Moon of Alabama Brecht quote
June 22, 2009
Iran: ‘There is very little logic at work’

[-c contacted me yesterday. She is a "perennial lurker" here and "an Iranian ex-pat living in the US". I asked her what she might want to add and the she wrote back the following . The text is unaltered  but for a personal closing paragraph directed to me which I decided to omit – b.]

by -c

I'm not really sure that anyone can add anything of value at this point. We have to wait to and see. Having said that, I will share my thoughts on what is happening now and what bothers me about what I see and hear. Apologies if my thoughts are disjointed; I've tried to lay them out as best I could. Believe it or not, I've also tried to keep it brief — there are many aspects to what is happening, and I only touch upon one or two that resonated with me.

I don't want to address the issue of election fraud because, frankly, I don't have a favorite in this race (I had serious problems with both candidates) and I can buy plausible scenarios for both having won. I also don't presume to speak for anyone else with my remarks. The relationship that the people of Iran have with the government is, like most things in this world, more nuanced than people on both sides would like to admit, and if one person says that they know that the majority of people feel a certain way, that person is lying. In any case, it seems as though we might be seeing the end of the protests, so some of what I write is moot. (But I will write it anyway! šŸ˜‰ )

The problem, in my view, is that there are three groups, all of whom are convinced that they are absolutely right and hold a majority: those who support Mousavi and think the election has been stolen from them, those who support Ahmadinejad and think that foreign elements are trying to steal the election from them, and those who hate the Islamic Republic and want it gone.

These people do not talk to each other, and they refuse to accept that the other side has valid concerns and/or solutions. No one in the country talks to those who have differing views, unless it is to insult them. Last week, I asked my cousin (a Mousavi supporter) what she wanted. She told me that she just wanted the government to count her vote, and she was upset that Ahmadinejad had insulted those who voted for Mousavi. She said that all they wanted was a re-vote, but when I asked what would happen if Ahmadinejad won the re-vote, she said that that would never happen. "But what if it did happen," I asked. "Would you accept the result?" Her answer? No, because it would mean that the government had cheated again. As has become clear to most people over the past week, there is very little logic at work in this situation, and it is that more than anything else that makes me despair for a solution to this conflict.

Regardless of what happens, there needs to be fundamental changes in how society operates. This atmosphere of isolation and disdain for people who have differing viewpoints, and the idea that compromise is for pussies, if you will, will break the country in the long term. That way lies civil war and massive bloodshed. Nevertheless, if the government can successfully paint a picture of foreign interference in the short term, I think they will come out on top. Iranians across the political spectrum are incredibly nationalistic, and I'm not sure how much they will be willing to tolerate if they get the impression that Western nations, particularly Britain and the U.S., are benefitting from the current unrest.

I mentioned in my earlier e-mail that I was disturbed by coverage of the protests in the United States. More than that though, I am disturbed by, and skeptical of, the manner in which the opposition has proceeded. From the very beginning, there was a concerted effort to co-opt iconic images and chants of the 1979 revolution. For example, the AP, I think, had a neat page where they compared a photo of a gathering in Azadi from '79 to one from '09 and the staging was fairly close to identical. The shouting from rooftops and chants are eerily similar to or exactly the same as those used against the Shah. The Pinochet/Chile one was used originally in '79 as was the "I will kill whoever kills my brother".

I was a baby in 1979, but I do remember my childhood in Tehran. I remember how good people felt, not necessarily because of the new government (though Khomeini was incredibly popular), but because they had defeated a superpower that had crippled the country. I have always felt that the revolution, for all its faults, was an organic next step in opposition to the Shah. The chants, the gatherings, the shouting from the rooftops because of the oppressive regime, happened naturally because people had had enough. "Allah-o-akbar!" was chosen partly because of the Shah's offensive on religion. The Pinochet chant was used because Pinochet had come to power only a few years before with the help of the US government, and the people wanted to let the US know that Iran was different. This time, they trotted out these things one day after the elections ended. Being at least somewhat aware of their original meaning(s), it was jarring to hear them used in a situation to which they weren't really relevant.

