|
Siege Shows U.S., Concern Trolls Hypocrisy
Do you remember the outcry over the siege of Ramadi by Iraqi and U.S. forces? When those forces expressed little concern for the civilians who were not let go by the ISIS fighters occupying the city?
No? You do not remember those concerns? The outcry from Amnesty, HRW, the UN and other organization?
That is probably because there were none.
Dec 2 2015: Iraqi forces surround Ramadi, but it could be a long siege
Iraqi troops and militias backed by U.S.-led airstrikes have surrounded the key city of Ramadi and appear poised to launch a new attempt to wrest it from the Islamic State group.
…
On Monday, the Iraqi military dropped leaflets into the city,
…
But residents told The Associated Press on Tuesday that the militants have clamped down, setting up checkpoints across the city to monitor civilians’ movements and prevent anyone from going.
…
When Maan was asked about the high number of civilians that could be trapped inside Ramadi once the fight gets underway, the Interior Ministry spokesman said he was confident they would be able to flee “to a safe place.”
“We are focusing now on the enemy only,” he added.
Today Ramadi is back in the hands of the Iraqi government.
But there is another big and outdrawn siege ongoing – this time of a large city in Syria. One where the population and the enemy are under constant bombardment. Where the population is prevented from leaving. Where mass casualties of civilians are caused by misdirected airstrikes.
That city is Manbij.
June 11: Siege of IS bastion in north Syria traps thousands
Thousands of civilians were under siege Saturday in an Islamic State group stronghold surrounded by US-backed forces in northern Syria[…]
…
“Tens of thousands of civilians still there can’t leave as all the routes out of town are cut,” the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitor’s head Rami Abdel Rahman said.
Six weeks on the siege of Manbij continues.
July 25: US-backed fighters renew offer for IS to leave Syrian town
U.S.-backed fighters in northern Syria renewed an offer Monday to Islamic State militants in Manbij, saying that if they allow civilians to leave the besieged northern town IS fighters will be allowed to leave too and will not be attacked.
…
Monday’s offer by the SDF-linked Manbij Military Council came days after the extremists ignored an earlier, 48-hour offer to leave the town safely with just their “individual weapons.”
Again, like in Ramadi, there is no protest from Amnesty, HRW, the UN or any other concern peddlers over the fate of the city and its people. There was and is no outcry over the siege or the casualties in Manbij by any of the usual subjects.
Now another, third siege happens and this one exposes the utter hypocrisy of the United States and the concern trolls organizations it controls.
July 28: US Envoy: Syrian Offer of Safe Passage for Aleppo Civilians ‘Chilling’
US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power condemned Syria’s leaflets, urging civilians in rebel-held East Aleppo to flee and offering them safe passage and access to temporary shelters “chilling,” insisting that the civilians must never trust a government “that’s bombed & starved them.”
Syria’s military has increased its control over the area surrounding Aleppo recently, controlling all roads leading into the east. Eastern Aleppo is controlled mostly by al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, ..
To the U.S. propagandists the siege of east-Aleppo and the offer to leave it is “chilling”, while the siege of Manbij or Ramadi never created any such bad feelings. How come?
The insurgents in east-Aleppo, mostly of al-Qaeda in Syria, are preventing any civilians from leaving through the designated corridors the besieging forces offer.
Where is the condemnation of that?
Instead we hear a whole army of concern trolls, the IRC, the UN, Amnesty and various other propaganda shops demanding that civilians “are allowed” to stay(!) in the besieged area
Hello?
My take on it (also posted by me at landis):
From a pro Russian pov., the following things come to mind:
1: I would regard the coup in Turkey as the actual strategic sea change.
The encirclement and capture of Aleppo is simply the first strategic result of it.
2: The Russian pov. was that the Turkish deep state was supporting certain groups of Rebels in Syria, while Erdogans government supported other groups. The groups supported by the Turkish deep state (typically somewhat more ethnically defined and a bit less Islamist, and more fascist/turkish nationalist) are now up in a creek without a paddle. Given Erdogans current internal distractions, the more Islamist groups supported by him will have to deal with an at least temporary reduction of Turkish supply.
Support for former Turkish deep state supported groups will effectively resume once these groups find a new sponsor, this may take a while, but could also happen pretty quickly. Islamist groups formerly supported by Erdogan will find their support increasing the more Erdogan centralizes power. A total sellout of these groups by Erdogan is not likely, as it would imply weakness and Erdogan has no interest being seen as weak at this point.
I would predict an intense Russia/SAA assault on groups formerly supported by the Turkish deep state. It is a rare opportunity to effectively kill Turkish assets with Turkish consent, and Russia is unlikely to miss this opportunity. If opportune, Russia could be capable of casting groups it wanted to get rid off anyway as having had the support of the Turkish deep state as well.
3: Such operations would feature major Maskirovka, and also strive hard to encourage defections. Russia likes defectors, and generally has the resources to treat them decently. The thing is, individual groups would not have the luxury of defecting to Russia, they would be defecting to Assad and that is a very different story.
4: A narrative of Aleppos fall would be of great use in encouraging defections. I would btw. predict “Rebel leaks”. SAA and allies should capture sufficient amount of IT equipment etc. to use this for a major propaganda effort.
5: One cannot stress how vital the actual information war, as in war about actual information, as opposed to propaganda warfare, is. If SAA+allies can, following the fall of Aleppo, create a narrative of “yield, with terms, or we send the forces that took Aleppo at you”, they can reap major benefits in second order defections. Due to the fact that Russias air force is indeed highly mobile and highly powerful, it would not take much to make such narratives credible. The important issue for Russia is to use her air force in conjunction with approaches in the informational, subversive and public sphere while maintaining a sufficient degree of cohesion throughout the loyalist alliance.
6: A point of considerable contention will be the Loyalist-Kurdish truce.
Russia, due to not having any Kurdish minorities within its borders, and due to a pretty long history of supporting Kurdish interests, is quite noticably pro Kurdish. Towards their Iranian and Syrian (Iran has not forgotten the Mahabad republic) allies, they could justify their support of the Kurds by stating that Kurdish aspirations are far more damaging and dangerous to Turkey then they are to either Syria or Iran. With Turkey being much less of a threat the Kurds could, in the eyes of certain Syrian and Iranian actors, have “outlived their usefulness”.
7: The distinction of “useful vs. not useful” Syria is however quite interesting, and would work against an impending Loyalist attack on Rojava for a number of reasons. First, it would still be very hard for loyalists to hold positions close to the Turkish border. If one adds the not exactly rich economy of the Kurdish areas, leaving these areas to the Kurds as a buffer against Turkey does make sense. Especially since, in my opinion (no access to the sea, indefensible border, infrastructure is not in the least optimized for that configuration), the Syrian Kurdish areas do not constitute a viable statelet in the long term.
From the Assad pov. attacking Rojava gets them a lot of “not useful” land, risks alienating both Russia and the (sane)USA and does not present much of a strategic gain.
Finishing up, after Aleppo, rebel holdouts in Damascus, and reinforcing control on the Jordanian border, are things which would appear to be far more achievable and have a bigger payoff (like economical improvements in Damascus etc.) for sucess.
Posted by: Mightypeon | Jul 31 2016 14:43 utc | 80
|
