It isn’t surprising, because most Iranians also consider him as Hitler, with the only difference being that he didn’t build up Iran’s infrastructure the way Hitler rebuilt Germany. We Iranians got the worst of both worlds.

Posted by: Parviz | Jun 16 2009 11:39 utc | 4

Channel 4 video of people attacking/burning a headquarter and getting shot at by a defender.
@Parviz – It isn’t surprising, because most Iranians also consider him as Hitler
That lets me conclude that most Iranians do not know shit about Hitler, his policies and orders.

Posted by: b | Jun 16 2009 11:55 utc | 6

Didn’t someone here post about a similar situation with a photo of an Ahmadinejad victory rally labeled as protesters against Ahmadinejad?
Tried to search for it, but nothing came up.
Now I’m not sure where I saw it….
Hey, one huge rally is as good as another when the point is to create doubt about the election’s validity.

Posted by: jawbone | Jun 16 2009 12:02 utc | 8

They’ve hated Iranian regime from dey 0, just as they – US,EU – hate every society that resemble on socialism and humanism. They “invented” gnome such as: Salman Rushdie, as a means to discredit Iranian regime and than society.
But this is not about ordinary people, not class struggle. This is fight of demagogues.
This is primarily struggle within Iranian governing class; Conservative and Neoconservative fraction, and the kids on the street do not know what they are doing! They will get access to Facebook, jeans, Twitter, credit cards, etc., and then they will be enslaved and they will work for minimum wage for some of newly created “entrepreneur” who privatized national wealth with help of western “investitors”. It will be what is: Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, SA and/or Latvia,Bulgaria or Mexico, and many other in East Europe,Africa today. Faceless country, mired in debt of several billions of dollars, Iran will be news when IMF rush there with it’s “life support” of newly printed worthless currency called dollar. As for collateral: it will be assets – natural gas and petroleum, 1/6 proven world’s reserve natural gas is located in Iran.

Posted by: balkanac | Jun 16 2009 12:14 utc | 10

So many are portraying Moussavi as the saviour of democracy for Iran while ignoring his actual record while he was in power. Here’s what the Angry Arab wrote yesterday about him:

When he was prime minister back in the 1980s, he presided over a regime far more oppressive than Ahmadinajad’s.

As for the election we do have evidence – an indepedent poll taken by another country coinciding with the actual election results, and televized election debates wherein the incombant won and exposed the connection between Moussavi and Rafsanjani, and Moussavi declaring victory long before the election count was released. There is no hard evidence presented to this date indicating the election was fixed. Interesting that the main powers behind this struggle are Khomeini and Rafsanjani battling for control of the real power in Iran.

Posted by: Sam | Jun 16 2009 13:30 utc | 12

Sam (comment 13)
I hope this was a typo: ‘Khomeini’ in your last sentence (probably meaning ‘Khamenei’).
—
A voice from the wilderness (from the streets of Teheran)
http://ehsanakhgari.org/blog/2009-06-15/glimpse-hope
(that person is a contributor to the browser some of you are using)

Posted by: Philippe | Jun 16 2009 13:43 utc | 14

What does the green banner at the upper left corner say and mean?

Posted by: rjj | Jun 16 2009 14:15 utc | 16

The word “protest” should read celebrate.
(My mantra, “keep it simple stupid”)

Posted by: ritalin | Jun 16 2009 14:56 utc | 18

Well, I’m sure hundreds of thousands did protest Ahmedinejad’s election. Iran is a bitterly divided country, with each factions’ members (even if not necessarily their leaders) totally convinced they represent “the people.” This is a recipe for a total disaster.

Posted by: kao-hsien-chih | Jun 16 2009 15:28 utc | 20

Thank you, balkanc and Sam. Exactly. I agree.