The other day, one of my co-workers marveled at how organized the protesters were, and she said that some American movements could use organization like that. And you know what? She's right. But I believe that the movement (at least in its current incarnation, and assuming that we are not seeing a color revolution in the works) is doomed to failure precisely because of the spectacular organization. In 1979, the protesters formed the chants. In 2009, the chants formed the protesters. This may work in the short term, but the problems people have with the government, the reasons they poured out onto the street, will not be solved by Mousavi or Rafsanjani coming to power. And if the protesters do somehow overthrow the government, we'll be in this same spot ten years from now because a large segment of the population, the ones who really did vote for Ahmadinejad, will have been disenfranchised.

In speaking to my aunt in Tehran, her greatest desire is that things calm down. She is terrified for her children who have to go to the university, where much of the violence was happening earlier, and rapidly growing tired of the disruption to her life by both rioters and the Basij. Of course, as someone who wishes only the best for the country and its people, I certainly hope that the worst of the violence has passed. My own personal hope for the country is that Iran one day be allowed to govern itself without outside interference. I thought that day was here, but I guess not.

At the end of the day, while I have my own preferences about the kind of government I want, I don't really care about the political or social orientation of the person that can make that independence happen: communist, socialist, conservative, religious, secular. It doesn't matter to me. All I want is for the people of Iran to be able to choose whether or not they want a revolution, not to have one foisted upon them. If the Iranian people truly want a revolution, then by all means, they should go out and protest and try to overthrow the government.

Then again, if the Iranian people truly wanted a revolution, the protesters would not need to be begging for help from people in foreign countries.

-c

Comments

I don’t believe a democratic, secular, nationalistic government could be overthrown so easily
Democratic secular governments DON’T NEED TO BE OVERTHROWN because they’re so cheaply purchased.
The point by “C” about how much each Iranian faction hates the other and won’t listen to reason – that’s the very basis of Neocon strategy. Shatter the existing power structure dramatically, instead of replacing it slowly, so that no new structure is in place. That way sectarianism can triumph and nobody cares to look beyond their borders at the rape and pillage of Palestine.

Posted by: airtommy | Jun 23 2009 6:51 utc | 201

Lizard’s response @200 says it all really. The armchair slagging off the guy on the ground.

Posted by: Alex_no | Jun 23 2009 8:12 utc | 202

I have been dithering since the Iran election over whether there was fraud or not, but there does seem to be some indications of something fishy.
The Chatham House report at: http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/14234_iranelection0609.pdf
is very much worth reading (Thanks Amir S @2)
Money quotes:
• In two Conservative provinces, Mazandaran and Yazd, a turnout of
more than 100% was recorded. (Add that to the ‘infill’ between, say, a ‘normal’ 85% turnout and just 100%, and the figures look cooked. Mazandaran, near the Caspian Sea, maybe overfull of holidaymakers, but Yazd, in the middle of the desert, isn’t -R).
• In a third of all provinces , the official results would require that
Ahmadinejad took not only all former conservative voters, and all
former centrist voters, and all new voters, but also up to 44% of former
Reformist voters
, despite a decade of conflict between these two
groups.
(That’s a massive, and perhaps doubtful, swing – R)
• In 2005, as in 2001 and 1997, conservative candidates, and
Ahmadinejad in particular, were markedly unpopular in rural areas.

That the countryside always votes conservative is a myth. The claim
that this year Ahmadinejad swept the board in more rural provinces
flies in the face of these trends.
• According to the official data, Mahmud Ahmadinejad has received
approximately 13m more votes in this election than the combined conservative
vote in the 2005 Presidential election

