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The MoA Week In Review – OT 2022-007
Last week's posts at Moon of Alabama:
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Other issues:
Covid-19:
Flying:
Prosecution Futures:
Use as open thread …
Judging by the truly unprecedented propaganda hysteria in the Western, primarily American, media, deliberately dispersing to the limit the semantic narrative created by American propaganda about the “Russian attack on Ukraine” (ridiculous maps alone are something!), and also based on statements/intentions (evacuation diplomatic staff from embassies in Ukraine), actions (demonstratively supplying Ukro nazis with weapons/equipment/ammunition) and rumors/”leaks” (allegedly the head of China asked the President of the Russian Federation “not to attack Ukraine during the Olympics”, allegedly “Russia has prepared an occupation government” that will rule after the coup d’état in Ukraine) from Western politicians and the media, I get the impression that the West actually decided to launch an upgrade version of Georgia-2008 in the coming weeks.
During (or on the eve of?) the Beijing Olympics, which starts in two weeks, the Ukrainian regime (which, btw, has amassed about 120,000 soldiers on the Donbass/Russia border), having received the go-ahead in the West, will attack the Donbass (or even Crimea?), which will require a military response from the Russian Federation and another coercion of the aggressor to peace. This situation will be on the front pages of the Western media, pushing the Olympics in “authoritarian China” to the periphery, making it secondary.
As a result, the West will try to designate Russia as the “aggressor” (as they did in 2008), and China will be told that it was “the Russians who ruined your Olympics.” Thus, the West will try to embroil the Russian Federation and China.
The West, apparently, thinks that he learned the lesson of 2008 and 2014, and now will not be mistaken. In 2008, the Georgians attacked South Ossetia without disguising themselves. Actually, it was obvious and did not raise questions about who the aggressor was. In 2014, the Ukro nazis also attacked the Donbass without disguise. Now the “lesson has been learned”, and the attack on the Donbass will be carried out by Ukro nazis dressed in the uniform of the Donbass militia, as well as the Russian army.
Actually, the Americans openly talked about the scenario, traditionally turning everything upside down and attributing to Russia what they themselves planned. I love reading the statements of American politicians – you always know what the Americans themselves are planning to do, or have already done.
U.S. statement: “Russia is preparing to stage a coup d’état in Ukraine.”
What is most likely to happen in reality: the United States will carry out another coup in Ukraine, or at least not prevent the Ukrainian oligarchs from overthrowing Zelensky. In any case, Russia will be to blame for what happened.
U.S. statement: “Russia will carry out a false flag operation by attacking the Donbass with special forces to blame Ukraine for this attack.”
What is most likely to happen in reality: the Ukrainian regime, with the approval (and possibly with the participation) of the United States/West, will carry out a false flag operation, attacking the Donbass under the guise of a “Russian army”, and then blame Russia for this attack. The new version of the White Helmets in action – with photos, videos, “evidence”, “witnesses” and so on. The technology of lies has been perfectly developed and tested in Syria.
I could be wrong, I’ll be glad if I am. In any case, February is obviously going to be a very dynamic month.
Posted by: alaff | Jan 23 2022 15:54 utc | 3
@55 schmoe
All big buyers and sellers arrange contracts in advance, anyone who didn’t would risk getting wiped out, as energy commodities regularly suffer from huge price swings in both directions.
Gas sold by Gazprom and other Russian suppliers mostly either hub-indexed or oil-indexed (with a time trailing average, so effectively a time delay).
Example source: https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news/2070157-majority-of-gazproms-european-sales-hubindexed
Note that Gazprom exports mostly to the west and southwest. Pipeline export to China, at present, is still a small fraction, and Novatek hasn’t ramped up it’s LNG capacity yet either — but eastward business is very clearly the future for both Gazprom and Novatek.
So the current multi-month bump in strip prices for gas will increase revenue 6-12 months into the future. This will be true whether there is a long-term hub-indexed contract, or whether arrangements are via 1-year-out futures or options. There may be some more desperate (i.e. cash-poor) customers, and some particularly aggressive traders or producers, who are tempted to hold off from booking their 2022-2023 business now…
Gazprom, however, is for the most part conservatively managed (though they tend to go big for capex), and the commercial relationships with China perhaps even more so. So the effect on the bottom line is not nearly as drastic as the swings in the spot or futures prices. But compared to the situation in, say, 2019, it’s a noticeable increase. For a data point, Gazprom stock (US OTC = OGZPY) was up from $6 in Apr ’21 to almost $10 in Oct ’21, but retreated to $8 ish now.