Posted by: Obamageddon | Jun 16 2009 15:57 utc | 22

@Cyntia – After a lot of back and forth, I have finally decided to side with Parviz on this one. From what I can tell, many of you here, including b, have concluded that Ahmadinejad won fair and square because you think this election is about the poor pitting themselves against the rich. But this sort of thinking is flawed for several reasons.
Now that is unfair. I have said and titled my posts about the issues “We don’t know”. We still do not know.
I find it more likely that Ahmadinejad won than that Mousavi won
a. because the TFT poll
b. because it is plausible give the real policies involved (and not the false “rightwing” vs. “moderate reformer” meme)
c. because Mousavi declared himself winner before the polls closed. This together with a pre-campaign in the “western” media that skewed the expectations is a sign of foul play by his part.
First of all, many Ahmadinejad supporters aren’t simply poor, most of them are also hellbent on keeping religion firmly entrenched in government.
Mousavi, Khatami and Rafsanjani are hellbent to achieve the same. All three are Mullahs. It was Ahmadinejad who wanted to open the soccer stadiums for women. The Mullahs were against it.
So if anything, this election, in my view, boils down to a battle between those who want theocracy to remain alive and well in Iran and those who want Iran to evolve into a more or less secular state.
Which is a totally false understanding of Mousavi who wants to “return” to Khomeini’s original teaching (according to Angry Arab).

Posted by: b | Jun 16 2009 16:09 utc | 24

Feel free to your opinion Cynthia.
I don’t think Ahmadinejad won fair and square, as much as I have not seen compelling or even reasonable evidence that Khamenei stole the election. And there would be evidence of a stolen election, and there are forces in Iran that are not beholden to Khamenei that would present the evidence if it existed. They may still find evidence and present it.
If I could pick a president for Iran, it would be Mousavi. He seems like less of a lightning rod for attacks on Iran and would be able to get a better deal on the nuclear issue and reducing the sanctions than Ahmadinejad will.
My liking Mousavi better does not mean that if Ahmadinejad wins then every single reported vote was fabricated. That is essentially Parviz’ argument. Of the dozens of people who would have had to be part of that conspiracy or provably know about it, have Rafsanjani, the richest person in Iran and elected chair of the elected Assembly of Experts, a body that has the power to remove the Supreme Leader, present one of these people exposing the fraud and the perpetrators of the fraud will be imprisoned.
If there was a massive fraud, there is evidence of such a fraud, and this fraud is contrary to the values of many of the participants. Someone will step forward. The person who steps forward will have protection and will have resources to ensure that his voice is heard.
So I am skeptical that there was a massive fraud even though I prefer Mousavi to Ahmadinejad.
Big rallies are not at all impressive to me, because we already knew Mousavi has millions of supporters. When there is evidence of fraud, we will not need rallies to reverse the election outcome.
These rallies hurt Iran, not least because people die in them, but they do not advance the cause of ensuring that votes are counted. Even if the elections were fair, the authorities would put down rallies that disrupt the functioning of society to too great a degree. The rallies are not proving the election was stolen.
The United States does not want Mousavi to be President under the current Iranian system, but it does want Iranian society to be as disrupted as possible for as long as possible. The rallies are playing into that interest of the United States.
A dream scenario for the United States would be that the rallies grow to a point where the Iranian system is forced to abdicate power and a figure who is friendly to US interests is able to take power. I do not see this as a likely scenario, but rallies seem more effective at bringing that about than they are at finding real electoral fraud committed by Khamenei, even if they are not designed to do install a pro-US dictator and will not do that.
So I’m hostile to the rallies and disagree with Parviz who supports the rallies. But not because I want to see Iran in any way be a backward country.
I also doubt the idea that Mousavi is much more progressive than Ahmadinejad on domestic issues. And I’m sure he is at least as corrupt and likely more corrupt.

Posted by: Arnold Evans | Jun 16 2009 16:21 utc | 26

Dan Mousavi is not a mullah.
You are right, sorry my mistake, thanks.

