Another sign of the futile failure of U.S. policy, coming immediately after the jihadists have declared an Islamic state in Syria, where they do control some territory. The US reliance upon military force instead of diplomacy has been thoroughly discredited many times but it is still the U.S. default position even as the situation in Syria worsens.
some bits of trivia — The commander of the 1st Armored Division MajGen Dana Pittard will visit Saudi Arabia soon for a week. He currently has 30 troops participating in an exercise there called Earnest Leader. Pittard has a son named Jordan.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 17 2013 18:00 utc | 3

@1
Command and control of insurgents is the work of special forces not an armored division headquarters element.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 17 2013 18:35 utc | 5

It is the playbook however from Afghanistan to Mali, first step, Al Queida public relations exercise, second step convince the Western public that something has to be done. I just wonder whose playbook.
According to the Austrian press Turkey has started for the first time to arrest Jihadis.

Posted by: somebody | Apr 17 2013 19:08 utc | 7

No, i dont think the fanatical US Zionist regime is THAT stupid.Not now. I mean we (Europeans) didn´t put our brightest, or even our next best brightest people over there in the first place, not even the third, but we did it for a purpose and you have been spawning inbreed retards in wars for israel and the tribe ever since.

Posted by: magma | Apr 17 2013 20:51 utc | 9

Gehenna (9)
Interesting that you bring this up.
There is more: I read that Lavrov and davotoglu just jointly announced their intention to respect Syrias right to resolve their problems themselves and diplomatically.
In the same session they also declared that they will work towards a souvereign palestinian state with the 1967 borders.
It was quite evident sind quite some time that turkey has a major role, not only as staging ground for the usa sponsored terrorists but also geostrategically.
If ever a war between Russia and the usa came to pass it would be extremely important for the Russians to have turkey at least neutral. To summarize it (somewhat brutally) shortly, turkey actually never was more than a conventient backyard, dump and buffer both for nato and the eu. On the other hand turkey can play a major role in a changing near/mid-east and, concerning Russia, turkey gain either gain very handsomely or get brutally maimed (and torn in between usa and Russia).
I have noticed signs since a while now as it seems that Russia finally made it perfectly clear to turkey where their place is and where their loyalty should definitely not be.

Posted by: Mr. Pragma | Apr 17 2013 22:48 utc | 11

AP, Apr 17

The decision to dispatch the 1st Armored Division troops of planners and specialists in intelligence, logistics and operations comes as several lawmakers pressed the Obama administration for even more aggressive steps to end the two-year civil war.
Hagel said the fresh troops will replace a similar number of U.S. forces that have been in Jordan for some months. They also will provide leadership personnel that could command additional forces if it’s determined they are needed in the future.
The unit is based at Fort Bliss, Texas, and will start deploying in mid- to late May.

They will be replacing the special forces troops that have been training insurgents, and will plan something bigger. They brought up the chemical weapons threat again, so perhaps they have a plan along those lines.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 18 2013 2:48 utc | 13

“Russia fears that a power vacuum in Syria will lead to the decent into total chaos. Someone is going to have to keep order in Syria to support and safeguard any new transitional Government.”
Not only that, the US (israeli) intention is, if they manage to finish off Syria that is, to redirect their Al-Qaeda retards to Iran and the somewhat volatile southern Russia where USA and israel has been supporting Beslan-terrorists since the 80´s.

Posted by: magma | Apr 18 2013 12:12 utc | 15

Some progress around Damascus: Battle for Damascus: Regime Fights on Four Fronts
The non-existing exile government of Syria introduces sharia law for the “freed” Syrian areas where it has no say at all: Syrian opposition to establish moderate form of Sharia law

Posted by: b | Apr 18 2013 12:56 utc | 17

16) there is a BBC interview with Netanyahu

Mr Netanyahu, in an exclusive interview with the BBC’s Lyse Doucet, said Israel’s concern was “which rebels and which weapons?”
“The main arms of concern to us are the arms that are already in Syria – these are anti-aircraft weapons, these are chemical weapons and other very, very dangerous weapons that could be game changers,” he said.
“They will change the conditions, the balance of power in the Middle East. They could present a terrorist threat on a worldwide scale. It is definitely our interest to defend ourselves, but we also think it is in the interest of other countries.”

