McClatchy's Tom Lasseter has spend four weeks in Afghanistan and investigated the opium trade. He finds that not only the local resistance, or Taliban, tax the opium farmers but that everyone from the lowest policemen up various persons within the Karzai cabinet is taking a share of the loot. The export value of Afghanistan's opium trade is some $3.4 billion and makes up more than half of its GDP.
The new U.S. troops arriving now will have two tasks. The first is counterinsurgency operation against the Taliban through a population centric approach. The second is to eradicate the opium trade. The U.S. alleges that the Taliban make some $300 million through opium taxation and cite that as a reason to eliminate the trade.
But how can one do population centric counterinsurgency when one at the same time eliminates half of a country's GDP, the $3.1 billion that goes not to the Taliban, and thereby diminish the income of a lot of people? The farmers will make much less by planting wheat. The district governments and the police will loss a major financing source. Some quite important persons will have reason to sabotage political initiatives. They all will have good reason to fight the occupiers that put them into that position.
So this two pronged strategy seems contradictory to me. A massive eradication campaign will likely have the same result than the dissolution of Saddam's army and most of the state bureaucracy had in Iraq. A lot of people out of job or with much less income and with a social grievance towards the occupiers are the main ingredients of any insurgency.
It will be a hot summer in Afghanistan.