Posted by: b | Jun 16 2009 16:57 utc | 28

balkanac:
I know first hand from people in Iran that many of the guards speak only arabic. Thanks for this Spiegel article. Now I understand why. (many had thought they may be Iranian-Arabs, but Iranian-Arabs speak Farsi as well.) This completely fits with a the theory of militarist coup. The regular army is on the side of Rezai, who is with the Mousavi faction.
dan:
M.o.I. contacted Mousavi and told them that he had won the night of the elections. They then back tracked and said that A.N. had one. Then they “counted” 40,000,000 votes, -hand written ballots- in about 3 hours. Usually it takes 2 days. That night they shut off the power in Tehran. Mousavi won, A.N. committed a coup.
b:
I don’t understand how the decision or mistake of an editor at LA Times discredits a democracy movement in Iran. Your blog seems to be only a very shallow attack website on democracy in Iran. You selectively post only stories which fit your silly conspiracy theory, no matter how weak, and completely ignore all evidence to the contrary.
I won’t be coming back here,
—A.S.

Posted by: Amir S. | Jun 16 2009 17:13 utc | 30

West-East issues here Amir S, and I respect your decision.
MoA blog is the bastard child of the blog of Bill Montgomery.
Bernhard,(known as b here), started this for the folks who missed him when he decided that enough is enough. This blog therefore is born of Billmon’s cynical view of western economic policies and warcraft towards countries that have real tangible assets.
b, is just as cynical as Billmon.
It is just a blog. And Comment is Free.

Posted by: Cloned Poster | Jun 16 2009 17:33 utc | 32

the iranians who fled to the usa and other parts west prefer the dictatorship of the shah. they and their families made out. screw the country.

Posted by: papa bear | Jun 16 2009 17:37 utc | 34

Good old Bhadrakumar has written a good piece Rafsanjani’s gambit backfires. I am quoting below the interesting parts (although the whole should be read).

