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Syria: Hizbullah Joins The Fight
Hassan Nasrallah announcement to use Hizbullah's full power on the side of the Syrian government brings a new quality to the fight. Hizbullah has a record of successful military operations against the most powerful and brutal enemies. When Nasrallah promises victory, as he yesterday did, the odds are that he will deliver. In his speech he justified Hizbullah's intervention by the danger the "western" supported takfiris pose to the resistance against Israel.
That Nasrallah defined the insurgents as takfiris is important. A takfiri is one who declares everyone who does not strictly follow his version of believe an unbeliever that should be punished and killed. As one of the Jabhat al-Nusra guys asserted in an interview:
There is a difference between the basic kuffar [infidels] and those who converted from Islam. If the latter, we must punish them. Alawites are included. Even Sunnis who want democracy are kuffar as are all Shia. It’s not about who is loyal and who isn’t to the regime; it’s about their religion. Sharia says there can be no punishment of the innocent and there must be punishment of the bad; that’s what we follow.
By defining the enemy solely as takfiris Nasrallah can justify his call to arms as a non-sectarian fight. Not every Sunni will buy it but many likely will. Following that announcement attacks were and will be mounted against Hizbullah in Lebanon but those will be more of a nuisance than a real danger.
The fight in Qasayr is ongoing. The Syrian military had some successes but the urban combat proves again to be a hard slog. Several of the opposition leaders have urged insurgents from other areas to join the fight in Qasayr. That was a mistake. Few of the reinforcements seem to have reached their target but were caught in the Syrian army cordon around Qasayr. Many of them (video) were killed. For some weeks now the Syrian Observatory's casualty count shows that about double as many insurgents are getting killed than troops on the government side. Some of the insurgents are killed in unnecessary conflicts with Kurds or other groups, some of them by missile fire and many in street combat. I doubt that the killing of 11 Chechen in Syria will lead to more Chechen joining the fight. The takfiris are training kids (video) but those will have little chance against Hizbullah's or the Syrian army's seasoned troops. At a certain point the general insurgency will die down for lack of manpower. When the Syrian government regains full control of the country a terrorist element will likely continue to exist. But it will no longer be an existential danger to the Syrian state.
Senator McCain claimed that the U.S. will create a no fly zone should, as is likely, the Geneva talks fail. I doubt this very much. It is just one of the scare points brought up by the U.S. to increase pressure on the Syrian government. Other such points are Jordan's request for Patriot missiles deployment and the announcement of a large scale multinational maneuver in Jordan.
Under international pressure to join the Geneva talks the exile opposition is in Istanbul again trying to unite but, like in every one of these events before, this attempt is likely to fail. The Muslim Brotherhood, supported by Turkey and Qatar, is unwilling to give up its (somewhat hidden) majority, does not stick to its earlier commitments and inserts new demands:
When [Al Sabbagh] was asked in front of the foreign ambassadors: "What is your priority? Especially that we are facing the challenges of Geneva 2. These demands will lead to the failure of the plan or even the fracture of the coalition which might consequently lead to Bashar Al Assad staying in power". He answered with this (literally): "My conditions are more important and urgent".
These are the people the U.S. wants to install in Syria? Do these exiles look like they would gain control of the takfiris? No and no.
The U.S may soon recognize that its Syria project has come to a dead end. There is no viable replacement for the Syrian government and the takfiris are a serious danger. If the U.S. were sure about a positive outcome should the insurgency win it would certainly do more to help them. Instead it presses European countries to deliver weapons to them. If one, like Nasrallah, is convinced of ones case, one will use all ones own might to win and not ask proxies for help. That the U.S. is doing such is telling
Hezbollah isn’t needed in Qasayr, the Syrian army can, did, and will handle that.
While the well trained Hezbollah fighters can, of course, fight everywhere their stronghold with a, that’s important, well prepared theater is Lebanon and the South of Syria where they impressingly showed their capabilities and force in 2006.
b brings up, albeit more as sidenote, an extremely and quite possibly decisive point:
Unlike israel, Syria now has tens of thousands of battle hardenend, experienced soldier and a lot of critical know how such as the tested capability of communication in a harsh, hostile environment.
Next to the question of weapons and possibly even more important (if the weapons difference isn’t too steep) this is an immensely important factor. To put it (grossly simplifying) simple: Think Hezbollah 2006 multiplied and with better weapons.
Considering the situation on the ground it can be assumed that israel can not risk a ground offensive against Syria; they would pay an unberably high price in term of lost lifes (and material).