Posted by: somebody | Apr 18 2013 14:33 utc | 19

This post is about the security situation in Al-Raqqa city in Syria.
A little over a month ago, starting 4 Mar 2013, armed rebels in Syria took over the center of Al-Raqqa city. It was widely reported it as a news event at the time. I’m knowledgeable enough about the Western media’s general behaviour to guess confidently that they haven’t reported on the situation in Al-Raqqa since about 11 Mar 2013, although essentially I haven’t and won’t read the Western news media on Syria. Al-Raqqa News is a pro-government Facebook blog in Arabic language which has breaking news every day, often several times a day, from Al-Raqqa about the security situation there. https://www.facebook.com/alrakaNews . The situation today continues to be as it has been for the last month, namely the government’s security forces are by far the stronger side and are in general in control, but the rebels are still present and shooting in Al-Raqqa, causing parts of the city to be in a state of terror, like how things were in Aleppo City six months ago, Homs City a year ago. The army in Al-Raqqa is having difficulties exterminating the rebels and restoring normalcy despite the army’s superiority in manpower, in weaponry, in coordination systems, and in support from the local population. On the matter of the political sentiments of the local population, (1) during 2011 on Fridays the size of the anti-government street protests in Al-Raqqa were tiny in relation to the city’s overall size and were greatly outsized by several huge pro-government rallies Al-Raqqa in 2011, and (2) during 2012 Al-Raqqa was tranquil and normal. The rebels in Al-Raqqa today are small in number (like 120 or suchlike). Some unknown but necessarily large percentage of them are non-locals (I’m not saying non-Syrians). Once again, as in other places in Syria, I cannot understand the reality that the Syrian security forces have not been able to restore normalcy yet.

Posted by: Parviziyi | Apr 18 2013 15:12 utc | 21

Well, it seems Al Nusrah is the only viable political opposition force on the ground

