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Recent Events In Afghanistan
An outline of the recent events in Afghanistan:
- Some U.S. officer, an idiot and/or evangelical nut, ordered a truckload of Qur'ans and other religious writings to be burned
- Some locals saw that and intervened, risking their health and their jobs to save their holy scriptures
- The event went public and was the catalyst for wide raging protests against the occupation forces over several days all over Afghanistan
- The outrage also triggered two green on blue events in which U.S. troops were killed by Afghan security personal
- One of these events was by a Tajik, not a Pashtun Taliban, against two U.S. officers within a high security environment
- This led to the shut down of all mentoring wherein western forces embed with Afghan forces to teach them how we do stuff in our, not their, culture
- The original plan to leave from the lost war in Afghanistan was to train a fig leaf of Afghan security and administrative structure before declaring victory and leaving through the backdoor
- The military also planned to keep forces in Afghanistan for continued U.S. control of the wider strategic area
- Without the mentoring those plans are mute – without it there is only one option – leave immediately in an orderly, planned way
- The U.S. election process does not allow for such an immediate retreat
- For lack of political feasible alternative the mentoring fig leaf plan will be reinstated
- Another trigger event like the Qur'an burning is inevitable
- A now still possible orderly retreat may then turn into a route where every leaving truck will come under fire by this or that incensed Afghan
As Kipling versed in The Young Britush Soldier
When you're wounded and left on Afghanistan's plains,
And the women come out to cut up what remains,
Jest roll to your rifle and blow out your brains
An' go to your Gawd like a soldier.
b, you can always delete this post if you decide it’s too long – but please take into account your post #19 and my answer #37
so that anyone can judge for himself if Stratfor fed useless info to its readers, or if at least some analysis were worthwhile reading, here’s an article by George Friedman, Jun2 29, 2009, on the Iranian elections
and just remember how at the time the MSM worldwide was intent in demonizing the “dictator” Ahmadinejad, just as these days it’s doing with Assad
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THE REAL STRUGGLE IN IRAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DIALOGUE
By George Friedman
Speaking of the situation in Iran, U.S. President Barack Obama said June 26, “We don’t yet
know how any potential dialogue will have been affected until we see what has happened
inside of Iran.” On the surface that is a strange statement, since we know that with minor
exceptions, the demonstrations in Tehran lost steam after Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei called for them to end and security forces asserted themselves. By the
conventional wisdom, events in Iran represent an oppressive regime crushing a popular
rising. If so, it is odd that the U.S. president would raise the question of what has
happened in Iran.
In reality, Obama’s point is well taken. This is because the real struggle in Iran has not
yet been settled, nor was it ever about the liberalization of the regime. Rather, it has
been about the role of the clergy — particularly the old-guard clergy — in Iranian life,
and the future of particular personalities among this clergy.
Ahmadinejad Against the Clerical Elite
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ran his re-election campaign against the old
clerical elite, charging them with corruption, luxurious living and running the state for
their own benefit rather than that of the people. He particularly targeted Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, an extremely senior leader, and his family. Indeed, during the
demonstrations, Rafsanjani’s daughter and four other relatives were arrested, held and
then released a day later.
Rafsanjani represents the class of clergy that came to power in 1979. He served as
president from 1989-1997, but Ahmadinejad defeated him in 2005. Rafsanjani carries
enormous clout within the system as head of the regime’s two most powerful institutions —
the Expediency Council, which arbitrates between the Guardian Council and parliament, and
the Assembly of Experts, whose powers include oversight of the supreme leader. Forbes has
called him one of the wealthiest men in the world. Rafsanjani, in other words, remains at
the heart of the post-1979 Iranian establishment.
Ahmadinejad expressly ran his recent presidential campaign against Rafsanjani, using the
latter’s family’s vast wealth to discredit Rafsanjani along with many of the senior
clerics who dominate the Iranian political scene. It was not the regime as such that he
opposed, but the individuals who currently dominate it. Ahmadinejad wants to retain the
regime, but he wants to repopulate the leadership councils with clerics who share his
populist values and want to revive the ascetic foundations of the regime. The Iranian
president constantly contrasts his own modest lifestyle with the opulence of the current
religious leadership.
