Two weeks ago the National Transport Safety Board (NTSB) released a 13 pages long recommendation (pdf) resulting from its investigation into the 737 MAX incidents. Since we dicussed that damning report more bad news for Boeing has come out.
- Boeing's general business is not doing well.
- A newly found structural defect on older 737 NG planes, the predecessor of the 737 MAX, will ground a significant number of those planes.
- There are new damning revelations about the 737 MAX development process that have led to two deadly accidents. The Southwest pilot associated is suing Boeing for making false statements. A whistleblower asserts that Boeing left out safety features because of their costs. A Joint Authorities Technical Review will make it more difficult for Boeing to 'upgrade' older airplane types.
- There are further delays in the MAX return into the air.
As AirInsight analyst Ernest Arvai summarizes:
The MAX is grounded, the 787 is being investigated for quality issues and has major engine problems, the 777-X is even further delayed with engine problems, and the KC-46 is failing to meet needs and currently restricted from carrying passengers and cargo. Now, the prior generation 737NG is developing serious premature failure of structural components that should last the lifetime of the aircraft, and could result in an additional financial drain. We’ve been looking for good news about Boeing, but simply can’t find any.
An order for 22 of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner was canceled. Without new orders the two production lines for the 787 will need only 40 more months to finish the outstanding orders. That is a relative short backlog for a large passenger jet production line. Boeing needs a new mid-range product but has little time to work on it.
Boeing's overall orderbook is shrinking:
Boeing's net order tally, including cancellations, was a negative 84 for the first nine months of 2019, also hit by the bankruptcy of India's Jet Airways, which resulted in Boeing removing 210 aircraft from its order backlog.
During the conversion of a 737 NG passenger jet into a freighter plane Boeing found serious defects on a structural component that was supposed to have a longer lifetime than the plane. Boeing notified the FAA:
The FAA has issued an Air Worthiness Directive (AD) for high time Boeing 737 NGs, requiring immediate inspections for cracks in their wing attachments called pickle forks.
The cracks were discovered on high time aircraft which were torn down for conversion to freighters. The affected 737 types are NG only; the MAX and Classic have a different wing attachment design.
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The issued AD affects Boeing 737 NG aircraft with over 22,600 flight cycles (flights). These shall be inspected within one year. For aircraft with more than 30,000 flight cycles, the inspection shall be completed within one week from the effective date of the AD.
The central wingbox is the structure where the wings are attached to the planes body.

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Two frames (STA 540) at the front and the rear of the wingbox carry the load into the upper body structure.

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At the lower end of these frames are the forged 'pickle forks' that are riveted to the wingbox.

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This is how the whole construct looks in real life.

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The planes with these defects (pdf) have been grounded as such cracks tend to grow and a failure of the structure would likely end catastrophically.