Ahemdinajad 2009 – 24,515,209
Ahmedinajad 2005 – 5,711,254
Other Conservatives -2005 – 5,808,317
(In other words, Ahmedinajad almost quintupled his vote over the past 4 years. Surely a popular guy, so why the huge demonstrations? – R)
• In 2005, the more rural a province was, the less support there was for
the three conservative candidates combined. (Fig 5 in the report)
In 2009 the trends described by Fig.4 and Fig.5 have disappeared, and
Ahmadinejad is universally supported (Fig 6)
• The 2009 data suggests a sudden shift in political support with precisely these
rural provinces, which had not previously supported Ahmadinejad or any other
conservative (Fig.5), showing substantial swings to Ahmadinejad (Fig.6). At
the same time, the official data suggests that the vote for Mehdi Karrubi, who
was extremely popular in these rural, ethnic minority areas in 2005, has
collapsed entirely even in his home province of Lorestan, where his vote has
gone from 440,247 (55.5%) in 2005 to just 44,036 (4.6%) in 2009
. This is paralleled by an overall swing of 50.9% to Ahmadinejad, with official results
suggesting that he has captured the support of 47.5% of those who cast their
ballots for reformist candidates in 2005
. This, more than any other result, is
highly implausible, and has been the subject of much debate in Iran.
This increase in support for Ahmadinejad amongst rural and ethnic minoritiy
voters is out of step with previous trends, extremely large in scale, and central
to the question of how the credibility of Ahmadinejad’s victory has been
perceived within Iran.
(Now he may have captured this massive swing by doling ut cash and potatoes, but either way it suggests either massive voter bribery, or fraud – R).
I agree with b’s analyses on most (almost all) subjects, but I feel he took a leftist position on this one from the start, and is sticking to his guns.
Can’t MoA rustle up just one Ahmedinajad fan from those 24,515,209 Iranians who are supposed to have voted for him?
I sympathise and agree more with Parviz, c, and Amir S, who, as Iranians, have a somewhat more personal stake in the outcome of all this.
But Parviz, who is attacked by old codger leftist regulars on this forum, should refrain from using personal, ad hominem epithets. SHIT and CRAP don’t fit well with serious discussions. Just rebut all their old leftist pretences.

Posted by: richard | Jun 23 2009 10:16 utc | 203

Thanks, Alex. I presciently wrote:
“I don’t have problems communicating with Cynthia or with ThePaper or China_Hand even when I disagree with their views. It’s some of the others to whose provocations I respond in kind.”
… and guess who crawled out of the woodwork?
And referring to the photos I sent Bernhard, the same person writes:
“did you take the picture? when? where?”
Well, no, and I didn’t take the video of Neda being murdered either.
I have enough problems responding to the numerous posts from bona fide members (Arnold_Evans asks me a new question with every post — Sorry, Arnold) without having to cope with such slaggers.

Posted by: Parviz | Jun 23 2009 10:17 utc | 204

you’re right, alex, guess i’m just a soulless armchair slagger who hates the iranian people.

Posted by: Lizard | Jun 23 2009 10:42 utc | 205

In short, someone who has a lot of credibility discussing Israel and the U.S. suddenly lost all credibility when he stated that in THIS particular case the U.S. had nothing to do with it. Up came a host of messages about the CIA’s support of the Jundullah, the $$$ hundreds of millions approved by Congress for anti-Iran activities and criticism of any news network displaying pictures and videos shot not by them but by the actual demonstrators on the ground.
You Ahmadinejad supporters at MoA are backing the wrong horse. Iran will fall apart if he stays in power, just as the Soviet Union did in spite of its massive militarization and paranoid anti-Americanism. He no longer has legitimacy among the people, and he has dragged the so-called ‘Spiritual’ Leader (whose son Mojtaba has become a multi-billionaire out of nothing) into the sewer with him.
The legitimacy of this regime was well and truly shot on June 12th. It will take either ‘regime change’ or ‘massive change within the regime’ to stabilize the nation domestically. Meanwhile, we have 50 % inflation (officially 25 %), factories closing left and right despite 10 times the revenues during Khatemi’s presidency, 25 % unemployment, serial killings, an out-of-control mercenary militia, religious hypocrisy and superstition, transfer of the nation’s means of production and wealth entirely into the hands of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, an accelerated brain drain, hundreds of executions of youngsters and homosexuals, trials in secret, torture, a permanent state of social and intellectual intimidation, widespread media and internet censorship and ……. I could go on all day and night.
MoA thinks Iranians, 70 % of them relatively young, highly educated, energetic and nationalistic, have to be ‘persuaded by some hidden foreign hand’ to rise up and protest? Really?

Posted by: Parviz | Jun 23 2009 10:47 utc | 206

richard@203
Now he may have captured this massive swing by doling ut cash and potatoes, but either way it suggests either massive voter bribery, or fraud – R
why is this voter bribery any more than doling out food-stamps, Section-8, selective tax-breaks, massive subsidies for farmers & big-agro, school vouchers, bailouts for big-banks & big-auto, …
also, I’n not sure how useful it is to try to break down voting patterns in Iran along the lines of reformist vs conservative especially when you have an incumbent like Ahmadinejad. If I had to characterize Ahmadinejad, I think populist comes a lot closer.
having watched this, I suspect there were at the very least, some significant irregularities in the election. But its very hard to see how a vote-theft of the size alleged could have been achieved through isolated or unrelated fraud. It would have required a conspiracy by a good number of people to pull it off (assuming massive result-falsification at the top is not a factor). It may turn out thats what happened. Or that it did’nt happen.
The Iranian authorities have agreed to release box-by-box counts. So theres more info and analysis ahead.

