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Erdogan’s Gets War Powers
Update (11:30am)
The neocon Israel mouthpiece and supporter of the Syrian insurgents Michael Weiss just tweeted this:
Important to note: Turkish bill for authorizing force deployment was dated September 20. Erdogan knew trouble lay ahead.
The FSA insurgents captured the border crossing point Tal Abyad right next to the town Akçakale on September 19 to build a supply line for their attack on the city of al-Raqqa. A day later Erdogan prepares a bill giving him war powers. This certainly increases the suspicion that this was a false flag attack with the purpose of getting Erdogan war powers.
/end update/
Turkey, led by its premier Erdogan, fell into a trap. Other countries applauded the insurgency in Syria and provided weapons and money to it. Erdogan joint them and delivered himself much support. But when the insurgency did not provide the expected immediate success no other country agreed to help Turkey with regular outside forces to overthrow the Syrian government. Meanwhile Turkey's economy got damaged, the influx of over 100,000 refugees brought increasing problems and the resurgence of the PKK in Turkey led to several spectacular attacks. The Turkish public continues to be against Erdogan's interventionist policy in Syria.
Before yesterday's mortar attack on the Turkish border village Akçakale Russia had warned of such a false flag incident:
Both Syrian and Turkish authorities “should exercise maximum restraint” since radical members of the Syrian opposition might deliberately provoke cross-border conflicts for their own benefits, Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov said yesterday. The diplomat said Moscow has been worrying about the situation on the Syria-Turkey border.
Just a day later such a conflict happened. Someone launched mortars from Syrian territory onto Akçakale and killed five people in Turkey. Turkey responded with heavy artillery fire against Syrian Arab Army positions.
Did the Russians knew what a false flag attack was in the making? As even the NYT remarked:
It was unclear if the mortar that struck Turkey was fired by government forces or by rebels fighting to oust the government of Mr. Assad
Still the Turkish government waxed about a violation of its sovereignty by the Syrian government. Just a few days ago Iraq had called on Turkey to leave the bases it has in northern Iraq since the 1990s. Turkey rejected that call. That and Turkish support for the insurgents in Syria tells you all you need to know about how Turkey really feels about sovereignty.
Not being able to pull others into the conflict which the insurgents lack the manpower to see through and not willing to risk the loss of face a climb down from his position would entail Erdogan has chosen to escalate.
With a 320 to 129 vote the Turkish parliament just adopted a motion that gives war powers to the Turkish government. The core text:
This situation has reached a stage that poses serious threats and risks to our national security. Therefore, the need has developed to act rapidly and to take the necessary precautions against additional risks and threats that may be directed against our country. Within this framework, on the condition that the extent, amount, and time will be appreciated and determined by the government, I submit according to Article 92 of the Constitution a one-year-long permission to make the necessary arrangements for sending the Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and having it [TSK] mandated, according to the principle causes that will be designated by the government.
An opposition member in the parliament called this a license for a bigger war:
"This motion has no limits," İnce said. "You can wage a world war with [the motion]."
Indeed one wonders what the plural in "foreign countries" and "principle causes" mean. Will Erdogan order the invasion of Armenia?
One also has to wonder how the Turkish military would perform in an all out war. Over 300 Turkish officers are in jail, including 71 former and active generals, for allegedly planing a coup. More are likely to be indicted. What Turkish officer will show any initiative when any act without an explicit written order may put him in danger of getting hauled in front of a court?
And how will the proverbial Arab street react when Turkey with openly neo-ottoman ambitions invades an Arab country?
War powers or not. In the end the big loser in this conflict might well be Erdogan himself.
Erdogan seems to of created a situation where a constitutional coup in which he essentially becomes an absolute dictator is the only way that the AKP & the forces now tied to them will retain power.
He has engendered an enormous level of alienation with large sections of his own population, completely alienated his immediate neighbors & many of Turkey’s major trading partners, & put himself completely in the camp of outside cultural forces that are despised by the majority of the Turkish people – the bizarre blend of Wahhabi influenced extreme Islamism & extreme neoliberalism that has hijacked much of the ‘Arab Spring’.