A Western sociologist who just returned from the countryside around Aleppo and Idlib said that Jabhat al-Nusra, along with other Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated fighting brigades, has succeeded in building a need-based relationship with the peasant inhabitants of Idlib and Aleppo as a result of the penurious conditions, the unrelenting war and the destruction of the inhabitants’ main sources of livelihoods. Jabhat al-Nusra thus went into competition with other fighting groups, taking advantage of its abundant and constant funding by Gulf Arab states, as well as its fighting power, which is greater than that of other groups.
Although the loyalties of fighters in the Idlib countryside change and vacillate, Jabhat al-Nusra has succeeded in maintaining an important reserve of full-time combatants. Other fighting groups do not possess exclusive rights to particular areas, towns or cities in the Idlib countryside, and their members are able to leave and join other groups as they wish, which is an indication of the lack of ideological conviction among those fighters and the predominance of mercenary and locally driven motivations. As a result, enlistment in Jabhat al-Nusra’s ranks has risen, which opponents have attributed to the conservative nature of Idlib and the religiosity of the people as opposed to their desire to join a global movement for jihad. Syria’s al-Qaeda understands this well and has accepted this shunning of its elitist isolation as a precondition for the group remaining on the battlefield. Whole brigades have thus undergone reallocation to other factions. Such is the case for the Ahrar al-Sham faction (the Free Men of Greater Syria), which has recently seen complete fighting brigades choosing to leave it and join Jabhat al-Nusra’s ranks.
Military control of land areas is nonexistent, and combatants lacking fixed encampments or barracks are mostly compelled to take refuge in their own villages in the countryside around Idlib and Aleppo, where they are welcomed and helped by a largely sympathetic populace. Clashes between different fighting brigades have subsided, as has the level of competition and fighting over captured loot, particularly when compared to the quarrels that erupted between some brigades of the Free Syrian Army and local fighting forces in other regions of the country.
It would seem that Jabhat al-Nusra and various other Salafist factions have achieved much in the area of coexisting and accepting the influence of local elders, chieftains and forces that rose to prominence when the area was abandoned by the state’s security forces and Baath party. Radicalism, in its present incarnation, is thus forced to live with these people and groups, while it awaits a new change in the balance of power. Furthermore, the temptation that compels Jabhat al-Nusra’s leaders, or some of them, to try to impose a comprehensive Salafist agenda on the Aleppo and Idlib countryside is thwarted by an inherent inability to instill radical Islam in an already conservative society endowed with an effective local religious body that strongly resists such changes.
Jabhat al-Nusra does not want to enter into a confrontation with the local communities and try to impose Shariah law, following the lessons that were learned in Iraq, where the Americans exploited al-Qaeda’s excessive zealotry and organized a clan-led coup spearheaded by the Sahwa (Awakening) army against the organization. The fighting brigades thus managed to create mechanisms by which disagreements would be kept in check in the areas under their control, when their military gave civilians complete control over the Shariah councils.
Through these Shariah councils, Jabhat al-Nusra has infiltrated Idlib and Aleppo’s societies in order to normalize its relationship with Syrian society at large. As a result, any future authority will find it difficult to wrest power from these Shariah councils that the fighting brigades established, for they have become the nucleus of a real government. The nine councils overseeing Idlib’s countryside have expanded the scope of their authority beyond the judiciary, to include the police force, supervision of security-related issues and the administration of prisons.
Idlib’s councils are also leaning toward uniting into a supreme Shariah council that would supervise the work of all other branches. These courts, however, are predominantly composed of clerics and not civilians; each of them is presided over by two imams, in addition to a judge specializing in civil affairs. These Shariah councils are governed by the Arab Unified Penal Code, which the Arab League penned, and which includes articles that were inspired by Shariah law, though Shariah punishment is not imposed.
Jabhat al-Nusra’s ascension is limited by the continued control exercised by a conservative religious body, divided between members of the pro-regime Association of Islamic Scholars of Syria, most of whom apprenticed with the late Sheikh Mohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti, and followers of Saria and Osama al-Rifai, as well as the Association of Syrian Scholars, which includes clerics with close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.
Aleppo constitutes a huge arena for competition between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jabhat al-Nusra, whereby the Brotherhood administers the western neighborhoods of the opposition-controlled areas under the supervision of a Shariah council led by a group aligned with the Syrian National Coalition, while Jabhat al-Nusra and its own Shariah council administers the eastern part, in alliance with the Tawhid Brigade, Ahrar al-Sham and the Ahfad al-Rasul (Descendants of the Prophet) Brigade.
These brigades have also entered the relief arena, for Jabhat al-Nusra has succeeded in organizing aid-distribution operations in the areas under its control. In this context, the aforementioned sociologist said that Jabhat al-Nusra now has among its ranks dozens of relief workers who have daily contact with hundreds of thousands of inhabitants who primarily live on the aid given to them by Jabhat al-Nusra and other such groups.
Jabhat al-Nusra’s pledge of allegiance only garnered one single line of objection, when Ahmad Moaz al-Khatib wrote on his Facebook page: “Al-Qaeda’s ideology does not suit us, and the revolutionaries must now take a stand.” The Coalition, on the other hand, had nothing to say about al-Qaeda’s official entrance into the Levant, busying itself with preparations for the formation of an interim government that would rule the whole of Syria. However, Hitto should prepare himself to share that land with the Islamic state that Joulani strives to establish. [It was reported this week that the Islamic State in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra had joined together to form the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.]
For its part, Syrian opposition abroad is afraid of being marginalized if it were to fully espouse the West’s views and proclaim its animosity toward Joulani. For the overwhelmed head of the interim Syrian government cannot afford to antagonize Jabhat al-Nusra and be caught between a rock and a hard place afforded him by the Free Syrian Army, which refused to even nominate him, and still refuses to accept the post of defense minister, which it was offered. Hitto needs both of these factions to gain the legitimacy he requires to return to Syria and spread his administration’s authority.
In all probability, the problem of coexisting with al-Qaeda is only raised inside small circles of people belonging to internal opposition factions such as the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change, the Building the Syrian State Movement and some other secular movements. It is also raised, on another level, by Western powers that do not fear the transformation of Syria into an Islamic state as much as they fear chaos reigning over the country and its conversion into a rear base for global jihad that would threaten Syria’s neighborhood, as well as Israel, European interests, and nearby dependent economies.

