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WikiLeaks: U.S. Enables Illegal Weapon Transfer To Southern Sudan
In September 2008 Somali pirates captured the M/V Faina, a ship with 33 tanks plus various arms and ammunition on board and on its way to Mobasa, Kenia. While the Kenian government claimed that those weapons were for its own army, it was quite clear that these were for South Sudan. MoA reader B real followed the story starting with this comment. As I pointed in correcting an LA Times article, such weapon transfer to southern Sudan was illegal.
The U.S. got immediately involved and as we can see from WikiLeaks cable releases it did know from the very beginning not only what was happening but it helped along to bring the weapons to Kenia and eventuall to southern Sudan.
A cable send by the State Department on September 28 remarks:
S) As part of a contract signed between Ukraine and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army in December 2006, the vessel is believed to be carrying the following cargo intended for transshipment to southern Sudan:
— 33 T-72 tanks, with spare parts
— 42 ZPU-4 rolling anti-aircraft guns
— 36 RPG-7v
— 6 BM-27 Self propelled multiple rocket launchers
— 13,000 125mm rounds of ammunition (T-72)
(Note: Astonishing here is the amount of ammunition. The combat load for one T-72 is 44 125mm grenades. Those 13,000 rounds would be nearly 300 combat loads per tank! In an equal tank on tank fight one would, on average, not expect a tank to survive long enough to dispense its full combat load. At a price of more than $1,000-$2,000 per round this "overinvestment" in ammunition is very, very odd. We noted here the German reports of transfers of another hundred tanks but even with those included the ammunition number is still widely off the mark. How many tanks does the South Sudan Liberation Army really have?)
Another cable from October 2 adds:
(S-NF) This is not the first time a T-72 shipment to South Sudan has been publicly diverted. In mid-February, the Government of Kenya was reported as "seizing" a shipment of tanks bound for the Sudan People's Liberation Army as it violated the 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement to end Sudan's civil war. The "seizure" occurred when Kenya's own security situation was still precarious given the post-election crisis. The tanks were ultimately released and proceeded to Sudan, and the cargo currently aboard the M/V Faina was meant to complete the tank sale.
So the U.S. was well aware of the sale as well as its illegality but after the ship was released by the pirates in February 2009 its navy escorted the Faina into Mombasa harbour.
To calm down the media and the Kenian parliament on the issue the weapons first stayed in Kenia but the Bush administration still wanted the weapons transferred to southern Sudan.
But then the administration changed and the Obama administration ordered that those weapons shall not be transferred. The U.S. ambassador to Kenia, Ranneberger, who was part in creating the deal under Bush in the first place, was now suddenly tasked to deliver a demarche to Nairobi demanding a transfer hold. The Kenian government was furious about this and Ranneberger embarrassed. In December he cabled to Washington:
The GOK is understandably confused, as transfer of these tanks, in their view, dove-tailed with the goals of the United States to implement the CPA by converting the SPLA from a guerrilla force to a small conventional force capable of defending Juba (but not take Khartoum), able to integrate with a national force, and able to counterbalance the significant military capacity of Khartoum.
Ranneberger then asks Washington to reconsider and to let Kenia transfer the weapons.
The weapons are now believed to be in southern Sudan, so much for Change, and will be used in the next civil war in Sudan that will likely erupt in January after the north-south partition referendum.
b – that first link in the top post, to a comment, doesn’t work
two parts of this story i’d like to touch on at the moment here
first, has anyone determined yet exactly who is really behind these shipments? at the time we were speculating maybe either u.s./israel or russia as the key dealmakers. the fact that the m.v. faina was owned by an israeli national and that kenya, as the transit point, is a u.s. client, lent weight to it originating w/ parties out of that alliance.
the info in the few cables on this subject released to this point refer to the u.s. role as that of consultation and make it sound like the kenyan govt was in the lead on behalf of GOSS. is it protocol to write these things in such a manner as to always strive for plausible denial, to have a scapegoat handy, even in documents w/ restricted access? or it could also be that the circle of people in the know is actually very limited — official vs unofficial channels & all that — though that seemingly wouldn’t apply to ranneberger, who is quite powerful there in kenya. So is he not showing all his cards in the cables? kibaki may have his own mt. kenya mafia, but do they have the connections and credit for big int’l arms deals like this on their own? seems to me they’re just a hub in a larger chain requiring a more powerful sponsor or sponsors.
if the u.s. was one of those, it’s interesting then that the u.s. was using the ukraine’s role as the weapon’s origin as a stick as shown in the november 2009 kyiv embassy cable
¶31. (S) Van Diepen recalled that when the U.S. had raised with Ukraine in July 2008 that an additional shipment of T-72 tanks, BM-1 GRAD armored vehicles, small arms, and other military equipment planned for a late June or early July shipment to Kenya was being purchased by the Kenyan Ministry of State Defense for South Sudan, Ukraine had assured us the arms were for the Government of Kenya. Ukraine had informed the U.S. that it had received an end-user certificate from the Kenyan government and receipts acknowledging the arrival of the earlier tank shipment in Kenya. Subsequent to our discussions, the M/V Faina, which was carrying another weapons shipment from Ukraine, was hijacked, and it became clear that cargo was also intended for South Sudan. Van Diepen asked if the GOU had investigated.
