… and thanks for coming back.

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

When the third camp was built, our circumstances deteriorated. We were served less food, the quality worsened and punishment increased. Cube block was an example: newly made, the living conditions were very hard. Prisoners were left to live in open cages in their underwear no matter what the season, not being able to cover themselves even for prayers. Very little food was served and the soldiers would abuse the prisoners. The toilet was visible to all and the cages weren’t big enough for prisoners to lie down to sleep.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 18. Guantánamo Bay

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

The Pakistani soldiers were all staring as the Americans hit me and tore the remaining clothes off from my body. Eventually I was completely naked, and the Pakistani soldiers—the defenders of the Holy Qur’an—shamelessly watched me with smiles on their faces, saluting this disgraceful action of the Americans. They held a handover ceremony with the Americans right in front of my eyes.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 17. Prisoner 306

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

When I reached Kandahar, the city was in chaos. Kabul had fallen only two days previously, and a cloud of sorrow hung over those left in Kandahar. I went straight to the headquarters that had been set up in a new building inside the city. I wanted to meet Mullah Mohammad Omar.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 16. A Hard Realisation

As the Washington Post reports, the British police believes that the Washington Post has links to al-Qaeda. The British police also seems to believe that I am a likely terrorist.

This week the British secret services hauled in some twelve poor chaps from Bangladesh for allegedly planing terror attacks. Three of those dangerous folks were let go after a day but the other nine are still in custody.

The Washington Post's piece about the issue on its 'World' page is prominently headlined "Terror suspects alleged link to al-Qaeda group".

The story itself says:

LONDON – Nine men arrested in Britain on terrorism charges last week found inspiration and bomb-making instructions in an English-language Internet magazine published by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, British investigators reportedly said.

The revelation, relayed by British newspapers, provided the first purported link between the nine British-based suspects, some of Bangladeshi origin, and an anti-Western terrorism campaign being waged by Yemen-based jihadists of Yemeni, Saudi, U.S. and other nationalities under the aegis of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

In links related to the story, the Washington Post helpfully offers INSPIRE: full version of the al-Qaeda propaganda magazine which is hosted on its website.

bigger

As the British police obviously thinks that owning a copy of that magazine is a serious indication for a connection to al-Qaeda, the WaPo editors shall better defer from visiting London.

From The Telegraph we learn of other serious indications of foreigners planing terror attacks in London:

A reconnaissance trip is alleged to have been made from Trafalgar Square, down Whitehall to Westminster Bridge where Big Ben was studied intently.

A mobile phone had appeared to be raised and pointed towards the clock tower, the court heard.

Westminster Abbey, the Palace of Westminster and the London Eye were also closely examined before the Church of Scientology near Blackfriars was allegedly observed intently for some minutes.

The journey ended with a meal in a McDonald’s fast food restaurant, the court heard.

So a sightseeing walk along London's attractions, taking a picture of Big Ben, looking at pretty buildings and eating crap at a Mac D is now a terrorist reconnaissance trip?

Dear British police, I confess that I have downloaded the Inspire magazine – all three editions. I read the Inspire nonsense piece on "How to make a pipe bomb in the kitchen of your mom”. I confess that I have made several long terrorist reconnaissance trips in London. These including making pictures of Big Ben and a ride on the London Eye. Places that could blow up any day! And beware! Just an hour ago I bought some strong explosives and I WILL USE THEM tomorrow night.

Now, you idiots, come and get me.

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

My mind raced as I looked at the screen and considered the probable repercussions of the attack. At that very moment, I knew that Afghanistan and its poverty-stricken people would ultimately suffer for what had just taken place in America. The United States would seek revenge, and they would turn to our troubled country.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 15: 9/11 and its Aftermath

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

The UN worked hard to maintain a good relationship with Afghanistan and the embassy. They would visit regularly and make sure that whenever a senior official from abroad paid a visit to their department, they would include a meeting with our embassy in their schedule. In retrospect, I believe it was as a result of their frequent visits that we came under more and more pressure.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 14. The Osama Issue

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

Even though Pakistan and the ISI maintained close relations with the Taliban, they also continued to uphold their ties to our opposition.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 13. Growing Tensions

The AFP is pushing a wrong history of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and "western" financing of the resistance to that.

West quickly agreed to back Afghan resistance in 1980: files

LONDON (AFP) – Western powers met in secret soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and formed plans to back Islamic resistance, according to British files from 1980 released Thursday.

Senior officials from Britain, France, then West Germany and the United States met in Paris on January 15 that year to discuss the West's response to the December 24, 1979 invasion.

While that meeting may well have taken place, the notion that the financing of a resistance by western money followed only after the Soviets invaded is wrong.

