American commanders say their plan in the next few years is to kill large numbers of insurgents in the border region — the military refers to it as “degrading the Taliban” — and at the same time build up the Afghan National Army to the point that the Afghans can at least contain an insurgency still supported by Pakistan.
Intelligence Reports Offer Dim View of Afghan War, NYT, Dec 15
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Thus, the administration escalated in response to North Vietnamese Taliban actions. Its objective was to inflict a level of pain on the North Vietnamese Taliban that was sufficient to make them bargain in earnest. Thus Vietnam Afghanistan became a war of attrition. Johnson Obama would regularly characterize his decisions as taking the middle ground. He would not "pull out" as the "doves" and "nervous Nellies" suggested nor would he go "all out" as the "hawkish" military advisors recommended.
Fighting a war with limited and political objectives had an added liability. It was difficult to define and convey the idea of "progress" to the public. There were few set piece or conventional battles and American objectives were not defined in geographical terms (e.g., Berlin and Tokyo). Instead, the administration was forced to create and essentially sell indicators of progress to the public. Herein lies the origin of such commonly used terms as "pacification zones" and "kill ratios."
The Vietnam War 1962-1968
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Ho Chi Minh said, in reference to the French, "You can kill ten of our men for every one we kill of yours. But even at those odds, you will lose and we will win." Most analysis of war casualties indicates that the allied army inflicted roughly a three-to-two ratio of communist combat deaths against allied deaths. Ho Chi Minh was proved correct in that the US eventually pulled out.
Body Count, Vietnam War