There seems to be some recognition that the attack on Syria is failing:
France said on Thursday there were no signs that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is about to be overthrown, something Paris has been saying for months was just over the horizon.
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Fabius told RFI radio in December "the end is nearing" for Assad. But on Thursday, he said international mediation and discussions about the crisis that began in March 2011 were not getting anywhere. "There are no recent positive signs," he said.
This is definitely a change in the French governments mind. The attack on Mali may be the reason for that. The public can hardly be deceived about the fact that the Jihadists France is trying to fight in Mali are the same ilk that Bashar Assad is fighting against. There is only so much hypocrisy that can be covered up.
Peter Lee believes that the Saudis are the ones that are still lobbying against a negotiated solution:
The United States and its European allies, it appears, would welcome some kind of negotiated settlement as long as Western face is saved by Assad stepping down. Turkey, which is facing a growing Kurdish calamity and has probably had a bellyful of its Syrian adventurism, would probably agree. And, as noted above, Qatar has a post-Assad electoral agenda based on its M[uslim] B[rotherhood] assets.
However, Prince Saud has drawn the line in the sand, indicating that Saudi Arabia is optimistic about a scenario of total regime collapse—and a subsequent political endgame in which Saudi allies occupy a privileged and protected position in the new power structure instead of getting massacred by a tag team of threatened Sunni citizens and the newly “democratic” Syrian army.
I have a different read of the Saudi position.
Some Saudis have indeed yet to acknowledge their defeat:
A senior member of Saudi Arabia's monarchy called on Friday for Syrian rebels to be given anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons to "level the playing field" in their battle against President Bashar al-Assad.
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"I'm not in government so I don't have to be diplomatic. I assume we're sending weapons and if we were not sending weapons it would be terrible mistake on our part," said Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former intelligence chief and brother of Saudi Arabia's foreign minister.
Turki al-Faisal was ambassador to the U.S. but resigned after his predecessor, Bandar bin Sultan, visited the White House several times without Turki al-Faisal knowledge. Turki al-Faisal no longer has a political role in Saudi Arabia. But Bandar bin Sultan is now Secretary General of the National Security Council and Director General of the Saudi Intelligence Agency. Bandar bin Sultan planned and is running the Saudi part of the campaign against Syria. As Seymour Hersh reported back in 2007:
To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. […] The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.
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The key players behind the redirection are Vice-President Dick Cheney, the deputy national-security adviser Elliott Abrams, the departing Ambassador to Iraq (and nominee for United Nations Ambassador), Zalmay Khalilzad, and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi national-security adviser.
There is recently some news that the arms flow to Syrian insurgents has much diminished. They are on the verge of loosing their positions in Homs and the Damascus suburbs.
I take the public demand for more arms by Turki al-Faisal as criticism of a change in his rival's Bandar bin Sultan's policies towards Syria.
Bahsar Assad has the upper hand in Syria and is slowly regaining ground:
[T]he prospects of the ground battle are changing. There are new factors and military strategies. The army has learned from its mistakes. The army has gained more control over security breaches caused by corruption. Popular committees, which have been intensively training for two months, have been formed. An information and eavesdropping network has been installed (with great help from the Russians, which has surpassed all Western aid to the armed opposition). Self-protection measures in minority areas have been taken. It is said that the popular committees’ accomplishments have exceeded the army’s expectations.
Bashar Assad's now acknowledged survival has changed the Saudi policies towards him:
Behind-the-scenes contacts between Syria and Saudi Arabia have changed the relationship between them. Nothing major has come of these efforts, but they are a good start. The talks are not with the official Saudi authorities, but many inside the Saudi government hold a different opinion about interfering in Syria. Damascus is mostly resentful of Qatar, although Moallem often talks about Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Algerian, Iraqi, Lebanese and Egyptian officials have relayed genuine Syrian frustration about Qatar’s insistence on arming the opposition.
There is indeed, as Peter Lee describes, a deep split between Qatar's and Saudi Arabia's policies. While Qatar wants to install the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, a group the Saudis fear, Saudi Arabia had planned for conservative Sunni regime, headed by a strongman or – preferable – a king. And while the Saudis use Jihadis for their purpose in foreign policies they also fear them at home. As the situation has now developed in Syria a defeat of Assad would likely end in a significant role for the Jihadists and those would immediately threaten Jordan and the Saudi borders.
As Saudi Arabia recognizes the danger from the powers it unleashed it is looking for a way out. Keeping a – much diminished – Assad regime in place may well be preferable to a win for those powers, the MB or the Jihadists, who do not recognize and would fight against the Saudi princes legitimacy.
Hard proof for the change in the Saudi position is not yet in. But the situation has developed to a point where a win for the opposition would result in likely trouble for the Saudi state. My hunch is therefore that the Saudis will agree to a negotiated solution while the Qataris will likely be against anything that leaves the Muslim Brotherhood out of a governing position.
But Qatar may have overstretched its position. Supporting the Jihadists in Mali, as some in France allege it is doing, may bring an end of its freewheeling intervention policy by money and weapon support.