Moon of Alabama Brecht quote
October 21, 2019

737 MAX Produces More Bad News For Boeing

The financial markets have finally woken up to Boeing's criminal behavior around the certification of the 737 MAX:

Boeing shares were falling in premarket trading Monday after analysts from at least two firms cut their ratings and price targets in light of recent revelations about the Chicago aerospace giant's grounded 737 MAX jetliner. Credit Suisse analyst Robert Spingarn cut Boeing to neutral from outperform and pared his price target to $323 from $416 after publication of instant messages by an ex-senior test pilot at the company that he "unknowingly" misled safety regulators about a 737 MAX control system.

"We can no longer defend the shares in light of the latest discoveries, [which] significantly increase the risk profile for investors," Spingarn said in a note to investors.
Boeing was the Dow's biggest loser on Friday, closing down 6.8% to $344.

At 1:00PM EDT Boeing was down to $330. Since the second deadly MAX crash Boeing's share price has decreased by more than 18%. On Wednesday Boeing will reveal its quarterly results and may well announce billions more of losses.

The bad news for Boeing continues to come in.

Consumer advocate Ralph Nader, whose grandniece died in a 737 Max crash, says that Boeing CEO Muilenburg and the entire board need to go. Nader says that the plane should never fly again.

There are signs that Boeing will reduce or even completely stop the production of new 737 MAX at least until its re-certification is assured. Currently Boeing still produces 42 MAX per month without delivering any to its customers.

The downgrading of Boeing comes after a three years old exchange between two MAX project pilots came to light:

The exchange of messages in 2016 between the two lead technical pilots on the Boeing 737 MAX program was released Friday after regulators blew up at the company for belatedly disclosing the matter. The messages reveal that the flight-control system, which two years later went haywire on the crashed flights, was behaving aggressively and strangely in the pilots’ simulator sessions.
“It’s running rampant in the sim on me,” 737 Chief Technical Pilot Mark Forkner wrote to Patrik Gustavsson, who would succeed him as chief technical pilot. “I’m levelling off at like 4000 ft, 230 knots and the plane is trimming itself like craxy. I’m like, WHAT?” (Spelling errors in the original.)

“Granted, I suck at flying, but even this was egregious,” Forkner added.

In the Nov. 15, 2o16, message exchange, Forkner tells Gustavsson that MCAS is now active down to Mach 0.2 — meaning at low speed, not just in the high-speed maneuver for which it was originally designed. He adds that it will now be necessary to update the description of the system, presumably referring to material Boeing provides the FAA.

“So I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly),” he texted.

Another document released by DeFazio’s committee Friday is an email Forkner sent to an FAA official just over seven months earlier, on March 30, 2016, asking that MCAS be omitted from the pilot manuals and not mentioned in pilot training.

Forkner, who is now with Southwest Airlines, is using his 5th amendment right on the issue. He does not do so because of the above exchange. Until that point he indeed lied unknowingly. But even after he had experienced the brutal power of MCAS he worked to keep it out of the pilot manuals:

In a separate email to an FAA official in mid-January 2017 — two months after the text exchange when he had noted the “egregious” behavior of MCAS — Forkner suggests two changes to the “differences training” that pilots were to undergo in order to move from flying the prior 737 model to the MAX.

The first change was to delete a reference to MCAS.

“We decided we weren’t going to cover it” in the flight manual and training course, he reminded the FAA official.

The Seattle Times reported in March that the FAA was not fully informed of a major design change to the MCAS system when Boeing expanded it to cover certain low-speed flight situations. It further reported that this change was not updated in the System Safety Assessment that Boeing submitted to the FAA during certification of the MAX.

MCAS was completely left out of the pilots flight manuals and training materials. The maintenance manual described MCAS with four short sentences but falsely says that it only acts at higher speeds.

Boeing now claims that the 'egregious' behavior was just a simulator issue and that the FAA was fully informed of all MCAS issues. But the Seattle Times finds that the claim does not hold up as the two pilots also talk about the need to change the flight manual with a description of the issue:

This interpretation that it was the simulator program that was at fault is certainly not “obvious” from the full transcript of the messages.
Boeing’s assertion that the FAA was fully informed of this crucial design change directly contradicts the findings of an international panel of regulators — the Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) — released earlier this month.

That panel of experts found that as MCAS evolved starting in March 2016 “from a relatively benign system to a much more aggressive system,” it was not properly evaluated in the certification documents that Boeing submitted to the FAA.

The technical pilots Mark Forkner and Patrik Gustavsson are not test pilots. Specially trained test pilots fly the real plane beyond the limits of its flight envelope. They acquire the data used in the simulators. The technical pilots fly the plane in the e-cab engineering simulator within its flight envelope to evaluate subsystems and to collect data needed for the flight manuals and certifications.

In the case of the MAX the test pilots did not communicate well with the technical pilots:

“Why are we just now hearing about this?” Forkner asks.

Gustavsson responds: “The test pilots have kept us out of the loop.” He then adds that “It’s really only christine that is trying to work with us, but she has been too busy.” This appears to be a reference to Christine Walsh, who was engineering test pilot on the MAX program.

Forkner concurs about the test pilots: “They’re all so damn busy, and getting pressure from the program.”

More of Boeing's internal messages will certainly be revealed in the myriad of law suits the company is now facing. Boeing has so far played tough and admitted no guilt. The financial analysts finally recognized that this makes Boeing's position only more difficult.

After the two deadly accidents Boeing behaved arrogantly towards the regulators, pilots and the public. This arrogance is just as apparent in the compensation offers to its customers:

Boeing’s opening compensation offers to airlines and lessors affected by MAX pretty much sucks.

To airlines, Boeing’s opening position is to offer credits for work by Boeing Global Services and discounts (described as steep) on 787 orders. (The 787 skyline falls off a cliff in 2022.) But no discounts on 737 or 777 orders.

Airlines are not, to put it mildly, very receptive.

Boeing’s initial offer to lessors is to reschedule MAX deliveries to 2023/24 (lessors were finding a supply-demand imbalance even before the grounding)—but pre-delivery payments and price escalations still have to be paid.

The lessors are less receptive than the airlines.

Finally, as LNA reported months ago, Boeing is also taking the position that the grounding is an “excusable delay” that protects Boeing against compensation claims. Go ahead and sue if you disagree.

Boeing also takes the position that once the FAA recertifies the MAX, this stops the clock on any claims because the FAA, not EASA, CAAC or any other agency, is the governing agency.