First, the ABC of the election. Who is Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmedinejad’s main opponent in the election? He is an enigma wrapped in mystery. He impressed the Iranian youth and the urban middle class as a reformer and a modernist. Yet, as Iran’s prime minister during 1981-89, Mousavi was an unvarnished hardliner. Evidently, what we have seen during his high-tech campaign is a vastly different Mousavi, as if he meticulously deconstructed and then reassembled himself.
This was what Mousavi had to say in a 1981 interview about the 444-day hostage crisis when young Iranian revolutionaries kept American diplomats in custody: “It was the beginning of the second stage of our revolution. It was after this that we discovered our true Islamic identity. After this we felt the sense that we could look Western policy in the eye and analyze it the way they had been evaluating us for many years.”
Most likely, he had a hand in the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Ali Akbar Mohtashami, Hezbollah’s patron saint, served as his interior minister. He was involved in the Iran-Contra deal in 1985, which was a trade-off with the Ronald Reagan administration whereby the US would supply arms to Iran and as quid pro quo Tehran would facilitate the release of the Hezbollah-held American hostages in Beirut. The irony is, Mousavi was the very anti-thesis of Rafsanjani and one of the first things the latter did in 1989 after taking over as president was to show Mousavi the door. Rafsanjani had no time for Mousavi’s anti-“Westernism” or his visceral dislike of the market.
Mousavi’s electoral platform has been a curious mix of contradictory political lines and vested interests but united in one maniacal mission, namely, to seize the presidential levers of power in Iran. It brought together so-called reformists who support former president Mohammad Khatami and ultra-conservatives of the regime. Rafsanjani is the only politician in Iran who could have brought together such dissimilar factions. He assiduously worked hand-in-glove with Khatami towards this end.
If we are to leave out the largely inconsequential “Gucci crowd” of north Tehran, who no doubt imparted a lot of color, verve and mirth to Mousavi’s campaign, the hardcore of his political platform comprised powerful vested interests who were making a last-ditch attempt to grab power from the Khamenei-led regime. On the one hand, these interest groups were severely opposed to the economic policies under Ahmadinejad, which threatened their control of key sectors such as foreign trade, private education and agriculture.
For those who do not know Iran better, suffice to say that the Rafsanjani family clan owns vast financial empires in Iran, including foreign trade, vast landholdings and the largest network of private universities in Iran. Known as Azad there are 300 branches spread over the country, they are not only money-spinners but could also press into Mousavi’s election campaign an active cadre of student activists numbering some 3 million.
The Azad campuses and auditoria provided the rallying point for Mousavi’s campaign in the provinces. The attempt was to see that the campaign reached the rural poor in their multitudes who formed the bulk of voters and constituted Ahmadinejad’s political base. Rafsanjani’s political style is to build up extensive networking in virtually all the top echelons of the power structure, especially bodies such as the Guardian Council, Expediency Council, the Qom clergy, Majlis, judiciary, bureaucracy, Tehran bazaar and even elements within the circles close to Khamenei. He called into play these pockets of influence.
Rafsanjani’s axis with Khatami was the basis of Mousavi’s political platform of reformists and conservatives. The four-cornered contest was expected to give a split verdict that would force the election into a run-off on June 19. The candidature of the former Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Mohsen Rezai (who served under Rafsanjani when he was president) was expected to slice off a chunk of IRGC cadres and prominent conservatives.
Again, the fourth candidate, Mehdi Karrubi’s “reformist” program was expected to siphon off support from Ahmedinejad, by virtue of his offer of economic policies based on social justice such as the immensely popular idea of distributing income from oil among the people rather than it accruing to the government’s budget.
Rafsanjani’s plot was to somehow extend the election to the run-off stage, where Mousavi was expected to garner the “anti-Ahmedinejad” votes. The estimation was that at the most Ahmedinejad would poll in the first round 10 to 12 million votes out of the 28 to 30 million who might actually vote (out of a total electorate of 46.2 million) and, therefore, if only the election extended to the run-off, Mousavi would be the net beneficiary as the votes polled by Rezai and Karrubi were essentially “anti-Ahmadinejad” votes.
The regime was already well into the election campaign when it realized that behind the clamor for a change of leadership in the presidency, Rafsanjani’s challenge was in actuality aimed at Khamenei’s leadership and that the election was a proxy war. The roots of the Rafsanjani-Khamenei rift go back to the late 1980s when Khamenei assumed the leadership in 1989.
Rafsanjani was among Imam Khomeini’s trusted appointees to the first Revolutionary Council, whereas Khamenei joined only at a later stage when the council expanded its membership. Thus, Rafsanjani always harbored a grouse that Khamenei pipped him to the post of Supreme Leader. The clerical establishment close to Rafsanjani spread the word that Khamenei lacked the requisite religious credentials, that he was indecisive as the executive president, and that the election process was questionable, which cast doubt on the legality of his appointment.
Powerful clerics, egged on by Rafsanjani, argued that the Supreme Leader was supposed to be not only a religious authority (mujtahid), but was also expected to be a source of emulation (marja or a mujtahid with religious followers) and that Khamenei didn’t fulfill this requirement – unlike Rafsanjani himself. The debunking of Khamenei rested on the specious argument that his religious education was in question. The sniping by the clerics associated with Rafsanjani continued into the early 1990s. Thus, Khamenei began on a somewhat diffident note and during much of the period when Rafsanjani held power as president (1989-1997), he acted low key, aware of his circumstances.
The result was that Rafsanjani exercised more power as president than anyone holding that office anytime in Tehran. But Khamenei bided his time as he incrementally began expanding his authority. If he lacked standing among Iran’s clerical establishment, he more than made up by attracting to his side the security establishment, especially the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC and the Basij militias.
While Rafsanjani hobnobbed with the clergy and the bazaar, Khamenei turned to a group of bright young politicians with intelligence or security backgrounds who were returning home from the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war – such as Ali Larijani, the present speaker of the Majlis, Said Jalili, currently the secretary of the National Security Council, Ezzatollah Zarghami, head of the state radio and television and, indeed, Ahmadinejad himself.
Power inevitably accrued to Khamenei once he won over the loyalty of the IRGC and the Basij. By the time Rafsanjani’s presidency ended, Khamenei had already become head of all three branches of the government and the state media, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and even lucrative institutions such as Imam Reza Shrine or the Oppressed Foundation, which have almost unlimited capacity for extending political patronage.
All in all, therefore, the power structure today takes the form of a vast patriarchal apparatus of political leadership. Thus, perceptive analysts were spot on while concluding that Ahmadinejad would never on his own volition have gone public and directly taken on Rafsanjani during the controversial TV debate on June 4 in Tehran with Mousavi.
Ahmadinejad said, “Today it is not Mr Mousavi alone who is confronting me, since there are the three successive governments of Mr Mousavi, Mr Khatami and Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani arrayed against me.” He took a pointed swipe at Rafsanjani for masterminding a plot to overthrow him. He said Rafsanjani promised the fall of his government to Saudi Arabia. Rafsanjani hit back within days by addressing a communication to Khamenei demanding that Ahmadinejad should retract “so that there would be no need of legal action”.
“I am expecting you to resolve the situation in order to extinguish the fire, whose smoke can be seen in the atmosphere, and to take action to foil dangerous plots. Even if I were to tolerate this situation, there is no doubt that some people, parties and factions will not tolerate this situation,” Rafsanjani angrily warned Khamenei.
Simultaneously, Rafsanjani also rallied his base in the clerical establishment. A clique of 14 senior clerics in Qom joined issue on his side. It was all an act of desperation by vested interests who have become desperate about the awesome rise of the IRGC in recent years. But, if Rafsanjani’s calculation was that the “mutiny” within the clerical establishment would unnerve Khamenei, he misread the calculus of power in Tehran. Khamenei did the worst thing possible to Rafsanjani. He simply ignored the “Shark”.
The IRGC and the Basij volunteers running into tens of millions swiftly mobilized. They coalesced with the millions of rural poor who adore Ahmadinejad as their leader. It has been a repeat of the 2005 election. The voter turnout has been an unprecedented 85%. Within hours of the announcement of Ahmadinejad’s thumping victory, Khamenei gave the seal of approval by applauding that the high voter turnout called for “real celebration”.
He said, “I congratulate … the people on this massive success and urge everyone to be grateful for this divine blessing.” He cautioned the youth and the “supporters of the elected candidate and the supporters of other candidates” to be “fully alert and avoid any provocative and suspicions actions and speech”.
Khamenei’s message to Rafsanjani is blunt: accept defeat gracefully and stay away from further mischief. Friday’s election ensures that the house of Supreme Leader Khamenei will remain by far the focal point of power. It is the headquarters of the country’s presidency, Iran’s armed forces, especially the IRGC. It is the fountainhead of the three branches of government and the nodal point of foreign, security and economic policies.
Obama may contemplate a way to directly engage Khamenei. It is a difficult challenge.

