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The Mysterious Destroyed “Russian Armored Vehicles”
Yesterday the Guardian's Shaun Walker claimed to have seen Russian military vehicle crossing the Russian border into Ukraine. I wrote elsewhere that I am skeptical of that claim:
I'd be very careful in believing the stuff Shaun Walker writes. He was with the [aid-]convoy yesterday and the convoy is halted some 20-30 kilometer away from the border. How could he have observed the (not really well defined) border from there?
Said differently: The Guardian and Shaun Walker have certainly not be neutral in their reporting and publishing about the Ukraine conflict. There is no reason for the Russian army to invade Ukraine especially not in near an aid-convoy which is covered by dozens of "western" journalists.
But this afternoon the Ukrainian government claimed that its troops overnight had destroyed a some Russian vehicles:
Ukraine's president, Petro Poroshenko, told David Cameron in a phone call on Friday that a column of Russian armoured vehicles had been destroyed.
Now everyone in the media is jumping from the Shaun Walker report to the destroyed "Russian armored vehicle" to claim that it was a Russian military convoy that was attacked and destroyed within Ukraine.
But all armored vehicles in Ukraine are "Russian armored vehicles" as they all were constructed during the Soviet times. All the 123 tanks and APC destroyed in this conflict, most of them from the Ukrainian army, were "Russian armored vehicles". The insurgents use such vehicles as does the Ukrainian army. So even if Poroshenko's claim is true, and there was no proof presented for it at all, there is actually nothing factual that lets one connect "Russian armored vehicles" to actual Russian army vehicles.
The Russian government asserts that no Russian army vehicles have entered Ukraine. The Ukrainian government has claimed for several month that a Russian invasion is imminent or already occurring and a lot of other nonsense. Unless there is additional evidence that actual Russian army vehicles really entered Ukraine I will rather believe the Russian government.
Posted by: Demian | Aug 16, 2014 3:08:11 AM | 59
Timothy Garton Ash at the Hoover institution
The Hoover institution
have a look at the other fellows.
Timothy Garton Ash on the new “European” identity
Europe has lost the plot. As we approach the 50th anniversary of the treaty of Rome on 25th March 2007–the 50th birthday of
the European economic community that became the European Union–Europe no longer knows what story it wants to tell. A
shared political narrative sustained the postwar project of (west) European integration for three generations, but it has fallen
apart since the end of the cold war. Most Europeans now have little idea where we’re coming from; far less do we share a
vision of where we want to go to. We don’t know why we have an EU or what it’s good for. So we urgently need a new
narrative.
I propose that our new story should be woven from six strands, each of which represents a shared European goal. The
strands are freedom, peace, law, prosperity, diversity and solidarity. None of these goals is unique to Europe, but most
Europeans would agree that it is characteristic of contemporary Europe to aspire to them. Our performance, however, often
falls a long way short of the aspiration. That falling short is itself part of our new story and must be spelled out. For today’s
Europe should also have a capacity for constant self-criticism.
I wonder why he forgot equality.
Timothy Garton Ash on Freedom and Diversity
For everyone in a diverse society, the feeling of belonging together depends crucially on the social and cultural signals sent and received every day.
Timothy Garton Ash in the Guardian in March
It would be equally naive, however, to pretend that there are not real fears among many in eastern Ukraine. Start by abandoning the labels “ethnic Ukrainians” and “ethnic Russians”. They mean almost nothing. What you have here is a fluid, complex mix of national, linguistic, civic and political identities. There are people who think of themselves as Russians. There are those who live their lives mainly in Russian, but also identify as Ukrainians. There are innumerable families of mixed origins, with parents and grandparents who moved around the former Soviet Union. Most of them would rather not have to choose. In a poll conducted in the first half of February, only 15% of those asked in the Kharkiv region and 33% around Donetsk wanted Ukraine to unite with Russia.
In the same poll, the figure for Crimea was 41%. But then take a month of radicalising politics and Russian takeover, with Ukrainian-language channels yanked off TV. Add relentless reporting on the Russian-language media of a “fascist coup” in Kiev, exacerbated by some foolish words and gestures from victorious revolutionaries in Kiev. Subtract Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians living in Crimea, who largely boycott the referendum. Season with a large pinch of electoral fraud. Hey presto, 41% becomes 97%.
It is not just Russian “political technology” that changes numbers and loyalties. What happens in such traumatic moments is that identities switch and crystallise quite suddenly, like an unstable chemical compound to which you add one drop of reactant. Yesterday, you were a Yugoslav; today, a furious Serb or Croat.
Timothy Garton Ash in the Guardian in February
I have no idea what will happen in Ukraine tomorrow, let alone next week. But I know what all Europeans should want to happen over the next year and the next decades. In February 2015, on the 70th anniversary of the Yalta agreement, Ukraine should again be a halfway functioning state. A corrupt and rackety one, but still the kind of state that, in the long run, forges a nation. It should have signed an association agreement with the EU, but also have close ties with Russia. In February 2045, on the 100th anniversary of the Yalta agreement, it should be a liberal democratic, rule-of-law state that is a member of the EU, but has a special relationship with a democratic Russia. “Pie in the sky!” you may say. But if you don’t know where you want to go, all roads are equally good. This is where we should want to go.
That outcome would obviously be good for Ukraine. Less obviously, it would be good for Europe. Look at the shifting balance of world power, and look at the demographic projections for western Europe’s ageing population. We’ll need those young Ukrainians sooner than you think, if we are to pay our pensions, maintain economic growth and defend our way of life in a post-western world. Less obviously still, it would good for Russia. Russia has lost an empire but not yet found a role. Its uncertain sense of itself is inextricably bound up with its deep-seated confusion about Ukraine, a cradle of Russian history that many Russians still regard as belonging back in Russia’s nursery.
Very nicely presented. Democracy in Ukraine first and then in Russia. Ukraine in the Western Block and a friendly Russia next door.
Talking about bringing democracy to a country this is Timothy Garton Ash on Iraq
But on Iraq, I would still like to defend a position of tortured liberal ambivalence. Being liberal doesn’t mean you always dither in the middle on the hard questions. I was strongly against the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, against the American interventions in Nicaragua and El Salvador, for military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo, and for the war against al-Qaida in Afghanistan, all on good liberal grounds. Iraq is different and more difficult. I see four strong arguments on each side.
He is part of the marketing of wars for liberals. He never explains why Ukraine should be part of Europe, why a conflict between Ukraine and Russia is necessary.
Posted by: somebody | Aug 16 2014 10:40 utc | 66
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