Posted by: somebody | Apr 18 2013 16:12 utc | 23

A Western sociologist ….

He should have been arrested, interrogated, beaten and then incarcerated in Gitmo!
Assad you are too nice!

Posted by: hans | Apr 18 2013 17:14 utc | 25

24) yikes – judging reality on the ground by web 3.0 –

A Note on Syria Video
The bulk of video content uploaded from Syria originates from opposition-aligned parties. The representation of video material acquired by Syria Video reflects this reality. Upon encountering this abundance of rebel-filmed footage, some initial visitors to the new (and still developing) service suggested that Syria Video is deficient as a tool for critically approaching the conflict. Let me emphasize: the element of criticism must be introduced by the user. Syria Video does not provide analysis; the user performs it.

I think US taxpayers should ask their money back

Posted by: somebody | Apr 18 2013 18:28 utc | 27

When visiting the desert areas in Syria along the Jordan border very recently, the journalist Hussein Mortada of Al-Alam TV says: “National Defense Forces and Popular Committees sometimes address terrorist groups infiltrating from Jordan in these areas.” (Ref). His phrase “National Defense Forces” in that context does not mean the Syrian army or police; it means pro-government irregular militias. You can find similar usage of the same phrase at Al-Akhbar photoblog, in particular see the third-last photo where an irregular (civilian) militiaman is armed with a Kalashnikov-type gun, wears a bulletproof vest over a fleecey grey-blue jacket, and has printed on the bulletproof vest the government’s Syrian flag with the text الدفاع الوطني = “national defense”.
It reminds me of the following item in the interview of Bashar Assad by the UK Sunday Times on 3 Mar 2013: Question: “Are you aware of Hezbollah fighters in Syria and what are they doing?” Bashar Assad’s reply: “Hezbollah’s role is to defend Lebanon not Syria. We are a country of 23 million people with a strong National Army and Police Force. We are in no need of foreign fighters to defend our country.” (Ref.). To which I add that the Syrian National Army and Police Force ought to be strong enough that there’d be in no need for irregular militias to defend the country either. The emergence of these pro-government armed militias is a very recent development, and is not on a large scale. I take them to be a symptom of the ongoing inability of the would-be “strong National Army and Police Force” to extinguish the rebellion. As I’ve said before on this board a dozen times, it is incomprehensible to me why I am seeing this ongoing inability.
I agree with ‘b’ when he said on this board on 3 Apr 2013 that his best guestimate for the number of rebels is 25,000 rebels. KerKeraje replied to ‘b’ on 4 Apr 2013: “It does not make sense to claim that the rebels are only 30,000 men. It is not conceivable that a mere 30,000… should be able to fight on several major fronts, put a number of cities and towns more or less under siege, take major military bases and airfields, capture many border crossings, block supply routes, encircle international airports etc. while the regular army that is supposed to be at least 250,000 men has had to abandon many places….” I reply to KerKeraje that it is in fact happening, with fewer than 30,000 rebels, and the right question to ask is why isn’t the army able to stop it.
@ Rusty Pipes #24: I took a quick scan of what’s at that link and I came away thinking it’s fundamentally a piece of shite because it’s blind to the big fact that when the several rebel factions are taken all together they’re all on a small scale in Al-Raqqa. They’re thin-on-the-ground guerillas. If they were to become dense they’d be blown away by the firepower of the Syrian army.

Posted by: Parviziyi | Apr 18 2013 20:04 utc | 29

The government forces are still powerful and effective, but on a local level it’s often largely a war of – and between – militias, it seems.
USAToday

Ras al-Ayn is ruled by militias. In its western part, two Islamist groups and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the rebel group that originally took up arms against the government, have control. In the eastern areas, the Kurdish Popular Protection Units, or the YPG, are in control.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 18 2013 20:38 utc | 31