The other thing that came with NS2 was a lot of industrial cooperation and tech licensing from mostly-German multinationals like Siemens, Linde, Windershall… Gazprom made a point of gaining control of technology, but there is a lot of European-origin technology in the stack just the same. Everything from pipeline construction, processing plants, unconventional drilling/production, LNG export terminals. It is, or rather was, understood by the Europeans that by making this connection, they are not only making money, but also investing in a source of cheap energy for their other domestic industry. Going forward, the EU multinationals know they are also competing with both Russian domestic firms, and China, Korea, and so on. Furthermore, at this point, Russia has a buyer in China who is ready and eager to take every last drop of oil and gas that can be fit into a ship or pipe, and is not shy about entering into a bidding war with the EU. If EU actions manage to slow Russian energy buildout, which is certainly possible, the result will be Russia will supply their domestic market first, the Chinese second, Turkey and south-stream customers third, and western EU last.
Posted by: ptb | Jan 24 2022 3:00 utc | 71
Am I still banned-
Well before i provide a link to a great site that discuses these important issues – like will we have a extinction level happinez.
What’s the connection between Blinken, Sherman, and our great cooker monster Nuddleman. I not sure BUT their actions toward Russia will be ‘dehumanizing’.
Symposium: What would US intervention over Ukraine really look like?
Scholars, journalists, former military and intel officers weigh in on the wide-ranging costs of military aid and a clash with Russia.
January 24, 2022
Written by
Responsible Statecraft
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Following talks between the U.S. and Russia this month, the landscape looks bleaker than ever in regards to avoiding a clash with Russia over Ukraine. While President Biden has promised a “swift, severe and united” response to any Russian incursion into Ukrainian territory, administration officials are now publicly declaring they are “united for Ukraine” on social media.
Responsible Statecraft asked a host of military and international relations scholars and journalists, as well as former military and intelligence officers what it would look like if the United States decided to intervene to defend Ukraine. We asked them to answer the following prompt:
“Many in Washington, including media pundits, are saying Washington may have to get involved militarily — directly or indirectly — to defend Ukraine should Russia invade. Yet they do not expand on what that would actually mean in practice, or in costs, to the U.S. Based on your experience and expertise, if the U.S. decides to defend Ukraine against a Russian invasion, what kind of costs and repercussions would such a conflict incur (long and short-term), for the United States and for the region?”
Respondents:
Emma Ashford
Lyle Goldstein
William Hartung
Michael Kimmage
Anatol Lieven
Doug Macgregor
Rajan Menon
Robert W. Merry
Lindsey O’Rourke
Paul Pillar
Monica Duffy Toft
Katrina vanden Heuvel
Stephen Wertheim
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Emma Ashford, senior fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security
The United States isn’t going to get directly involved in defending Ukraine from a potential Russian invasion; there will be no troops on the ground, and no direct U.S. military support. But there are a variety of other proposals out there that would dial up lethal arms sales to Ukraine, initiate large-scale NATO exercises elsewhere in Europe, or even help to shelter Ukrainian military assets from Russian attack. Some further arms sales might well be warranted in the event of a large-scale invasion, but the Biden administration should be cautious about taking any of these other steps towards militarizing or deepening U.S. or broader NATO involvement in this conflict. The risks of escalation are simply too high, and Ukraine’s direct importance to U.S. foreign policy too small.
Lyle Goldstein, Director of Asia Engagement at Defense Priorities
U.S. military intervention, whether direct or indirect, in a Russia-Ukraine war would have deleterious and even catastrophic consequences. An indirect U.S. military role, such as offering weapons and military trainers, may sound appealing. Yet, such activities would further cement the “New Cold War,” might prolong the war and the killing, would strain the NATO alliance, and could encourage Russian horizontal escalation, whether in Syria or even Venezuela.