¶32. (S) Valeriy Lysenko, from Ukraine’s Export Control Service, said that the T-72 tank shipment was intended for Kenya. He said Ukraine had not transferred any military equipment to South Sudan. All of Ukraine’s contracts were checked.
¶33. (S) Van Diepen gave the Ukrainian side a copy of the contract that clearly lists the GOSS, and asked if the GOU side maintained that the export was for Kenya. Lysenko held to this line, questioned the authenticity of the contract, and asked if the U.S. had any better evidence. Van Diepen, regretting that the GOU had forced him to do so, showed the Ukrainians cleared satellite imagery of T-72 tanks unloaded in Kenya, transferred to railyards for onward shipment, and finally in South Sudan. This led to a commotion on the Ukrainian side.
¶34. (S) Van Diepen continued that he appreciated the sides could have different export control policies, as was their sovereign right. But not being told the truth was something the United States did not expect from a strategic partner. There was nothing for Ukraine to gain from lying and a lot to lose, he cautioned. Since South Sudan is on the U.S. terrorism list, the U.S. would have to consider whether to impose sanctions over the transfer; a factor in U.S. deliberations would be whether the GOU the truth.
¶35. (S) Lysenko said that Ukraine would study the U.S. information and he asserted that Ukraine only had a relationship with Kenya, and did not have a relationship with South Sudan. Ukraine could not be held responsible for the actions of a third country. This matter was a common problem for the U.S. and Ukraine to resolve. He said Ukraine’s special agencies might need to get involved to find out what had happened. Nykonenko said that Ukraine would study this situation in the light of a partner relationship so hat the U.S. would know that Ukraine is a reliable partner.
of course, the illicit arms trade business is undoubtedly murky on purpose so it’s difficult to know which leads to follow and which to discard.
second thing, building off that last cable citation
interesting that there’s some confusion re the number of tanks too. some sources state 32 and others 33. ranneberger’s december 2009 cable (ten months after the faina was offloaded in kenya) states
(Note: There are 32 T-72 tanks remaining in Kenya from the shipment that arrived in Mombasa aboard the M/V Faina. End note.)
the nyt reported thursday that “By the time the freighter was seized, 67 T-72 tanks had already been delivered to bolster southern Sudan’s armed forces against the government in Khartoum”
that would have been mid 2008. the faina had another 32 or 33, depending on which number you believe. 67 + 33 makes an order of 100 tanks, if a round number like that holds any significance.
anyway, as we know, the faina was offloaded in february 2009 and the media interest in the story quickly yielded to other stories. jane’s put out an article five months later, IMINT tracks T-72 tanks towards South Sudan, that stated
Officials confirmed to Jane’s that the Faina cargo was the last of three shipments of weapons bound for the south. Published reports highlighted a previous shipment from Ukraine, which moved north in February 2008, comprising T-72s and assorted artillery, as well as a first shipment that had arrived in Mombasa in November 2007. In total, military and diplomatic sources confirmed to Jane’s, 100 MBTs were ordered by South Sudan.
…
A ransom was paid to liberate the Faina in February and it arrived at Mombasa. The tanks were offloaded and transported to Kahawa barracks outside Nairobi, where they were to remain in the possession of the Kenyan military. Since March, however, eyewitness reports, some corroborated by photographic evidence, have placed the tanks elsewhere. At the same time, extensive construction has been ongoing at a military compound of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.
Jane’s began an extensive satellite imagery canvass of the area in March, aiming to trace the movement of T-72s from Mombasa towards South Sudan. While the analysis does not conclude that the tanks aboard the Faina were in transit towards their ostensible rightful owners, it does show a pattern of tanks making their way north.
that’s all us non-subscriber’s can get from this story, but there is a march 2009 satellite image of 33 tanks sitting in the dirt outside kahawa barracks near nairobi (larger image here)
a look at the current satellite image (or as current as google maps provides) shows indeed that those are no longer parked there in the dirt.
so when did they move? the jane’s article of june 2009 stated that they’d definitely been moving north toward sudan, though they couldn’t confirm that they had arrived. the ranneberger cable of december that same year, five months later, states
As of 16 December, the 32 T-72 tanks remain on flatcars at Kahawa Army Barracks in Nairobi. If indeed the tanks are not going to be transported in the “foreseeable future,” we would expect to see them off-loaded soon and the flatcars returned to Rift Valley Railroad service.
don’t have enough info on hand to punch holes in either of those stories, though they obviously can’t both be true
Posted by: b real | Dec 11 2010 10:19 utc | 4
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