On August 6 1945, seventy five years ago, the U.S. military dropped a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima. A few days later another one obliterated Nagasaki.
The question of why the United States used the nuclear bombs has more than one answer. The decision involved various persons with differing motives. Some of those people, especially in the military, were against using the bomb. Japan was ready to surrender even before the nuclear bombs were dropped. It did not surrender because the bombs destroyed two of its cities.
A major reason to use the new bombs was to demonstrate to the Soviet Union – already selected as the next enemy – that the U.S. had superior weapons. But it did not take long for the scientist in the Soviet Union to catch up and to test their own nuclear device.
It then dawned on some in Washington that a world with nuclear weapons is less secure than one without them. For 75 years they tried to stop the race for more nuclear weapons and to create a path to their total abolishment. But the hawks were more numerous – they still are – and they won out each and every time.
A history of that process is well caught in Scott Ritter's opus "Scorpion King – America's suicidal embrace of nuclear weapons from FDR to Trump".

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Scott Ritter has studied the Soviet Union, worked in military intelligence and as a United Nations weapon inspector in Iraq. He is extraordinarily qualified to write about nuclear weapon policies.
The book is an updated version of the 2010 edition. It is comprehensive and covers the decision processes of every U.S. administration with regards to nuclear weapons, nuclear arms control, non proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
Over the first decades many new nuclear arms and delivery systems were introduced. There was always a demand for even more. The nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union were widely exaggerated. The U.S. assessments of Soviet power were often fake. One commission after the other was setup to make nuclear war plans, to decide which cities should be obliterated, how many million people should be killed and to calculate how many additional weapons were needed to achieve that.
Over time the insanity of the nuclear arms race became more obvious. But when presidents tried to negotiate arms control agreements, and to lower the number of nuclear weapons, there were always people who worked to hinder them. Some successes were made. Nuclear tests were banned. A number of strategic weapons were restricted. Anti-ballistic missiles, introduced to prevent an enemy's response to an offensive first strike, were limited. Certain categories of intermediate nuclear weapons were abolished.
But then came the breakup of the Soviet Union. The U.S. no longer felt a need to restrict itself. Its 'unilateral moment' had begun. Since the 1990s it has once again tried to gain an absolute nuclear supremacy. It has encroached on Russia's borders and reintroduced anti-ballistic missile capabilities to make a nuclear first strike against Russia possible.
The attempt failed when Russia in 2018, a decade after warning the U.S. to back off, introduced new weapons which can evade any attempt to counter them. The Obama administrations had failed to draw the right consequences from Russia's warning. Under Trump more nuclear treaties were abolished and soon there will be none left. The world is today more in danger of a nuclear war than it ever was.
As Ritter diagnoses:
The United States is a nation addicted to nuclear weapons and the power and prestige, both real and illusory, that these weapons bring. Breaking this addiction will prove extremely difficult. This is especially true given the lack of having any real nuclear disarmament policy in place since the dawn of the nuclear age. The failure of the United States to formulate or to implement effective nuclear disarmament policy has placed America and the world on very dangerous ground. The longer America and the world continue to possess nuclear weapons, the greater the likelihood of nuclear weapons being used. The only way to prevent such a dire outcome is through abolition, and not the reduction of control, of all nuclear weapons.
The book gives a detailed history of the nuclear decision processes of every U.S. administration since the dawn of the nuclear age. It digs into the motives of many of the involved persons. It documents how – throughout many administrations – the general nuclear policies were kept unchanged. The differences were only gradual.
With 501 pages, including end notes, the Scorpion King takes more than one evening to fully comprehend.
But I for one am grateful to have had the chance to read it all the way through. Scott Ritter's opus will now be THE work of reference to consult when I write about nuclear policies.
The book is available as paperback for $29.95 or electronically for $19.00.