I think it’s anyway more complicated than x thousand Syrian army against y thousand “freedom fighters”.
For a starter the Syrian army and their soldiers are bound to certain rules of engagement, an important one of which is to keep collateral damage minimal. Add to this that “collateral” for them actually is their citizens, their neighbours, their relatives.
The terrorists on the other hand are not bound to such rules. Furthermore to them Syrians are hardly valuable; they have no relations with them. Actually, as many massacres show, killing innocent Syrian people is considered usefull by them (instilling fear, creating chaos, etc.)
Another important point is that the Syrian army is trained to fight other military forces. The terrorists, however, are very much different in many respects, starting with simple things like often not even being recognizeable as enemies (no uniforms) or their main tactics of sniper attacks and other ambushes. Even worse, while the Syrian army desperately strives to keep civilians out of harms way, those civilians are basically just hostages for the terrorists.
Btw: One of the reasons, if not even the major one, why americans could cope somewhat easier with a similar situation in Iraq is that they had no qualms with accepting extremely high collateral damage; after all, the people there were not their citizens. Actually one can say that the usa armies attitude was way closer to that of the terrorists in Syria than to that of an army with rules and honour.
Unpleasant as all that is for the Syrian army, there is a good side to it, too. One point is that Hezbollah fighter who have a long and profound experience with asymmetric warfare are extremely helpful. Another one is that Syria is an ideal training ground for covert Iranian forces. What they exercise in Syria today might quite soon be very valuable in Iran.
All in all, the fact that Syrian forces so far withstand the massive terrorist attacks quite well and even succeeded many times to kill groups of terrorists shows that it’s by no means a toy-army, although I assume that they got some discrete help from experienced Russian commandos.
The only major failure I see so far is that Syria was way too lenient toward defectors to the terrorists. This is “just” psychology but actually extremely important for te troups morale. Assad should have established special commandos early on to mercilessly hunt down and kill such defectors/traitors.

Posted by: Mr. Pragma | Apr 18 2013 20:50 utc | 33

@ Parviziyi #32 The pro-government local militias are NOT more capable.
You are the one who indicated that they are.
To which I add that the Syrian National Army and Police Force ought to be strong enough that there’d be in no need for irregular militias to defend the country either.
And as for your crazy ‘crazy’ allegation, explain why it isn’t the case. Specifically I suggest that many of the local militia are ‘shabiha’ and are essential to the Syria government cause, just as the US-formed Afghan Local Police are in Afghanistan. As I explained above, they are effective because they’re local.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 18 2013 21:25 utc | 35

The inability if the SAR to stamp out the insurgents is probably because of bad leadership. Bad communications, lack of independent thinking, initiative???? The Syrian soldiers can’t of that bad quality. Right?

Posted by: Fernando | Apr 18 2013 21:57 utc | 37

@37 Fernando
Don’t be too hard on the Syria army. Conventional armies were fit for organized battles on recognized battlefields but the rules have changed. Organized militaries haven’t been faring too well against motivated partisans. The ‘world’s finest military’ surged in Afghanistan three years ago, and victory is nowhere in sight. The Russians, French and British haven’t done much better. –“Hamid Karzai says security in Helmand better before British troops arrived.”
The US Marines went into Helmand also. Dec 2012:
Nearly five years after Marines first kicked in the door in Helmand province, the area remains one Afghanistan’s most violent, according to a new Defense Department report released Monday. In fact, Helmand is home to Afghanistan’s most violent district — Nahr-e Saraj — and eight of the 10 most violent districts overall.
Overall in Afghanistan — Apr 18, 2013:
Red Cross: Security deteriorating in Afghanistan
KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The International Committee of the Red Cross warned on Thursday that security was deteriorating across Afghanistan as militants flood the battlefield and conduct attacks in what could be the most defining spring fighting season of the nearly 12-year-old war.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 18 2013 22:42 utc | 39

Hand out AK-47s, you’ll get some protection and also some thuggery. It happens in Afghanistan just that way, too, with the Afghan Local Police started by Petraeus. (I know more about Afghanistan, little about Syria. But people are people.)

