The Two Weak Pillars Of The IAEA's Case Against Iran
The annex of the recent IAEA report on Iran claims that Iran up to 2003 had an active nuclear weapon program and, based on a few hints also claims that such a program "MAY" have continued after 2003. (Only 4 out of 65 paragraphs in the annex point to some post-2003 work).
The IAEA accusations about the alleged pre-2003 work relies on two major pillars of "evidence" plus some "corroborating" information from open and dubious secret sources. The report is based on "1,000 pages of research" claims the IAEA, pretending that volume can make up for quality.
The first pillar of evidence are issues related to the work of the Ukrainian scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko in Iran. The second pillar is a set of papers in electronic form known as the "alleged studies" which were collected on the "Laptop of Death" and which some secret "western" agency years ago pushed onto the IAEA. It is from a combination of selected parts of those two sets of alleged "evidence" and some additional hearsay, annectodes and innuendo that the IAEA report draws its conclusions.
My analysis of the work of Ukrainian scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko showed that his known expertise is the production of nanodiamonds through detonations and not nuclear weapon production. Danilenko's work is about precise explosions that push a concentrated detonation wave onto carbon atoms which then, under maximum pressure, form into small diamond crystals. These are useful in many industrial fields for example for high quality polishing of optics and computer harddisk surfaces.
I also demonstrated that Iran has a very active nanotechnology program and that its scientist have published various papers about their progress in this field. Danilenko himself categorically denies to have worked on anything other than civil applications of his knowledge with Iran. While some of the technolgies used in creating nanodiamonds can also be used in application towards nuclear weapons the IAEA report shows no proof that Iran has done this. That someone uses a screwdriver to fix a car does not provide that s/he plans to stab the neighbor.
This now has some officials in a twist and they race to reclaim the lost believability of the IAEA allegations by throwing more chaff around:
[D]iplomats — who asked for anonymity because their information was privileged — said Danilenko's son-in-law has further implicated the scientist, telling the agency the expert also helped Iran build a related project, a large steel chamber to contain the force of the blast set off by such explosives testing.Diplomats first told the AP last week that the IAEA had evidence of such a chamber, set up at Iran's Parchin military complex. The confidential IAEA report obtained by the AP on Wednesday confirmed their statements.
Of course did Danilenko help Iran to build an explosion chamber. He has a patent [USSR Patent No. SU
181329 A3, Priority May 12 (1991)] for these and has build one for his son-in-law's company Elit which has a picture of it on its website. He himself does not talk about it. Likely because he has the usual confidentiality/non-disclosure clause in his contracts with Iran like all consultants all over the world have in theirs. But the building of an detonation chamber does not prove anything nefarious. Indeed one needs such a chamber if one wants to create nanodiamonds. There is nothing in the IAEA report that proves that the chamber has been used for anything related to nuclear work.
These anonymous diplomats (American? Israeli?) also come up with another "new" "conspicuous" issue. Notice the innuendo that is involved here:
The diplomats said some of those at the meeting also expressed their concerns about indications that nearly 20 kilograms — about 45 pounds — of a component used to arm nuclear warheads was unaccounted for in Iran.The IAEA has long known that Iran has drawings of how to form uranium metal into the fissile core of warheads. But the diplomats pointed to an inconspicuous section of Wednesday's report — near the end, under "Other Matters" — revealing that an IAEA inspection in August came up 19.8 kilograms, or 43.56 pounds, short of what Iran says it had stored.
See how "fissile core of warheads" is put next to a few kilograms of allegedly missing unidentified stuff implying that this stuff has made it into such a warhead. A simple look into the IAEA report (page 9) tells us that this stuff is nothing usable:
In August 2011, the Agency carried out a PIV at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Research Laboratory (JHL) to verify, inter alia, nuclear material, in the form of natural uranium metal and process waste, related to the conversion experiments carried out by Iran between 1995 and 2002. The Agency’s measurement of this material was 19.8 kg less than the operator’s declaration of 270.7 kg. In a letter dated 2 November 2011, Iran provided additional information on this matter. The Agency is working with Iran to try to resolve this discrepancy.
So there is a 7% discrepancy in weighting the stored WASTE and natural, not-enriched Uranium from quite old experiments. Are we to believe that Iran can now make a "fissile core for warheads" from old process waste? Or is it more likely that this one of the simple discrepancies of byproduct measurement that seem to occur in every second IAEA report and is usually explained in the following one?
Onto the second pillar of the IAEA "evidence".
The 2005 "laptop of death" "alleged studies" documents focus on three areas: the so-called "green salt project" to provide a source of uranium, high-explosives testing and re-engineering a Shahab-3 missile load chamber to fit a nuclear warhead. One wonders how papers, reportatly wrtiten in English, from three very distinct technical fields have made it onto one laptop which then miraculously ended up in the hands of the "western" secret service that provided it to the IAEA.