Posted by: a | Jun 16 2009 17:58 utc | 36

Yet the ledger of probabilities b has offered does not mention the untraditional and suspicious early announcement of who had won this election. Also there is the context of history of the clerical authority vetting and filtering who can stand for election in Parliament, plus the the massive boycott of recent presidential contests by the voters, and the massive turnout this time. The implication at least holds some higher probability that the enthusiasm to vote was to throw the bum out, rather than a lovefest for Ahmadinejad.
The pent up frustration of a young electorate is ignored to some degree in b’s analysis here. Of course, until we see hard proof we can’t yet conclude whether anecdotal evidence or charges that the ballot boxes have been sequestered behind closed doors, without any counting taking place, are true. Will there be a recount? Is the investigation called for by Khamenei to be the real thing or a whitewash? Will there ever be a transparent process, where disinterested parties or at least representatives of the other political factions can examine the ballots themselves, and be part of the recounting process?
It’s stupid of course to called Ahmadinejad Hitler, but this is just another distraction thrown into this argument we are having about what has really happened. I am hoping that the questions I raise and the questions others are raising here can be answered.
And there is also the matter of waves of goons on the street, and a particular style of bashing, with the presence of un-uniformed militia and reports of the invasion of campuses, which is especially sinister. Robert Fisk has witnessed the brutality in the streets. A kick in the balls and a baton in the face seems to be in fashion.