Direct military intervention would carry with it risks of an even higher magnitude. U.S. forces in the region, too small to make a meaningful difference, are likely to become casualties. For example, U.S. Navy units operating in the Black Sea would be isolated and highly vulnerable targets for Russian forces. Moscow could quite conceivably view a wider Ukraine War as an opportunity to severely maul and thus punish NATO members, such as Poland, Romania, or the Baltic states for their perceived transgressions. The economic costs of a wider European war could also be massive, but the most tragic possible outcomes would be the spread of major war to the Asia-Pacific, as well as a limited nuclear exchange — a definite possibility if high intensity combat ensues between Moscow and Washington in Ukraine.
William Hartung, senior research fellow of the Quincy Institute
No one in their right mind is suggesting that the U.S. intervene directly if war breaks out. But even indirect intervention could cost billions, while increasing the risks of escalation in ways that could put U.S. personnel — and U.S. interests — in danger.
So far the Biden administration has stepped up supplies of anti-tank missiles and other military gear to Ukraine, and has given the green light to Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania to transfer U.S.-supplied Javelin anti-tank missiles and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Ukrainian military. The U.S. will no doubt pay to replace these missiles, and before you can blink an eye the hundreds of millions of additional U.S. military aid offered so far will jump into the billions. The Baltic states and Poland are also lobbying for a permanent U.S. troop presence in their countries, which could entail further costs if the Biden administration grant their requests. But perhaps the biggest risk is posed by the likely deployment of additional U.S. troops and contractors to help to train Ukrainian forces on using U.S.-origin systems, and to assist in maintaining them. If any U.S. personnel end up on the front lines and are killed in the event of a Russian invasion, the stakes – and the prospects for escalation – will rise dramatically.
Michael Kimmage, professor of history at the Catholic University and author of The Abandonment of the West: The History of an Idea in American Foreign Policy
In the event of a Russian invasion, Washington could choose to support Ukraine symbolically via the provision of arms and training either of a conventional military kind or of an insurgency. This approach need not incur great costs for the United States and would run little risk of involving the United States directly in the conflict. If, on the other hand, the United States would choose to defend Ukraine from a Russian invasion, this would be a crossing of a Rubicon. It would require the provision of air power, and it would require a substantial commitment of U.S. forces to a country that is territorially large and has a population of some 40 million people. This would incur two separate costs for Washington. One would be financial and military: the expense necessary to enable this involvement and the deployment of military resources to Eastern Europe (rather than to other theaters). The other cost would involve the danger of escalation. There is no doubt that American soldiers and air power on the front lines of a war between Ukraine and Russia would radicalize Russia’s own war aims, contributing to an escalating commitment, and it is hard to imagine that this development would not furnish the impetus to even greater U.S. involvement, a substantial short-term and long-term sequences of costs.
Anatol Lieven, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute and author of Ukraine and Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry
If Russia does invade Ukraine, Russia will win. The Biden administration has ruled out sending troops; and with only four brigades in Europe, the United States is in any case in no position to defend Ukraine, and as for NATO’s European allies, the idea that they will fight Russia in Ukraine is ludicrous.
A Russian invasion would be followed by a new offer of an agreement with the Ukrainian government and the West; most probably a ban on Ukraine joining NATO (or a treaty of neutrality, plus a federal system for Ukraine with autonomy for Russian-speaking areas.
Washington would then have three options:
One would be to send the greater part of the American armed forces to Ukraine to launch a counter-offensive to drive Russia from Ukraine. This would involve tens of thousands of American dead, the risk of nuclear annihilation, and an open invitation to China to establish its hegemony in the Far East.
The second (as threatened) would be to launch a guerrilla war against Russia on the model of the Afghan war of the 1980s. This would lead to permanent conflict in Europe and the likelihood of repeated Russian attacks on Poland.
The third option would be to negotiate a compromise. Or of course we could do that now, and prevent Russia from invading in the first place.
(Ret) Col. Douglas Macgregor, former senior advisor to the Acting Secretary of Defense
The talks between Secretary of State Blinken and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov drag on without result. Meanwhile, the Russian military buildup continues without interruption. All of the NATO militaries including United States Forces are turning out to be ‘too late to change the outcome’. It seems that all NATO can do is sit and watch Russia intervene at will in eastern and southern Ukraine.
Having failed for at least 20 years to acknowledge Moscow’s legitimate security interests in Ukraine, Washington and its allies will inevitably confront new facts on the ground. The real question for Washington is whether it wishes to live in a state of perpetual conflict or crisis with Moscow?