As then CIA director Robert Gates wrote in his memoir and then National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski confirmed in an interview with the French Le Nouvel Observateur, the U.S. was financing an Islamic resistance against the Afghan government long before the Soviets invaded. Indeed part of the intent of pushing such a resistance was to drag the Soviet Union into its Vietnam:

Q: The former director of the CIA, Robert Gates, stated in his memoirs ["From the Shadows"], that American intelligence services began to aid the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan 6 months before the Soviet intervention. In this period you were the national security adviser to President Carter. You therefore played a role in this affair. Is that correct?

Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahadeen began during 1980, that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan, 24 Dec 1979. But the reality, secretly guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.

Israel's relentless campaign to incite a U.S. led military attack on Iran intensified this year. It will further intensify next year and will continue until the bombs fall on Tehran.

With many U.S. troops still in Iraq and Afghanistan a low risk military attack is not yet possible. But by the end of 2011 U.S. troops will likely have left Iraq and by the end of 2014 they will probably have left Afghanistan. After that an attack on Iran is very likely.

The history of the war on Iraq has shown that the chance of a low risk attack can and will be furthered by long years of ever increasing sanctions and a parallel campaign of brainwashing of the U.S. public. That is why the ongoing campaign against Iran is extremely dangerous.

The only people who argue with some success against that campaign, against war and for a big U.S.-Iran relation realignment are Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverett. At their blog, the Race for Iran, they are asking for  contributions to help that cause.

If you can, please send them some $$$s.

The Washington establishment is turning against last years darling General Petraeus.

A public warning shot against him was fired today by the Washington Post's David Ignatius. It starts off with a great but deadly line:

If briefings could win wars, Gen. David Petraeus would already be finished in Afghanistan.

Ooch.

Now Ignatius has certainly more friends in the CIA than in the Pentagon and this shot may well come from the three letter agencies with Ignatius just being their usual mouth piece. The intelligence community is certainly not convinced of Petraeus happy review of the Afghanistan campaign, marketed as progress by the Obama administration. The recent National Intelligence Estimates of Afghanistan and Pakistan were very negative.

Additionally a leaked UN map shows a deterioration of the security situation and various aid groups have serious doubts that the Taliban are on the run. The new year outlook by the experts at the Afghanistan Analysts Network is also full of gloom and doom.

So Ignatius is justified in his critic even if it is a CIA plant. He states:

History shows that three variables are crucial in countering an insurgency: a real process of reconciliation, no safe havens for the enemy and a competent host government. None are present in Afghanistan.

He asks Petraeus how these can be fixed. He is unlikely to get answers as there is no ready fix available.

One has to note that this was obvious from the beginning. The Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (pdf), copied by its "author" Petraeus from an older Vietnam version, refers to legitimacy as the core of COIN:

Legitimacy is the Main Objective
1-90. The primary objective of any counterinsurgent is to foster the development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

The U.S. imposed government in Afghanistan and its unelected president and parliament have no legitimacy at all. COIN and its pope Petraeus are thereby the wrong answer for Afghanistan.

A good answer would include a serious reconciliation effort which would give the Taliban a chair at a new government table. It would include a U.S. led regional truce and 'stay out' agreement with all neighbor countries of Afghanistan (but would exclude India).

But the Obama administration is too coward to go that way. It will rather follow the troop reduction the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Haas, proscribed which -in the end- will be a simple withdrawal without any political solution. And here is the second hint that Petraeus will (rightly) be sacrificed. Hass closes his piece:

[I]t is the commander-in-chief's responsibility to take into account the nation's capacity to meet all of its challenges, national and international. It is for this reason that the perspectives of Gen. Petraeus and President Obama must necessarily diverge.

Not only the perspectives …

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

I often told the US Ambassador that he should contact myself and the Afghan Embassy directly and not try to solve the problems they had with Afghanistan though the mediation of the government of Pakistan or its administration. “Pakistan”, I told him, “is never an honest mediator and will control and manipulate any talk they mediate or participate in”. I passed on the same advice to all other diplomats and embassies, as well as the United Nations.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 12. Diplomatic Principles

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

Working in the field of diplomacy without any experience in such a fragile and charged environment was a monumental task. I knew about the difficult situation and the role that the embassy in Islamabad played in the events that were unfolding. All this left me concerned upon hearing the announcement of my appointment as ambassador.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 11. A Monumental Task

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

I was still upset when I returned to Kabul. I had no wish to return to government, but going to prison wasn’t a serious alternative and I had sworn in Sangisar to stand by Mullah Mohammad Omar no matter what. After two days in Kabul I was appointed the Deputy Minister of Mines and Industries. Amir ul-Mu’mineen had written a decree that was announced over the radio. A few days later I was officially introduced at the ministry by members of the Independent Administration of Affairs.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 10. Mines And Industries

Just in:

Israeli forces have killed a Palestinian man and wounded five others in tank shelling and gunfire attack on Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip.
…
The incident comes two days after two Palestinians died in Khan Yunis after Israeli soldiers launched a gun battle in the area.