The airlines have real losses caused by the criminal decisions Boeing made during the development of the 737 MAX. To get offered compensation in form of rebates for a jet type one does not want to buy is cringeworthy. This will have long time consequences for Boeing. Airbus should seriously think about opening another A-320 series production line. A lot of Boeing's customers would surely like an opportunity to buy elsewhere.

In our last piece about Boeing issues we also discussed an unexpected fatigue issue found in the 737 MAX predecessor, the 737 NG:

During the conversion of a 737 NG passenger jet into a freighter plane Boeing found serious defects on a structural component that was supposed to have a longer lifetime than the plane.

The cracks in the so called 'pickle fork' occurred in some 5% of the older planes:

Each plane will take three weeks to repair. But the supply of replacement parts for the cracked component is limited and it may take longer to produce new ones.

A knowledgeable source says that the cause of the cracks has been found:

The actual cause of the pickle fork cracks is because of the the holes being over drilled by around 6 thousands. The holes are grossly oversize and the bolts that run through the part and the fail safe strap are not supporting the part. The bolts are supposed to be snug fit so when a plane lands the bolts and part share equal stress and not have a stress issue. The bolts are not touching the sides of the holes hardly at all therefore any gap between the bolt and the part contributes to all stress being put on the fork part and fail safe strap, which has holes where the bolts are.

The results (pdf) of these production mistakes are cracks in an important structural part. The affected planes have been grounded as such cracks tend to grow and a failure of the structure would likely end catastrophically.


When airplanes are put together the parts that need to be fixed to each other get aligned in some fixture. Then holes are drilled, deburred, reamed and even coldworked to prevent any possible cracks appearing around them. After an inspection the rivets, fasteners or bolts are pressed in, tightened and again inspected. There are about 600,000 bolts and rivets that hold each 737 together. To install them can be a repetitive and boring task. But it is important that it is done correctly.

Since it started to emphasize shareholder value Boeing experienced many quality issues within its production lines. Foreign object debris was found on new tanker planes delivered to the airforce. Qatar Airlines does not accept any 787 planes produced at Boeing's non-union factory in Charleston, South Carolina because of frequent production problems in that plant. The 737 NG was already known to have misfitted parts (vid). Now we learn that other parts were installed incorrectly.

Some 7,000 737 NG have been produced and most of those are still flying. As some 5%, or 350 of them, need to be reworked for three weeks each, the bill Boeing will have to pay for this issue will also be significant.

On Wednesday Boeing will publish is quarterly results. October 29 is the first anniversary of the Lion Air 604 accident. The full accident report will be published around that time. On October 30 CEO Muilenburg will be questioned in Congress hearings.

Boeing's name and the 737 MAX issue will stay in the news for some time, and not in a positive way. While I am not a financial analyst the Credit Swiss price target to $323 seems extremely optimistic to me. Even if the MAX is allowed back into the air, maybe by next summer, it will not be easily accepted:

Nearly half of the 2,000 respondents said they would pay more to avoid the MAX.

Boeing needs to change. Unless it does its share price will continue to fall.

Previous Moon of Alabama posts on Boeing 737 MAX issues:

Posted by b on October 21, 2019 at 17:44 UTC | Permalink


It's bail out time.

Posted by: vk | Oct 21 2019 18:29 utc | 1

Boeing needs to change. Unless it does its share price will continue to fall.
Let it's share price keep falling. Once it has fallen too far the current board and executives will be culled. That's the American capitalist way, don't bother with the morals, the only thing that matters is the share price.

Posted by: Ghost Ship | Oct 21 2019 19:01 utc | 2

Surely at some point someone within Boeing has proposed a proper implementation of MCAS? Leaking that original proposal, or the after the fact retrofit solution, would be the thunderbolt that forces issue and quantifies the cost of fixing the fleet in both time and money. THAT'S when Boeing stock tanks...

Posted by: EEngineer | Oct 21 2019 20:01 utc | 3

The American way is to transfer wealth from the poor to the rich (and resources from foreign people to Westerners). It subsidizes the military and financial industries (and many others) while claiming there's no money for social services. It's socialist comfort for the rich, "capitalist free market" excuse for screwing the poor and foreigners [when it's not jailing and murdering them by the millions].

Posted by: Jark | Oct 21 2019 20:08 utc | 4

I live in Southern Calif., and most rank and file are being fed the BS, that the problem isn't with the Boeing plane, but with the foreign pilots.

Boeing is still spinning hard, to avoid the real problem, profits over people's safety.

Posted by: ben | Oct 21 2019 20:13 utc | 5

Can there even be a "proper" implementation of MCAS? One that meets the requirements that management set for the engineers? The 737 MAX needs to fly under the same type certification as the 737 NG, and it is necessary there be no retraining of the pilots certified to fly that type to fly the MAX.

I think that might not be possible.

When customers who have placed orders for these planes get told that what will be delivered is not what was in the glossy brochure when they ordered it then that is when the lawsuits will start in earnest.

Posted by: William Gruff | Oct 21 2019 20:22 utc | 6

Key questions not yet asked of Boeing/FAA interested parties:

We have heard that Boeing wanted to omit mention of MCAS in the 737MAX manual, and FAA agreed. This suggests some probing questions of Boeing and FAA, especially the first 2:

1. Why did you want to omit mention of MCAS in the pilot manual? What were the justifications to omit? There must be documentation to cover this unusual action to get FAA approval. Where is it?

2. If FAA refused to omit MCAS from the manual, what exactly would you have put in the manual about MCAS? Would you just mention and explain function of MCAS? What further questions might pilots ask about MCAS if MCAS was explained?

3.Is the aircraft "stable " when MCAS is being used? Is the aircraft stable without MCAS during takeoff?

4. Why is MCAS needed on 737MAX?

5. If MCAS fails, would using a "rollercoaster" procedure ever be needed? Does "rollercoaster" procedure cause some loss of altitude? At low altitude, might there be risk of ground impact?

6, Can MCAS fail at any altitude? During takeoff and initial climb, if MCAS wrongly forces plane to go nose-down, can pilot recover? How?

7. When were all 737MAX pilots told of MCAS and how it operates?

Posted by: chu teh | Oct 21 2019 20:24 utc | 7

b says: “Some 7,000 737 NG have been produced and most of those are still flying. As some 5%, or 350 of them, need to be reworked for three weeks each, the bill Boeing will have to pay for this issue will also be significant.”

My understanding is that unlike a car company, that needs to correct a defect in an automobile, Boeing is not responsible for fixing a mistake in their airplane outside of the warranty period. The aircraft owner is then liable for the repair costs. So if the FAA issues an Airworthiness Directive (AD), the aircraft owner is on the hook.