Recognizing the threat Ahmadinejad represented to him personally and to the clerical class
he belongs to, Rafsanjani fired back at Ahmadinejad, accusing him of having wrecked the
economy. At his side were other powerful members of the regime, including Majlis Speaker
Ali Larijani, who has made no secret of his antipathy toward Ahmadinejad and whose family
links to the Shiite holy city of Qom give him substantial leverage. The underlying issue
was about the kind of people who ought to be leading the clerical establishment. The
battlefield was economic: Ahmadinejad’s charges of financial corruption versus charges of
economic mismanagement leveled by Rafsanjani and others.
When Ahmadinejad defeated Mir Hossein Mousavi on the night of the election, the clerical
elite saw themselves in serious danger. The margin of victory Ahmadinejad claimed might
have given him the political clout to challenge their position. Mousavi immediately
claimed fraud, and Rafsanjani backed him up. Whatever the motives of those in the streets,
the real action was a knife fight between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani. By the end of the
week, Khamenei decided to end the situation. In essence, he tried to hold things together
by ordering the demonstrations to halt while throwing a bone to Rafsanjani and Mousavi by
extending a probe into the election irregularities and postponing a partial recount by
five days.
The Struggle Within the Regime
The key to understanding the situation in Iran is realizing that the past weeks have seen
not an uprising against the regime, but a struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad is not
part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of
having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution. The post-election unrest in Iran
therefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as in Prague in
1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are each committed to the regime,
but opposed to each other.
The demonstrators certainly included Western-style liberalizing elements, but they also
included adherents of senior clerics who wanted to block Ahmadinejad’s re-election. And
while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly committed electoral fraud to bulk up his numbers, his
ability to commit unlimited fraud was blocked, because very powerful people looking for a
chance to bring him down were arrayed against him.
The situation is even more complex because it is not simply a fight between Ahmadinejad
and the clerics, but also a fight among the clerical elite regarding perks and privileges
— and Ahmadinejad is himself being used within this infighting. The Iranian president’s
populism suits the interests of clerics who oppose Rafsanjani; Ahmadinejad is their
battering ram. But as Ahmadinejad increases his power, he could turn on his patrons very
quickly. In short, the political situation in Iran is extremely volatile, just not for the
reason that the media portrayed.
Rafsanjani is an extraordinarily powerful figure in the establishment who clearly sees
Ahmadinejad and his faction as a mortal threat. Ahmadinejad’s ability to survive the
unified opposition of the clergy, election or not, is not at all certain. But the problem
is that there is no unified clergy. The supreme leader is clearly trying to find a new
political balance while making it clear that public unrest will not be tolerated. Removing
“public unrest” (i.e., demonstrations) from the tool kits of both sides may take away one
of Rafsanjani’s more effective tools. But ultimately, it actually could benefit him.
Should the internal politics move against the Iranian president, it would be Ahmadinejad
— who has a substantial public following — who would not be able to have his supporters
take to the streets.
The View From the West
The question for the rest of the world is simple: Does it matter who wins this fight? We
would argue that the policy differences between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani are minimal and
probably would not affect Iran’s foreign relations. This fight simply isn’t about foreign
policy.
Rafsanjani has frequently been held up in the West as a pragmatist who opposes
Ahmadinejad’s radicalism. Rafsanjani certainly opposes Ahmadinejad and is happy to portray
the Iranian president as harmful to Iran, but it is hard to imagine significant shifts in
foreign policy if Rafsanjani’s faction came out on top. Khamenei has approved Iran’s
foreign policy under Ahmadinejad, and Khamenei works to maintain broad consensus on
policies. Ahmadinejad’s policies were vetted by Khamenei and the system that Rafsanjani is
part of. It is possible that Rafsanjani secretly harbors different views, but if he does,
anyone predicting what these might be is guessing.