Posted by: jony_b_cool | Jun 23 2009 11:10 utc | 207

@207: Did you carefully read the report? Or merely glance through it? I suspect the latter. The Report clearly suggests, to quote your own phrase
“massive result-falsification at the top”

Posted by: Parviz | Jun 23 2009 11:16 utc | 208

gee parviz, i don’t know why someone would respond negatively to the implication that they have “lost their soul” and hate the iranian people.
let me repeat, one more time, that i have never discounted the possibility of fraud, and i don’t support ahmadinejad. i’m not backing either “horse”, i don’t know enough to have an informed opinion about what is happening, i’ve tried following all the varying views being expressed, and have consistently pointed out, to parviz, that he has participated equally in attacking and provoking folks here who have expressed justifiable skepticism.
that’s all.

Posted by: Lizard | Jun 23 2009 11:17 utc | 209

also, lest we forget, the first comment to b’s post on June 14th was parviz, who opened his comment with the following:
b, I have never read such unadulterated crap, and I mean NEVER.
The fraud was so transparent that anyone denying it is either ideologically tainted or just plain stupid.

Posted by: Lizard | Jun 23 2009 11:25 utc | 210

Parviz, no apology has ever been necessary, but if #204 has an apology for not answering questions it is accepted.
I want to say that I am in favor of change in Iran and think there are policies of Iran’s government that are wrong both morally in respect to its citizens and also in practical terms as in they prevent Iran from being as powerful as I’d like it to be.
I am not a regime supporter on the basis of the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
But it seems plausible to me that Ahmadinejad won. The reports of the three million votes came with the explanation that they were the result of people voting away from their home district, which seems plausible in a very-high turnout election. I think it is possible that Ahmadinejad won the debates, despite the effect they had of turning you further against him, and Rafsanjani’s letter against him may have made the aftermath of the debates more favorable to him still.
So there are protesters against Ahmadinejad and in favor of Mousavi. Mondale lost a landslide in 1984 and there was a large number of people who supported Mondale, enough to cripple the country if they organized together to do so. That did not mean they were the majority. I do not believe Mousavi supporters or protesters are the majority of the country.
The reports of Mousavi’s claims of irregularities seem unconvincing to me. In his public complaint to the Guardian Council he did not claim that none of the votes were counted or that all local-based counting was suspended and even if he doesn’t trust the Guardian Council, that was a place to give his best explanation of what exactly he believes went wrong with the election, why he does not trust it.
I feel that Mousavi is acting very irresponsibly, and that Mondale, in similar circumstances could have acted the same and gotten his supporters, especially his core supporters worked up enough that they would risk their lives, essentially for nothing, but Mondale could claim it is for fundamental change in the government or society or something.
If Mondale did that, I would wonder if he had some organized outside backing, but in Mousavi’s case it could well be that his only backing is Rafsanjani and that faction, or it could well be that it is Mousavi’s own ego driving this. Or it is possible, I don’t claim and don’t necessarily believe that it is driven by the CIA. But there are signs that Mousavi’s tactics are similar to tactics of previous CIA-sponsored revolutions. But that could be coincidence. I don’t think there is necessarily the connection.
I thought Mondale’s supporters were right, and Reagan was a bad guy. I think Mousavi’s supporters have a lot of valid criticisms of Iran’s government.
I think Iran’s government takes enough input a wide enough swathe of Iranian society that it is capable of change internally, and I do not see indications that Mousavi is more committed to the democratic process than Khomeini was. Khomeini could have transformed Iran into a hereditary dictatorship with no restraints from an elected Assembly of Experts and no input from Iran’s people and did not because he felt it would have been religiously wrong to do so. I don’t know that I would have trusted Khomeini to do that, but I don’t trust Mousavi to do that. I see a Musharraf scenario, of ad-hoc usurpations of power and an indefinite suspension of any limitations on his office as just as probably under Mousavi.
To Mondale and Mousavi supporters I say, the vote indicates that you really do not have the popular support to win an election, much less complete a revolution.
Does Iran have a consensus behind a “go west” strategy as opposed to a “go east” strategy? No. If it did, Iran would go west. There is also no national consensus around relaxing religious restrictions, which I think is wrong but Iranians have to be convinced, and I’m sure the pro-Mousavi protests are not the way to convince them.
There is a consensus around reducing corruption, but Ahmadinejad and Mousavi both say they support that. Iran could easily believe Ahmadinejad, the one who carries his lunch from home to work and who named Rafsanjani by name, saying what a lot of people already knew but wouldn’t say in public, is the best candidate to fight corruption.
By my understanding a major motivation behind Rafsanjani’s support for a go west strategy is that he would benefit from it personally.
So those are my views on Iran’s election and the situation today. I don’t see a point in further protests. I expect a general strike to fizzle out, if it is really launched. I mourn all of the deaths. I wish they had not happened and consider them naive sacrifices to either Mousavi’s ego or the forces behind Mousavi that I do not consider good, if they are the CIA or Rafsanjani.