As the 2014 deadline for ending the US combat mission in Afghanistan approaches, US forces have been working with the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) to build their capacity to fight the Taliban and other insurgent elements on their own. Yet even as the ANA and ANP cost US taxpayers billions of dollars a year, there are still swaths of the country that the national army and police cannot control.
Faced with an impending withdrawal deadline and tightening budgets, US planners created another security entity, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which they have pitched as an affordable short-term fix to fill this security vacuum. However, the name is a misnomer, since members do not have police powers and are essentially village militias armed with AK-47s. Highlighting its prominence as a key feature of the US exit strategy, General David Petraeus described the ALP program in 2011 as “arguably the most critical element in our effort to help Afghanistan develop the capacity to secure itself.”
Despite some success in achieving security gains, the ALP program has been plagued by such problems as Taliban infiltration and insider attacks. But most controversially, ALP units have been accused of committing serious human rights abuses against local populations with apparent impunity.

cont.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 19 2013 0:13 utc | 41

#42
The Treasury Department issued more economic sanctions against Syrians? Color me shocked. Under pressure from the Israel Lobby, congress enacted an office in Treasury specifically to monitor Iran and others Israel defines as enemies. In addition, since congress overwhelmingly passed the Syria Accountability Act during the Bush Administration, Treasury has been tightening the economic screws on Syria, one turn at a time. The last one I heard of was on the bank accounts of Asma’s distant relatives.
Yesterday, after Defense wasn’t as enthusiastic about tightening the screws on Syria as State has been, Levin and McCain sent a message to Obama demanding that all of his advisors speak with one voice (which kind of undermines their effectiveness as advisors).
The insurgents will continue to label as shabiha anyone who objects to their taking over the neighborhood, enforcing sharia law and hiding behind civilians when the army sends bombs. A police state which is concerned about the escalating level of random violence and losing control is less likely just to be flooding AK-47s to random villagers.

Posted by: Rusty Pipes | Apr 19 2013 1:48 utc | 43

@22 – The only major failure I see so far is that Syria was way too lenient toward defectors to the terrorists. This is “just” psychology but actually extremely important for te troups morale. Assad should have established special commandos early on to mercilessly hunt down and kill such defectors/traitors.
Wasn’t there something about Assad lowering prison sentences for “rebels” by 3/4 recently? Seems like he is really pushing for some reconciliation. Which is probably good In mu opinion – it keeps the lines clearly drawn between Syrians and foreigners, and shows perhaps that he will do what is necessary to reconcile and the country together – ie, show the Syrian Sunnis that when they end the rebellion (and kick out the foreign jihadis), they won’t be relegated to second class citizenry forever.
Seems like wise policy.

Posted by: guest | Apr 19 2013 3:02 utc | 45

Is this guy a comedy genius or what?

Posted by: yah . . . But | Apr 19 2013 6:52 utc | 47

The 2 shooters lit an unwieldy bomb and threw it at police in the middle of gunfight http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/20/us/explosives-detonated-in-massachusetts-standoff.html?hp …
just like Syria

Posted by: brian | Apr 19 2013 7:02 utc | 49

rusty pipes 40’The Syrian regime appears to be trying to create distance from the former role of “shabiha,” partly because they have been accused of thuggery in the past, and also because the insurgents have often pinned their crimes on “shabiha” (think Houla).’
there is no such thing as ‘shabiha’…its a loose term for ‘thug’
2 syria has a government not a ‘regime’
but yes the insurgents do pin their crimes on the ‘shabiha’ thats why they were invented

Posted by: brian | Apr 19 2013 7:06 utc | 51

This is the state of agreement on Syria internationally

Several factors combined to pull off the Qatari coup and impose a “sovereign temporary government” instead of an “administrative executive body.” Many NCR members changed positions. In the end, 33 of 66 NCR members voted for Hitto. Muslim Brotherhood leaders had opposed forming a temporary government but changed their minds after the US and Russia reached an understanding over the Geneva Accord. The Muslim Brotherhood is a powerful force within the NCR. The Brotherhood also controls a large part of the Syrian National Council, with 26 seats, and has an ally in NCR Secretary-General Mustafa al-Sabbagh, whose bloc comprises 15 representatives from the revolutionary movement and the “local councils.”
The US-Russian understanding troubled the Brotherhood because it revived the Geneva Accord. That accord requires the opposition, including the Muslim Brotherhood, to share the transitional government with representatives of the Syrian regime, under a US-Russian umbrella. Statements by US Secretary of State John Kerry that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad would stay on during the transition process in return for the Russians accepting a transitional government with absolute powers indicated that the political option was now being favored over the military option, at least in theory.
An NCR source said Sabbagh persuaded the Qataris to replace Mustafa with Hitto. The latter’s closeness with the Brotherhood and his US connections, especially in the State Department, helped his selection.
An NCR source said the Saudis were shocked by Qatar’s maneuver. The Saudis had sacrificed their favorite candidate, Riad Hjab, during their consultations with the Qataris in favor of the consensus candidate, Mustafa. Moreover, the Qataris rejected a Saudi request to postpone the election.

