Today's NYT piece on the German chancellor Merkel is rather weird: German Leader Faces Key Choices on Rescuing Euro:
As Europe struggles to reverse a plunge in financial confidence, the world waits for Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, to make a fundamental choice.
…
Much hinges on getting all 17 nations in the euro zone to ratify the decisions of July 21, as the French Parliament has done, which includes an increase in the bailout fund and an expansion of its powers. Those decisions would already mark a shift in Germany’s harder-line positions on the euro.An expanded European Financial Stability Facility would be able to act as a kind of bank, supported by all the members. It would be a significant step toward using Europe’s collective clout with debt markets to rescue countries with much weaker standing.
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Eurobonds — issuing common European debt that any member of the currency zone could tap — is one popular solution among European Union officials in Brussels.
The article pretends that these "rescue" measures depend on Merkel's choice or ability.
That is nonsense.
An extended European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in the planned form of a permanent European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM), as well as Eurobonds, are no longer a choice. The German constitutional court, while allowing current temporary measures, last week prohibited those permanent measures.
It essentially decided that:
1. The right to budget decisions (taxing and spending) is the fundamental rights of any democratically elected parliament. The right of future parliaments to make budget decisions shall not be undermined by unlimited, permanent transfer decisions taken by the sitting parliament. Allowing such unlimited transfer decisions would take away all meaning of future democratic elections.
2. Therefore the German government and parliament are not allowed to approve of treaties which might undermine that budget right for future German parliaments. No mechanisms are allowed “which result in an assumption of liability for other states’ voluntary decisions, especially if they have consequences whose impact is difficult to calculate.”
3. Any extended ESFS would need German parliamentary approval each time it demands additional transfers of money. It would have to give the German parliament detailed reviews leaving it in control. But such an ESFS would not be able to give assurances or guarantees to anyone else as it would always depend on the next German parliament's vote. It would be useless.
4. Eurobonds as planned would allow a majority of Eurozone countries to just out vote Germany and issue a lot more Eurobonds than the German parliament would like while at the same time make German taxpayers liable for those bonds. That would undermine the German democracy. Therefore Germany can not take part in the planned Eurobond scheme.
Any change in the above would need a change in the German constitution and a public referendum on those changes. With 75% of all Germans against bailouts that is not going to happen.
But the NYT piece does not even mention the court's decisions. It presents choices for Merkel to make that no longer exist.
What then is the purpose of that piece?