opportunity and honor to congratulate Azerbaijan on the victory in the Karabakh war, when the country was able to return its lands… Our hearts are beating in sync with Azerbaijan.”
In this case, the Pakistani minister was referring to the second Karabakh war of 2020, in which the government of Imran Khan (now in opposition) and all of Pakistan supported Azerbaijan. The change of government did not affect Islamabad’s position in any way. On March 23, on the occasion of Pakistan Day, Pakistani Ambassador to Azerbaijan Bilal Hayee told reporters:
“For many years, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have been standing shoulder to shoulder on international platforms. We supported each other on difficult issues, from Karabakh to the Kashmir problem. And I can say with confidence that we will continue to support each other.”
About the March 23 date itself, the ambassador said:
“Today is a very important day for our country, it is the day of unity of Pakistanis. On March 23, 1956, we gained sovereignty, and every year we celebrate this day with deep reverence.”
Indeed, March 23 was chosen as the national day for a reason. On March 23, 1940, at the 27th session of the Muslim League in Lahore, a resolution proposed by Abul Kasem Fazlul Huq was adopted. The resolution demanded the creation of two Muslim-majority states in northern British India. The northwestern state was to include Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and the northeastern state was to include Bengal and Assam. This event led to the emergence of a mass movement for the creation of an independent Muslim state (present-day Pakistan).
Therefore, the speech of the Pakistani ambassador at this event is a kind of signal that the alliance between Islamabad and Baku is very strong, as well as the Ankara–Baku–Islamabad alliance in general (read “The Union of Pakistan, Turkey and Azerbaijan once again passed the test”). And herein lies the issue for Pakistan to be drawn into a military conflict.
The United States, once again extending the waiver of Section 907 [of the United States Freedom Support Act, banning any direct U.S. aid to the Azerbaijani government — S], has recently stepped up military cooperation with Azerbaijan, which is in conflict with Iran (read “The trend towards turning Azerbaijan into an outpost of the West against Iran is obvious—opinion”). One of the reasons for the confrontation between Baku and Tehran is the different vision of the future of Transcaucasia. Iran opposes violent changes in the borders in the region, including opposing the “Zangezur corridor” promoted by Baku and Ankara. Tehran is especially opposed to the plans of the Turkish–Azerbaijani tandem to create a Turkic-Sunni ring around Iran, one of the elements of which could be Armenia if it is turned into “Western Azerbaijan”.
Pakistan is a Sunni country bordering Iran. Baku does not hide plans to involve Pakistan on its side in the confrontation with Iran. The involvement of Pakistan in the Azerbaijani–Iranian conflict has now become especially likely for several reasons. First, thanks to China’s actions, Azerbaijan now has fewer potential allies. Previously, Baku expected that Saudi Arabia would help the Transcaucasian republic if the war against Iran flared up. After the normalization of Saudi–Iranian relations, this becomes unrealistic. Now Saudi Arabia will definitely not go to war against Iran. Moreover, it is possible that China will try to achieve normalization of relations between Iran and another Arab country, which Baku hoped would participate—the United Arab Emirates.
Secondly, Azerbaijan and Pakistan have an ally interested in organizing a full-scale war against Iran—the United Kingdom. And since Baku and Islamabad are allies themselves, the British won’t have to spend too much time persuading Azerbaijan and Pakistan to jointly oppose Iran. In addition, the United States, a traditional ally of Pakistan that has stepped up military cooperation with Azerbaijan, will also support the alliance between Baku and Islamabad against Tehran. Finally, another reason is the huge power of the army elite of the Pakistan Army, traditionally connected with the U.S. and the UK. If the Pakistan Army has been on the side of the West in the Russian–Ukrainian conflict since 2022, knowing about the dependence on Russian grain, then who said that the Pakistani military will not want to take part in the war against Iran on the side of the Turkish–Azerbaijani tandem?
One can entertain the illusion that Shehbaz Sharif’s government will be distracted by internal political infighting, and the Pakistani Army will be weakened by transferring several dozen tanks to the Ukraine and will not be able to strike at Iran. But it is better to take into account the Pakistani factor, keeping in mind the U.S. and the UK’s favorite style of fighting by proxy.
Posted by: S | Mar 26 2023 18:14 utc | 50
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