To prevent criticism of its operation in Afghanistan the western ISAF military is eager to one side suppress negative news and on the other to put a false gloss on figures that demonstrate alleged progress. Here are examples for each category. First the minor issue.

The Associated Press just found that ISAF underreported the numbers of green on blue incidents in which members of Afghan security forces attack ISAF troops. Only those incidents in which ISAF troops died and the number of those died were reported. If additional people were wounded in such an incident those numbers were not disclosed. Incidents in which no ISAF troops died but some were only wounded or which resulted in no casualties were not reported at all:

Jamie Graybeal, an ISAF spokesman in Kabul, disclosed Monday in response to repeated AP requests that in addition to 10 fatal insider attacks so far this year, there have been two others that resulted in no deaths or injuries, plus one attack that resulted in wounded, for a total of 13 attacks. The three non-fatal attacks had not previously been reported.

Graybeal also disclosed that in most of the 10 fatal attacks a number of other ISAF troops were wounded.

Thirteen attacks in four month, one in every ten days, seems remarkable to me and consistent with an opposing force strategy. But even in the quoted AP report ISAF still continues to call each attack an "isolated incident".

Now onto a more serious case. Every six month the U.S. Department of Defense has to deliver a Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. This so called 1230 congressional demanded report gives numbers on Afghan security forces strengths and capabilities.

A while ago Dan in Kabul pointed out that there is some fudging going on with the reported capabilities of Afghan forces. In the April 2011 report (pdf) the Executive Summary said (pg 3):

By the end of the reporting period, 75 percent of ANP units in key terrain districts were rated as either “Effective with Advisors” or “Effective with Assistance,” although none were yet rated as independent.

It explained how units are rated (pg 37):

"Independent" denotes a unit that is capable of the full spectrum of its missions without assistance from Coalition Forces. “Effective with Advisors” means that the partnered coalition unit does not exceed a limited guidance role. Units that are “Effective with Assistance” are those that are capable of executing operations and providing regional security with varied partnered unit assistance. …

In the October 2011 report (pdf) the Executive Summary notes (pg 4):

Force growth and professionalization efforts are translating into a more capable and effective ANSF. ANA effectiveness improved, as the number of units rated “Effective with Assistance” or better rose from 52 percent of units in September 2010 to 72 percent of units in September 2011.

Here the fudging is in setting the comparison date. The number of units rated “Effective with Assistance” or better in the April 2011 report was 73.7% and in the Executive Summary of that report boosted as 75%. That number decreased to 72.0 % in the October 2011 report. By comparing the September 2011 number with the September 2010 number and thereby skipping the latest report of April 2011 the October 2011 assessment showed progress where none was made.

There was also, as Dan pointed out, some fudging in that those units that were rated higher were almost all headquarter units. The number of actual fighting battalions, or kandaks, that were rated "Effective with Assistance" or better actually decreased from 116 in April 2011 to 115 in October 2011.

But not everything was bad. By October 2011 one of those kandaks had achieved the highest status of "Independent" while no unit had achieved that in April 2011. That was until one read further down (pg 42):

Prior to the spring campaign, IJC reviewed the definition of an Independent unit and concluded that the definition was too restrictive and would be difficult for any ANSF element to attain. As a result, IJC rewrote the definition of an Independent unit to reflect the reality that most ANSF force enablers will likely require long-term coalition assistance.

Fast forward to the just published April 2012 report (pdf). There the Executive Summary boosts (pg 2):

As of September 2011, no ANP unit, and only one ANA kandak had been rated as “Independent with Advisors.” As of the end of the current reporting period, 13 ANA kandaks and 39 ANP units had achieved this rating. These ratings are regularly substantiated by the field performance of the ANSF, which continues to exceed expectations.

That sounds like great sudden progress. How come?

The secret sauce for this progress can be found in a paragraph deeper into the report (pg 37):

Prior to January 31, 2012, the Validation Transition Team (VTT) was tasked by IJC with validating any unit that received a CUAT rating of “Independent with Advisors” by the Regional Commands. The IJC procedure was to not report a unit assessed by the RCs as “Independent with Advisors” until the VTT could validate the rating. Instead, units would remain rated at the “Effective with Advisors” level until the validation was complete. However, after January 31, 2012, the requirement for outside validation for newly reported “Independent with Advisors” units was eliminated, which has resulted in the recent increase in “Independent with Advisors” units. The new process places greater emphasis on the ratings from the units partnered with the ANSF, who have first-hand knowledge of the unit’s performance. In the future, there will continue to be increases in the number of independent units, although this is expected to be at a more gradual rate.

Before February 2012 the real quality of the "independent" ANA troops was evaluated by an special independent evaluation unit. Now the quality of ANA troops is evaluated by those U.S. units that directly partner with these troops.

Those units and their commanders do of course have a huge incentive to report "success" of their tour in Afghanistan. The evaluation of their unit and their commander's chance for promotion depend on it. They therefore upgrade the ANA unit they partner with no matter what it real progress is.

In April 2011 their were zero Afghan security force units capable of independent action. In April 2012 there are still zero Afghan force units capable of real independent action. But the number of units that were reported as "independent" increased from zero to one to fifty two because first the definition of "independent" was changed and then because the evaluation was turned over from an independent evaluation entity to those entities that have direct self interest in reporting such progress.

Anyone who only reads the Executive Summaries of those 1230 reports will see great progress in developing Afghan security forces while a detailed reading shows that none has been made. Likewise anyone who believes ISAF reports about the number of security incidents and the number of casualties without further questioning is in for bad surprises.

One again has to ask how can the sovereign of the countries that send troops to Afghanistan, the people of these countries, make informed decisions about the deployments there when the military commanders, without any challenge and consequences, consistently misreport and misrepresent the real situation there?