Are these points a good concept for the occupation of Afghanistan?
- stabilize the country by garrisoning the main routes, major cities, airbases and logistics sites;
- relieve the Afghan government forces of garrison duties and push them into the countryside to battle the resistance;
- provide logistic, air, artillery and intelligence support to the Afghan forces;
- provide minimum interface between the occupation forces and the local populace;
- accept minimal own casualties; and,
- strengthen the Afghan forces, so once the resistance is defeated, the military can be withdrawn.
How much do they differ from the strategy Obama announced two month ago? As the Guardian described it:
The key to the new strategy is to build up the Afghan army and police force. Obama today announced an extra 4,000 US troops to help with training, with the intention of doubling the Afghan force from its current 65,000. He said this might have to be increased again as power was transferred to Afghanistan. This is a relatively cheap option for the US as the pay of each Afghan soldier is quite small.
This will be accompanied by a "surge" in US civilians to Afghanistan, doubling numbers to 900, to help rebuild the country's infrastructure.
Obama last month ordered 17,500 US combat troops to Afghanistan to reinforce the 38,000 already there.
Those concept and Obama's strategy seem quite similar to me. Behind both is the idea to nationalize the conflict part while the occupation force provides the national forces with the needed resources and takes care of the infrastructure.
The first strategy is from a paper published in 1995 about the Soviet war in Afghanistan and describes their strategy.
The paper, by U.S. military analyst Lester W. Grau and retired Afghan General Nawroz, ends with these words:
Lessons learned from this conflict were gathered by both sides. Whatever else these lessons may show, the most fundamental of them is that no army, however sophisticated, well trained, materially rich, numerically overwhelming and ruthless, can succeed on the battlefield if it is not psychologically fit and motivated for the fight. The force, however destitute in material advantages and numbers, which can rely on the moral qualities of a strong faith, stubborn determination, individualism and unending patience will always be the winner. These may not be the optimum qualities always found in the armies of western democracies.
The "motivation" and "unending patience" is what the 'western' forces in Afghanistan are missing. If Grau and Nawroz are right, they will lose that war.