The other classical strong point of israel was zusa; yes, “was”. Not only has shown zusa (cheap and basically automatic rhetorics aside) a strong reluctance to be drawn into yet another war for israel but, probably more important, zusa can and will not risk (or even finance) a war with Russia which has so far shown that it’s words are followed by actions. Furthermore zusa would – and will not – risk tens, if not hundreds of thousands of (zusa) lifes in the gulf region nor can or will zusa risk to be involved actually in two wars because Iran has declared and would surely be involved if a war against syria was launched.
That’s why the 2 (yes 2) S-300 factors are extremely important.
The only way for israel to at least have any chance (under ideal conditions) in a war against Syria were using their air (both missile and aircraft) superiority to “prepare the grounds” for their troups.
This was and is, more than zusa, israels ace; this gave them the possibility to attack other countries with almost impunity; this is what leveraged israels relatively weak army (and geostrategic position) above their neighbours.
And this is what Russian high tech (way more capable than anything zusa has) Air Defense systems can basically nullify.
I mentioned 2 S-300 factors (simplifying again because the S-300 is just one albeit a decisive AD system in an AD “orchestra”). One evidently is the S-300 installed in or soon to be shipped S-300.
Now, some (mainly british murdoch zio journal “sunday times”) doubt that S-300 deal and others put the effective delivery into a not near future.
This is quite certainly nonsense (because, amongst other factors, Russia not or only (too) late delivering those systems would de facto tell any and all existing and future partner or client state not to trust them).
But even assuming those rumours has some credibility to them, the situation wouldn’t change too much. Because of “S-300, part 2”: the Russian flottilla and Tartus.
It would seem quite strange for the Russians not to have strong AD systems in Tartus. And, of course, a part of their ships is equipped with naval versions of S-300 (or better).Hezbollah isn’t needed in Qasayr, the Syrian army can, did, and will handle that.
While the well trained Hezbollah fighters can, of course, fight everywhere their stronghold with a, that’s important, well prepared theater is Lebanon and the South of Syria where they impressingly showed their capabilities and force in 2006.
b brings up, albeit more as sidenote, an extremely and quite possibly decisive point:
Unlike israel, Syria now has tens of thousands of battle hardenend, experienced soldier and a lot of critical know how such as the tested capability of communication in a harsh, hostile environment.
Next to the question of weapons and possibly even more important (if the weapons difference isn’t too steep) this is an immensely important factor. To put it (grossly simplifying) simple: Think Hezbollah 2006 multiplied and with better weapons.
Considering the situation on the ground it can be assumed that israel can not risk a ground offensive against Syria; they would pay an unberably high price in term of lost lifes (and material).
The other classical strong point of israel was zusa; yes, “was”. Not only has shown zusa (cheap and basically automatic rhetorics aside) a strong reluctance to be drawn into yet another war for israel but, probably more important, zusa can and will not risk (or even finance) a war with Russia which has so far shown that it’s words are followed by actions. Furthermore zusa would – and will not – risk tens, if not hundreds of thousands of (zusa) lifes in the gulf region nor can or will zusa risk to be involved actually in two wars because Iran has declared and would surely be involved if a war against syria was launched.
That’s why the 2 (yes 2) S-300 factors are extremely important.
The only way for israel to at least have any chance (under ideal conditions) in a war against Syria were using their air (both missile and aircraft) superiority to “prepare the grounds” for their troups.
This was and is, more than zusa, israels ace; this gave them the possibility to attack other countries with almost impunity; this is what leveraged israels relatively weak army (and geostrategic position) above their neighbours.
And this is what Russian high tech (way more capable than anything zusa has) Air Defense systems can basically nullify.
I mentioned 2 S-300 factors (simplifying again because the S-300 is just one albeit a decisive AD system in an AD “orchestra”). One evidently is the S-300 installed in or soon to be shipped S-300.
Now, some (mainly british murdoch zio journal “sunday times”) doubt that S-300 deal and others put the effective delivery into a not near future.
This is quite certainly nonsense (because, amongst other factors, Russia not or only (too) late delivering those systems would de facto tell any and all existing and future partner or client state not to trust them).
But even assuming those rumours has some credibility to them, the situation wouldn’t change too much. Because of “S-300, part 2”: the Russian flottilla and Tartus.
It would seem quite strange for the Russians not to have strong AD systems in Tartus. And, of course, a part of their ships is equipped with naval versions of S-300 (or better). And we are not talking about 5 or 10 missiles; more in the (low) 3-digit range.
And we are not talking about 5 or 10 missiles; more in the (low) 3-digit range.
Posted by: Mr. Pragma | May 27 2013 12:12 utc | 25
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