Robert Kelley is an American nuclear engineer and former IAEA inspector who now works on non-proliferation at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). As an IAEA inspector he personally reviewed the "alleged studies" papers when those handed to the IAEA and he does not believe that they are reliable evidence:
"The first is the issue of forgeries. There is nothing to tell that those documents are real," says Kelley, whose experience includes inspections from as far afield as Iraq and Libya, to South Africa in 1993."My sense when I went through the documents years ago was that there was possibly a lot of stuff in there that was genuine, [though] it was kind of junk," says Kelly. "And there were a few rather high-quality things" like the green salt document: "That was two or three pages that wasn't related to anything else in the package, it was on a different topic, and you just wondered, was this salted in there for someone to find?"
It would not be the first time that data was planted. He recalls 1993 and 1994, when the IAEA received "very complex forgeries" on Iraq that slowed down nuclear investigations there by a couple of years.
So we have Danilenko's work, the first set of the IAEA's "evidence", precise detonations, hemispherical formed sets of explosives and a detonation chamber, all of which is plausibly explained through his cooperation with Iran's work on nanodiamonds. While these technologies could eventually also be used in nuclear weapon research there is nothing in the IAEA report annex that proves that Iran has actually applied them towards anything nuclear.
We also have some stuff from the "laptop of death" which Robert Kelley regards as possible forgeries and planted evidence. Kelley as well as Shannon Kile, head of the Nuclear Weapons Project at SIPRI are unconvinced that all the above adds up to a clear case against Iran:
"Yes, Iran is making progress, they've covered the waterfront in terms of the main technical areas that you need to develop a nuclear weapon," says Mr. Kile. "But there is no evidence they have a dedicated program under way. It's not like they are driving toward nuclear weapons; it's like they're meandering toward capability."
...
For Kelley, formerly with the IAEA, the current Iran report is a "real mish-mash" that includes some "amateurish analysis."Among several technical points, Kelley notes the report's discussion of Iran's "exploding bridge-wire detonators," or EBWs. The IAEA report said it recognizes that "there exist non-nuclear applications, albeit few," and point to a likely weapons connection for Iran.
"The Agency is wrong. There are lots of applications for EBWs," says Kelley. "To be wrong on this point, and then to try to misdirect opinion shows a bias towards their desired outcome.... That is unprofessional."
Both pillars of the IAEA report annex that is supposed to prove work on nuclear weapons in Iran are very weak. Unless something proves that Danilenko's work in Iran was not for civilian purpose and that the "alleged studies" "evidence" is not just forgery it is impossible to accept the IAEA's report annex as something that would stand up in a trial and could support a case for punishment.
It is no wonder that the former director of the IAEA El Baradei rejected the publishing of such a report. It took the more pliable new IAEA director Amano, installed with U.S. help, to discredit the IAEA by publishing a report which the former inspector Kelley calls "unprofessional" "mish-mash".
Based on this weak report the U.S. is pressing to put more sanctions on Iran but as Russia, China and many other states do not buy the case the IAEA tried to make there is little chance for that to happen.
We can thereby expect more dirt to be thrown at Iran by anonymous "diplomats" in the hope that the media will stay as uncritically towards their claims as they so far have been. It may be that one future day believable evidence of a nuclear weapon program in Iran may emerge. So far it has not.
Posted by b on November 12, 2011 at 7:47 UTC | Permalink
Superb analysis as always b,
Your contribution to this topic has been invaluable.
May I ask what you make of the claims of modelling and simulations. I read through the report and it is even more vague than the other allegations.
As for the design of the nose cone for the Sahab 3, I'm sure you're aware that Gareth Porter revealed that the Sahab 3 had already been decommissioned by the Iranians in the late 90's, and were working on the Sahab 4 by the time this material surfaced. Surely, this must be another serious flaw in the annex.
Posted by: Shingo | Nov 12 2011 10:47 utc | 2
One more thing B,
This is not the first time that claims have been leveled at Ran for procuring equipment or experiments that are only specific to nuclear weapons applications. David Albright, the narcissistic propagandist who first mentioned Danilenko, once claimed that the fact Iran were acquiring vacuum pumps was evidence they were producing nuclear weapons. In fact, vacuum pumps are standard equipment in any civilian nuclear facility.
Posted by: Shingo | Nov 12 2011 10:53 utc | 3
even though the report has been discredited by verifiable facts, the damage has already been done. another case of cognitive dissonance. the movers and shakers of US policy got out early and told everyone what the IAEA report had in it. it was all scary and bleak.
that is what people heard
no one will bother to actually read the report themselves,
the rebuttals to the report are few (in corporate media) and low key.
why can't charges of terrorism be brought against those people who openly and willingly lied?
seems to me to be the only way to stop them.
Posted by: dan of steele | Nov 12 2011 11:09 utc | 4
A couple of questions worth considering:
1) While Iran now has a healthy nanotechnology program, what was it like during the period of Danilenko's presence (1996 to 2002)? Nanotechnology is very diverse - how much of a focus is UDD production?
2) The blast chamber at Parchin is described as being quite large (on the order of a double-decker bus) by the standards of these things. Why so large? Danilenko himself says that most UDD research is conducted in smaller chambers and that large ones are necessary only for industrial scale production. IIRC as of 2004 he said that he had the only big one (~100 cubic metres) while the others were around 3-6 cubic metres. Why would Iran spring directly to industrial scale production, and where are the products of that production?