From the FAA: “What is the responsibility of aircraft owners/operators? Aircraft owners and operators are responsible for ensuring compliance with the requirements of all ADs that apply to their aircraft. Anyone who operates a product that does not meet the requirements of an applicable AD is in violation of 14 CFR.”

Boeing warranties are usually 2 years against defective parts. They reimburse the airlines for costs depending on the failure. Boeing does not fix the problems with the airplanes except in certain rare occasions. But airlines can negotiate longer warranties at the time of purchase.

I could be wrong, but as I remember, that is how it was explained to me.

Posted by: meshpal | Oct 21 2019 20:52 utc | 8

I keep wanting know why some Boeing executives are not held criminally liable for the deaths from those two crashes?

Until and unless folks are held criminally responsible for the financialization decisions that affect peoples lives the cost cutting decisions will continue to be made and more will die or suffer.

Thanks for continuing with your coverage of this criminal financialization issue b....its all about money/profit in the Western world and we are in a civilization war with China et el because of a sick Western social contract.

Posted by: psychohistorian | Oct 21 2019 21:13 utc | 9

If this was any other non US company it would already be in bankruptcy and most of the planes grounded. These planes will only fly in the US. Any country certifying them to fly and another crash means the entire country will be in turmoil. Maybe some europeans can be bullied into it but most major airlines will not go for it since they are just one crash away from being liquid.

Posted by: Igor Bundy | Oct 21 2019 21:22 utc | 10

The American way is to transfer wealth from the poor to the rich (and resources from foreign people to Westerners). It subsidizes the military and financial industries (and many others) while claiming there's no money for social services. It's socialist comfort for the rich, "capitalist free market" excuse for screwing the poor and foreigners [when it's not jailing and murdering them by the millions].
by: Jark @ 4 <= nope its not the American way, it may be the USA way, as the USA forces the Americans it governs to pay the bills to support the mistakes its feudal lords make.

Posted by: snake | Oct 21 2019 21:22 utc | 11

"... Since it started to emphasize shareholder value Boeing experienced many quality issues within its production lines ..."

That's surely the understatement of the whole MoA series of articles on the Boeing 737 MAX issue and an encapsulation of what some of us MoA barflies have been discussing throughout the comments forums attached to the articles. Boeing moving its main administrative and executive functions from Seattle to Chicago (centre of the neoliberal universe) and dispersing its various other functions around the US to take advantage of non-unionised and low-paid labour in places like South Carolina is part and parcel of the organisation's transformation into yet another classic example of a stone being bled for its assets and blood by neoliberal elites / Deep State America.

In the meantime New York Times Magazine and William Langewiesche are overdue in their apologies to Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines for insinuating their dead pilots were at fault and for not training them properly in spite of Boeing's own culpability for knowingly issuing inadequate training manuals and not advising the airlines of the MCAS system. How can Langewiesche and the magazine editors sleep well at night for having blamed two serious tragedies on those least able to defend themselves?

Posted by: Jen | Oct 21 2019 21:27 utc | 12

- The cynic in me says that Airbus can expect more US tariffs on its planes.

Posted by: Willy2 | Oct 21 2019 21:28 utc | 13

"Qantas has completed the world's longest non-stop flight on a commercial airliner, flying from New York to Sydney, with 49 passengers and crew members on board. The 16,200-kilometre test flight took 19 hours and 16 minutes, Qantas said on its Twitter account on Sunday."
2 days ago

This story was big news in Oz at the weekend. The aircraft was a DreamLiner 787. Considering the mid-crisis timing, I couldn't help wondering if QANTAS CEO Alan Joyce and Boeing's Board are BFF?

Posted by: Hoarsewhisperer | Oct 21 2019 21:48 utc | 14

Boeing is screwed. I doubt a government bailout would save it. The only way forward for Boeing is to merge with another company. I predict Lockmart and Boeing will eventually merge. Expect more tariffs on foreign competitors, and maybe an outright ban on some.

Posted by: Ian2 | Oct 21 2019 22:14 utc | 15

Boeing test pilots and engineers had to look the other way to keep their jobs. Cost cutting to transfer company wealth to the already rich is the sole business objective. Corporations dictate to the few government regulators left. Safety is a talking point. 737 Max passengers are no different than the 200 or so American troops and contractors assigned to keep the Deir ez-Zor oil fields from being taken over by the Syrian Arab Army. They are expendable.

Posted by: VietnamVet | Oct 21 2019 23:13 utc | 16

I don't know much about Boeing or aviation, but I heard it mentioned somewhere that back in the 70s Boeing's top management were all highly trained engineers. Now they are basically glorified accountants (but no doubt highly trained accountants.) If that's true, I wonder if there's a lesson to be learned from that.

Posted by: Lysander | Oct 21 2019 23:19 utc | 17

Boeing doesn't depends on its share price. Its the shareholders who care. Boeing got its money when they sold the shares the first time.

Now the executives and managers who have stock options might sob a bit, and shares Being bought back or didn't sell might hurt their financials but taking a hair cut on share price is not a big deal. The credit downgrade makes borrowing more expensive but revenues are so large and 737 business is fraction of the total. Not many competitors and its main competitor is maxed out. I think there problems are being overstated

Change will happen just so Boeing can say those responsible are gone and problems are solved. Buyers will believe because they have few options. Monopoly capitalism at work

Posted by: Pft | Oct 21 2019 23:29 utc | 18

psychohistorian @9--

I would think the governments having jurisdiction related to the ownership of the airplanes and/or where they took off from would be responsible for filing such charges, and to get Boeing execs arrested and extradited would be defended by the Outlaw US Empire's government. On the other hand, a civil suit over wrongful death seems possible within the Empire, but that would require the plaintiff having the financial resources to wage such a suit (any lawyers amidst us barflies?). Then of course, there's the basic corporate legal structure which is designed to protect its employees from liability/repercussions of the corporation's actions. At the very least, Boeing ought to have its corporate charter revoked, which would outright kill it, but that would require citizen action as the government's not going to do anything morally responsible.

Posted by: karlof1 | Oct 21 2019 23:32 utc | 19

dear b.,

great info from, as always. this being said, a little vocabulary point: it is not possible to "lie unknowingly". one can say something wrong unknowingly, but then it is not lying. lying implies intent. you lie if you know that what you say is not true.


to lie:
1: to make an untrue statement with intent to deceive
She was lying when she said she didn't break the vase.
He lied about his past experience.
(2. refers to a subject that is not a person)

best regards,

Posted by: Christophe Douté | Oct 22 2019 0:03 utc | 20

looks like they found their scapegoat . . .