Posted by: Arnold Evans | Jun 23 2009 11:33 utc | 211

But by design or accident, Mousavi’s actions from the day of the vote until today have been exactly what the US would have ordered to get the most possible destabilization of Iran out of the election. There is nothing a party interested in harming Iran could have asked Mousavi to do that Mousavi has not done. There are many things Mousavi could have done, if he was primarily motivated by a genuine concern that there had been electoral fraud that he has not done. In my opinion, Mousavi has joined the Shah and Sadat as great betrayers of the interests of their people. Hopefully, unlike the Shah and Sadat, the damage Mousavi does will be contained.

Posted by: Arnold Evans | Jun 23 2009 13:06 utc | 212

For my part, i think that Mousavi and others had these protests planned before the election, and that they simply didn’t ‘try very hard’ to keep it from Western intelligence agencies. Open collaboration with the CIA wouldn’t be necessary.
I think Mousavi/Rafsanjani have been bold, took a very great risk by doing what they’ve done, and have succeeded at opening up a space for maneuvering should they, at some time in the not-too-distant future, decide they need to face off against the Basij and the IRGC. It’s a pretty amazing move, and a memorable historical moment that i hope may yet provoke some steps towards the lofty promises we’ve been hearing (but i doubt it).
That said, however: i still haven’t seen much in the way of evidence the election actually was stolen, even as i’ve seen the Western media building a (largely unfounded) narrative that may well be used to badly abuse the people of Iran.
In recent days i’ve begun to see some more believable allegations — the anomalies quoted in 203 are quite provocative — and the recent BBC article brought up some new points (for a change). Perhaps time will tell if those have any substance. For the moment, though….
And i agree with Arnold Evans: i think Mousavi’s been extremely irresponsible, and his supporters naively manipulated.

Posted by: china_hand2 | Jun 23 2009 13:22 utc | 213

the Chatham House report definitely moves my assessment significantly closer to the likelihood that there were significant irregularities. (Sorry if that sounds weaselish). Not all by itself but also thanks to a better understanding of Iran’s voting/counting process.
However, it should be noted that only two provinces (Yazd and Mazandaran) were observed to have had over 100% turnout. So lets put this in context. There were also some three provinces that had turnouts of 75% or less. If we accept turnouts as low as 71% (West Azerbaijan), in order to get to the final total turnout of 85%, we should not be too surprised to see turnouts higher than 90% in other provinces and this is statistical reality.
[Disclaimer: Let me also note that I consider the total turnout (85%) as a factor thats quite worthy of sceptism.]
hence the announced provincial turnouts of over 100% are much less troubling than if the total turnout had been 65% for example rather than 85%.
it also bothers me that the Chatham report relies very strongly on factors :
1) comparisons with 2005
2) ethnic-based presumptions
3) political labels (conservative/reformist)
to put it this way, there is more potential for introducing unhelpful bias as a result of these assumptions than the Chatham authors seem to believe.
I think Mousavi should try to cut the best deal he can that gives the reformists including the brave souls protesting on the street, as much as he can get for now, including election reforms.