3) Does UDD production explain the hemispherical assembly? Danilenko himself states that the best charge configuration for UDD production is an elongated cylinder - the IAEA document references experimental work on cylindrical charges post-2003. Why the initial focus on a hemispherical configuration (that supposedly matches [is consistent with] the dimensions of an RV)?
As an aside, I think the diplomat has things muddled - the concern with natural metallic uranium wouldn't be using it to produce fuel, it would be about possible use in subcritical tests. Given that the material is described as having been under IAEA seal since 2003, this may be the first time they realized they were short.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 12 2011 13:10 utc | 5
Missing 45 lbs vs. missing 17 tons of weapons grade nuclear fuel.
Who is the real danger?
Posted by: Butch in Waukegan | Nov 12 2011 13:42 utc | 6
Danilenko himself says
Danilenko himself states
I was wondering where you are taking these quotes from?
Posted by: David A. | Nov 12 2011 13:53 utc | 7
@JustPlainDave
A couple of questions worth considering:
I'll give it a try.
1) While Iran now has a healthy nanotechnology program, what was it like during the period of Danilenko's presence (1996 to 2002)? Nanotechnology is very diverse - how much of a focus is UDD production?
I can't tell. Someone with access to a library with the relevant chemist and physics magazine will be able to answer that. An abstract of a talk at Russian conference on Nanotechnology in 2008 is on Detonation Properties of Explosives Containing Nanodiamond(UDD) by researchers of the Department of Materials and Manufacturing Technologies, Malek-ashtar University of Technology, Tehran.
2) The blast chamber at Parchin is described as being quite large (on the order of a double-decker bus) by the standards of these things. Why so large? Danilenko himself says that most UDD research is conducted in smaller chambers and that large ones are necessary only for industrial scale production. IIRC as of 2004 he said that he had the only big one (~100 cubic metres) while the others were around 3-6 cubic metres. Why would Iran spring directly to industrial scale production, and where are the products of that production?
The "double decker bus size" is propaganda nonsense. Double decker buses have more height than width. Detonation chambers are cylindrical. The IAEA report annex only says "large". The IAEA has never seen the detonation chamber but in commercial satellite picture form 2000. The various pictures from commercial nanodiamond producers show chambers from 6 to 8 meters long and 2 to 3 meters wide. That already is large.
3) Does UDD production explain the hemispherical assembly? Danilenko himself states that the best charge configuration for UDD production is an elongated cylinder - the IAEA document references experimental work on cylindrical charges post-2003. Why the initial focus on a hemispherical configuration (that supposedly matches [is consistent with] the dimensions of an RV)?
Danilenko and others used both according to his history of nanodiamonds. Theoretical hemispheric charges should give the maximum pressure but there are certainly other parameters involved like temperature, desired end-product size etc. I would not expect one best method but best method in relation to the product quality and output.
As an aside, I think the diplomat has things muddled - the concern with natural metallic uranium wouldn't be using it to produce fuel, it would be about possible use in subcritical tests. Given that the material is described as having been under IAEA seal since 2003, this may be the first time they realized they were short.
The muddling is intended.
@David A I was wondering where [JustPlainDave] are taking these quotes from?
There is a book online in which Danilenko describes the history of nanodiamonds and explains some stuff: Ultrananocrystalline Diamond - Synthesis, Properties, and Applications (pdf), see chapter 10. I think I have seen other stuff from him (or by others about him?)too, but have no link at hand now.
David A. @ #7: The full cite is: Danilenko, V.V. (2004). "On the Discovery of Detonation Nanodiamond", in Ultrananocrystalline Diamond Synthesis, Properties, and Applications Olga A. Shenderova & Dieter M. Gruen, eds pp. 335-45. Norwich, NY: William Andrew Publishing. Available online via b's link above in pdf.
The relevant quotes, in what I hope is enough context, [emphasis added in both] are:
"In 1992, the author developed large-scale technology for pro- ducing UDD (10 kg charges from RDX/TNT 60/40%, water cooling, UDD yield 8–10% and UDD concentration in soot 60–75%, UDD specific surface area 200m3/g, particles size 4–6nm) and implemented it at the commercial plant of the “ALIT” company (Zhitomir, Ukraine). The main part of the plant was an explosion chamber 100 m3 in volume with water cooling of the UDD (designed by the author)[16]. At present all another manufacturers use small explosion chambers (2–6m3) and small charges (0.5–2kg), which are not effective for UDD industrial production. For example, for the production of 100 kg of UDDs per month, an explosion of ∼80 charges of 1 kg mass each day is required, which is unrealistic."
"In 1963–1965, about 100 successful experiments were carried out to analyze the effect of explosion conditions, as well as the composition and configuration of charges, on UDD synthesis and the properties of the UDD produced.It was shown that DP cooling as a result of conversion of the potential energy of DPs into kinetic energy of the envelope surrounding the charge plays a decisive role in the UDD synthesis. It was found that an elongated cylinder is the best shape for charges; the explosion of such a charge from RDX/TNT 60/40% in a water jacket gives a UDD yield of 8–12% of the charge mass and UDD concentration in the detonation soot of up to 75%."