Posted by: ptb | Oct 22 2019 0:31 utc | 21

karlof1 19

Boeing had to cover or hide the extent of mcas from FAA and lot of people killed as a result so should be criminal liability. Failing that I'm guessing US lawyers will be looking at getting a class action going. Good chance of winning and a big payout. They could probably hit FAA as well as Boeing as FAA had delegated some of their duties to Boeing. Like a cop asking a suspect to investigate him or herself.

Posted by: Peter AU 1 | Oct 22 2019 0:55 utc | 22

Where is ENRON these days?
"Enron has since become a well-known example of willful corporate fraud and corruption." (wikipedia)

Posted by: imo | Oct 22 2019 1:21 utc | 23

Boeing is another Too Big to Jail... er Fail company, given that it is joined at the hip to the American Military-Industrial Complex (Hallowed Be Thy Name).

Time for another American government billion dollar bailout!

Posted by: AK74 | Oct 22 2019 1:27 utc | 24

Keep in mind that after the McDonald Douglas merger the Boeing board of directors became the old McD board and they drove McD to within a week of being worth 10 cents on the dollar.

That is who built the 737 Max.

Posted by: Oz | Oct 22 2019 1:46 utc | 25

Jen ¬

In the meantime New York Times Magazine and William Langewiesche are overdue in their apologies to Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines for insinuating their dead pilots were at fault and for not training them properly in spite of Boeing's own culpability for knowingly issuing inadequate training manuals and not advising the airlines of the MCAS system. How can Langewiesche and the magazine editors sleep well at night for having blamed two serious tragedies on those least able to defend themselves

Yes. WL has gone down in my (previously high) estimation. Journalistic rush-to-keyboard rather than wait and see?
With his very readable work behind him, why would you rush that? Too much at stake, surely. There will be silence from him and NYT am guessing. Roll in potential litigation re unfounded allegations, and... /-:

Posted by: Paulie (prev PH) | Oct 22 2019 2:35 utc | 26

Peter AU 1 | Oct 22 2019 0:55 utc | 22

Explanation rarely referenced: Likely never see trial. If gets to trial, that opens door to all kinds of exposure via the "discovery process".

In case "discovery" is granted, alternate ploy is "slap and seal", i.e. slap of wrist and all records sealed so public remains totally stupid.

There will probably be a "slap and seal" action as ex-Gen Flynn comes for sentencing; he is in so deep that his and many others' protection seems certain. There is possibility he was gradually read-in to bad-ass programs at an innocuous pace so it was too late to back-out, aka a patsy.

Posted by: chu teh | Oct 22 2019 3:03 utc | 27

To wit: the best and brightest are sought out/recruited to create awesome, genius-level traps [before they are old enuf to do their own thinking.

Posted by: chu teh | Oct 22 2019 3:07 utc | 28


Merging LM and Boeing together is one sure way to ensure the MIC would never produce anything useful again, on any budget. But a wet dream coming true for the MIC profiteers? Definitely.

Posted by: JW | Oct 22 2019 4:12 utc | 29

Boeing was building a passenger airplane that they knew would crash. What did they EXPECT to happen when they started falling out of the air?

I mean there's greedy and then there's stupid.

Posted by: Dan Delgado | Oct 22 2019 4:37 utc | 30

Amazed Boring haven't offered to buy MoA just to shut you up. ;)

Posted by: jason kennedy | Oct 22 2019 5:29 utc | 31

So, were they or were they not testing production targeted software in their simulators? If there's a distinction between "TEST simulator" and, just, "simulator," then, perhaps, one could weasel out. IS there a functional certification process that includes simulation testing? Kind of hard to think that there wouldn't be, but I'm not in this industry in which case I can only ask questions.

The simulator runs ought to be documented as to software build and mechanical configurations and versions. It most certainly should be that any production software and hardware be able to be traceable back to their origins, and through any acceptance/verification suites.

Posted by: Seer | Oct 22 2019 5:32 utc | 32

@30 "Boeing was building a passenger airplane that they knew would crash"

Well, no. They were building a plane that they knew was unsafe.

You might not think there is much of a difference between those two propositions, and I might be inclined to agree with you.

But the Boeing management might have been in denial e.g. while they might know that it was an unsafe aircraft they - somehow - managed to convince themselves that the magic flying unicorns would always be there to swoop in and save the day.

"I mean there's greedy and then there's stupid."

They were desperate, and that made them willing to gamble with people's lives.

But "desperation" is not "stupidity", nor is it necessarily "greed".

Look, at the end of the day the motivations don't really matter.

Airbus had Boeing by the short and curlies with the A320NEO.

Boeing responded with an design brief that was fundamentally unsafe, and over 300 people paid for that decision with their lives.

I don't really care why Boeing made that particular decision, all I care about is that it was the wrong decision - a criminally-wrong decision - and I will not shed a tear when Boeing goes out of business because of it.

Pity, though, that none of the senior management will ever pay any price for their criminality because, frankly, in Big Business they never do.

Posted by: Yeah, Right | Oct 22 2019 7:10 utc | 33

This is from Sunday, Oct-20-2019

Posted by: Bob | Oct 22 2019 8:25 utc | 34

In b's fine article, above, he provides transcript of Nov.16, 2016 comm between Forkner and Gustavsson. It wowed! me.

For optimum effect, click and read b's link "three years old exchange". Now you get closer to source on the subject. It is Nov 16, 2016, not even 3 years ago.

E.g., seems they did not know to that point that MCAS was active at low level during take-off/climb.

"Oh shocker alert! MCAS is now active down to M.2 ...Oh great, that means we have to update..."

[If M = speed of sound, then m = about 760 mph at sea level. So, M.2 = about 152 mph. The 737MAX lift-off speed is about that speed.]

Posted by: chu teh | Oct 22 2019 8:48 utc | 35

more from Forkner/Gustavsson transcript.

..."So I basically lied to the regulators {unknowingly}"
"It wasn't a lie, no one told us that was the case."...

So what was the necessity for MCAS? Was it take-off/climb when [as media told me] there was heavy nose-up force bec engines were full thrust and ahead of ctr of gravity], or for hi-speed maneuvers [when aero-forces are greatest on the stabilizer and oppose manual trim by pilots.}?
So here I sit. An observer only of what media has told. And unable to ask my own questions and repeat them until I get each one answered by a reputable source of my own choosing.

Media control and media capture is de rigueur.

