Last week the Syrian National Council elected a Christian, George Sabra, as its leader to somewhat disguise that it is still under control of the Muslim Brotherhood.
[T]he Brotherhood secured 23 seats out of 41 seats for the general secretariat of the Syrian National Council.
The new SNC leader called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict – not:
"We need only one thing to support our right to survive and to protect ourselves: We need weapons, we need weapons," Sabra told reporters after the vote.
Under pressure from the U.S., which wants a more compliant puppet than the SNC, and under advice from the Qatari paid Brookings Doha, the SNC then agreed to join with some other opposition groups that were hand selected by U.S. government.
This created a new monster, the "Syrian National Coalition for the Forces of the Opposition and the Revolution". While the SNC was at least disguising its sectarian stand the new SNCFOR is again lead by someone who will likely not be acceptable for the minorities:
The group’s new leader, Moaz al Khatib, who had served as the imam at the historic Umayyad mosque in Damascus until he left the Syrian capital in July. […] Khatib is said to have the support of municipal councils in rebel-held areas. He also has the backing of the Muslim Brotherhood.
(Would a Cardinal Ratzinger really be a good choice to lead a secular protestant Prussia?)
One difference between Sabra and Khatib is a noticeable change in their demands:
In his first remarks as head of the new organization, Khatib said Syrians “need humanitarian aid and to stop the bloodshed.” He avoided calling for arming the Syrian resistance.
That remark is consistent with the calls by the U.S. for a "political solution" in Syria. It would fit my hunch that the purpose of this new group is to allow for negotiations and for regime-led change in Syria.
But the new group smelled the rat:
Some of the last holdouts said they suspected that the agreement was a sly way for the international community to negotiate with Mr. Assad about a transition to a new government. So one clause in the agreement specifically bars such talks.
The agreement, translated to English here, that led to the creation of the new SNCFOR is quite interesting. It does not allow for any compromise:
- The invitation extended by the State of Qatar in coordination with the Arab League bore fruit when the Syrian National Council and the other opposition groups attending this meeting agreed to form the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Membership in the new body will be left open to all hues of the Syrian opposition. The Coalition’s Statutes shall make clear each side’s proportion of representation.
- The sides agreed to bring down the regime and all its symbols and mainstays, to disband the regime’s security services and to call to account those responsible for crimes against Syrians.
- The Coalition commits not to engage in any dialogue or negotiation with the regime.
- […]
If this coalition would actually get to power and would adhere to its point two, Syria would go through the same anarchic chaos as Iraq did after Paul Bremer abandoned the Baath party and all Iraqi security forces.
At least one independent opposition group in Syria has rejected the new coalition:
“We think that any brokers of opposition unity should be neutral. Right now international players are pulling the opposition apart by sponsoring certain groups over others."
The Kurdish minority as also not yet agreed to the new coalition.
It is also likely that this new coalition, like the SNC before it, will destroy itself in endless bickering. Its founding agreement leaves several important points open to further negotiations:
- The Coalition’s Statutes that will regulate each side’s proportion of representation. (1)
- The set up of technical and specialized committees required for its work, their number and the modalities of their establishment and duties. (7)
- An Interim Government to be formed only after receiving international recognition. (8)
With all the pressure and haggling that was needed to create the new coalition in the first place the process getting to the further more detailed agreements will likely very be ugly and take very long.
Additionally it is yet unknown if any of the insurgents groups who are fighting on the ground will follow the command or policies of the new body. That seems unlikely. Especially the Jihadi groups receive their weapons and money from Saudi and Qatari sources independently. Unless these sources dry up they will see no need to agree to any political leadership.
The end of the conflict depends on the United States and on Israel. Washington has the power to end the conflict simply by telling Turkey and Jordan to close their borders for to the insurgents and their logistic support. It can pressure Saudi Arabia and Qatar to end their support. But that is not yet in the U.S. and Israeli interest nor is their interest to intervene. As the former Israeli ambassador to the U.S. and negotiator with Syria Itamar Rabinovich sees it:
I don't think Israel pushes for intervention. The policy is very passive. When you don't have great choices, you don't really push hard for any of them. If Israel was told that Assad was going to be replaced by a liberal, Westward-looking government, you know, it would be quite happy. But this is not a very likely scenario. The more likely scenario is instability, maybe fragmentation, maybe chaos, maybe Islamist takeover -there are lots of negative possibilities here. So I would say it is ambivalent, with a slight preference to see him go than to see him stay.
I do believe that Israel's real preference is different. To avoid uncertainty it would like Assad to stay, but it wants, which it cannot say publicly, a much weaker Syrian state that will then no longer be able to resist to Israeli pressure.
As written here earlier:
Destruction of the infrastructure, economy and social fabric of Syria is [the insurgents] and their supporters aim.
The leading men on the ground now recognize this:
"When the revolutionaries get stronger, and start to best the government, the international community stops weapons being sent.
"Then when the revolutionaries become weak, more support arrives. When you look at what's happened, at the support starting and stopping, you realise it is arranged so as to leave Syria in chaos, rather than to bring about change."
A some point Israel and the U.S. may fear that more destruction would lead to too much chaos. At that point they may stop their support for the insurgency. let it die on the battlefield and negotiate with Assad.