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 12 2011 14:36 utc | 10
b @ # 8 re. my question 2: I don't think it makes much difference whether the chamber is double-decker or single decker size. Similarly, it's less relevant what chamber sizes now for industrial production are than what they were in the 1997 to 2003 time frame. Reading the history of the UDD process, it's clear that the field has moved significantly from the timeframe that the IAEA is referencing - having licked a lot of technical issues, more widespread industrial scale facilities make sense. The key issue for analysis of dual use tech is did the expense of constructing such a chamber make sense back then and did they make as much sense as competing uses?
re. my question 3: I'm afraid I don't see any mention of hemispheric charges in Danilenko's work. The issues appear to be far less the pressures generated by the shockwave than what happens afterward [from Danilenko, 2004 emphasis added]:
"Thus, the main problem is not in the formation of UDD but in its storage (i.e., in creating conditions in chamber that prevent oxidation and graphitization of the UDDs obtained). Despite convincing theoretical predictions (Table 10.1), only the experiment carried out in 1963 proved for the first time that diamond is indeed formed in a detonation wave and that the obtained substance can be preserved."
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 12 2011 14:53 utc | 11
no one will bother to actually read the report themselves,
Let's face it, the report is designed to be difficult to read and digest, thus precluding the majority of people from reading it except the so-called experts. It's filled with legal ease and technical ease, as all such "reports" are, and made necessarily ponderous so as to avoid scrutiny. It's one of the reasons I won't bother with it especially since I already know it is a lie based off of pattern recognition and logic. It's a waste of my time....and plus, b, and a few others here, have done the leg work in isolating it for the lie it is, and I trust b's analytical ability.
I agree with the rest of what you said, dan of steele, the damage is already done, all protestations to the contrary. He who controls the message controls the people and the sub-conscious/unconscious mind is as deadly, or more deadly, than the conscious one.
As an example, the other night before signing off before going to bed for the night, with my wife over my shoulder we reviewed, per our anti-virus software, a severe level virus that is repeatedly being removed from our back-up drive. The particular file that is repeatedly removed has the words "glass" and "broken" in it. My wife didn't read the name of the file consciously, but she was looking right at the screen where the file name was displayed. The next morning she recounted a dream that centered around broken glass. That is the amazing power of subconscious/unconscious recognition, so imagine the effect all of this has on a populace that has been primed to accept this message, already, consciously. When you include the unconscious element, you can appeal to their warped consciousness til the moon is blue, but it isn't going to make a bit of difference if you don't, and can't, undo the damage done by conditioning, and are not seen as a legitimate source for the "message."
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 12 2011 15:41 utc | 12
just in case you have not seen this latest asiatimes by Gareth Porter
Iran has an aggressive program to develop its nanotechnology sector, and it includes as one major focus nanodiamonds, as blogger Moon of Alabama has pointed out. That blog was the first source to call attention to Danilenko's nanodiamond background.
Posted by: annie | Nov 12 2011 16:38 utc | 13
@justplaindave my question 2: I don't think it makes much difference whether the chamber is double-decker or single decker size. Similarly, it's less relevant what chamber sizes now for industrial production are than what they were in the 1997 to 2003 time frame. Reading the history of the UDD process, it's clear that the field has moved significantly from the timeframe that the IAEA is referencing - having licked a lot of technical issues, more widespread industrial scale facilities make sense. The key issue for analysis of dual use tech is did the expense of constructing such a chamber make sense back then and did they make as much sense as competing uses?
Alit the Ukrainian company Danilenko worked with was founded in 1991 and had the aim of industrial size production. It has a 100m3 chamber on its website. From looks of it it wasn't produced recently. Danilenko himself (P343):
"In 1992, the author developed large-scale technology for producing UDD (10 kg charges from RDX/TNT 60/40%, water cooling, UDD yield 8–10% and UDD concentration in soot 60–75%, UDD specific surface area 200m3/g, particles size 4–6 nm) and implemented it at the commercial plant of the “ALIT” company (Zhitomir, Ukraine). The main part of the plant was an explosion chamber 100m3 in volume with water cooling of the UDD (designed by the author)
re. my question 3: I'm afraid I don't see any mention of hemispheric charges in Danilenko's work.
From the book you and I quote (P336):
Owing to his initiative and support, scientists from the gas dynamics group, including K. V. Volkov, V. V. Danilenko, and V. I. Elin, carried out the following pioneering work in diamond synthesis in 1960–1965:[1,2]From the top of my head the other Soviet researchers who discovered the process in the 1980s used spherical explosions. Will try to find that later.
(1) Diamonds were obtained by shock compression of graphite and carbon black in spherical and cylindrical storage ampoules (1962).
Funny issue - just saw this literature reference: "V. V. Danilenko. Nanocarbon phase diagram and conditions for detonation nanodiamond formation. Proceedings of NATO Advanced Research Workshop
“Ultrananocrystalline Diamond”, p. 181 (2004)"
It would not be at all surprising if Iran were attempting to acquire the capability of building a nuclear weapon at short notice, if it became necessary. Faced with almost daily threats of being bombed and attacked, why wouldn't they? Their leaders would deserve impeachment (or worse) if they didn't.
Apart from acting as a deterrent, such a capability would enable them to respond to an attack by Israel and the USA, if it occurred. Such an attack, though its ostensible goal would be to destroy Iran's nuclear capability, would in fact be aimed at inflicting severe damage on the country's military and industrial potential.
iow he was a leading enough expert for nato's workshop.