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The planes are supposed to make up to 90,000 flights throughout their life without such structural damages. The first inspection round showed that the problem is systematic and serious:
The results of the first week of inspections are 5% of the inspected aircraft have cracks with the lowest flight cycle aircraft with cracks at 23,600 flights.
Each plane will take three weeks to repair. But the supply of replacement parts for the cracked component is limited and it may take longer to produce new ones.
It is not clear yet what causes the cracks in the forged aluminum part. Many older NG were retrofitted with winglets on the tips of their wings. These may have led to unforeseen loads or vibrations. It is possible that some of the younger 737 NG airplanes have a similar problem.
This is bad news for those airlines that exclusively fly Boeing 737 planes. Not only are their new 737 MAX planes grounded but a significant share of their older 737 NG fleets will also come off the flight line and will require lengthy repairs.
Southwest Airlines Pilots Association has sued Boeing over its 737 MAX design:
“Boeing made a calculated decision to rush a re-engined aircraft to market to secure its single-aisle market share and prioritize its bottom line,” the introduction to the suit states. “In doing so, Boeing abandoned sound design and engineering practices, withheld safety critical information from regulators and deliberately mislead its customers, pilots and the public.
“Boeing’s misrepresentations caused SWAPA to believe that the 737 MAX aircraft was safe,” the suit goes on, then adds starkly: “Those representations proved to be false.”
The suit includes (pdf) some remarkable facts:
120. The risk profile and required risk assessment of the second iteration of MCAS was completely different from the first, and yet Boeing neither assessed that increased risk nor even attempted to mitigate it. Instead, Boeing used its ODA authority to hide this information.
This is a point we made several times in our writings about the MAX. Boeing has claimed that an MCAS failure was a 'runaway stabilizer' incident for which no extra training was needed. The Southwest pilots disagree:
229. An MCAS failure is not like a runaway stabilizer. A runaway stabilizer has continuous un-commanded movement of the tail, whereas MCAS is not continuous and pilots (theoretically) can counter the nose-down movement, after which MCAS would move the aircraft tail down again.
SWAPA is suing Boeing because the assertions it made about the 737 MAX were directly relevant for the union's negotiations with Southwest:
7. Boeing’s false representations, made directly to SWAPA, caused SWAPA to agree, despite its initial reluctance, to include the 737 MAX as a term in its collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with Southwest. The aircraft’s grounding is now causing SWAPA pilots to lose millions of dollars each month because the 737 MAX was removed from Southwest’s flight schedule, and from SWAPA pilots’ paychecks as well.
It will cost Boeing some $100 million to settle the suit. That will only be a small part of the total damage the 737 MAX problems caused the company. But the additional public relation damage will be significant.
A Boeing engineer has come forward to say that Boeing rejected safety upgrades because of their costs:
The ethics charge, filed by 33-year-old engineer Curtis Ewbank, whose job involved studying past crashes and using that information to make new planes safer, describes how around 2014 his group presented to managers and senior executives a proposal to add various safety upgrades to the MAX.
The complaint, a copy of which was reviewed by The Seattle Times, suggests that one of the proposed systems could have potentially prevented the crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia that killed 346 people. Three of Ewbank’s former colleagues interviewed for this story concurred.
The proposed but rejected changes would have prevented false cockpit alarms. The point is crucial because the Angle-of-Attack sensor failures that caused both 737 MAX accidents led to a number of confusing alarms which made it difficult for the pilots to diagnose the problem. It has since been revealed that Boeing had received exceptions from current regulatory rules that demand a better alarming system:
In 2014, Boeing convinced the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to relax the safety standards for the new 737 MAX related to cockpit alerts that would warn pilots if something went wrong during flight, according to documents reviewed by the Seattle Times.
Seeking an exception, Boeing relied on a special FAA rule to successfully argue that full compliance with the latest federal requirements would be “impractical” for the MAX and would cost too much.
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The Seattle Times reviewed the relevant parts of the document that Boeing submitted to the FAA to win its exception. They show the federal regulator struck out four separate clauses that would be requirements for any new jet being produced today. This meant Boeing avoided having to design a complete upgrade of the 737’s aging flight-crew-alerting system.
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On the Ethiopian Airlines flight that crashed in March, the pilots faced a barrage of alerts throughout the six-minute flight. Besides the stick-shaker, they heard repeated loud “DON’T SINK” warnings that the jet was too close to the ground; a “clacker” making a very loud clicking sound to signal the jet was going too fast; and multiple warning lights telling the crew the speed, altitude and other readings on their instruments were unreliable.
The use of old certification standards when updating a plane is a major point of criticism raised by a new report:
The Federal Aviation Administration, which approved the design of the jet in 2017, dropped the ball on many fronts, the Joint Authorities Technical Review found. A 69-page summary of the findings also said the panel found evidence that Boeing exerted “undue pressures” on some of its own employees who had FAA authority to approve design changes.
The JATR report is damning for both, Boeing and the FAA. It describes all the known failures and makes 12 recommendations that will change the way how old plane types can be 'upgraded' into a new version. FAA exceptions like the ones above will no longer be possible:
Changed Product Rules (..) and associated guidance (..) should be revised to require a top-down approach whereby every change is evaluated from an integrated whole aircraft system perspective. These revisions should include criteria for determining when core attributes of an existing transport category aircraft design make it incapable of supporting the safety advancements introduced by the latest regulations and should drive a design change or a need for a new type certificate. The aircraft system includes the aircraft itself with all its subsystems, the flight crew, and the maintenance crew.