Posted by: chu teh | Oct 22 2019 9:06 utc | 36

I know it is fashionable to bash accountants on the Boeing threads but please remember that the board of directors sets the targets after discussions with the shareholders. The targets are NOT set by accountants.

It wasn’t the accountants who left out critical material in the training manual.

It wasn’t the accountants who incorrectly drilled the wrong size holes on the production lines.

It wasn’t the accountants that certified that the plane was safe to fly.

It wasn’t the accountants who knowingly misled the FAA.

There has to be dozens of senior engineers on the Boeing production line. If they didn’t do their jobs properly it’s not the accountants fault.

Posted by: Accountant | Oct 22 2019 9:55 utc | 37

Paulie @26

There will be silence from him (Langewiesch) and NYT am guessing.

There was a followup letter. I don't know how to link to the letter at NYTimes Magazine, and I don't know how to link to previous moa comments. The letter was from Chesley Sullenberger (Hudson landing), and I gave quotes you can find by searching "sullenberger" at moa Main.

Posted by: browning | Oct 22 2019 11:18 utc | 38

@Accountant | Oct 22 2019 9:55 utc | 38

I would prefer using MBAs, coz the accountants are on the low ground in terms of decision making, but let's face it as you wrote:

"It wasn’t the accountants who left out critical material in the training manual." - Have you ever seen an accountant with a hardware tool or material in the hand? So, easy not to forget it somewhere. But may be, there was a decision to hire and fire unskilled worker, not to create a skilled labour force?

"It wasn’t the accountants who incorrectly drilled the wrong size holes on the production lines." - That would have needed the MBA to take a drilling machine in the hands, highly unlikely, isn't it?

"It wasn’t the accountants that certified that the plane was safe to fly." - But may be, they requested to do so?

"It wasn’t the accountants who knowingly misled the FAA." - Obviously, as we have her the word "knowingly" requiring understanding of the technology and the science behind. Highly unlikely for a MBA. And that's the problem.

Posted by: BG13 | Oct 22 2019 12:04 utc | 39

@ Posted by: Accountant | Oct 22 2019 9:55 utc | 38

Yes, accountants are just white collar workers. They are not paid to think critically (and do not).

Muilenberg, by the way, is an engineer. The problem with Boeing is not that the engineers were ostracized from the company's board, but that there was a cultural revolution in the USA as a whole during the 1970s, that marked the transition from the "keynesian consensus" (1945-1975) to "neoliberalism" (1980-2008). So, it's not that Boeing's engineers left the stage to Boeing's accountants, but that Boeing's engineers are now thinking like accountants. The "accountants" of today were the "engineers" of yesterday, the same way the "barbarians" that were sacking the Roman Empire in the West in the 4th-5th centuries were the legionaries of of the 3rd century.

Neoliberalism collapsed and left no successor ideology in the West (we now live over the corpse of neoliberalism, which we commonly call "austerity"), so its ghost remains around us -- including its cultural revolution it laid down in the 1980s.

Posted by: vk | Oct 22 2019 12:29 utc | 40

Not specific to airplane wing mounting, but when the holes (in whatever) do not line up it's not unusual for assembly jocks to hammer in a bullprick (that's a tapered alignment bar), thus lining up one hole, and them ram a drill bit through the others, hammer in bolts, whack the bullprick sideways to loosen it, and them bang in the last bolt. This is followed by over-tightening...

I cannot imagine Boeing doing anything even remotely like that, but I do wonder when I see the cracks and hear about drilling out holes....

I recall the Kansas City Catwalk collapse... put together in the field in an "ad hoc error". The design was ok, except that it invited the error of cutting and offsetting the suspension rods for, presumably, convenience of the iron-workers (Kansas City Scabs??) and the engineer/manager fellas missed it, if they did their walk-downs every day, or maybe they didn't care.

Similarly, out of alignment parts invite hammers and pricks...and unintended secondary after-effects.

Posted by: Walter | Oct 22 2019 12:44 utc | 41

I've been digging a lil bit deeper...
B777 - GE90, left engine failure
B777 - GE90, right engine failure
B777 - GE90, left engine failure
B777 - GE90, left engine failure
B777 - GE90, left engine failure

Posted by: Bob | Oct 22 2019 12:47 utc | 42

@ Posted by: Walter | Oct 22 2019 12:44 utc | 42

Aero engineering is on a completely different level of required precision than civil engineering.

Civil engineering deals with huge margins of error, up to the ten-fold tolerance. It is highly tolerant to below-par designs and manufacturing and construction/assembly labor force. Therefore, its productive process is susceptible to higher labor intensity and thus, human error.

Aero engineering deals with much lower margins of error of the material and is much harder than civil engineering. They know this, so the production process of the parts of an airplane are produced on a much more automated (and, therefore, precise) manufacturing process.

To put it in other terms, an airplane's parts are essentially produced by computers nowadays. Up to until ten years ago, it was widely believed accident with airplanes were only possible through direct human error (pilot error or negligence of the airline in relation to maintenance of the airplanes).

But now Boeing is bringing us back to the 1950s, where planes exploded or fell because the parts itself are defective (due to imperfect manufacturing processes).

Posted by: vk | Oct 22 2019 13:56 utc | 43

@ Posted by: vk | Oct 22 2019 13:56 utc | 44

Generally we agree. However the precision necessary in civil work is, if we examine rotating machine, just as high as aero work. The reduction gears in turbomachine, for example, or the interference fits in couplings and alignments, the accuracy of wave guides, etc etc...

Maybe you missed my point...

The necessity of precision is why I cannot believe what I'm told Boeing did - drill out holes and presumably horse things 'round with alignments bars.

But there are, where's all this precision ?

Of course it is necessary...that's my point.

And what I wrote remains valid> all of it, and especially> "Similarly, out of alignment parts invite hammers and pricks...and unintended secondary after-effects. (as I am sure you'll part because of what we see every day.)

Posted by: Walter | Oct 22 2019 14:46 utc | 44

The email exchanges reported by b (and I'm sure there will be more to follow) are really potentially game-changing. They move the inquiry from one of "negligence" to "reckless" behavior with respect to the planes and "intentional" behavior with respect to dealings with the FAA.

In a normal world, an enterprising young Federal prosecutor would be assembling a RICO case about now, as this appears to be pretty much the definition of criminal conspiracy, and name everyone from the test pilots on up at Boeing, and with hundreds of counts of reckless homicide and intentional misrepresentations to regulators being on the line, it would become quite the spectacle.

