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Egypt: Chaos But Brotherhood Lacks Support For Escalation
As I was traveling I could not follow the Muslim Brotherhood "Day of Rage" in Egypt today. The result seems to be more chaos. Some 70+ Muslim Brotherhood supporters died today as, according to the government, did some 24 policemen. The army has checkpoints on major streets in Cairo and some loyalists vigilants appear to create some anarchic form of neighborhood watch groups.
The Saudi and the U.S. government are against "terror" in Egypt and back the generals but cooperate in creating terror in Syria and Lebanon. But others, including Russia, also support the generals. No one in the international field seems to take the side of the Brotherhood.
That gives some hope that the situation in Egypt will not evolve into the proxy war like the one that is waged on Syria and now also on Lebanon.
Bevin, with much respect, this seems off the mark: “There are two sides in Egypt, that of the dictatorship and that of the people.” Assuming I have gotten the spirit of what your words, I’d offer the following.
I am afraid that we are not seeing the people’s hand in any of this, though we are seeing, sadly, plenty of their blood. It appears to me that the Muslim Brotherhood – as they intended to do in Syria – are willing to use the lives of poor Egyptians to achieve their own political ends. My contention at this point is that we are witnessing not a revolution, but a battle between two sectors of the Egyptian elite, neither of has done anything to deserves any association of their name with the plight of common Egyptians.
What is happening now bears few similarities with the events of 2011, when the entirety of Egypt took to the streets to depose Mubarak. We have here one group (the MB), so wedded to their own narrow ends that they have lost the support of all other sectors of Egyptian society, versus another (the army), cynically using the desires of the people to be entirely free of any sector of the elite, to launch an aggressive round of repression. The MB cannot make a revolution on their own, or they would have done it decades ago. And they cannot claim, now, to speak for the Egyptian people when clearly a huge part of Egyptian society wants nothing to do with them. A real revolution of the power of the one that toppled Mubarak, like the one that will be necessary to topple the army chieftains, will require ALL of Egyptian society. But if the elites of the MB intent to double down on their bet (using the lives of their poor followers like so many poker chips) that they can return to power in the face of overwhelming rejection of their rule, they may well fracture the only coalition that can save the people of Egypt from the starvation and violence that surely awaits them.
There is no way at all to defend the army’s actions, nor the coup itself. But it is equally impossible to, for the reason of their being removed from power, to suddenly begin to defend the disastrous rule of the MB. Al Amin calling the army “obstinate” may be true, but certainly ignores the obstinacy that allowed the army coup to come to fruition – that of Morsi using the word “legitimacy” like some magic talisman that would make him immune to the very real anger of huge numbers of Egyptian people. I can’t accept the suggestion that the Egyptian people have to stand up for a party of elitist fundamentalists so as to effect a people’s revolution. The leaders of the MB, having spent decades throwing tiny scraps to the poor while they edged their way into the top positions of wealth and power in Egypt and the Middle East, are responsible for the lives of their followers that they are so callously throwing away as some repulsive human sacrifice on the altar of their past charity. They would also recognize, if the leaders of the MB cared for even a moment about the future of all the people of Egypt, that their display is doing nothing to secure that future. In fact this display (to turn Marx’s famous quote on its head), is but the serious tragedy following the farce that was their obstinate attempt to hold onto power at the end of June.
I can’t see the meaning in Al Amin attempting to compare these few weeks of killing, certainly terrible and bloody (but, at least yet, less bloody that the heady days of 2011), with Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Nakba. This kind of ahistorical hyperbole doesn’t serve anybody well, certainly not the Egytpians who are dying on the street to secure the power of people who intend nothing for them except austerity, poverty, and religious stricture. To compare this event with ones that have caused the death and/or displacement of millions (especially in light of the fact that those losing their lives know full well that Morsi intended to inflame the brutal war in Syria) strikes such an exceptionally discordant tone.
The people of Egypt are served by neither the army nor the MB. The Egyptian people need rely on no one, indeed, other than themselves fighting as one. They proved their power when they removed Mubarak. They proved their power when the pushed the army into elections (as skewed as it was) and forced the army to elections. They proved it again when they removed Morsi. They can do it again, and the opinion polls that Al Amin point to shows that they have the inclination. That is, of course, if they don’t allow the Brotherhood to sap their strength in this foolish “revolution” of which the aim is to return a wildly unpopular elite back into power.
Posted by: guest77 | Aug 17 2013 0:14 utc | 10
20) Your rant – which I agree with – applies to everybody who puts ideology over common humanity. Actually Stalin handed German communists back to the Nazis after the Hitler-Stalin Pact. Anybody with any sense on the German left – like the guy who gave the name to this blog – emigrated to the US – not the Sovjet Union – which led to him having to appear in front of a McCarthy committee but saved his life.
but I will say if Egypt did decide to aid those thugs now, in the future or even back when Morsi was ‘pharoah’, that call will be made by players further up the food chain than Morsi ever got.