Posted by: jony_b_cool | Jun 23 2009 13:29 utc | 214

I find the Chatham report not provocative at all. Really, these could have been applied to Reagan’s victory in 1984, he won a lot of votes that he was not supposed to win if you assume Carters voters in 1980 would vote for him again. That’s what a 62% victory is.
I’m waiting for “I was ordered to change the ballots”. That is not much to ask for because a _lot_ of people would have to be in on turning a Mousavi win, or a slim Ahmadinejad win into a 63% landslide.
It turns out that the rumors of all voting being done centrally were not in Mousavi’s complaint to the Guardian Council. Instead he complained that there were polling locations where he did not have monitors and things like that that really are not of the scale to produce the numbers Ahmadinejad produced. And Mousavi knows it.
A lot of people transmitted their district’s results to Tehran. I’m waiting for “the official results say Ahmadinejad won my district, but when I remember counting the results and I told Tehran that Mousavi won.” This had to happen a lot, in a lot of districts and Rafsanjani could put Khamenei out of power if he got evidence like that. We have not seen that and now we can say we have not seen it because it does not exist.
We are way past the point of “these results do not align with my expectations for the election”. That never was evidence, but certainly not a more than week later with supposed fraud being Iran’s primary national issue since the election.
But that is all the evidence Mousavi has. It is not evidence at all.

Posted by: Arnold Evans | Jun 23 2009 13:39 utc | 215

Arnold Evans
Well, to be fair, Walter Mondale’s campaign representatives were actually present whilst the ballots were both cast and counted all across America – it would have been a tad difficult for them to dispute the result after having agreed that they lost. In addition there was months and months of pre-election polling by a variety of different organisations, coupled with extensive exit-polling on the day itself; that Mondale lost was not a matter of debate, or surprise – that’s what happens when the “process” is sufficiently robust, free and transparent – and whilst bitching about the result is one thing, disputing the result in the face of an agreed set of facts makes it difficult to maintain any credibility.
Khomeini could never have transformed Iran into a hereditary system – he authored, with help from others, an explicitly republican constitution.
I simply cannot understand this fixation with Rafsanjani. Was Rafsanjani’s image on Mousavi’s election literature? No. Did Rafsanjani campaign with Mousavi? No. Is Mousavi’s political programme borrowed from Rafsanjani? No.
Mousavi is “representing”, for want of a better phrase, the Khatami agenda. Do you know who Khatami is and the role he played in the election campaign? Do you know anything about his record whilst he held the presidency between 1997 and 2005? What his failures and successes were? Why he failed in some things? Why, having been cleared to run again for the presidency this time, he withdrew and made common cause with Mousavi? Instead of exclusively focussing on the “bete noire” figure, don’t you think it might be worth some of your time to also consider the role of Khatami in the Mousavi campaign?
Look, Mousavi is representing a coalition of groups – Rafsanjani is indeed in this group, but it is much, much wider than him. Do you know why Rafsanjani, Khatami, Mousavi and a large slice of the reformist “camp” have got together for this election as opposed to 2005, when between them they fielded no less than 3 candidates plus Karroubi in the first round?

Posted by: dan | Jun 23 2009 14:55 utc | 216

[comment by Parviz via email – b]
Sorry, Arnold, I can’t let this go. Read the Chatham House Report in full, and then let’s discuss it, bit by bit. FYI, Chatham House has in the past strongly supported Khamenei’s anti-U.S. policies and took great pains to expose U.S. Neocon treachery in response to Iran’s invaluable assistance post-9/11 as well as the Neocon outright rejection of Iran’s peace overtures in 2003. They have continually justified Khamenei’s foreign policy.
However, on this particular subject Chatham House comes down fairly and squarely (but couched in restrained academic language) on the side of those who claim MASSIVE nationwide polling AND computer fraud.
If the Guardian Council claims there were “3 million extra votes”, then why weren’t there a corresponding “3 million fewer votes” elsewhere? You mean everyone suddenly went on holiday during the voting in spite of furious debates during the preceding week that had the entire population riveted to their seats?
Here are just 2 excerpts (but I suggest you read the entire academic study carefully before commenting further):
In a third of all provinces, the official results would require that Ahmadinejad took not only all former conservative voters, all former centrist voters, and all new voters, but also up to 44% of former reformist voters, despite a decade of conflict between these two groups.
Roukema’s application of statistical fraud detection techniques to the ā€˜by district’ data has turned up some anomalies with respect to the figures for Karrubi’s vote which may suggest that they were created by a computer.