If implemented the recommendation will make another 737 MAX impossible. A future upgrade of an old plane type will have to conform with the current regulation to a much larger extent and can no longer rely on the old rules to which it was originally designed. If this gets applied to the currently grounded 737 MAX, which may be possible, the plane will never fly again. Current Boeing plans to upgrade its 777 with new wings and engines might also be in trouble. Thoughts about upgrading the 767 will have to be put aside.
Other JATR recommendations criticize the FAA's delegation system that allowed Boeing engineers to self-certify some design changes. Other points are the general lack of human factor analysis and problems with evaluating pilot training necessities.
A few observations in the JATR report will have some engineers shake their heads. This lack of functionality in Boeing's engineering simulator is, for example, inexcusable:
Observation O3.13-A: During evaluation in the Boeing engineering simulator (E-Cab), the JATR team observed that the device does not incorporate control loading on the manual stabilizer trim wheel. As a result, control forces on the manual stabilizer trim wheel are not representative of the aircraft.
The manual trim is required to bring the plane back into normal flight after the electric trim or MCAS failed. That is currently not always possible because the aerodynamic forces in certain situations are too great to be overcome with the manual wheel. The European regulator noted that as a major problem that Boeing has to rectify. That Boeing was not even able to simulate this is mind boggling.
It is also damning for Boeing and the FAA that the report's authors had to include this eternal engineering truth:
[I]n the hierarchy of safety solutions, mitigation by design should be prioritized over warnings and training/procedures.
This comment from a pilot forum is also very relevant:
Finding F3.5-C The JATR team considers that the STS/MCAS and EFS functions could be considered as stall identification systems or stall protection systems, depending on the natural (unaugmented) stall characteristics of the aircraft. From its data review, the JATR team was unable to completely rule out the possibility that these augmentation systems function as a stall protection system.
(my emphasis)
In my words, it seems unclear to this day, whether the MAX is sufficiently aerodynamically stable in pitch or not. Whether the MAX requires a full blown stall envelope protection including all the mandatory redundancy, or not, may decide the fate of her certification.
The Seattle Times has more on the JATR report.
As a consequence of all the above some industry analysts have called for the firing of the CEO and of long term board members of Boeing.
Yesterday the Boeing board took the first step and demoted its chairman and CEO:
With pressure mounting on the Boeing board and increased public concern about a need to revamp the company’s safety culture, the board on Friday took away Dennis Muilenburg’s role as company chairman, separating that position from his chief executive role.
Muilenburg will remain CEO and president, and will stay on the board of directors, while lead director David Calhoun was elected to replace him as chairman.
It is generally assumed that Muilenburg will be fired as CEO as soon as the MAX disaster is over.
This will still take several months.
While the new MCAS software is allegedly ready to be cerified there are still many open points that international certification authorities have asked Boeing to rectify. The European regulator wants more testing to be done to the changes to the Flight Control Computers:
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency recently told senior U.S. regulators it wasn’t satisfied that FAA and Boeing officials had adequately demonstrated the safety of reconfigured MAX flight-control computers, according to people briefed on the discussions. The aim is to add redundancy by having both computers work simultaneously to eliminate hazards stemming from possible chip malfunctions identified months ago; over decades, and on previous versions of the 737, only one computer at a time has fed data to automated systems, alternating between flights. The concerns were passed on by EASA chief Patrick Ky to Ali Bahrami, the FAA’s top safety official, one of the people said.
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Boeing and the FAA are finishing testing the dual-computer system, and the final results haven’t been presented to EASA or other regulators. EASA has signaled, though, that it wants additional risk scenarios examined beyond those in the current testing plan, this person said.
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Boeing engineers are frustrated EASA hasn’t specified what additional measures might allay its objections, according to people close to the discussions.
The last paragraph is astonishing. It is not the task of a regulator to tell Boeing engineers how to solve their problems. The regulators set the rules and check if a manufacturer's engineering solutions comply with those.
That Boeing still does not get that and is looking for easy ways out of its problems shows that the company has yet to learn its lesson.
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Previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 MAX issues:
- Boeing, The FAA, And Why Two 737 MAX Planes Crashed – March 12 2019
- Flawed Safety Analysis, Failed Oversight – Why Two 737 MAX Planes Crashed – March 17 2019
- Regulators Knew Of 737 MAX Trim Problems – Certification Demanded Training That Boeing Failed To Deliver – March 29 2019
- Ethiopian Airline Crash – Boeing Advice To 737 MAX Pilots Was Flawed – April 9 2019
- Boeing 737 MAX Crash Reveals Severe Problem With Older Boeing 737 NGs – May 25 2019
- Boeing's Software Fix For The 737 MAX Problem Overwhelms The Plane's Computer – June 27 2019
- EASA Tells Boeing To Fix 5 Major 737 MAX Issues – July 7 2019
- The New Delay Of Boeing's 737 MAX Return Will Not Be The Last One – July 15 2019
- 737 MAX Rudder Control Does Not Meet Safety Guidelines – It Was Still Certified – July 28 2019
- 737 MAX – Boeing Insults International Safety Regulators As New Problems Cause Longer Grounding – September 3 2019
- Boeing Foresees Return Of The 737 MAX In November – But Not Everywhere – September 12 2019
- 14,000 Words Of "Blame The Pilots" That Whitewash Boeing Of 737 MAX Failure – September 18 2019
- Boeing Failed To Consider Pilot Workload When It Designed and Tested The 737 MAX – September 29 2019