The U.S. and the UK's plan for Syria has been revealed:
Part of the "preferred plan" reads: "In order to facilitate the action of liberative forces, reduce the capabilities of the Syrian regime to organise and direct its military actions, to hold losses and destruction to a minimum, and to bring about desired results in the shortest possible time, a special effort should be made to eliminate certain key individuals. Their removal should be accomplished early in the course of the uprising and intervention and in the light of circumstances existing at the time."
Just like in that plan a deliberate killing campaign against persons of values for the Syrian state is ongoing. Besides the high profile bombing of the security center in Damascus there is a campaign to kill doctors, professors, media people and high ranking administrators. These assassinations are usually not reported in the "western" media.
The "preferred plan"adds: "Once a political decision is reached to proceed with internal disturbances in Syria, CIA is prepared, and MI6 will attempt, to mount minor sabotage and coup de main incidents within Syria, working through contacts with individuals.
"The two services should consult, as appropriate, to avoid any overlapping or interference with each other's activities… Incidents should not be concentrated in Damascus; the operation should not be overdone; and to the extent possible care should be taken to avoid causing key leaders of the Syrian regime to take additional personal protection measures."
…
The plan called for funding of a "Free Syria Committee", and the arming of "political factions with paramilitary or other actionist capabilities" within Syria. The CIA and MI6 would instigate internal uprisings, for instance by the Druze in the south, help to free political prisoners held in the Mezze prison, and stir up the Muslim Brotherhood in Damascus.
That "preferred plan for Syria" was from 1957 and was not enacted at that time. But we see that the methods mentioned in it are just the same than the ones used today.
But there are two important difference from the old plan to the recent one. The first one is the extensive use of foreign mercenary fighters. Reports of their existence were downplayed by the media. At least a year after their first occurrence in Syria Reuters only now has an "exclusive" about Libyan fighters in Syria.
Those foreigner fighters are mostly responsible for those gruesome killing of "suspicious" Syrians by beheading them or throwing them off buildings.
These fighters can not win their war against the Syrian government but that is not important as it isn't their real purpose. Therein lies the second and more important difference between the plans of 1957 and the plans of today. The aim in 1957 was to replace the Syrian government with a new "friendly" one. While that would still be a convenient outcome today it is no longer a necessity.
The US, Israel and the Gulf countries who pay, train and command the foreign fighters today have a different objective. They want the current war in Syria, which they see as just an aspect of their war on Iran, to continue as long as possible:
The much more unpleasant strategic reality is that, whether foreign forces intervene or not, the U.S. receives little reward from hastening Assad’s downfall. An embattled Assad imposes just the same limitations on Syrian and Iranian threats to U.S. interests. Resources will have to be diverted from the proxies Iran supports through Syria to Syria itself as Iran tries to maintain its host’s viability. The loss of Assad’s regime would mean a rapid retrenchment in Iranian support, for sure, but this would likely be replaced by a proxy campaign against Syria’s new government and its foreign backers, or a redeployment of IRGC/QF assets to other theaters, probably against the U.S (if not both). Given that rapidly overthrowing Assad without major overt military action from a broad coalition of forces is a pipe dream anyway, the United States should consider contingency plans in which it works through, rather than against, the specter of protracted civil war. To be able to bleed Iran in Syria would, relative to the risks involved, be a far more significant strategic opportunity against Iranian power relative to the investment and risk than would be a major overt campaign to overthrow Assad outright. The more blood and treasure Iran loses in Syria – even if Assad stays in power longer – the weaker Iran will be.
Only with that strategy in mind can one understand why the CIA is blocking weapons from reaching the insurgents:
"Not one bullet enters Syria without US approval,” one official claimed in Istanbul. “The Americans want the [rebellion] to continue, but they are not allowing enough supplies in to make the Damascus regime fall.
…
Over the past 10 months, a Syrian opposition official told The Sunday Times, the CIA has blocked shipments of heavy anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, which rebel units of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) have long described as vital to their efforts to overthrow President Bashar al-Assad’s regime.
Even the sanctions against Syria seem designed to hinder the opposition.
While keeping Syria in chaos and thereby weaken it is the preference for the U.S. and Israel, a prolonged fight in their neighbor country is a danger for Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. It is there where the strategy of a prolonged fight in Syria might fail due to internal unrest and other spill over effects.
The Turkish government, knowing well that a prolonged conflict will bring more PKK attacks and more refugees and wounded fighters, has been urging for more outright intervention and is again holding drills next to the Syrian border.
Erdogan and his sidekick Davutoğlu need the war to end before it erodes their political positions. But when Hillery Clinton visited Turkey last week, she did not offer the backing for an intervention but only agreed to a working group for planning further action against Syria. That is code for "let's sit down and do nothing". Today Defense Secretary Panetta said that a no-fly zone is not on the front burner.
While the U.S. does not risk anything by keeping the war on Syria boiling its allies in the region do feel the heat of the cooking fire. Their internal problems are the weak points of the current "preferred plan". It is there where any strategy against the plan must push for effect.