That someone uses a screwdriver to fix a car does not provide that s/he plans to stab the neighbor.
fun soh
Posted by: annie | Nov 12 2011 16:47 utc | 16
@FB Ali - I agree. And capability comes automatically with any civil nuclear energy program that is based on domestic fuel creation or reprocessing. Some 40 countries in this world have nuclear capability.
There is no reason I can see why Iran should not have it.
Some 40 countries in this world have nuclear capability.
In the case of Iran, they better have more than just capability, because I don't think that will be enough of a deterrent to what seems an inevitable attack. Correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't imagine whipping a nuclear tipped missile up, even though you are capable and have the necessary ingredients/components, is like whipping a coconut icebox cake up. If an attack is imminent, that capability can be squashed in no time flat, I would think.
http://www.cakemixdoctor.com/recipe/grandmas-coconut-icebox-cake/
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 12 2011 19:05 utc | 18
Thanks for the invaluable scientific information & discussion.
One power only, already the only one to ever use atomic warfare, wth the world's largest nuclear weapons stockpile and building 'new improved'ultimate WMD, has the self-declared 'right' to preemptive nuclear attacks...in'defense' of course of its doomed global domination.
2005 U.S. Strategic Command Declares Preemptive Nuclear Global Strike Capability “a new kind of deterrence”
David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2005_12_2.html#FB378486
**CONPLAN 8022 Preemption Strike Plan - nuclear & conventional weapons-merged in U.S. strategic war plan http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2008/07/globalstrike.php
@MB - If an attack is imminent, that capability can be squashed in no time flat, I would think.
It can't. A big country, lots of mountains and valleys, lots of places to hide stuff, lots of capable well trained people. Other than "kill them all", currently unthinkable, doesn't really work in such a situation.
@b #14 A spherical ampoule isn't the same as a hemispherical charge. As I understand the early experiments, the ampoules with carbonaceous materials inside were placed in the middle of a charge - I don't know what the specific geometry of the charge initiation was.
If the Parchin chamber is intended for industrial-scale UDD production, and was produced in the timeframe of Danilenko's involvement (1997-2003), why does he say in his 2004 book chapter that his chamber at ALIT is the only big one involved in UDD production? If it's not for production work, why's it so big? And again, where's the production output of the Parchin chamber? What do they use the UDDs for? Why would they dick around with a charge configuration that's known not to be optimal for UDD production? I could see the Iranians wanting to go to industrial production in the mid-2000s once a number of technical issues were dealt with, but why go so big so early? It doesn't make a lot of intrinsic sense. For the UDD interpretation to be the most compelling fit - as opposed to other alternatives like being a cover for exploration of dual-use technology - the Iranians have to be a very specific combination of stupid (using the wrong charge configuration) and precognitive (building way more infrastructure than they need). And aside from all that, all of this is just one isolated line of inquiry among many in the program.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 12 2011 20:28 utc | 21
JustPlainDave, you seem to be demanding that Iran prove a negative.
Namely, that the anomalies which, you assert, suggest that the chamber is not configured for optimum efficiency, give rise to the assumption that Iran is using it as part of a nuclear weapons programme.
And that to believe this is reasonable in the absence of any proof to the contrary, being proffered before the charge was made.
Especially when we bear in mind that "this is just one isolated line of inquiry" in a whole cornucopia of innuendo, half truths, forgeries and damned lies, concocted by the IAEA, a farrago of falsehoods so crude that the recently retired and respected director of the IAEA, feels compelled to state publicly his doubts about his successor's work.
I take it that you knew that Saddam Hussein had Weapons of Mass destruction, primed and ready to be loaded on to model aeroplanes cruising off Chesapeake Bay, as well.
And the Polish Government never did come up with a satisfactory explanation for the attack its nationals made on Germany on August 31 1939, did they?
And neither Britain nor France knew of Israel's plan to attack the Egypt in 1956.
Posted by: bevin | Nov 13 2011 1:09 utc | 22
A war with Iran, if waged, will be a direct result of Obama's refusal to investigate, indict, and prosecute the Bush Administration criminals. The Bush Administration, held unaccountable, signaled every subsequent POTUS that he will be held above and beyond the letter of the law.
God help us, (considering our President's immunity from abiding by the letter of the law), if a religious zealot attains the throne, and gets their hands on the nuclear trigger. There are those currently vying for the Republican nomination that are a far greater threat to our security, and global stability, than Iran is.
And, to simplify the issue, one must ask; why wouldn't Iran want nukes? Israel has proven itself to be an aggressive, criminal, and murderous player in the region, and the United States has proven itself capable of unjustified military aggression founded on blatantly false and fabricated "intelligence". Were I a patriotic Iranian citizen, I would consider it governmental malfeasance if my nation's leaders were not seeking a deterrent against Israeli or United States threats, and acts or war and aggression.
A nuclear Iran might just be the catalyst needed to return the Israelis to practicing sane, just, and humane policies and actions in regards to its neighbors and the Palestinians.
