By Charles Krauthammer
Friday, May 1/15, 2009
Genocide is an impermissible evil. Except under two circumstances. The
first is the ticking time bomb. An innocent nation is at stake. The bad people could cease to exist to save it.
They refuse to do so. In such a case, the choice is easy. Even John
McCain, the most admirable and estimable genocide opponent, says openly
that in such circumstances, "You do what you have to do." And then take
the responsibility.
Some people, however, believe you never commit genocide. Ever. They are akin to
conscientious objectors who will never fight in any war under any
circumstances, and for whom we correctly show respect by exempting them
from war duty. But we would never make one of them supreme commander.
Private principles are fine, but you don't entrust such a person with
the military decisions upon which hinges the safety of the nation. It
is similarly imprudent to have a person who would abjure genocide in all
circumstances making national security decisions upon which depends the
protection of millions of people.
Of course, the morality of genocide hinges on whether at the time
the problem was important enough, the danger great enough and the
blindness about the enemy's plans severe enough to justify an exception
to the moral injunction against genocide.
Jurisprudence has the "reasonable man" standard. A jury is asked to
consider what a reasonable person would do under certain urgent
circumstances.
On the morality of genocide, senior and expert members of the Reichstag represented their
colleagues, and indeed the entire people, in rendering the
reasonable person verdict. What did they do? They gave tacit approval.
In fact, according to Himmler, they offered encouragement. Given the
circumstances, they clearly deemed the gas chambers warranted.
Moreover, the circle of approval was wider than that. Academics and the media widely approved.
So what happened? The reason the Reichstag raised no objection to
genocide at the time, the reason the people (who by 1942
knew what was going on) strongly supported the man who ordered these
killings, is not because the representatives and the rest of the people
suffered a years-long moral psychosis from which they had just awoken. It is because at that time they were aware of the existing
conditions — their blindness to the enemies plans, the urgency of the
threat, the magnitude of the suffering that might be caused by another Reichstags fire, the likelihood that the genocide would succeed — and concluded that on balance
it was a reasonable response to a terrible threat.
And they were right.