There has been an increase in incidents this month with Israel shooting and bombing Palestinians on Gaza while various Israeli officials threaten further attacks:

"The IDF is working hard to deal with this issue. I'm not waiting for a disaster to happen," said [Deputy Defense Minister] Vilnai

Historian Ilan Pappe fears that Israel is planing another Gaza massacre:

There is no new plan for Gaza – there is no real desire to occupy it and put in under direct Israeli rule. What is suggested is to pound the Strip and its people once more, but with more brutality and for a shorter time.
…
The scenario for the next round is unfolding in front of our eyes and it resembles depressingly the same deterioration that preceded the massacre of Gaza two years ago: daily bombardment on the Strip and a policy that tries to provoke Hamas so that more expanded assaults would be justified.

I have no idea if Israel really plans another slaughter party. Already feeling delegitimized, it would only further international opinion into that direction. But would it really care?

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

After returning from Herat I decided to stay home for a month to reflect on the past few years, while my brother—who had since returned from his studies—stood in for me at the mosque. But before I could return to my mosque Mullah Mohammad Omar sent a car for me. His title had changed and he was now called Amir ul-Mu’mineen. We sat down in his office and he asked me about my health and my family. “It was a good idea to take a month off”, he told me. “It is good to rest. But now you should return to your work”.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 9. Administrative Rule

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

At the time the Taliban did not have any plans to extend their activities beyond those two districts. We were mainly thinking about our friends and neighbours, the villages and towns in which we lived. The situation had become so bad that something needed to be done, but no one seemed to be able or willing to try to stand up to the rogue commanders and bandits. We informed only the people along the road. But instead of complying with our calls for them to leave their checkpoints, the situation deteriorated.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 8. The Beginning

Reading Abdul Salam Zaeef: My Life with the Taliban:

For the next few years I lived in Pakistan but frequently visited Kandahar. In the early 1990s, after the fall of Najibullah and the arrival of the mujahedeen government, Afghanistan seemed to disintegrate.

Fighting had broken out in Kabul but soon swept down through the south. Local commanders such as Ustaz Abdul Haleem, Hajji Ahmad, Mullah Naqib and others were clashing within the city limits and in the surrounding districts for power and control. Fighting became so intense that it was impossible to live a normal life.

Cont. reading: Reading Zaeef: 7. Taking Action

One wonders why exactly "western" media and politicians are up in arms about the new guilty verdict against the former Russian oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

The man, as most of the other oligarchs, is of course guilty of stealing the Russian natural riches from the Russian people, of tax evasion and even more serious criminal stuff. The "western" media know this.

Even a cable from the Moscow embassy reported that the first trial against him was went as it should:

An observer for the International Bar Association stated his belief that the trial is being conducted fairly.

The first judgment against Khodorkovsky as well as the current second one are fair, legal and just.

What irks the "west" is that especially those oligarchs opposed to the democratically elected Putin administration ran into trouble. Says the cable:

It is not lost on either elite or mainstream Russians that the GOR has applied a double standard to the illegal activities of 1990s oligarchs; if it were otherwise, virtually every other oligarch would be on trial alongside Khodorkovskiy and Lebedev. There is a widespread understanding that Khodorkovskiy violated the tacit rules of the game: if you keep out of politics, you can line your pockets as much as you desire.

The "western" elites hate democracy. They had hoped to have an authoritarian Khodorkovsky as the head of Russia. A criminal, like Jelzin, who would sell out the Russian resources for nothing but some handsome bribes.

Unfortunately for them, democracy still rules in Russia. Unlike the people of the United States, who's  government in Washington is wholesome owned by Wall Street, the Russians, even while tolerating some stealing, will still fight against being also ruled by those thieves.

My Life With The Taliban is a subjective and naturally self-serving memoir of a Taliban fighter/commander/politician, Abdul Salam Zaeef. Zaeef was incarcerated and tortured by the United States in Guantanamo and elsewhere before being released in 2006.

The book is an important correction to the "western" history myth that sees the Taliban, Afghan religious scholars and students taking up arms, as a creation of the 1990s. Zaeef describes the Taliban as a distinct part of the mujaheddin fighting against the communist Afghan state and the Soviet occupiers. When the Soviets left, the Taliban laid down their arms and took them up again only when the warlord anarchy which followed the Soviet withdrawal became insufferable.

Zaeef's editors and translators Felix Kuehn and Alex Strick van Linschoten will further document this next year in their upcoming History of the Taliban.

The book also documents the deep believes, cultural conservatism and the breath of the Afghan national resistance against the Soviets. It is the same national resistance that is now winning against allegedly superior "western" occupation forces.

During the next days and while reading the book I will continue to publish a few subjectively selected paragraphs from each chapter. I hope that some of you will enjoy them. They may even motivate you to buy the book.

With the U.S. continuing to escalate the War On "AfPak", those countries and the war on them will certainly be the focus of further posts here. Reading Zaeef will hopefully set some context for that.

Some links to recent stories on the campaign in Afghanistan:

Cont. reading: On Reading Zaeef