Posted by: PissedOffAmerican | Nov 13 2011 2:19 utc | 23
For the UDD interpretation to be the most compelling fit - as opposed to other alternatives like being a cover for exploration of dual-use technology
On what basis do you come to the conclusion that there is any dual use to this technology? What history is there or prior nuclear implosion devices produced in large steel containers?
And speaking of all the other lines of inquiry, the rest are no more credible.
Posted by: Shingo | Nov 13 2011 2:29 utc | 24
@b #14 A spherical ampoule isn't the same as a hemispherical charge. As I understand the early experiments, the ampoules with carbonaceous materials inside were placed in the middle of a charge - I don't know what the specific geometry of the charge initiation was.
If the Parchin chamber is intended for industrial-scale UDD production, and was produced in the timeframe of Danilenko's involvement (1997-2003), why does he say in his 2004 book chapter that his chamber at ALIT is the only big one involved in UDD production? If it's not for production work, why's it so big? And again, where's the production output of the Parchin chamber? What do they use the UDDs for? Why would they dick around with a charge configuration that's known not to be optimal for UDD production? I could see the Iranians wanting to go to industrial production in the mid-2000s once a number of technical issues were dealt with, but why go so big so early? It doesn't make a lot of intrinsic sense. For the UDD interpretation to be the most compelling fit - as opposed to other alternatives like being a cover for exploration of dual-use technology - the Iranians have to be a very specific combination of stupid (using the wrong charge configuration) and precognitive (building way more infrastructure than they need). And aside from all that, all of this is just one isolated line of inquiry among many in the program.
Lots of questions:
- Why not go big? They had the world expert there at that time who could build the real thing right away. No reason to bother with "technical issues".
- The purpose of UDD? Polishing, that is what everyone uses them for.
- There is no "cover for dualuse". Stuff is dual use by nature. Guess what: humans are dual use. Do Iranians make kids to become nuclear scientists because they want to build nukes?
- The sphere stuff only occurs once in the IAEA annex, as mere "calculations" (53 in the annex).
The whole issue is that the IAEA has
a. no legal business in Iran to do anything other than watch and measure the "declared material" just as the NPT and Iranian safeguard agreement says
b. comes up with stupid question about fields that are irrelevant to a and that do have plausible explanations besides nuke business. Is that toilet paper usable to wipe a nuke? What are you doing with it? Explain! We'll sanction toilet paper!
c. Is obviously politicized by the U.S. for nefarious purposes.
Is that toilet paper usable to wipe a nuke? What are you doing with it? Explain! We'll sanction toilet paper!
That's priceless, b. Next..... Sanction Wipees!!!!
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 13 2011 14:23 utc | 26
@shingo #24 Given that both Livermore and Los Alamos have a number of these things and given that there have been requests for funding for new ones as late as 10 - 15 years ago, specifically in the context of nuclear weapons design, I'd have to say the evidence is decent. My understanding is that since the hydrocode has gotten good and has been experimentally validated, they may be less necessary than they were for experienced designers. For a nuclear aspirant, I tend to think they'd still be damned handy.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 13 2011 14:52 utc | 27
@bevin #22 I'm sympathetic to the difficulty of proving a negative. However, this isn't quite that situation. There are two closely related scenarios on offer - purely civil UDD production (MoA) and exploration of dual-use technology using UDD for a cover (IAEA). I think the IAEA one is a better fit given the totality of the evidence - there are aspects of the pure civil hypothesis that aren't as good a fit. Proving a negative would be if the evidence better fit purely civil UDD production and still maintaining that the activity was an indicator of weapons design activity.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 13 2011 14:57 utc | 28
So let's say the Iranians agree to dismantle/destroy their Parchin chamber....will that be the end of it?
Posted by: dh | Nov 13 2011 15:21 utc | 29
- Why not go big? They had the world expert there at that time who could build the real thing right away. No reason to bother with "technical issues".
The question isn't could they technically build the chamber - the question is why would they build the chamber. What's the imperative to go immediately to a much more expensive industrial scale? Research on UDDs was happening using much smaller chambers. Industrial production uses larger chambers, but there were a number of technical issues in the processing of the UDDs after formation that had to be overcome to make them as useful as they currently are (Osawa, 2008). These technical issues weren't resolved until after Danilenko's involvement.
- The purpose of UDD? Polishing, that is what everyone uses them for.
Polishing of what, where? Why do the Iranians need a world class supply of these things? There are other uses as well - for the purely civil UDD hypothesis to be the best interpretation, we should see specific assertions accounting for this use emerging over the next little while. If they aren't forthcoming, that would be consistent with the IAEA hypothesis.
- The sphere stuff only occurs once in the IAEA annex, as mere "calculations" (53 in the annex).
The "sphere stuff" in graf 53 has little to do with the matter under discussion. We're discussing whether the hemispheric charge mentioned in graphs 43 and 44 can be explained by UDD production. I still haven't seen an indication that it can. The specific charge geometries associated with UDD production aren't consistent with this.
The whole issue is that the IAEA has a. no legal business in Iran to do anything other than watch and measure the "declared material" just as the NPT and Iranian safeguard agreement says b. comes up with stupid question about fields that are irrelevant to a and that do have plausible explanations besides nuke business. Is that toilet paper usable to wipe a nuke? What are you doing with it? Explain! We'll sanction toilet paper! c. Is obviously politicized by the U.S. for nefarious purposes.
