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Extended U.S. Iran Talks Likely To Fail Again
The recent negotiations over limits of Iran's civilian nuclear program were unsuccessful. But instead of coming to that conclusions all parties agreed to prolong the deadline for another seven month. In fact two new deadlines were introduced. One in four month to reach a framework agreement and one in seven month to reach a complete understanding. The first deadline is very fuzzy as a "framework agreement" could be just anything. The second deadline is likely one that will not see any further extension.
The open points at the end of this negotiation round were the same as at its beginning. What maximum numbers of centrifuges would Iran be able to use? What is the timeline for lifting sanctions? How long is the whole agreement to run?
The first point, number of centrifuges, is irrelevant. The whole concept, introduced by the U.S., of a "possible breakout time for Iran to get material for one bomb" is nuts. If Iran would be interested in nuclear weapons it would produce those in secret and in numbers that would make them a viable deterrence. The difference between five thousand or fifty thousand centrifuges running under IAEA supervision would not influence that.
The timeline for lifting sanctions could also be simple. As soon as Iran fulfills x% of the agreed upon steps x% of the sanctions should be lifted. Some U.S. sanction are related to other than the "nuclear Iran" issues and can only be lifted by the U.S. congress. Those would likely stay in place but could be reduced in their effects by executive orders.
The timeline for the whole agreement is something that is also easy to do. Iran offers a three or five year limit, the U.S. wants a double digit number of years, the compromise is right in the middle.
All this is easy and could have been done in a 30 minutes phone call. That the last days of negotiations in Vienna, with seven foreign ministers in attendance, could not reach a simple solution is likely because one side does not want one. I am sure that Iran wants a reasonable agreement. I am also quite sure that the U.S. is the blocking side. It wants to keep sanctions as future pressure points even as Iran agrees to limit its nuclear capabilities.
The U.S. needs Iran to solve conflicts in Iraq, in Syria and elsewhere. But that need is not yet urgent enough to allow for some sensible position change in the general attitude towards Iran and its interests. Only if the U.S. faces more pressure from its deteriorating position in the Middle East is a change of mind in Washington likely. The seven month extension of the talks is too short to allow for that. I therefore find it likely that the next talks and the whole negotiation round will fail (again) and that the cooked up conflict will prevail.
The issue of nuclear non-proliferation and nature of Iran’s civilian program has served the U.S. as a tool for attempting to destroy the Islamic Republic as well as contain or at least slow down its rise as a regional power.
The issues at stake and reasons for the negotiations are far more fundamental, these are the so-called “gaps” which we keep hearing and reading about.
The Deal
A concise interview by Hillary Mann Leverett, a former U.S. foreign policy official, fleshes out the “gaps” that keep an agreement from being concluded in clear language.
First, any ‘nuclear’ agreement that is signed by the P5+ 1 will essentially mean that the United States recognizes the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and its sovereign rights.
It would specifically entail that the U.S. accepts an Iran that is “strong, independent and a nuclear power (not weapons power)”.
Second, according to Leverett [2:40-3:15 minutes into the video]: the U.S. can only accept Iran IF:
it can become part of a pro-American security and political order in the Middle East …to do so it would have to give up some elements of sovereign rights in order to have a big functioning military, full industrialization and to have policies that support the United States.
In essence, Iran would have to agree to become a vassal state and turn back the clock to the pre-1979 revolution, the time of the Shah. Paradoxically, this type of relationship would open up enormous economic opportunities for foreign investment (mostly Asian) in Iran’s energy resources but it would end Iranian political autonomy and would entail that Iran uses it growing power on terms defined and set by the U.S. Some of the factions of Iran’s elite that surround President Rouhani, including Hashemi “the shark” Rafsanjani – the powerful chair of the Expediency and a multi-millionaire, are in favor of giving up elements of its sovereignty and joining a U.S. political and security order in the Middle East for which they would reap enormous personal fortunes.
If Iran closes the “gaps” and agrees to U.S. demands for Iranian compliance with the U.S.’s region wide policy then a range of interlocking issues such as the fates of Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians, Israel’s desire to colonize all of historic Palestine, the possibility of carving out compliant and dependent mini-states including for the Kurds, the enormous leverage to shape global energy flows and gain pressure points over China and Russia come into play.
Standing in the way of such an accommodation are other factions – notably the Pasadran, Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Having been elevated to power across Iran’s political structure and expanded its economic interests via its holding company the Khatam al-Anbia during the Ahmadinejad Presidency, the Pasadran are a powerful force in Iranian politics and base their legitimacy as “keepers of the revolution”. The question is what is the extent of this counter pressure against complete and utter subordination to the U.S.?
…what the U.S. negotiating team is trying to test is whether the Islamic Republic of Iran is willing to join this pro-American political and security order. … to signify that Iran can do this they [Iran] would limit their ability to have civilian nuclear program according to American wishes.
The current negotiations about Iran’s civilian nuclear program is the mechanism that the U.S. and western powers are using to achieve their political objectives – one’s they were unable to achieve via overt and covert war against Iran. It would seem that Iran is willing to join a U.S. political and security order in the Middle East as she accepted the interim 6-month deal to reduce uranium enrichment from over 20% to below 5% (a nuclear bomb (minus delivery systems know-how) is only achievable after 90% uranium enrichment and since all of Iran’s nuclear sites are monitored real-time by the IAEA via CCTV … you know where the argument goes).
In return, unilateral U.S. sanctions that are akin to war continue and are hampering any attempts at economic recovery that could alleviate the deteriorating lives of its populations. U.S. policy makers desire that collective punishment of Iran’s relatively young population would somehow destabilize the country and open the door to a coup d’état remains a mirage.
Signing an agreement is the ultimate sign that Iran has “closed the gaps” and satisfied some of the U.S.’s political demands. Whether that means the demise of the axis of resistance and a free reign to the religious fundamentalist regimes of the region, mainly the Saudi’s, Israel’s and the Turks and former colonial powers of France and Britain is open to the unfolding of history.
Nevertheless, the maximalist points of the “gap” are at least a U.S. demand that Iran agree to give up crucial elements of its sovereignty and join a U.S.-centered political order in the Middle East. Iran seeks as its maximalist position to maintain its independence, sovereignty and ability to rise as an important power, paraphrasing HML. Iran’s principle threat as seen by the Saudi’s, Israeli’s and former colonial powers like France is its continued rise as a formidable power in West Asia.
So, looking forward the prospects that these countries will try their utmost to sabotage any U.S.-Iran deal will be complemented by a pro-war faction (including Democrats) controlling Congress and putting pressure on Obama. The prospects for a deal are not promising and even if forthcoming the nature of that deal will depend on the conflict’s in Syria and Iraq and desperation of the Obama and Rouhani administration to seal a deal. Until then, both parties are planning for war.
Posted by: thirsty | Nov 24 2014 16:56 utc | 8
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