I was wondering about that actually. The explanation you give is good.
The reason why I feel most Egyptians did support the coup (what support can mean in a choice of pest and cholera) is this – from April 2013:
A new draft law on private security companies currently on the table is an attempt to regulate a sector that for more than 30 years has operated with almost no oversight.
This past week, students at Misr International University, who were engaged in a sit-in to demand increased safety measures on the highway and a road leading to campus, were attacked with excessive force by the university’s private security.
Police refused to intervene in the clashes, highlighting a troubling security dynamic in Egypt’s post-uprising streets.
Under former President Hosni Mubarak, crime was contained by an Interior Ministry that worked at the behest of the regime and had few scruples about the heavy-handed methods it employed to contain any activity deemed antagonistic to its interests. As a result, major crime in touristic and upper-class areas was rare.
After the revolution, and in the vacuum left by an unraveling Interior Ministry, whose authority on the streets has evaporated, Egyptian citizens and the state have to adjust to a new reality of increased crime rates.
…
According to the adage, security breeds security: People see their neighbors taking security measures and think they should be doing the same. Care Services’ Operations Manager Mohamed Eissa says business has increased by 10 percent after the revolution, a trend confirmed by other security companies Egypt Independent spoke to.
Egypt may well be heading the way of South Africa, where there are 2 million people employed in private security firms — more than are employed in the police force — performing policing functions.
In “Policing for Profit: The Future of South Africa’s Private Security Industry,” Jenny Irish lists the reasons for the expansion of the sector: the growth of public-private property such as shopping malls and the perception that the police are unable to protect the public — both relevant to the Egyptian context.
Notably, Irish writes, “Private security shifts the responsibility for social control and order away from the state.”
“The expansion of private security involvement, such as patrolling the neighborhoods of those who can afford it, has the effect of creating ‘enclaves,’” she writes. “There may be a reduction in crime in an enclave, but this does not lead to an overall reduction in crime.”
and this – from March
Talks of the Interior Ministry contracting private security companies have created a stir, especially after a leading member of the Freedom and Justice Party called for granting them arrest powers.
News reports claimed negotiations are under way between Interior Minister Mohamed Ibrahim and private security companies to aid the ministry in clamping down on protests and widespread unrest.
Saber Abul Fotouh, head of the FJP labor committee, called for alternative methods to maintain security in the country in light of a recent wave of police strike that saw Central Security Forces close their camps and dozens of police stations close nationwide.
Among Abul Fotouh’s suggested methods is a draft law that would allow private security personnel to arrest citizens and hand them over to the prosecutor general, raising fears of laxer laws creating fertile grounds for armed militias.
On his Twitter account, the chairperson of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Hafez Abu Seada, said no party or parliament is entitled to form “special forces” or “militias” with arrest, arguing it is unconstitutional.
However, Abul Fotouh downplays any talk of militias, blaming it on media hype, and explaining that he rather seeks “legal measures” to maintain security.
He tells Egypt Independent that the draft law was merely a personal suggestion that is a result of the current crisis, namely the police strike.
A suitable solution, Abul Fotouh says, would be drafting a law that would issue licenses to grant private security companies legal powers “to protect citizens and institutions from any assault.”
The draft law, he says, would allow private security companies to “combat assailants and hand them over to either the prosecution or the Justice Ministry.”
He also suggests forming people’s committees akin to those formed during the 18-day uprising in 2011 after the police forces withdrew from the streets.
Abul Fotouh explains that the media created unsubstantiated rumors about the formation of militias, and that he only seeks legal methods to maintain security, bound by the suggested draft law.
He says ideally, the Interior Ministry would be doing its job in maintaining order. However, he laments the “scheming by remnants of the ousted regime and [former Interior Minister] Habib al-Adly’s followers,” who he alleges are causing the crisis.
In January, the Shura Council approved a controversial law granting the Armed Forces judiciary powers to arrest and try civilians. The Armed Forces were also previously given temporary arrest powers during the constitutional referendum in December.
For its part, the Interior Ministry media office has said it had no knowledge of any negotiations with private security companies.
Tarek Khedr, head of the constitutional law department at the Police Academy, fully rejects the idea of giving private security companies arrest powers.
“Private security companies cannot under any circumstances obtain arrest powers,” Khedr says, adding that it would undermine the state’s authority and fuel the current state of polarization, further spreading chaos and disorder.
Khedr sheds light on private security companies’ “legislative limits,” saying they have to be redefined.
Only police are entitled to arrest powers, Khedr explains, and the Armed Forces were the only exception.
Force as the monopoly of the state is a prerequisite of any democracy. Otherwise the power lies with young men with guns.
Posted by: somebody | Aug 17 2013 5:08 utc | 23
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