That's a political position and not one that has a lot of bearing on whether the interpretation you've put forward is the best fit for the evidence. I would assert that it is a misunderstanding of the role of the IAEA and the NPT, but that has just as little bearing on this.
Osawa, E. (2008). Monodisperse single nanodiamond particulates. Pure and Applied Chemistry 80(7):1365-1379.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 13 2011 15:29 utc | 30
@dh #29 The issue isn't the existence of the Parchin chamber - the issue is what it is/was used for. The Iranians have a clear and unfettered right to have a blast chamber for the study of conventional explosives or any other non-nuclear weapons design purpose they might want. Destroying the chamber would have no beneficial effect on their position vis-à-vis the IAEA/NPT and might even have a negative effect, as seen with the destruction of the Kalaye Electric Company facility - I would guess that the IAEA would want to take environmental samples.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 13 2011 15:38 utc | 31
OK then. Let's put it another way. Let's say the Iranians allow the IAEA to examine the chamber after which they agree not to use it for nuclear purposes. Would that be satisfactory? Or would someone accuse them of having more chambers hidden in mountains? I'm just trying to come up with a peaceful resolution to the problem. I'm sure you are too.
Posted by: dh | Nov 13 2011 15:45 utc | 32
I'm sure you are too.
Good one!
You asked the right question, but you can make it even broader. Nothing the Mullahs can do right now will change the course. They're being backed into a corner with The West poking its chest and shoving them backwards. No amount of pleading, even if they got down on their knees and begged for mercy which they wouldn't, of course, is going to change the trajectory. I believe one reason for the drawn out process is to provoke Iran into making a stupid, preemptive move, giving The West the PR justification for a full-on attack.
The larger question for me is what will Russia and China do once Iran is attacked and neutralized? My guess is they won't do a thing aside for verbal condemnation, but instead lay in wait to seize any opportunities that present themselves in the aftermath. Afterall, they're survivors, not suicidal.
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 13 2011 15:54 utc | 33
@dh #29 - I'm guessing that would go a ways to helping on that specific issue, but it certainly wouldn't be enough by itself. The whole constellation of issues would have to also be resolved. Someone in the commentariat would doubtless accuse them of something like what you describe, but it's unlikely that the IAEA would do so without specific evidence.
The thing required to come to a peaceful resolution of the problem (as opposed to an ongoing problem that isn't resolved by force - which is more likely but could look the same to an outside observer) would be for the Iranians to reverse themselves and actively either come clean on pre-2003 weapons related activity or allow a level of access that makes it clear that this is just a big analytical mistake. I don't see either of those things happening: a) Iranian leadership dynamics just don't work that way in the absence of crisis (which in this case I would hope we avoid) and b) this conflict is just too useful to too many players inside the nezam (the Iranian political system). And even then, there would be the flashpoint of post-2003 activity.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 13 2011 15:59 utc | 34
So the chamber is just the latest focal point then? As for the Iranians coming clean I imagine that will happen when Israel signs the NNPT.
Posted by: dh | Nov 13 2011 16:09 utc | 35
@dh #35 - I would say that the chamber as a thing, as opposed to a facility possibly associated with past illicit activities is actually relatively minor. It figures so prominently as a focal point here because it is being used as a datapoint in an attempt to discredit the entire IAEA process.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 13 2011 16:24 utc | 36
Well the chamber got a lot of media attention. But you're right.....it's no smoking gun. Do you think the IAEA is impartial?
Posted by: dh | Nov 13 2011 16:33 utc | 37
Do you think the IAEA is impartial?
Oh, come on, this is just "Plain" silly at this point. Does that question even need to be asked, considering? Where the hell is its report on Israel's Nuclear Program and the corresponding media coverage and hype? Correct, nowhere to be found, so of course, naturally, the IAEA is completely, 100% impartial. Yes indeedy, the IAEA is a fully competent, objective and impartial source of nuclear knowledge and prognostication. We can trust its judgment.
The IAEA is a tool in this, just like everything else is, including the media. In the end, it's irrelevant, because as was the case with Iraq, it didn't matter what the IAEA said, or did, it was going to happen regardless...and it did. Want to bet? What's discouraging is that we're having this silly argument all over again when we saw the results of the it the first go around, and yet so many want to cling to the belief that there's no pattern here, that this time it will somehow be different. It's insane to have this argument now. What we need to determine is how to stop the madness that is being unleashed with ever greater velocity.
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 13 2011 18:06 utc | 38
@dh #37 - I think the IAEA has a number of factions with institutional biases. The counterproliferation folks have a bias towards "proving a negative" for lack of a better term - they want positive, definitive verification that dual-use technology was not used in illicit activities. This is very hard to do without complete access, particularly in the context of ongoing contentious actions (e.g., Fordow). The political people have a less oppositional role and see a lack of ability to come to negotiated accommodation as a potential danger.