Rafsanjani is a pragmatist in the sense that he systematically has accumulated power and
wealth. He seems concerned about the Iranian economy, which is reasonable because he owns
a lot of it. Ahmadinejad’s entire charge against him is that Rafsanjani is only interested
in his own economic well-being. These political charges notwithstanding, Rafsanjani was
part of the 1979 revolution, as were Ahmadinejad and the rest of the political and
clerical elite. It would be a massive mistake to think that any leadership elements have
abandoned those principles.
When the West looks at Iran, two concerns are expressed. The first relates to the Iranian
nuclear program, and the second relates to Iran’s support for terrorists, particularly
Hezbollah. Neither Iranian faction is liable to abandon either, because both make
geopolitical sense for Iran and give it regional leverage.
Tehran’s primary concern is regime survival, and this has two elements. The first is
deterring an attack on Iran, while the second is extending Iran’s reach so that such an
attack could be countered. There are U.S. troops on both sides of the Islamic Republic,
and the United States has expressed hostility to the regime. The Iranians are envisioning
a worst-case scenario, assuming the worst possible U.S. intentions, and this will remain
true no matter who runs the government.
We do not believe that Iran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon, a point we have made
frequently. Iran understands that the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would lead to
immediate U.S. or Israeli attacks. Accordingly, Iran’s ideal position is to be seen as
developing nuclear weapons, but not close to having them. This gives Tehran a platform for
bargaining without triggering Iran’s destruction, a task at which it has proved
sure-footed.
In addition, Iran has maintained capabilities in Iraq and Lebanon. Should the United
States or Israel attack, Iran would thus be able to counter by doing everything possible
destabilize Iraq — bogging down U.S. forces there — while simultaneously using
Hezbollah’s global reach to carry out terror attacks. After all, Hezbollah is today’s al
Qaeda on steroids. The radical Shiite group’s ability, coupled with that of Iranian
intelligence, is substantial.
We see no likelihood that any Iranian government would abandon this two-pronged strategy
without substantial guarantees and concessions from the West. Those would have to include
guarantees of noninterference in Iranian affairs. Obama, of course, has been aware of this
bedrock condition, which is why he went out of his way before the election to assure
Khamenei in a letter that the United States had no intention of interfering.
Though Iran did not hesitate to lash out at CNN’s coverage of the protests, the Iranians
know that the U.S. government doesn’t control CNN’s coverage. But Tehran takes a slightly
different view of the BBC. The Iranians saw the depiction of the demonstrations as a
democratic uprising against a repressive regime as a deliberate attempt by British
state-run media to inflame the situation. This allowed the Iranians to vigorously blame
some foreigner for the unrest without making the United States the primary villain.
But these minor atmospherics aside, we would make three points. First, there was no
democratic uprising of any significance in Iran. Second, there is a major political crisis
within the Iranian political elite, the outcome of which probably tilts toward Ahmadinejad
but remains uncertain. Third, there will be no change in the substance of Iran’s foreign
policy, regardless of the outcome of this fight. The fantasy of a democratic revolution
overthrowing the Islamic Republic — and thus solving everyone’s foreign policy problems a
la the 1991 Soviet collapse — has passed.
That means that Obama, as the primary player in Iranian foreign affairs, must now define
an Iran policy — particularly given Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s meeting in
Washington with U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell this Monday. Obama has said that
nothing that has happened in Iran makes dialogue impossible, but opening dialogue is
easier said than done. The Republicans consistently have opposed an opening to Iran; now
they are joined by Democrats, who oppose dialogue with nations they regard as human rights
violators. Obama still has room for maneuver, but it is not clear where he thinks he is
maneuvering. The Iranians have consistently rejected dialogue if it involves any
preconditions. But given the events of the past weeks, and the perceptions about them that
have now been locked into the public mind, Obama isn’t going to be able to make many
concessions.
It would appear to us that in this, as in many other things, Obama will be following the
Bush strategy — namely, criticizing Iran without actually doing anything about it. And so
he goes to Moscow more aware than ever that Russia could cause the United States a great
deal of pain if it proceeded with weapons transfers to Iran, a country locked in a
political crisis and unlikely to emerge from it in a pleasant state of mind.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to
http://www.stratfor.com.
Posted by: claudio | Feb 29 2012 19:34 utc | 45
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