Posted by: Copeland | Jun 16 2009 18:52 utc | 38

Chris Floyd

Posted by: St | Jun 16 2009 19:03 utc | 40

@cyntia @33 – What you seem to be telling me is that Ahmadinejad is a hardliner, not because he wants to keep theocrats in charge of Iran, but because he wants to prevent neolibs from gaining control over Iran’s economy. And Mousavi is a reformer, not because he wants secularists in charge of Iran, but because he wants neolibs to gain control over Iran’s economy. Bottom line: this election has got nothing to do with religion; it has everything to do with the economy.
a. What is “hardline” in distributive economics? Take from the rich and give to the poor? Not that Ahmadinejad did that all out but at least he seems to have tried.
b. Keeping the theocrats in charge seems to me to be the program of Mousavi as much as Ahmadinejad. (notice Rafsanjani is a theocrat and the most rich man in Iraq. He’d love to be the theocratic supreme leader and get even richer)
c. I am not sure what Mousavi is, but I judge him from the attitude of those in power who back him. That do not seem to be the liberal/progressive folks “western” media assume/propagandize they are.
d. The votes in the election have to do with religion as much as economics. Religion and economics are hard to separate/differentiate in Islam. Economic sacrifice to further religious gains is quite normal in Islam (and original Christianity) and seems to drive a lot of the votes.
The elite fight over the election results seems to be much more over who gets the spoils of an economic change more than a religious base.
—
@Amir S. @30 – I don’t understand how the decision or mistake of an editor at LA Times discredits a democracy movement in Iran. Your blog seems to be only a very shallow attack website on democracy in Iran. You selectively post only stories which fit your silly conspiracy theory, no matter how weak, and completely ignore all evidence to the contrary.
I am doubtful about the “democratic” character of the current movement in the Tehran elite with English language “Where is my vote” posters on the street. Where are the numbers? Where are the facts or witnesses that would support the allegations of a really massive vote fraud? According to the official results Mousavi did win Tehran city. He can get a million people on the streets. So what. Is that the majority? Certainly not – not even in Tehran city and much less so in Tehran province or all over Iran
“Some folks at the interior ministry have told us Mousavi won …” Mousavi supporters say. Yeah, sure – “who do you believe me or your lying eyes”
Your blog seems to be only a very shallow attack website on democracy in Iran.
That is quite a shallow judgment on a blog that has been running for nearly five years with daily posts, many on Iran, of which you have read like 0.01%?
I won’t be coming back here,
That is your decision – so what?
You selectively post only stories which fit your silly conspiracy theory, no matter how weak, and completely ignore all evidence to the contrary.
If you had read the 200-300 comments in the last threads here on Iran you would have found all aspects and opinions to at least have been noticed here. You are free to post here. Make your case.
Write up a decent digestible piece that is based on facts and logical arguments respecting all sides. Email to moonofa_@_aol_._com or leave it as a comment and I’ll frontpage it.

Posted by: b | Jun 16 2009 19:26 utc | 42

Who is Mir Hossein Mousavi and his backer?
Rafsanjani: shark or kingmaker?