The inspector-types say that failure to positively verify compliance calls the NPT into doubt on the basis of effectiveness, the diplomat-types say that too zealous a position on positive verification calls the NPT into doubt on the basis of compliance and legitimacy. Both positions have their merits and their downsides. I don't know that that establishes whether the IAEA is impartial or not, but it certainly does explain why there are sometimes mixed messages coming out of it.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 13 2011 18:13 utc | 39
Thank you MB. I'd still like to hear JustPlainDave's answer to the silly question.
Posted by: dh | Nov 13 2011 18:14 utc | 40
I'd still like to hear JustPlainDave's answer to the silly question.
I could have typed his equivocating reply for you. In essence, it's not an answer.
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 13 2011 18:18 utc | 41
@JPD#39 Fair enough. The IAEA is an inspection agency and they are right to be skeptical. I just wonder if Iran isn't being singled out for special treatment.
Posted by: dh | Nov 13 2011 18:19 utc | 42
The IAEA is an inspection agency and they are right to be skeptical.
I don't agree with that statement. A matter of "right" has no place here. It's a matter of their purpose, and their purpose is to present the facts...their findings...not to imply and conjecture. That should be left to all those who read and interpret their factual findings. But, who inspects the inspectors when it comes to their alleged facts? One is reminded of Arthur Anderson.
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 13 2011 19:05 utc | 43
I think we're on the same wavelength MB. Iran is within it's rights to conduct nuclear research but it's obvious that some people will settle for nothing less than conclusive evidence of bomb making. The inspectors are just pawns in the game. They actually should be questioning the whole process.
Posted by: dh | Nov 13 2011 19:24 utc | 44
the iaea is about impartial as the imf
that is to say, a gaggle of jackals & vassals
Posted by: remembereringgiap | Nov 13 2011 19:38 utc | 45
Ah, JustPlainDave, resident Pentagon fluffer/spokesman over at theAgonist, here to defend the the drive to destroy yet another country. What a surprise! There isn't a single lie the or murderous action the murderous scum that run our country will perpetrate that he won't attempt to vigorously defend.
Posted by: ran | Nov 14 2011 5:37 utc | 46
The Washington Post has a piece about Danilenko. Notice that is based nearly exclusively of David Albrights say-so. Russian scientist Vyacheslav Danilenko’s aid to Iran offers peek at nuclear program
But you have to admit, ran, he makes a mean Philly Cheesesteak.
http://www.justplaindaves.com/
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 14 2011 11:57 utc | 48
@dh #29 - One thing does occur to me - Danilenko asserts that the chamber that he built at ALIT has special features. Looking at the still of it on the ALIT website, it looks like it may have a water injection system which I haven't seen on any of the other stills of such systems I've been looking at. Would be well worth looking at Parchin to see if it has this configuration.
Still here: http://www.alit.kiev.ua/kamera.jpg
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 14 2011 14:16 utc | 49
That would be the dual use feature I expect. It also makes perogies.
Posted by: dh | Nov 14 2011 14:26 utc | 50
@dh #50 - It shouldn't be a dual use feature - it would actually be an indicator consistent with civil use. The central challenge in manufacture of UDD is stopping the reaction at a given point so that the formed UDDs are preserved and can then be recovered from the detonation soot. I can't think of any reason why one would care to have such a system if conducting explosives experiments, either conventional or special purpose (i.e., weapons design related). If the feature is there it's consistent with UDD production, if it's not it's not dispositive.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 14 2011 14:32 utc | 51
@51 reminds me of this.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zrzMhU_4m-g
Posted by: Morocco Bama | Nov 14 2011 15:00 utc | 52
Apparently I shouldn't use a five buck word when others would do instead. To be clearer, presence or absence of a water injection system would only potentially help your case. If it's present, it lends support to the UDD theory - if it's not present, it doesn't indicate anything one way or the other.
Posted by: JustPlainDave | Nov 14 2011 15:28 utc | 53
@47 - The WaPo piece I posted above is based on a writeup by Albright/ISIS on Danilenko. Repeats a lot of the IAEA report adding some innuendo and chaff: Iran’s Work and Foreign Assistance on a Multipoint Initiation System for a Nuclear Weapon
Interesting paper showing some old soviet explosion chambers and with bits about the usefulness of nanodiamonds: EMERGING USA NANODIAMOND APPLICATIONS (pdf)
This is a good reason fro Iran to produce nanodiamonds:
In 1964, the Russian military manufactured over 10,000 kg of nanodiamond for motor oil to extend the operational range of its tanks, ships, and aircraft.
• In 2007, National Freight located in Allentown, PA became the first commercial trucking company in the USA to test NanoBlox 15W-40 Diesel Motor Oil. To date, they have realized an 8% increase in fuel economy.
• Potential fuel cost reduction of 7-8 million dollars per year for their national fleet.
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Frankly I am disgusted with the MSM here in the UK, who have simply followed the same line as other MSM and news outlets as surrogates for deception. Not one of any of the experts or so called "middle east editors" has spent a fraction of the time you have looking into the report. This includes the BBC which has continually slid downhill at an ever increasing speed in the standard of its reporting from that particular region. This is edvident with its latest "puff" piece being passed off as factual information:
IAEA Iran report: What you need to know
When people ask me about the report, I simply send them here and tell them to make their own mind up.
Posted by: David A. | Nov 12 2011 8:51 utc | 1