If Washington declines to recognize that Moscow’s interests in the region outweigh its own, Washington may watch as its allies in Europe gradually fade away. Germany, arguably, the cornerstone in NATO’s edifice, is already signaling its readiness to pursue a new policy path toward Moscow that diverges sharply from Washington’s. How many others will follow the German path before NATO ceases to have any real meaning?
Rajan Menon, Director of Grand Strategy at Defense Priorities and co-author of Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order
The United States won’t fight Russia to protect Ukraine: President Biden has effectively said that. Ukraine has no illusions that American soldiers will be dispatched to die to save it, possibly triggering a full-on war with Russia that ends in a nuclear confrontation.
Nevertheless, a former DoD official wants the U.S. to muster “an international coalition of the willing” — not just to defend Ukraine were Russia to attack now, but to expel it from Crimea and the Donbas. This idea combines silliness (which states would volunteer for a “coalition” of suicide?) with recklessness (imagine the catastrophe that would result from fighting Russia, on its doorstep no less). But The U.S. and Britain have been arming Ukraine. American soldiers have trained their Ukrainian counterparts since 2015, in Yavoriv, near Lviv, in western Ukraine. Canada has also provided training, since 2020.
Ukraine certainly has the right to acquire the means for self-defense. Yet the cold reality is that what Ukraine has received simply will not suffice to thwart a Russian combined-arms campaign: artillery and air strikes and air assault operations that pave the way for tank and motor-rifle units. Let us hope that diplomacy averts war.
Robert W. Merry, author of Sands of Empire: Missionary Zeal, American Foreign Policy, and the Hazards of Global Ambition.
For Russia, Ukraine represents a strategic imperative of the highest order; for America it is an ideological conceit based on a false and dangerous doctrine of American purity in a world of mostly bad guys. With such a differential in strategic significance and in attentiveness to geopolitical reality, an American military response to a Russian invasion of Ukraine can only bring negative outcomes for America and the West: for Europe, chaos, division, and destabilization; for Ukraine, far greater punishment than otherwise would emerge; from China, ever greater provocations aimed at America’s Asian dominance; for Russia, a quantum increase in geopolitical relevance globally and dominance regionally; and for America, a humiliation that will expose further the already discernible diminution in its ability to determine the course of world events.
George W. Bush and Barack Obama, with their reckless and arrogant actions in the Middle East, destroyed for decades any prospect for stability in that unhappy land. America ended up looking like a muscle-bound oaf. But American actions in Europe to counter Russia’s response to NATO’s 25-year encirclement provocation, would perpetuate much the same outcome in the very cradle of Western Civilization. The consequence could very well be catastrophic.
Lindsey O’Rourke, non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston College
If Russia invades Ukraine, many in Washington are likely to see covertly arming anti-Russian forces within Russian-occupied territories as an attractive middle option between full-blown war and doing nothing in response. Unfortunately, as I show in my book Covert Regime Change, America’s track record for covertly arming foreign dissidents is quite poor. During the Cold War, for instance, only 4 out of America’s 35 operations to covertly arm foreign dissidents during U.S.-backed covert regime change attempts succeeded in bringing America’s insurgent allies to power. Instead, such operations typically succeeded only in raising the cost of the conflict for all parties involved, prolonging bloody civil wars, and increasing civilian suffering. Furthermore, if Russia does invade Ukraine, Moscow is likely to limit its invasion to more sympathetic regions within Eastern Ukraine. This, in turn, would limit America’s ability to covertly organize an effective partisan defense. Even if an anti-Russian opposition emerged, Russia would still enjoy escalation dominance in the region, suggesting a low long-term prospect for success.
Paul Pillar, non-resident fellow of the Quincy Institute and non-resident senior fellow at the Center for Security Studies of Georgetown University
In any military involvement in Ukraine, the United States would suffer from severe asymmetries in both will and capability. Ukraine always will be much more important to Russia than it is to the United States. As for capabilities, the massing of Russian forces along the Ukrainian border is a reminder of a huge Russian advantage in geography and lines of communication. War in Ukraine would be a losing proposition for the United States from the firing of the first shots.
Ukrainian forces—and a Ukrainian insurgency, if it came to that—would be able to keep Russia from swallowing Ukraine smoothly. But Putin’s regime is far too committed on the issues involved to back off or back out simply because the conflict would become costly for Russia as well. A short-term quagmire could easily become a long-term one for everyone involved.
