Some remarks on recent issues (I should have blogged about):
1. Ukraine
The south and east of Ukraine are ethnically Russian. It is also where the Ukrainian industries are. Those industries are not (yet) capable of competing with western European industries and depend on business with Russia. In contrast to that the western Ukraine is mostly agricultural and some there would probably profit from a deeper association with the European Union. But over all the recent attempt of an EU-Ukrainian trade pact makes no sense. Many countries in the EU (France, Spain etc.) do not favor it and have contained the level of bribery the EU can undertake to buy the Ukraine. So the EU was somewhat restricted to offer "values" where Russia can offer cheep gas and a viable market for Ukrainian goods and services. Looking at Greece and Spain European "values" do not look that valuable these days. It was therefore right for the Ukrainian president to reject the EU deal. Some well paid EU claqueurs and "Orange Revolution" left behinds are now demonstrating against that. Ignore them.
2. Iran
Iran's foreign policy activity is breathtaking. Recently the Turkish foreign minister visited Tehran. Then the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates came. The Iranian foreign minister is currently in Kuwait and will next travel to Oman. While there was also an outreach to Saudi Arabia an offer to visit was rejected by Riyadh. Together with the recent temporary nuclear deal with the P5+1 this looks like a strategy to isolate Saudi Arabia and to thereby find unity against the Saudi-Israeli assault on Syria. This comes as the Syrian president Assad has (finally) declared war against Saudi Arabia and European diplomats are trickling back to Damascus. I am more confident now than ever that Syria, though at high costs, can and will win this war.
3. United States
There is some talk of a "Saudi America" because shale-oil and shale-gas exploration now allows for internal production of more than 50% of the hydrocarbons the U.S. is using. This is, in my view, nonsense. The break even for producing shale-hydrocarbons is mostly above $50 (and in some cases much higher) per barrel. The break even for producing hydrocarbons in the Middle East is as low as $1 to $5 a barrel. When Iraqi and Iranian production will be back online prices will fall and domestic U.S. shale production will no longer be profitable. As shale production is short term (the drill holes exhaust quite fast) even a short dip in hydrocarbon prices will put most of it to a halt.
4. China
Years after the Japanese and other East Asian countries declared Air Defense Information Zones, which require planes flying through them to inform those countries on their flights, China has done the same. The map shows that the Chinese zone is less extensive than the Japanese one. Some U.S. media now claim that China declared an "Air Defense Zone" and is about to go to war over it which is all wrong and stupid war propaganda. An information zone is far larger than a defense zone and its purpose is to give head ups of intentions to not waste defensive air power on innocent flights. The U.S. ADIZ has – by the way – much more restrictive rules than the Chinese one.