Much of the data is taken from the Ministry of the Interior’s own published data on statistical trends, which were fully contradicted by the data in this election.
Also, Arnold, your analogy about the Mondale vote is less appropriate than would be a comparison with the 2000 Florida election. If Gore supporters had taken to the streets and questioned the road blocks preventing Afro-Americans from voting, the disqualification of some who did vote, the chads and the Supreme Court’s imposition and last-minute cancellation of deadlines for presenting contrary evidence, the U.S.A. would not have been landed with Bush/Cheney/Wolfowitz/Rumsfeld.
This is exactly what we are fighting against, supported by evidence of massive nationwide polling fraud plus manipulation of data inputted by the Ministry of Information IT Department (the head of which, Mahmood Asgari, has mysteriously disappeared). This isn’t about a few thousand votes for Mondale or Gore. We’re talking 8-figure fraud.
[end comment by Parviz via email – b.]

Posted by: b | Jun 23 2009 15:02 utc | 217

@Parviz – for the third time or so. The Guardian Council never ever talked of “3 million extra votes”. You are making that up even after this has been corrected several times up-thread.
Here is the quote:

In response to the complaints that the number of votes in some provinces exceeded the number of eligible voters, Kadkhodaii explained that this occurred because there is no law requiring people to vote in their place of residence and people can vote anywhere in the country.
ā€œIt was decided that a number inspectors should go to the Statistics Organization (to examine the issue). However, the total of the votes in these constituencies amounts to three million votes, which cannot change the results of the election,ā€ he stated.

Oh, you do not trust Tehran Times, well take Reuters:

The authorities reject charges of fraud but a spokesman for Iran’s top legislative body, which is looking into complaints by the defeated election candidates, conceded that the number of votes had surpassed eligible voters in some constituencies.
But he said the total votes in these constituencies did not exceed 3 million and consequently would not have any impact on the election,” he said.

Stop making things up. It does not help your argument at all.

Posted by: b | Jun 23 2009 15:12 utc | 218

This is how disingenuous the pro-AN theocratic fascism argument is here: Mousavi’s “victory” is no more a victory than was Mondale’s in 1984! Christ.

Posted by: slothrop | Jun 23 2009 15:38 utc | 219

> ensley at 90 –
I made some rough calculations on what were certainly incomplete and possibly ā€˜bad’ numbers raising the possibility, but not more, that over-voting (multiple voting by voters themselves, not counting / announcement mistakes or lies) within the Iranian system (as I understand it) could occur. I don’t know enough about Iran to judge if Iranians would/do or would not do this, in any case that would be opinion and not fact. I was thinking about the system itself and the possibilities for cheating within it.
I knew Parviz would jump on my comment of him being on the right track – any support gleefully accepted. All I meant was that if ā€˜fraud’ corrupted this election, that would be a *first* place to look. So far, nothing salient has emerged about other aspects. (imho.)
One needs solid numbers to work with – difficult as Iran has no electoral lists, so there are imponderables all over.
Said that if extra-voting took place, it would, in theory, be distributed over the candidates in the proportion to their support (barring strong hypotheses of some group acting in a particular way.) the 3 million number comes out of thin air as far as I can see. It sounds impressive, but even that number could be explained ..by pop. numbers themselves (uncertain), a very high turn-out, etc. But who am I. Reaching any tempered conclusion would be tough, and could always be contested. I’ll spare you my own estimate based on the bad numbers.
Note, NYT on June 22:
Iran’s most powerful oversight council announced on Monday that the number of votes recorded in 50 cities exceeded the number of eligible voters there by three million, further tarnishing a presidential election that has set off the most sustained challenge to Iran’s leadership in 30 years. link
If this is true, i.e. that is the oversight council actually did state it (the NYT garbles and invents) that goes in the direction of multiple-voting, as speculated before.
What does it all mean?
opinion = That the PTB in Iran are as clueless as everyone else, and don’t track elections or electoral procedures carefully, with rigor. (As in other countries. US is dismal, say.) And they don’t have a grasp of the nos. That over-voting is possibly part of the culture. That they counted on BAU, and got caught short, now have to backtrack, etc. in an unexpected fashion. Or whatever.

Posted by: Tangerine | Jun 23 2009 15:56 utc | 220

Afro-Americans
Haven’t heard that one in a while. Does anyone with an Afro qualify?

Posted by: Obamageddon | Jun 23 2009 16:20 utc | 221