Now, does Saudi Arabi wish for a Muslim Brotherhood government on its borders? What do you think?
Let’s assume sectarian divisions are artificial and the real fight is about a share in the wealth of resources and modern development, what would Saudi Arabia prefer – an autocratic regime or democracy? And who is interested in Jihadis being the ennemy in Syria opposed to ‘moderate islam’? And why is the ‘official Western approved’ Syrian opposition so incapable of distancing themselves from the aims and methods of Jihadis? And is the US really interested in stretching its army in the Middle East and the Pacific?

Posted by: somebody | Apr 19 2013 7:19 utc | 53

@ 53 Whoes on first!

Posted by: yah . . . But | Apr 19 2013 7:45 utc | 55

“Obama is unlikely to want to have such a quagmire as his legacy”
why?
Why do people think this to be true? Why does anyone think Obama cares?
Obama’s legacy will be what ever is written into some text books based on media reports and official accounts.
Fact. Reality. Will have nothing to do with Obama’s legacy.
It is interesting that you stated that, when just prior to that this was said
“should the U.S. venture into Syria it surely would be in for another Iraq like quagmire”
So, we have the Iraq quagmire, the Afghan quagmire, the Libyan quagmire…what difference one more quagmire?
When we have so many quagmires ongoing, can it be a coincidence?
Or can it be the exact outcome desired?

Posted by: Penny | Apr 19 2013 10:52 utc | 57

@Parvizyi 29
You brought no clear argument forward why you think the rebels numbers is less than 30.000 men.
I repeat that I am quite sure they are no less than 60.000-100.000 men.
How else should day compensate average daily losses of 60-80 men? Thats around 2000 men/month.
Not only non-syrian Jihadists are entering Syria en masse but we have by now already seen the first foreigner casualties: Many dead Libyans and Tunisians, but also Turks, Chechens, Belgians, UK and France nationals…

Posted by: KerKaraje | Apr 19 2013 20:06 utc | 59

Shabiha is an accepted term for armed civilians (i.e. militia) who support Syria. Live with it.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 19 2013 22:08 utc | 61

@ KerKeraje #59 : I acknowledge I’ve not brought forward a clear argument why I think the rebel numbers are less than 30,000 men (closer to 20,000). A good clear argument would require a long presentation of details, details, and details, which I’m not going to do. I thought ‘b’ did a pretty good job of briefly summarizing two main points of the argument: What ‘b’ said was (1) there isn’t much rebel manpower needed to do the types of rebel actions that we’ve seen, and (2) we haven’t seen actual rebel manpower in non-small numbers anywhere (including, particularly, no large formations on view at youtube).
Let me remind you that the anti-government news media including the Western news media play up rebel incursions and rebel successes, no matter how fleeting and tenuous those may be, and play down the successes of the government’s army and, especially, they play down normalcy. Most of Syria is in a state of normalcy. Most of Homs City is in a state of normalcy. Aleppo City too. The great majority of Syrians nationwide are going to work, paying their taxes, and so on.
The rebels are not holding any ground anywhere except for a few localities where the army has decided to leave them alone temporarily. When the army decides to move against any of those localities, it can always take them back, and without meeting heavy resistance in doing so. The army’s problem is that a small number of mobile armed guerillas can create a lot of insecurity in a locality without really holding the ground in that locality.
Here’s a reiteration of a point ‘b’ already made. Suppose 300 rebels get together to attack a certain facility. The army can fight them off if the army is there beforehand in sufficient numbers. But the army can’t be everywhere at all times. The 300 rebels can capture a facility that is defended by 50 security guards. After they’ve captured it, they have to disperse, because otherwise the army will go there in large numbers and kill them. That’s what we’ve been seeing. And we’ve also been seeing the rebels take over a small town, or a neighborhood in a city. The rebels can hold onto the position there for longer because it’s harder for the army to root them out of the warrens of buildings. But there isn’t much rebel manpower involved in those urban guerilla operations. The army won’t reduce a whole neighborhood to rubble just to kill a dozen rebels. So the rebels are able to stay there for longer. Dense concentrations of rebels can be blown to smithereens with large-bore cannon, and it has happened on a few occasions, but not often because the rebels are not so foolhardy as to form themselves into a non-sparse formations for a non-brief period.
I believe the rebels’ average daily casualties are half of what you think they are. But once again, to decently support that belief I’d need a lot of time to go into details, but even then the details probably wouldn’t be comprehensive enough to change the mind of you who holds the contrary view. Likewise for your impression that non-Syrian Jihadists are entering Syria “en masse” — it’s not my impression. We are both taking impressions and overall conclusions from a load of concrete cases, reaching different conclusions. I know from earlier posts by you that you have taken the time to go into details on the ground, and you have formed your view by yourself from the details you’ve seen, and you didn’t form it by credulously believing someone else. That’s what I’ve done as well. I respectfully disagree with your impressions.