From a civil point of view, I'm sure the class action lawyers are already salivating, as the move up the scale from negligence means now not only compensatory damages would be available (which should be massive in their own right), but also punitive damages, which basically have no upper limit.

Unfortunately in the US I can't imagine there being any criminal liability pursued, and Boeing will likely split off it's commercial aviation line (or a part of it) to take the hit and fold, or be bailed out by taxpayers, while the military and other cash cow branches will proceed unphased.

Posted by: J Swift | Oct 22 2019 14:59 utc | 45

Sounds like depraved indifference murder to me. Even if no prosecutor prosecuted, surely that also amounts to a tort subject to civil liability. And I would think this justifies piercing the veil of corporate limited liability and holding the executives personally liable.

Posted by: lysias | Oct 22 2019 15:29 utc | 46

EEngineer said...

Surely at some point someone within Boeing has proposed a proper implementation of MCAS?

It's not that simple...

From the perspective of aircraft handling qualities that test pilots test for, the original, much less aggressive MCAS was found unsatifactory...

I have talked about this before...the MAX has a unique [to the 737 class] PITCH INSTABILITY at high angles of attack [aka 'alpha']...

This is because of new the larger diameter engines [the bigger fans increase propulsive efficiency by moving a larger amount of air, thereby also increasing fuel efficiency...note that the thrust is not necessarily increased from the previous version with the smaller fan...the physics here is that moving a greater air mass at a lower ejection speed gives the same thrust as moving a smaller air mass at a higher ejection speed, but the former gives more efficient propulsion]...

This is why we have been seeing increasing bypass ratio on turbofans, and thus the bigger engine diameters...

Unfortunately the 737 was designed more than 50 years ago to use quite small diameter engines, and one of its big advantages was being low to the ground...

As the aircraft evolved through its various generations, the bigger diameter engines were fited [now these also grew in power, ie thrust, because the aircraft kept growing, to where it is nearly double its original weight]...

The Max is only a little heavier than the NG and the engines only a little more powerful, but the fan diameter is about 12 percent it's mostly due to the propulsive efficiency, not the need for more power...which could have been accomplished with the previous engine fan diameter...

So the problem then became that those big engines had to be moved farther forward and up...thus creating a problem with the flight characteristics at high alpha...namely as the nose pitched up, those big barrel like engine nacelles started making lift of their own...thus partially offsetting the wing's natural tendency to increasingly pitch the nose down, the more you pitch it up with the control stick...

For the test pilot flying the aircraft, he is looking for the stick forces to keep increasing as he continues pulling back on the stick and nosing the plane up...

This doesn't happen with the a point where the nose is fairly high, that lift from the engine nacelles kicks in and the force on the stick lightens...

This is a big problem, since the pilot in these situations of high alpha [which are admittedly unusual and rare, but they do occur and are part of the flight envelope] going mostly by feel...this is mostly muscle memory...

If he feels the stick lightening up, he will want to pull back, or may not even consciously do so, but quite unconsciously pull back...which will put the airplane into an aerodynamic stall...where the wing angle of attack is too high, and the airflow coming over the top of the wing cannot make the stepdown to follow along the top wing surface to the trailing edge...but the airflow actually separates and lift is lost...

The stall in a large passenger jet can be dangerous and in fact deadly, especially at low altitude close to the ground, where there may not be sufficient height to recover...

So we see that the test pilots gave a failing grade to the original MCAS 'lite'...these are well established criteria and are rated by the Cooper-Harper scale...

So MCAS authority was ratcheted up until the stick force behaved like it should...with MCAS kicking in using the tail to nose the plane down automatically...all this to keep the stick force where it should be...

So now they are talking about fixing MCAS...


Do you go back to the MCAS lite...where the handling characteristics are unacceptable according to well established standards...?

That's the difficulty in a nutshell...the fact is that there is no fix possible because you have mutually opposing requirements...

I'm following this with interest because I really wonder how the FAA test pilots are going to sign off on the fix, which is apparently MCAS lite...

Also Bernhard did a very nice job with this latest reportage...especially important is the distinction between a test pilot and a technical pilot...

This is important...a test pilot must first graduate from a test pilot school, of which there are only a handful of in the entire world, and these are mainly military...

To even qualify for test pilot school you need an engineering, physics or math degree with high a lot of flying time as an instructor or other demanding skills...

The same goes for flight test engineers who work alongside the engineering test pilots when they do their work...which actually is intimately involved in the design phase the flight test team is not just parachuting in when the airplane is finished and ready to fly...far from it...

But Boeing on the MAX program did everything possible to keep its own flight test team out of the loop...test pilots and flight test engineers had to crash engineering meetings to which they were not invited...

That's pretty incredible...

Also worth noting is that the FAA test pilots and flight test engineers must fly the airplane also...these are accountable to the government and the people...

[although it is worth pointing out that ethics is a huge part of the flight test professional...there is no question that Boeing was manipulating its own flight test team, some of whom have since quit and stepped forward...all will come out in various courts and procedures...]

Incidentally, you can get a feel for what angle of attack really is when you drive down the highway and stick your hand out the window...if you keep your palm flat and facing the ground that's a low angle of you start turning your hand with your palm facing into the wind, you are increasing your 'alpha'...

Posted by: flankerbandit | Oct 22 2019 15:57 utc | 47

The impact of Boeing's 737 MAX grounding over American growth over the past quarter:

Corporate debt, fiscal stimulus and the next recession

The post is long, but it's very important for everybody here to read it in full (the part that directly mentions Boeing is the penultimate paragraph).


@ Posted by: Walter | Oct 22 2019 14:46 utc | 45

That why I think that, in Boeing's case, the precarization of the productive process was a direct order from the executive board.

Human beings tend to precarize their production the more labor intensive the process is. Work is hard, so it's human nature to save their limited life spans on work the most possible. Since they have control of the process when they are directly producing it, they tend to relax on it in order to save energy and time.

But this tendency is not true when the process is automated: humans can relax, but machines don't. For Boeing to get to the point where their planes are structurally defective to the order of 5%, it can only be because the machines which are producing the parts are either being fed second-rate materiel or cutting costs on quality control (or both). That can only happen through direct orders from the executive board, since in the capitalist system it is the capitalist class -- and not the workers -- which controls the means of production and, therefore, the productive processes (the exception to this rule being a strike, where the productive process ceases).

Posted by: vk | Oct 22 2019 16:06 utc | 48

Fake information is a racket on western democracies. The Globalist say, if you don't help us to win a war, then the migrants the war produces will be send to your country. So either you help us the globalist to win the war or we make your life in your country hell like.

