Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

Working in the field of diplomacy without any experience in such a fragile and charged environment was a monumental task. I knew about the difficult situation and the role that the embassy in Islamabad played in the events that were unfolding. All this left me concerned upon hearing the announcement of my appointment as ambassador.

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I later came to learn that the ISI played a key role within the Pakistani government and became accustomed to the fact that representatives from other countries also recognized its growing power. The intelligence agency’s officers had established a close relationship with Afghanistan and had influenced Afghan politics even before the Soviet invasion. But it was after the Russians had provoked Daud Khan’s coup against Zahir Shah that the ISI showed the extent of their influence and ambition. With Russia gaining ground in Afghanistan, the ISI felt increasingly threatened.

In an attempt to stop the Soviets, the ISI turned to some jihadi leaders who had already come to Pakistan and who were organizing the resistance to the Soviet puppet regime from outside Afghanistan. By the time the Russians staged the Saur coup in April 1978 against their former ally Daud Khan, the ISI had already established firm relationships with the resistance, even doubling the money, operations and training for the mujahedeen in Afghanistan.

Many countries outside the region agreed with Pakistan and openly expressed their concern about the growing influence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Many Arab countries also gave support to Pakistan to stop the spread of communism. In 1980, the mujahedeen opened offices in Pakistan under the supervision of the ISI. When Moscow decided to intervene by sending the Red Army to invade Afghanistan, the situation became more and more urgent. The arrival of Russian troops triggered the exodus of the Afghan people, and over the next few years Pakistan welcomed over two million Afghan refugees.

What began as small refugee camps soon grew into cities, and the ISI started an extensive programme to assist the mujahedeen in their struggle. The ISI was responsible for uniting the mujahedeen and forcing them to adopt a united strategy. The agency continued to play a crucial role among the jihadi factions until the outburst of the Taliban. At the time, even low-ranking Pakistani officials were more popular in Afghanistan than in Pakistan.

As an official representative of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan it was important to maintain my independence from this foreign intelligence agency, but I couldn’t entirely avoid their influence. In my dealings with them I tried to be not so sweet that I would be eaten whole, and not so bitter that I would be spat out. I attempted to work in an official way rather than clandestinely, and worked mostly with the Foreign Ministry in an attempt to establish an amiable relationship.