Posted by: Parviziyi | Apr 20 2013 0:07 utc | 63

@62 Mooser
You might be referring to this–
President Reagan
Executive Order 12333, December 4, 1981
No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.

Posted by: Don Bacon | Apr 20 2013 2:39 utc | 65

A few days ago, 17 Apr 2013, Bashar Assad did an interview on Al-Ikhbariya Souria TV, a pro-government Syrian TV station. There was a question and answer that’s pertinent to what was talked about earlier in this thread:
Question: “Mr. President, frankly, we hear a lot in media and from foreign sources that there are ’liberated areas’, which means areas out of the State’s control, and we see the situation in Aleppo, Raqqa, Homs. Are there really areas out of the State’s control in Syria?”
President Assad: “Let’s begin with a contrast with the traditional military case where an external enemy militarily comes to occupy a piece of our land. The national forces attack this enemy, defend the nation and expel the enemy. In that traditional case, it’s unimportant if the expelled enemy has been eliminated or not; maybe the enemy departs intact, without being eliminated; what’s important is that we have retaken our land. But in today’s case [of internal insurrection] we are dealing with a totally different war, needing a different frame of mind. We are dealing with armed groups who enter our cities. Some of these are not Syrian and some are Syrian. They enter cities and neighborhoods and sabotage. In our military operations, initially, our armed forces would expel the terrorists from a place. Sometimes it would take only a few hours. However, we see those terrorists leaving the place, either fleeing or maneuvering, and going into another place. Which means you’re spending all the time liberating territory endlessly. To be precise about this point, we are now not liberating territory: we are eliminating terrorists. There is a big difference between the first and the second. If we do not eliminate the terrorists, there’s no meaning to liberating localities in Syria from terrorists. If we understand this point, we understand what’s going on the ground.”

Footnote: Bashar Assad, in continuance of his answer to the same question, continued: “There’s another side when the Armed Forces, or the State, makes military plans based on a number of criteria like the political and media importance of the area, humanitarian side, citizen’s suffering, the military side, military logistic details. The priority for us always, in the Armed Forces, is the humanitarian side, protecting the lives of the citizens, and lift the suffering in places where terrorists enter. Media and political side is not a high priority — maybe the terrorists get a benefit from that. It doesn’t matter. What matters is reality [not perception]. Sometimes our deprioritizing of the media aspect lets the enemy go drumming and tooting victories as propaganda. This doesn’t concern us. A matter of greater concern is that in the nature of the battle at times there is a mismatch or discord between the military and the humanitarian criteria, temporarily and partially in some areas. These are matters imposed by the battle. But for us, the main priority is the humanitarian side.”

Complete interview with English subtitles: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m6z3lhQ9fu0 . An English transcript with no punctuation: http://www.syrianews.cc/syrian-president-bashar-assad-interview-ikhbariya-news-channel

Posted by: Parviziyi | Apr 20 2013 17:46 utc | 67