Much of what he has done over the last few years now stands in sharp relief – the persecution & jailing of independant media voices, the decapitation of the army leadership, the attacks against the judiciary, the aggressive lobbying to change the constitution, & the continued concentration of power to those in his inner circle or directly into his hands, while sidelining possible rivals.
The backbone of the AKP, the small & large business classes along with the working class are being hit very hard over the AKP foreign policy, and the major trading partners onboard with Turkey’s new foreign policy are now reduced to the EU & the Gulf states, with much of the EU only likely to go so far.
The Alevis, Kurds & many of the border peoples are likely completely unrecoverable for the AKP, & are now moving into a situation where their level of alienation brings into question their relationship as part of the Turkish state as a whole.
The enormous popular mandate that he had going into his ‘final’ term was very much based on the rising economy which had given genuinely broad economic improvement to the majority, & the greatly improved sense of security for the ordinary citizen that the policy based from the “zero problems with neighbours” formulation seemed to epitomise.
This is now firmly in the garbage heap.
What remains is the gamble is that Erdogan can maintain enough of a popular mandate to consolidate the powers he needs in order to crush any potential challenges or uprisings, while keeping the economy going.
The gamble seems based on a number of premises:-
For the economy:
– that enough long term deals have been signed with major trading partners in the ‘no problems’ era, particularly with Russia & China, that they will accept the new formulation without a major change in relations;
– that Turkey’s position as a stable trade corridor developed in the ‘no problems’ era is strong enough that the other powers & their attendant businesses will continue to maintain & look to grow their investments into Turkish trade infrastructure, and continue to patronise Turkish businesses in doing so.
– that enough diplomatic capital has been gained that they can still position themselves as an arbitrator & voice in Middle Eastern & Central Asian to maintain & expand Turkey’s interest;
– that Iran needs them too much for it to effect trade;
– that enough Gulf & Western capital will be forthcoming that they can paper over cracks, and utilise it to make up for lost business in Syria, tourism & trade losses, etc.
– that this influx of capital will be productive in the wider economy, & that the Turkish economy will be strong enough that this will not effectively result in overbearing debt, foreign capture of business assets, etc.
– that unemployment & inflation will not rise dramatically for an extended period of time.
This gamble seems to completely discount the major reasons for Turkish growth over the last decade – stability, & a relatively transparent investment framework removed from political overtones – which look to be headed for extinction.
It also completely overlooks the large-scale growth in other trade route infrastructure happening in Iran, Pakistan, & across Central Asia, as well as the strong interest in the opening of Egyptian trade routes to Chinese development. If Turkey is no longer a bastion of stability, it’s advantages dissappear, with political alliances & long-term interests coming much more into play.
The security gamble is even more extreme:
– that the military will be cowed & simply forced by circumstances into enforcing Erdogan’s dictates;
– that the massive influx of Salafi extremists into Turkish staging areas will continue to go across the border, & not become a major security threat to the Turkish people;
– that their ideology & methods will not spread to local groups;
– that the open support, funding & training of seperatists & extremists by the Turkish state will not rebound as others take up the same methods against Turkey.
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The closest to Erdogan’s current position in recent history is Saddam Hussein just prior to the invasion of Iran – a very successful, rising economy, & an extremely ambitious political leader with a broad popular mandate, looking to capitalize on a chaotic situation in a neighboring country with the help of the exact same foreign powers currently backing Erdogan.
Hussein opened with a full-scale military invasion funded mostly by outside sources, eventually leading to Iraq, Hussein & his inner circle ultimately being destroyed in the same manner.
Erdogan has started with the open use of subversion, seperatism, proxy forces, & limited direct military support, and there is a good chance that this ends in a similar fashion for both Turkey & Erdogan.
Posted by: KenM | Oct 4 2012 18:59 utc | 19
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