This is the racket. They now want an eu-army to fight the globalist war, after Trump got out the us-Army.

The Globalist don't want save travel for the whites. They want the whites to fight their wars. The globalist war is on whole people, they want whites against others. So their is no necessity to make good products if they don't get their war. Either you are with us and kill those we want, or you are against us and we will kill you.

Posted by: az | Oct 22 2019 17:14 utc | 49

flankerbandit | Oct 22 2019 15:57 utc | 48

So the best-and-brightest, who were mentored and matured into the elites' finest thinkers, came up with MCAS to solve the problem that blocked their path to dominate the world and thus could be handled as a National Security imperative....

Namely, the single, remaining problem was that 737MAX clearly required different piloting skills than the 737NG which made 737MAX not the dominant product it had to be to globally rule commercial transport. Only a dominant 737MAX will give us an overwhelming weapon. We will have it!

Thus the decision to use computer-automated assistance so NG pilots could use their same skillset, feel and muscle-training on the MAX. Presto-change-o! A 2-bit set of algorithms-on-an-SD-card is our winner!

We'll just let Muiley and any other principals know that we've got their back and their personal risk will, worst case, be limited to a slap-and-seal* . They will be made "reasonable" to see things our way.

All chant: We Are The National Security Secret-Team. Repeat. Repeat

* Slap and seal = a legal "fix" by a judge pretending justice by publicly slapping a wrongdoer's wrist and sealing all case documents so the matter is forgotten as a nothing-burger.

Posted by: chu teh | Oct 22 2019 17:40 utc | 50

@vk 49

"For Boeing to get to the point where their planes are [...] defective [...] it can only be because the machines which are producing the parts are either being fed second-rate materiel or cutting costs on quality control (or both)."

A big part of what makes that outcome possible (I would say, likely) is the culture of outsourcing and extreme reliance on subcontractors. I would include it in your point about the cultural revolution in big business, peaking right around the millennium I think.

Today we structure most complex production processes as a layercake of independent companies. While there are sometimes legit business reasons to do this, I think it's mostly done to keep the risk spread out and insulate each company from the liability-risk that is now carried by their suppliers. It has a bunch of side effects: 1. provides a convenient crack that old-school risk averse engineering judgments fell into and got lost. 2. encourages lowest-bidder mentality. 3. brain drain from the parent company and accounting death-spiral where the more you outsource, the more overhead there is on the work still done in house, justifying further outsourcing (there was a nice paper on this from a boeing engineer called "out-sourced profits" by L.J. Hart Smith 2001).. this process leads to the eventual fall from market dominance in any big company that isn't supported by govt/defense jobs.

I see this in medical device manufacturing now. The results are already kindof disturbing just in that you get some really idiotic technical decisions being made just because of the layered organization, and the top 2-3 layers of parent company are not only ignorant of the how's and why's of their product's quality, but they actively shun any such knowledge. Fortunately in this industry the regulators keep it more or less in check. With Boeing, being self-regulated was the nail in the coffin.

They'll get rescued I'm sure, but the dysfunction runs very deep, certainly even beyond boeing or the airline industry.

Posted by: ptb | Oct 22 2019 17:50 utc | 51

Seattle Times: Boeing’s defense of 737 MAX’s flight-control system in wake of pilot messages stands up

It was probably really, as Boeing claimed, a simulator error that let the sim pilot believe that MCAS went bad on him.

I am not convinced yet as the engineering simulator (e-cab) has the original hardware and software "in the loop". It runs with the same flight control computer and software than the real test plane.

But we do not know if that was the same version that ended up in the delivered production planes. It just shows that MCAS implementation was somewhat crazy.

Posted by: b | Oct 22 2019 18:05 utc | 52

@ Posted by: b | Oct 22 2019 18:05 utc | 53

It is irrelevant how the MCAS was tested because the original sin was that it was created in the first place.

Boeing should've redesigned the 737 in order for its chassis to fit the new engine. They didn't, so they created a band-aid for the plane not to fall outright in almost every case. This band-aid is the MCAS.

The MCAS shouldn't exist. It's not like the technology to fly commercial planes don't exist. Boeing is not trying to colonize Mars. We don't need MCAS like softwares to fly commercial planes around planet Earth because we already know it isn't needed -- the Airbus model is already out there for everybody to see.

Posted by: vk | Oct 22 2019 19:34 utc | 53

Kevin McAllister has just resigned:

Boeing Commercial Airplane Division Head Resigns Amid 737 MAX Crisis

Posted by: vk | Oct 22 2019 19:42 utc | 54

VK said...

The MCAS shouldn't exist. It's not like the technology to fly commercial planes don't exist. Boeing is not trying to colonize Mars. We don't need MCAS like softwares to fly commercial planes around planet Earth because we already know it isn't needed...

Nicely stated...I agree with this 100 percent.

The problem now is that this can of worms has already been opened...and Boeing appears to be close to succeeding in getting its 'fixed' MCAS approved and the airplane back into the air.

What this means for pilots and passengers is that there will be an MCAS 'lite' that should not have the kind of failures we saw with those two crashes, where the angle of attack indicator malfunctioned and set off the accident chain.

But how do they deal with the poor stick feel that is going to come with MCAS lite...?

Additional pilot training does not seem to be in the cards...and even if it were, I would disagree with training a pilot to handle an airplane with stick forces that relax when the nose is pitched up...

Like I said, this scenario happens only rarely and in dicey situations...because you don't need to pitch up that high in normal flight...

But in an unexpected steep turn...or an unexpected wind shear...or even a wind gust can all result in an excursion into this flight regime of high it will happen.

How will the aircrew handle it...?

We saw on AF447 that they kept the airplane wing stalled by holding stick back for several minutes right until they belly flopped onto the water.

A pilot flying that MAX need not make a mistake anywhere near that bad in order to have a big problem.

But I think the die is cast, because redesigning the airplane is simply not an option that anybody is considering.

So we will get an airplane that just doesn't fly well...and hope the pilots will be up to the task when called upon to go the extra mile.

Posted by: flankerbandit | Oct 22 2019 19:57 utc | 55

Not to be lost in the same news:

Transportation Committee Press release (18 October)

In New Letter to Transportation Secretary Chao, Chair DeFazio Sharply Questions Why Outrageous Emails Related to the Boeing 737 MAX Are Only Now Being Revealed, Months after Committee’s Initial Request

One of the emails provided this morning from Mark Forkner, Boeing’s Chief Technical Pilot on the 737 MAX aircraft at the time, was sent to an unidentified individual at the FAA in November 2016.