Posted by: balkanac | Jun 16 2009 19:40 utc | 44

If Amir is really trying to make us believe that the 10 million strong Pasdaran and Basij organization (which is the real power core behind the Islamic Republic, Khamenei hold on it, and Ahmadinejad presidency) needs the help of a small foreign lebanese militia then he has completely discredited himself and any attemp of portraying himself and this ‘revolution’ as something else as agitprop and phony manipulation.
So I will try to believe that it isn’t so and I’m misreading some of the comments.
If we start from the basis that Iran has been a dictatorship for 30 years and the power (included to decide who gets to be elected) is hold by the Supreme Leader, now Khamenei, this isn’t a coup by Khamenei or much less Ahmadinejad (a relatively low political figure in the power structure of the Islamic Republic). Who has the absolute control of power can’t really make a coup (against which power, himself?). It’s Musavi and Rafsanjani who have started a coup against the current power system. May be planned from day one. They are questioning Khamenei absolute rule and the Republic institutions (do you really want me to believe that everyone in the MoI is really a Ahmadinejad hardliner or something, just after 4 years in power?). And we are now to believe that everything that comes from those ‘revolutionaries’ (which in truth are ‘old revolutionaries’ not new) is pure like a newborn?

Posted by: ThePaper | Jun 16 2009 19:48 utc | 46

amir s
hizbollah shock troops – what utter horsehit. you deman your own argument & you besmirch what is a political reaction to repression throught the middle east
fucking hizbollah shock troops – not even the wackiest israeli newspaper would try to create that fiction

Posted by: remembereringgiap | Jun 16 2009 20:00 utc | 48

There was a great line in the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy: “Presidents don’t have power, their purpose is to draw attention away from it.”
The frenzy surrounding the Iranian Presidential election is all the more astounding when you take into account that most of the people whose attention is being drawn away aren’t Iranian. Are nowhere near Iranian. Nice drama though.

Posted by: Rowan | Jun 16 2009 22:11 utc | 50

fucking hizbollah shock troops – not even the wackiest israeli newspaper would try to create that fiction
I think one of them just did, r’giap.

Posted by: china_hand2 | Jun 17 2009 3:27 utc | 52

Philippe @ 14:
I hope this was a typo: ‘Khomeini’ in your last sentence (probably meaning ‘Khamenei’).
Yes trying to rush a post in the morning before heading to work. Thanx for pointing that out.
Obamageddon @ 22:
Thank you, balkanc and Sam. Exactly. I agree.
Your welcome. By the way keep up the good work i.e. “keeping it real”. That’s what we come here for.
rapier @ 53:
What I am trying to say is they didn’t finish counting 32 million ballots 5 or so hours after the polls closed I’m pretty sure.
Why not they do it in many other countries on a regular basis. Most countries have paper ballots that are hand counted and we know who wins the same day or the day after. I’m pretty sure Iranians are just as capable of counting as any other people on this planet.
Their general plan is for 3 days of counting and then the official announcement.
In the last 2 Presdiential elections the winners were announced the next day. So I don’t really see how that is relevant.

Hard-Liner Wins Decisively in Iran Presidential Election

http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/25/world/fg-iranelect25

Khatami Sweeps Iranian Election

http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jun/09/news/mn-8295

Posted by: Sam | Jun 17 2009 5:47 utc | 54

o – Ansar-e Hezbollah are officially behind the attacks which killed students. This is fact. Hezbollah in Iran is always training (rightfully so) Lebanese Hezbollah. Its not unfathomable that these “exchange students” were used in some instances.
1. The claim from Der Spiegel and repeated by VoA was quite specific that it was 5,000 Lebanese Hezbollah militia which really is a load of bollocks on all levels.
2. There have been credible reports in the past that Hezbollah fly a plane load of their militia at a time to Iran for training so that means there are only a few hundred Hezbollah militia in Iran at any one time. Why would Hezbollah risk its very highly trained and so very valuable militia when Iran has its own massive internal forces to deal with the repression of the rioters.
I think it unlikley that any Lebanese Hezbollah militia would get involved in riot control in Iran as Iran has more than enough internal forces to do and Hezbollah would have no knowledge of the local urban terrain.
This is a propaganda effort designed to smear the Lebanese Hezbollah – we have already seen the same where some US reporters have conflated the Iraqi Hezbollah with the Lebanese Hezbollah to persuade people that the Lebanese Hezbollah should still be terrorists in American eyes.

Posted by: blowback | Jun 17 2009 12:04 utc | 56