The resulting drain on U.S. resources, policymaking bandwidth, and willingness to make good on other commitments would have far-reaching repercussions. Intra-European disagreements on dealing with Russia would intensify. Great power cooperation on other issues would suffer. Those seeing an opportunity to benefit from U.S. distraction (think of China vis-à-vis Taiwan) would be tempted to act.
Monica Duffy Toft, professor of international politics and director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School of Tufts University
Direct and indirect aid to Ukraine and short- and long-term repercussions to the United States are key distinctions. Direct aid would include U.S. armed forces.The United States is unlikely to do this without a UN resolution, which won’t happen because Russia would veto it. Militarily, NATO would have to be unified, but NATO is divided because Russia holds Europe’s economies hostage to Russia’s energy resources. Indirect aid is already arriving in the form of anti-tank weapons, other defensive hardware, and cyber support. If Russia attacks, U.S. indirect support won’t prevent a Russian win. Short-term a failed indirect defense for the United States would be costly in terms of its capacity to deter aggression. This reputation was already damaged by Syria’s violation of President Barak Obama’s “red line” in 2013, and the tepid international response to Russia’s armed annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Moreover, sanctions sufficient to deter or punish Russia, would be difficult to enforce because again, Russia dominates Europe’s access to energy (it is no accident this is happening in winter). Long-term, a failed U.S. indirect defense of Ukraine may prove catastrophic: if Ukraine is this century’s Sudetenland, allowing Russia to establish that its interests supersede the sovereignty and independence of internationally recognized states on its periphery, may again lead to a world war that no one can win.
Katrina vanden Heuvel, president of the American Committee for the US-Russia Accord, editor and publisher of The Nation
Any intervention now would squander U.S. attention and resources on challenges posed by the pandemic, economic inequality, racial divisions and catastrophic climate change. What is essentially a civil war will become more entrenched as a proxy war — with grave geopolitical repercussions, mass displacement, empowering China, dividing European allies, fueling already challenging nuclear insecurity — and, if U.S. troops are there training Ukrainians, we may see American casualties. That could lead to even more U.S. involvement and a potential and exceedingly dangerous quagmire.
The United States just exited from the longest war in American history (Korean War excluded). Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates the Afghan war cost $5.8 trillion; the international community now appears unable to provide even $5 billion in humanitarian assistance. Scores of U.S. drone attacks misfired, killing thousands of innocent civilians. May this remind us of the true costs and repercussions of military misadventures: accountability is rarely demanded, and such military debacles undermine an already fragile democracy at home.
Ukraine demands a diplomatic and political resolution. A positive outcome would be the expansion of a new and demilitarized international security architecture in the region, and a moratorium on NATO expansion, along with international guarantees for Ukraine’s independence. May it be a bridge between East and West.
Stephen Wertheim, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, author of Tomorrow the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy
Several politicians and commentators warn that a Russian invasion of Ukraine would upend peace and stability globally. In particular, they suggest, a display of American weakness might entice China to invade Taiwan.
This argument could potentially resonate with Americans who would otherwise oppose serious military involvement in Ukraine against a great power and nuclear peer. But it is mistaken and gets the risks backward.
If the United States declined to go to war over Ukraine, a country it has no formal obligation to defend, this should hardly surprise Chinese leaders or change their decisions toward Taiwan. Invading Taiwan remains a huge strategic gamble, not to mention a personal one for President Xi Jinping as he seeks a third term this fall.
If, however, the U.S were to sleepwalk into war with Russia, it would then have to divert enormous resources to Europe. Deterrence in Asia would weaken. Moreover, Chinese leaders would see the United States breaching its own longstanding limits by defending Ukraine. They could fear that Taiwan might be next — that America would actually treat the island as part of its defense perimeter, even though Washington has no clear commitment to defend Taiwan and officially supports its peaceful reunification with the mainland. China might decide to strike, thinking it is now or never.
This fanciful scenario ought to remain just that. Biden has taken the use of force in Ukraine off the table. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains unlikely. But it’s important to remember, as passions rise, why war with Russia would be the worst course of action possible.
Posted by: col from Oz | Jan 24 2022 11:25 utc | 97
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