That email says: “Things are calming down a bit for my airplane cert, at least for now. I’m doing a bunch of travelling though the next few months; simulator validations, jedi-mind tricking regulators into accepting the training that I got accepted by FAA etc.” That is an outrageous email and I am even more outraged by the fact the FAA did not provide this email and others to the Committee months ago.

(my emphasis)

I wonder what's behind further Boeing communications disclosures. How many republican credits they're worth? or if they're worth anything beyond Empire's reach?

The FAA has also slow-walked our request to interview FAA employees, and it wasn’t until I spoke directly to FAA Administrator Dickson that our staff was able to begin interviewing some FAA employees. In at least one case, the FAA failed to respond to repeated requests to interview an FAA official involved in the 737 MAX program.
I expect the Department of Transportation to immediately respond to my April 1, 2019, records request letter to the FAA with unredacted emails and documents. In addition, please also provide the Committee with unredacted versions of the emails you provided to us today.

Or FAA's for that matter, even those disclosures made last Friday were redacted. The plot has not even thickened.

Posted by: Vasco da Gama | Oct 22 2019 23:55 utc | 56


Your extreme subcontracting scenario is a mere symptom of the now all-permeating worldwide "MBAed" diseased corporate culture that rewards fraudsters and punishes honest men.

Saleperson who overpromised product capabilities to nail a deal? Great job, Here's a big fat bonus paycheck.

Engineering guy who says said salesperson is unrealistic and asking for the impossible? A "non-team player" that needs to be put down.

Posted by: JW | Oct 23 2019 5:38 utc | 57

@ vk | Oct 22 2019 16:06 utc | 49

Precarization was a word unknown to me, thanks...yes is what's going on. This minds me of a mnemonic and a principle, as described below.

In the German of my youthful education the phrase used sarcastically when somebody did something stupid was "Hast du einen bruder", with the assumption implied that the action was so very stupid that it constituted an error that exceeded that capacity of one man, and required his also idiotic brother to achieve.

The principle seems to have operated at Boeing through the "little brothers" policy of outsourcing and pencil whipping... (the latter a phrase most useful in the US Army I once "supported" for a paycheck.).

Posted by: Walter | Oct 23 2019 12:02 utc | 58

About angle of attack sensor... the Wrights discovered this instrument - a short length of yarn was, I believe, tied to the wire lacings.

Actually there's good stuff on the Flyer. Fred Kelly's book is fine, but much since his publication - he knew my grandfather...long time ago.

search term "wright flyer angle of attack"

Stimson's "Wright Brothers Get a Lift" is a good essay...

By the way, when people discuss airplane design many claim that airplanes are not designed to crash. The W. Flyer was designed to crash, as they knew that they did not know how to fly, they expected to crash...Kelly says this, I believe. The location of engine next to pilot was to minimize the chance of it crushing him, the location of props was similarly well away from him...and of course crashing at 40 ft/sec is often survivable on dry sand in a headwind... ie about like a bicycle crash.

Posted by: Walter | Oct 23 2019 13:27 utc | 59

Boeing was in Panik because of the A 320 Neo (First flight Sept 2014, First delivery January 2016; 737 Max First flight January 2016, First flight May 2017) and was Troubled by Airbus since 1991. Mind that Oligarch Firtash made a Deal with Boeing in 2006 to get Access to Titanium needed for the 787 (Shanahan was in Charge for this Project and others). 18,5 Mio Dollar bribes in India to US indictment against him and he is fighting Extradition from Austria since 2014. Lew Parnas and Igor Fruman were Arrested when they wanted to fly to Vienna for preparing Former ukrainian General prosecutor Viktor Shokin who helped Firtashs Lawyers for a Hannity interview.

Firtash who lives in Vienna now Financed Lobbying for Former ukrainian President Yanukovich with Paul Manafort, former Austrian Chancellor Gusenbauer, US Law Firm Skadden,
Podesta Group, FTI Consulting and Others. Former US ambassador to Ukraine William Taylor Just testified before Congress on Remarks Firtas had made on his Connection to russian Mafia Don Semjon Mogilevich.

Gusenbauer was then .- as a Straw man - Behind a campaign against Airbus including suing the boeing Rival via Austrian Defense Ministry. For this purpose again Skadden and FTI Consulting were engaged.

Posted by: Alexandra | Oct 24 2019 23:23 utc | 60

Final report on the Lion Air flight JT610 (pdf)

322 pages with lots of technical and organizational details.

Main cause of the accident is of course MCAS ...

Posted by: b | Oct 25 2019 16:08 utc | 61

Tnx for the update b. Weekend reading applies.

Posted by: Vasco da Gama | Oct 26 2019 12:46 utc | 62

@ 49 % 52

"precarization" root meaning ? There's a wiki for precarity (1952), it helps. I see that the root meaning is "begging, being dependent on others, praying, and so forth. Does this seem like a path to Quality?

My thought in respect to this practice is that it creates a universe of "dualities" - a net distributed individuals of vast size, thus destroying Entfremdung, gumption, and making Quality merely an accidental or incidental output. Persig writes to this.

Primo Levy describes an example too, of paint livers and the creation of a useless feature in the legacy in paint formulation that was created incidental to a measuring error long ago. In his example no harm came, I think - seems to me they added zinc and presto, the livers went into the ball mill, and paint came out.

In the example of Wights, they made just about every part...avoiding the dualities.

Boeing might listen to the breeze blowing from the East...and examine where Quality comes from, and what it is.

Posted by: Walter | Oct 26 2019 16:14 utc | 63

WSWS has essay on Boeing and a bit of history of the one time the suits did go to jail when they pencilwhipped defective machines...

"The Boeing crashes and the criminalization of American capitalism"


Posted by: Walter | Oct 31 2019 11:47 utc | 64

Because of the apparently compromised email servers and lack of DMARC, Kubecka suspects that the infected email servers are being used to exfiltrate sensitive intellectual property, including code used in both civilian passenger aircraft as well as aircraft Boeing sells to the US military. see> "CSO" Boeing's poor information security posture threatens passenger safety, national security, researcher says

Posted by: Walter | Nov 6 2019 15:36 utc | 65

Fake News?

Boeing 737 MAX sales pick up at Dubai Airshow

Why would anyone order new 737 MAX planes when their are likely to be many airlines that would gladly sell some theirs - cheap?

Airbus scores major deals as Boeing falters at Dubai airshow


Posted by: Jackrabbit | Nov 19 2019 16:58 utc | 66

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