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Syria: A Possible Russian Move
There is a currently flurry of diplomacy with regards to Syria. The Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi just visited Jordan. Salehi will next fly to Damascus. Next week the Qatari foreign minister will visit Tehran. U.S. Secretary of State Kerry just talked with the Turkish Foreign Minister Dovatoglu. Kerry is now in Moscow for a talk with the Russian president Putin (The talk starts at least three hours late. Was Putin making a point with this?) Putin recently talked on the phone with the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahoo. On May 10 the British Prime Minister Cameron will also have a talk with Putin in the southern Russian resort Sochi.
The U.S. still demands that Moscow gives up on Syria and presses for Assad to leave. Moscow will, I believe, not agree to that.
In this diplomatic context Sunday's Israeli airstrikes near Damascus were a message to Putin, certainly coordinated with Washington. "Look what we will do if you don't give in. Next time we will bomb the Syrian air fields. Then their troops." At the same time the flurry of unfounded "chemical weapon" allegations are used to prepare the "western" public for a military intervention.
The big question is of course what Obama will do after Kerry and Cameron fail to change Putin's stand. There is a risk that Obama will decide to overthrow Assad by overt military means. He committed himself to that when he demanded that "Assad must go." It will be hard, if not impossible for him, to retreat from that. Military means would include a "no-fly zone" which would start to be implemented by destroying whatever is left of Syria's air defenses. Naturally with lots of collateral casualties.
Putin should plan on how to counter that. He should send a signal that can only be understood as "Up to here and no further." He should announce it on May 9, the 68th anniversary of Russia's victory over Nazi Germany.
On request of the Syrian government a squadron of 24 Russian fighter jets could be dispatched to Syria. They would be stationed at two Syrian airports. At each airport a battalion of Russian paratroopers would take care of the local security. Some long range early warning radar and some command and control elements would also be needed.
Supplies would come through Iranian and Iraqi airspace as well as though the port of Tartus where Russia's new permanent Mediterranean fleet is just arriving.
The declared sole and exclusive task of the Russian squadron would be to defend sovereign Syria's airspace from any outer interference. The message to Washington (and Tel Aviv) would be clear. Attacking Syria means attacking the Russian air force. Might you want to think twice about that?
Such a Russian move would be a heavens gift for Obama. He could back down from his demand that Assad has to go without losing much face. He could join everyone else in Washington in blaming Putin while appearing reasonable in not risking a wider war.
There is precedence for such a Russian move:
A contingent of 200 Russian troops deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina then crossed into Kosovo and occupied Pristina International Airport in Pristina, the capital city of Kosovo.
Upon hearing of the deployment, American NATO commander Wesley Clark called NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana, and was told "you have to transfer authority" in the area. Clark then ordered a contingent of 500 British and French paratroopers to seize the airport by force, an order that is still debated. British officer James Blunt, who commanded the contingent, questioned and did not carry out this order. His delay was sanctioned by British General Mike Jackson. Jackson refused to enforce Clark's orders, reportedly telling him "I'm not going to start the Third World War for you".
The U.S. and NATO eventually backed down because they did not want to risk a wider war.
A Russian air force capability in Syria would up the risk for any outright attack to a very high level. Even if Obama believes that his "credibility" demands a regime change no-fly zone in Syria, Russian air defense of Syrian airspace would likely make him change his mind.
Ad strategic and military aspects:
While I agree with b’s general line “Putin should send a signal that can only be understood as “Up to here and no further.”” I see other way as more promising – and way cheaper in any regard, incl. human lifes.
As I said (in 47) things are more complicated. On the public level (zusa demand for Assad to go) there is not even necessarily a problem; Russia didn’t exclude that possibility.
So, quite probably, the Syrian matter on the table in Moscow is to do with the circumstances of Assads potential leaving and, of course, how to make happen and guarantee proper procedures for the Syrians themselves to decide/vote for a new leader.
Quite certainly the Russian position will be somewhere around ‘*if* the Syrian people want Assad to leave as president, then he has to leave’ (and associated detail questions such as where and how Assad would live afterwards).
This makes the real american problem very clearly visible: They preach democracy but actually as so often before they live anything but democracy. In fact the whole Assad issue can be summarized as ‘The Russians want a democratic decision by the Syrian people, zusa on the other hand wants the people (who are rather pro Assad) out the equation and impose their will – by force if and as needed’.
Similarly the Russians follow the line ‘Syria can and shall be and do what it wants as long as the existing cultural, ethnical and religious groups basic rights and well being is not in danger and international law is respected’.
This is the exact opposite of zusas whishes and worse, a political solution is extremely hard to find because zusas agenda is a hidden one, about which to have poloitical talks and negotiations is complicated de nature.
It should be noted that the Russian position so far is brilliant and covers all their bases. It respects international law, it refrains from undemocratic decisions for the Syrians but rather demands those decisions being made by the Syrians – which, of course, is the best imaginable position towards what and whoever happens to be Syrias leadership of tomorrow.
Now to the ugly part …
The fact is, Russia cannot project nearly the amount of firepower that the US and NATO can. … I don’t know if Russia would risk that since the fact of the matter is, the US could defeat a couple of Russian squadrons.
(to pick one typical remark, made similarly by many in one or another way)
Just reading about “projecting firepower” raises my neck-hairs; This and the supremcy and superior blah is enough to describe the irrational and unrealistic vanity bordering to insanity zusa view on themselves.
Let’s clean that up quickly.
Maybe, let’s assume that for a moment, zusa can indeed project lots of firepower. But that, ladies and gentlemen, is simply not the point. No points for zusa, sit down, please.
The point of any military undertaking is to reach a political goal, to project desired structure in other, more american digestable words.
So, not only did zusa fail in professionally projecting firepower in the last decade, even worde, they obviously failed to understand the ABC, the one-digit multiplication of war of the first grade.
Both Iraq and Afghanistan are in a way worse position than before and in both countries the vast majority detests the americans like the Nazis were hated. Actually, both wars brought the respective countries (and some neighbours along) *closer* to Russia.
Second, there is another simple reason. Wars are not won by projection of weakness and insanely blown up egos and PR – they are won by troups and with weapons.
Third, wars are also extremely expensive. And obviously zusa is broken; so broken in fact, that they started to spend considerably less on their holiest of cows, the military, the very base of their wet dreams.
At the same time Russia and China very much increased their military budget and, best of all, they can actually afford it.
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There are btw. interesting signs that b’s assumptions point in the right direction. Just yesterday Russia made a very telltale move in out of nowhere offering their S-300 systems to … turkey.
Now, turkey is measly country run by whores and dogs. But it is nevertheless a real neighbour with potentially legitimate interests concerning Syria. Like in ‘Syria with either a very much strengthened Russian base’ or in ‘Syria with glitzy new S-300 AD systems’. It would therefore be reasonable to, if only for political reasons of looking nice, offer assurances to turkey that any such new Syrians AD prowess is by no means directed against a neutral a fair turkish partner (get the hint?) but rather against wet zato dreams of “superiority” military engagements.
Some may continue to dream about zusa firepower supremacy projection blah blah. The facts on the grounds are: With russian ships (and even more with eventual new Syrian AD systems) Syria is a de facto no-fly zone. For *zato and israel jets* that is.
Posted by: Mr. Pragma | May 7 2013 22:10 utc | 57
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